THE REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S
CHICAGO EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES TASK FORCE
2012-2013
Findings and Recommendations Regarding
The Implementation of IL P.A. 97-0474 and
Planning for the Future of Chicago’s Public Schools

June 2014
TO:   State Representative Michael J. Madigan, Speaker of the House  
      State Senator John J. Cullerton, Senate President  
      Governor Patrick Quinn  
      Mayor Rahm Emanuel  
      David Vitale, President, Chicago Board of Education  
      Chicago Public Schools CEO Barbara Byrd Bennett  

RE:  CEFTF Annual Report  

Pursuant to 105 ILCS 5/34-18.43(m), I am pleased to present the most recent Annual Report of the General Assembly’s Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force concerning the Chicago Board of Education’s School Actions and Master Facility Planning during the 2012 and 2013 school years.  

This report is the product of numerous public hearings, the ongoing work and meetings of the CEFTF’s Master Planning and School Actions standing committees, and countless hours of research. It reflects the findings and recommendations of the majority of CEFTF members and incorporates CPS’ feedback and responses. I believe this report provides a detailed and comprehensive review and analysis of recent CPS facilities-related decisions and actions, and will be tremendously useful as we consider additional recommendations and reforms that will allow CPS to better manage its school facilities while protecting the interests and values of the children it serves.  

Sincerely,  

State Representative Cynthia Soto  
Co-Chair, General Assembly Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force  

CC:  Sen. William Delgado, Chair, Senate Education Committee  
      Rep. Linda Chapa La Via, Chair, House Elementary and Secondary Education Committee  
      Rep. Will Davis, Chair, House Elementary and Secondary Education Appropriations Committee  
      Sen. Don Luechtefeld, Minority Chair, Senate Education Committee  
      Rep. Sandy Pihos, Minority Chair, House Elementary and Secondary Education Committee  
      All Members, Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force
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Preface

In 2009, the Illinois General Assembly passed a law creating the “Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force,” or, “CEFTF.” The CEFTF was created to examine educational facilities decisions being made by Chicago Public Schools. The Task Force is made up of state lawmakers of both political parties and both chambers of the state legislature; representatives of non-profit organizations; and has representation from Chicago Public Schools (CPS), the Chicago Principals and Administrators Association (CPAA), and the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU). State law charged the Task Force to review CPS’ facility-related decisions, examine national best practices, and seek out widespread public input about Chicago’s schools.

The law also mandates that the CEFTF issue at least one report every year. In 2011, the CEFTF issued findings and recommendations for transforming CPS’ approach to its facilities decision making. Many of the Task Force’s recommendations were enacted in a 2011 reform law in Springfield, aimed at creating greater transparency and accountability about CPS’ facility-related decisions; and which required CPS to follow a specified process before taking “School Actions, and create a 10-Year “Educational Facilities Master Plan” for the school district. In early 2012, the CEFTF issued Findings and Recommendations regarding CPS’ early implementation of the state reforms, focused on the shortcomings of the School Actions public input process and CPS’ then-newly released and controversial formula for assessing “efficient” use of Chicago’s existing schools.

The Task Force’s 2013 Report was prepared and produced at no expense to the taxpayers of Illinois. As with past CEFTF Reports, this document is based on the work of the CEFTF members themselves, in this case as led by the Subcommittees on Master Planning and School Actions. The appointed members of the CEFTF volunteer their time to this endeavor, and tap the expertise of several pro bono Advisors who also contributed to this work. The Report’s conclusions are based on the Subcommittees’ diligent research on best practices used by other major urban public school districts; analysis of data provided by the school district and other independent outside sources; and information from public testimonies gathered in 2012 and 2013 in dozens of open meetings and several community hearings. The Report will be delivered to the Governor, the General Assembly leaders, the Mayor of the City of Chicago, and the Chicago Board of Education. On May 12, 2014, the CEFTF voted to accept and adopt this Report with consideration of additional feedback from Chicago Public Schools (CPS). CPS’ feedback is cited throughout the Report, and can also be found in Appendix F to the Report.

Acknowledgments

The Task Force wishes to thank the hundreds of Chicago Public School parents, educators, and Chicago community residents who gave input to the CEFTF; and the staff teams from the Chicago Public Schools, Chicago Teachers Union and Chicago Principals and Administrators’ Association for the data they provided to the CEFTF, their expertise, and their willingness to engage in dialogue. Thanks also go to John Keigher, pro bono Legal and Legislative Advisor; and Jacqueline Leavy, pro bono facilitator and researcher who provided vital support to the CEFTF. Thanks are also due to the IL State Board of Education for supporting a webpage dedicated to the CEFTF’s work and proceedings. We also acknowledge and commend the work of dozens of Chicago-area academics and investigative journalists too numerous to list here, who contribute to the ongoing public discourse and analysis of public education issues in Chicago. The CEFTF also thanks our pro bono Advisor Mary Filardo, Executive Director of the 21st Century School Fund (Washington, DC) and founder of the “Building Educational Success Together” national collaborative, for sharing her extensive knowledge with us. Ms. Filardo is a nationally-recognized expert on educational facilities planning and management and urban education issues.
ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
CHICAGO EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES TASK FORCE

Members Appointed from the General Assembly

Rep. CYNTHIA SOTO (D) – Co-Chair
Sen. HEATHER STEANS (D) – Co-Chair
Rep. ESTHER GOLAR (D)
Sen. IRIS MARTINEZ (D)
Rep. BOB PRITCHARD (R)

(Three unfilled vacancies: 1 Republican State Representative, and 2 Republican State Senators)

Appointees from School/Community Groups

BLOCKS TOGETHER - CECILE CARROLL
CHICAGO COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS - LAURENE “RENE” HEYBACH
DESIGNS FOR CHANGE - VALENCIA RIAS-WINSTEAD
INSTITUTE FOR POSITIVE LIVING - MARRICE COVERSON

Other Appointees, As Per Statute

CHICAGO PRINCIPALS and ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION: DR. CLARICE BERRY
CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS: BARBARA BYRD BENNETT (or Designee)
CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION: KAREN LEWIS (or Designee)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Why this Report?

Since the Illinois General Assembly granted Mayoral Control over Chicago’s public school district in 1995, there has been a concentration of decision making about the nature and direction of public education in Illinois’ largest city, and the nation’s 3rd largest school system. These decisions have had substantial and sometimes drastic immediate and long standing effects on students, families, neighborhoods and the city. Once former Mayor Richard M. Daley announced his “Renaissance 2010” initiative in 2003 to create 100 new schools by 2010, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) has not only opened new schools (mainly charters); the district has also been closing neighborhood public schools and drastically reconfiguring the public school system in other ways. Since 2008 alone, four different CPS administrations with average tenures of less than 3 years made far-reaching changes and decisions that Chicagoans will live with for generations. These decisions have determined which students get to go to which schools; how to maintain school facilities; what the district’s capital spending priorities should be; and determined how and when to spend hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars on school repairs, renovations, and new construction. Yet Chicago Public Schools (CPS) has been making these decisions without adequate educational facilities planning or public input. These decisions are impacting the condition and operation of Chicago’s public school buildings and the access that 400,000 students have to schools across the city.

In 2009, the General Assembly created the “Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force” (CEFTF) because the public was increasingly concerned about their lack of input into these crucial decisions. The state legislature tasked the CEFTF with examining recent major changes CPS had made, including closing schools and reconfiguring them; and its decisions about when, how and where to invest in school facilities. The Task Force was to assess CPS’ facility-related decisions, seek out broad public input, and explore model approaches used by other school districts (best practices). In 2011 the legislature enacted changes in state law to address the concerns the CEFTF documented in its first year of inquiries. The 2011 reforms sought to make CPS decision making more transparent and accountable; required structured opportunities for public input from families, residents and front line educators into CPS’ facility decisions and plans; assured basic protections and support services for students affected by major changes like school closings; and required CPS to develop a long-range facilities plan based on the district’s educational goals which the district had never done before. The 2011 state reform law also charged the CEFTF with monitoring and evaluating the school district’s implementation of these reforms.

This report is the CEFTF’s evaluation of how CPS carried out the 2011 reforms in 2012 and 2013, and will be shared with the public, Illinois lawmakers, and Chicago education policy makers and elected officials. The report includes an analysis of School Actions taken by the school board in 2012, and CPS’ 2013 school actions which include the decision to close 49 schools – the largest downsizing of Chicago’s public school system ever undertaken. The report also documents CPS’ long-range planning efforts and assesses the resulting 10-Year Educational Facilities Master Plan that the school board approved in September 2013. The Findings in this report are based on data about and from CPS, additional independent research, and extensive public input gathered by the CEFTF in open meetings and hearings held around the City. This report also offers recommendations to the General Assembly, the Governor, the school district, the Mayor of Chicago and other policy makers on how to improve the planning for equitable, cost-effective management of Chicago’s public school facilities for the future of Chicago’s families and neighborhoods.
**Major Concerns**

In 2009, when the General Assembly created the CEFTF, lawmakers were responding to their constituents’ concerns about the loss of neighborhood public schools, other aggressive CPS interventions that restructured schools and weakened local control exercised by elected Local School Councils, lack of transparency in CPS’ capital spending priorities, overall lack of public input into these decisions, and a growing instability in the CPS system. The CEFTF’s 2011 Report and Findings helped spur the legislature to enact reform measures in 2011. Unfortunately, despite some positive steps taken by CPS to implement the changes called for in the reform statute, the public’s concerns have not abated. And rather than engaging in a more deliberative and systematic approach to school change, successive CPS administrations escalated major restructuring of the school system without broad public input or consensus to support those changes.

Since 2012 alone, CPS has closed 52 neighborhood public schools, 47 of them at the end of the 2013 school year while phasing out 5 more; and has implemented 15 “Turnarounds” (a restructuring under which the principal and all teachers and adult staff in a school are fired and replaced), with more under consideration. Additionally, since 2011 CPS has rapidly and radically altered other school district policies: restructured the school day; changed curricula content while changing performance measures for principals, teachers, and students; altered attendance boundary areas, and school feeder patterns and grade configurations and thus students’ access to schools; and introduced or phased out other educational programs at dozens of other schools.

The school district maintains that sweeping changes are needed to improve student outcomes. The public certainly wants better schools for all students. Yet CPS’ recent “School Actions” and other major changes have shifted tens of thousands of students to different locations and learning environments without a careful evaluation of whether or how students are benefitting. At the same time, CPS has dramatically expanded the number of charter schools. These steps were taken without establishing a guiding, shared educational vision for the district and before CPS had a facilities master plan in place. There still has not been adequate public input to build consensus in support of such dramatic changes for students, families, teachers, staff and communities.

Chicago can build a world-class, well-managed, inclusive and equitable public education system for all of Chicago’s students, but it will not happen without a plan that is well-understood by all stakeholders and has gained their backing for it. It will not happen unless stakeholders are at the table when critical decisions impacting Chicago’s school children and public school employees are made. It will not happen unless there is transparency and accountability for capital and operating spending, and a commitment to equitable investment that preserves the option for families to send their children to quality neighborhood public schools.
The CEFTF’s Findings on the Chicago Educational Facilities Master Plan

CPS’ completion of the 10 Year Master Plan was a major accomplishment for the district. The plan reflects CPS’ disclosure of facilities-related data that has begun to create greater transparency and accountability around CPS’ plans for its school buildings. While this has been a huge step in the right direction, the EFMP has many limitations that have impacted the viability of the plan. Recent facility investment decisions announced by the Mayor and CPS after the adoption of the EFMP illustrate that additional reforms must be put in place in order to better inform the district’s facility decisions to make optimal and beneficial choices that benefit all of CPS’ current and future students.

1. **CPS did not take steps to involve the public in developing the 10-Year Master Plan for 15 months after the enactment of the state reforms.**

The EFMP that the school board adopted in September 2013 lacks important information, disregards many established best practices in long-range educational facilities planning, and was based on minimal public input. Turnover in CPS leadership and repeated internal reorganizations between 2011 and 2013, and reluctance to proactively seek out public input all limited CPS’ progress in developing the 10-Year Educational Facilities Master Plan.

2. **CPS’ poor execution of the planning process fell short of full implementation of the General Assembly’s 2011 policy reforms of transparency, expanded public input and better facility management, and did not build consensus in support of its EFMP, or a forward-looking vision for the city’s public schools.**

The district failed to adhere to the reform law provision to plan for schools in their community context and did not conduct a comprehensive “Community Analysis” of future housing and community development and other community change trends. The school district did not coordinate with all the local governments the law requires. CPS created space utilization standards that did not conform with the statute or meet best practice educational facility planning and management standards. Instead CPS applied its space use formula to focus on and implement mass school closings before developing a long-term facilities plan.

3. **CPS omitted important requirements for public input when preparing the Master Facilities Plan.**

The CPS CEO did not hold required public hearings on the Draft Plan. Instead, CPS held informal “Community Briefing Sessions” a few weeks before the board adopted the EFMP. The meetings were called public hearings only after the fact. Additionally, CPS did not conduct the needed public input to develop required school-level master facilities plans which were to be developed in collaboration with each local school’s stakeholders. The final EFMP does not include school-specific master plans.

4. **CPS does not have a comprehensive long-range capital plan for Chicago’s schools.**

CPS’ EFMP does not clearly prioritize its district-wide facility needs, or rank which schools will receive improvements in order of district-wide priorities. The school district and the Mayor continue to make piecemeal decisions on major school construction and facility investment projects. Since the school board adopted CPS’ 10-Year Master Plan, the Mayor and the school district have announced over $163 Million in major school facility investments that were not clearly identified or prioritized in the EFMP.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force Report to the General Assembly

5. CPS’ EFMP does not address the effects of its Charter School expansion plans on the overall facilities needs or enrollment trends on the school district, despite the fact that since 2011 CPS has opened 33 new charter school campuses with 23,368 slots.

CPS’ long-range plan argues that the district has too many schools and too much classroom capacity, even as the district is expanding charters and continues to make investments in Charter School facilities.

6. CPS’ EFMP does not establish a planning process for repurposing of its closed publicly owned buildings; and lacks an asset management plan for its real property.

The EFMP did not include a full inventory of CPS facilities and real estate holdings, or a process to plan for the future re-use of closed school buildings and other “surplus” real estate assets. CPS has scores of empty school buildings throughout the city. CPS finally announced its school repurposing process 10 months after approving 47 more school closings (with two more to be phased out this year), but details about when the public will have input are not yet determined. The district has recently embraced all the recommendations of a Mayoral-appointed “Advisory Committee for School Repurposing & Community Development” that developed its recommendations after the EFMP was approved, and without ever holding a meeting open to the public.

The CEFTF’s Findings on Chicago Public School Actions & School Closings

These findings are based on analysis of data from CPS, the work of other researchers, and testimony from CPS parents, students, and school administrators that Task Force members have analyzed regarding the School Actions approved by CPS in 2012 and 2013. While the district followed many of the 2011 reforms aimed at improving student transitions and community engagement, CPS’ implementation of School Actions was flawed in important ways.

7. Final approval of the 2012-13 School Year mass school closings came so late in the School Year that impacted students and their families missed the deadline to apply for Magnet and selective enrollment school options, and with little time to plan for the upcoming school year.

The General Assembly’s vote allowing CPS to delay announcement of proposed closings to March 3rd, 2013 recreated the problems for families of CPS students that the 2011 law had sought to remedy by setting a deadline of Dec. 1st annually for announcement of proposed School Closings and other “Actions”. The school board did not take its final vote to close 47 schools and phase out 2 others until May 22, 2013. The Board approved the closings despite widespread, vocal and well-researched objections from an unprecedented number of stakeholders.

8. CPS did not address the analysis by reputable researchers on the negative effects of school closings on class size.

Several Chicago aldermen and some state lawmakers opposed many of the 2013 school closings; while university-based researchers issued studies about the importance of smaller class sizes to improve achievement of low-incomes students in primary grades. CPS has yet to respond to repeated CEFTF members requests for an analysis of class sizes before and after the closings.
9. CPS rejected the feedback and advice of some of its Independent Hearing Officers when they disagreed with a proposed Action.

In accordance with the 2011 law, CPS hired “Independent Hearing Officers” to preside at the 2012 and 2013 public hearings on proposed School Actions (the two rounds of School Actions since the reform law was passed). However, in both years, CPS rejected Hearing Officers’ findings when they recommended against a proposed School Action, including against proposed Closings. In 2013, CPS agreed to not close and consolidate Manierre with Jenner and Mahalia Jackson with Fort Dearborn, based primarily on safety concerns.

10. CPS’ initial planning for school transitions was weak. Once schools were closed, CPS developed more detailed Transition Plans (July 2013), but failed to publicize them or distribute them to all parents/guardians at the consolidated schools.

Required “Draft School Transition Plans” aimed at ensuring impacted students’ safe and educationally successful Transition to a new school were largely “boiler plate” in 2012 and had little to no local input in their creation. In 2012, the Welcoming Schools that CPS designated to absorb displaced students failed to attract the majority of students from closed schools and did not benefit from detailed final transition plans. Transfers to Welcoming Schools in 2013 were higher and Transition planning became more detailed over the summer, but scores of schools absorbed of student without the benefit of Transition plans or support.

11. CPS still has no defined system or policies in place to evaluate its Actions, or track the student-level impacts and outcomes of school closings and other School Actions (such as attendance boundary changes, phase-outs, and co-locations).

In both rounds of School Actions CPS has taken since the reform law was passed, the academic and social/emotional benefits to students have not been substantiated or evaluated. CPS has not published a report tracking where students displaced by closings, consolidations, co-locations, and attendance boundary changes are today. At the insistence of CEFTF members, CPS provided two School Transition reports to the Task Force, which did not address the impacts of School Actions and Closings on Welcoming Schools; or most importantly, document how the impacted students are faring. In “counting” the number of students “impacted” by its School Actions, CPS excludes the number of students enrolled at Welcoming Schools. At the March 26, 2014 school board meeting, CPS’ CEO gave board members a “Mid-Year School Consolidation Report” but it is not available to the public online.

12. In both the 2012 and 2013 School Actions and Closings, communities of color and the most vulnerable students, including those experiencing homelessness and those with disabilities, were impacted the most by CPS’ Actions.

Approximately 90 percent of the students directly impacted by School Actions and Closings in 2012 and 2013 were African American. An estimated 2,615 homeless students attended the Welcoming Schools and the schools that CPS closed in 2013; 2,097 Special Education students (those with disabilities and Individual Education Plans, or IEPs) were impacted.

13. CPS has not issued a report on the full costs of, or savings from the 2012 or 2013 School Actions, Closings and Transitions.

Despite the district’s rationale that the 2013 mass closings would produce savings and thus more resources for remaining schools, CPS cut $68 million from individual schools’ budgets in the School Year following the closings.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force Report to the General Assembly

CPS has not provided any cost/savings data for the 2012 School Actions. In 2013, CPS more than tripled its FY2013 capital budget --from $109.7 Million to $363.7 Million--to upgrade designated Welcoming School buildings and provide them with other amenities. CPS also allocated more than $155 Million in extra Transition funding to designated and non-designated Welcoming Schools. As a result of the 2013 closings, CPS added 43 more schools to its inventory of empty buildings. CPS’ costs for security and maintenance for these vacant buildings is unknown.

14. The projected “logistical” costs of the 2013 school closings and subsequent consolidations over the Summer of 2013 was more than three times higher than CPS’ original projection. The contract to empty and board up the buildings went from $8.9 Million to $30.9 Million¹.

CEFTF Recommendations

Build District and Public Capacity for Sound Long-Range, Comprehensive Planning

1. CPS’ 10-Year Master Plan must be substantively revised. CPS must get broad public input, refine its space utilization formula, correct its population and enrollment projections, and work with its sister agencies and others to analyze current and planned community and housing redevelopment. CPS should re-write the EFMP by July 1, 2015, rather than the current statutory deadline of June 2016. CPS should embrace and adapt some of the best practices for public engagement that have been tested and used in other major cities, and work more closely with its sister agencies to revise the current EFMP.

2. The General Assembly should dissolve the State Charter School Authorizing Authority. No Illinois public school district should have to deal with the “wild card” of having to accept charter expansions decided by a State Authority empowered to overrule the local district. Instead, as part of the state legislature’s own examination of charter school policy, the General Assembly should require CPS and all local public school districts to undertake an open public dialogue about the role of Charters in their respective districts, and then integrate planning for any charter expansion within the school district’s broader, district-wide strategic educational and facilities management plan.

3. The General Assembly should study and consider the creation of a State “School Planning & Construction Authority” to ensure fiscally-sound and equitable capital planning and spending by all Illinois public school districts. The Authority would support and ensure the comprehensive, orderly and cost-effective development of public education facilities that avoids unnecessary duplication and promotes planning and development of school facilities in areas with unmet needs. It would review and approve (or reject) school districts’ plans for new construction; and help districts with financing facilities construction and modernization, information management, educational facilities planning, and public engagement associated with best practice planning similar to the Illinois Health Facilities and Services Review Board that oversees hospital facility expansions².

4. The State of Illinois should increase its funding of public schools’ facilities’ needs.

² (20 ILCS 3960/) Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act – “promotes, through the process of comprehensive health planning, the orderly and economic development of health care facilities in the State of Illinois that avoids unnecessary duplication of such facilities; (3) that promotes planning for and development of health care facilities needed for comprehensive health care
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force Report to the General Assembly

As of 2010, Illinois ranked in the “bottom 20” of all 50 states in the percentage it contributes to local public school districts’ facility needs. With expanded and consistent state funding, local public school districts will be able to do better long-range planning, since state capital funding would be more reliable. The State should examine and consider new revenue sources, which could include a “Financial Transaction Tax” to help pay for public school construction, modernization, and other facility needs. The State could also help public school districts gain access to more revenue from their own local property tax base by amending state TIF law to allow school districts to “opt out” of TIF districts; limit use of TIF to rigorously-defined “blighted” areas; and establish clear rules for municipalities to define, declare, and redistribute “TIF Surpluses” to other local taxing bodies.

Ensure Cost-Effective, Fiscally Responsible Management

1. The General Assembly should mandate conservation of our existing public school buildings whenever feasible. Public schools are public assets for which taxpayers have already paid. CPS and the Mayor should be required to have an open public process to plan for re-use of closed school buildings that emphasizes use of existing, closed school buildings for community and (non-charter) educational purposes; and for future “re-commissioning” as public schools (in the event that CPS needs to open more schools in the future).

2. The General Assembly should require CPS to make “Joint Use” of schools by CPS’ “sister agencies”, other local governments, and non-profit partners a high priority. There should be State incentives to reward CPS and other public school districts for Joint Use cost-sharing agreements; CPS should be required to seek out Joint Uses before disposing of a public school building.

3. CPS must have a plan to maintain, secure, and repurpose a school before it can be closed, including disclosure of costs for “mothballing” and possible demolition costs.

4. Proceeds from any sale of a closed school or surplus school district real estate should be prioritized to be spent on the neediest school facilities in low-income neighborhoods.

5. CPS should be required by State Law to establish and disclose a school-to-school comparison and ranking of its priority capital investments every year in its Annual Capital Budget, its 5-Year Capital Improvement Plans (CIPs), and 10-Year Master Plan. This will help ensure greater transparency and equity in its capital spending, and good stewardship and conservation of the existing public assets for which taxpayers have already paid. The EFMP should also provide expanded and detailed reporting on charter school facilities, and CPS’ and non-CPS funding of them.

Ensure Safe and Educationally Successful Transitions for Students Following School Actions

1. Any further School Actions, Turnarounds, and Charter expansions should be put “on hold” until a truly comprehensive long-range plan is developed, and until CPS can provide definitive data that these

Actions have benefitted the actual students who were impacted. Instead CPS should focus on supporting whole school improvement in existing neighborhood public schools.

2. The Hearing process for Proposed School Actions should be reformed to clarify when an Independent Hearing Officer may overrule the CPS CEO’s recommendations; enable schools proposed for an Action to offer and then get a written response from the district to an Alternative Plan of Action for school improvement; and require CPS to define specific metrics and any qualitative factors on which each type of proposed School Action is based. Specific metrics are needed to effectively evaluate outcomes.

3. CPS should be required to provide 5 years of sustained, intensive academic and financial supports to current (and any future) non-Charter “Designated Welcoming Schools” and non-designated welcoming schools to benefit all impacted students (as more broadly defined to include students in Welcoming Schools). CPS’ budgets for School Transitions should be disclosed as part of the required “Draft School Transition Plans.” Parents’ and Local School Councils’ input should be required in developing Transition Plans, and final detailed Transition Plans should be provided to all parents/guardians at Welcoming Schools. Parents and students should get timely delivery of transition services, including over the intervening summer break between Board approval of Actions and the following school year in which Actions go into effect.

Improve Transparency and Accountability.

1. The General Assembly should require CPS to produce an Annual Report tracking student-level impacts of its past (and any future) School Actions. The school district needs to rigorously evaluate whether its interventions in neighborhood schools have “worked,” i.e., truly improved educational outcomes for children. Such an evaluation must also weigh the effects on “Welcoming Schools” and their students. Moreover, the definition of “School Actions” in State Law should be expanded to include “Opening of New Schools,” “Charter Expansions” (both adding more grades and campuses of current charter operators and approving new Charter operators), “Turn-Arounds,” “Changes in Academic Focus,” “Grade Restructurings,” and all “Attendance-Area Boundary Changes”.

2. CPS’ capital construction Bond Issues should be subject to Voter approval through binding referenda. State law should not exempt CPS from requirements for voter approval for school construction bonds.

3. CPS should be required to hold annual public hearings on its Capital Budget and 5-Year Capital Plan, with at least 14-day advance public notice and advance public disclosure of every school’s Capital Needs Report. A “State of our School” Report should report facility conditions, needs, and past and planned investments; and be distributed twice a year at CPS’ “Report Card Pick-Up” days.

4. The State of ILLINOIS should be more transparent about where State school construction dollars go. The ILGA, ISBE, and/or the IL Capital Development Board should disclose proposals for state funding for CPS school capital projects from both legislators and CPS. The ILGA should hold public hearings in Chicago to inform the public and get community feedback. Approved state-funded school capital projects, including grants to CPS and “Earmarks” for individual schools should be disclosed to the public and to the proposed individual recipient school and its duly-elected Local School Council or parent advisory body. The revenue sources for State school construction funding should also be disclosed to the public.
CEFTF REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF IL P.A. 97-0474

ASSESSING CPS’ COMPREHENSIVE LONG RANGE PLANNING

The Process

In monitoring CPS’ efforts to implement the state requirement to create a 10-Year “Educational Facilities Master Plan” (the “EFMP”), the CEFTF found that the school district’s efforts were “too little, too late;” and were overshadowed by the school district’s “pivot” to its self-declared “Under-Utilization Crisis” and stated goal to close dozens of schools to address a $1 Billion budget deficit. The CEFTF documented repeated delays by CPS in launching the master planning effort, identified “missing” data sets needed to develop the EFMP, urged CPS to conduct a robust public input process, and documented several flawed assumptions underlying CPS’ eventual efforts to develop the long-range plan:

- **CPS failed to engage the public in the development of the Master Plan in a timely manner**, and lacked sufficient public input into the EFMP, intergovernmental coordination, or community analysis.

- **CPS failed to incorporate effective national best practices for public engagement in developing a shared educational vision and long-term facilities plan with stakeholders.** Members of the public and the CEFTF’s Master Planning Subcommittee urged CPS to adopt and adapt national best practices for community input.

- **The sequence of key events and CPS policy choices beginning in the Fall of 2012 fatally compromised the school district’s ability to conduct a master planning process, and the credibility of the 10-Year Plan that the school board adopted.** CPS’ approach was to “downsize now, plan later.” (See Appendix B for a detailed time line of the master planning process.)

- **CPS did not have sufficient data or input to conduct a meaningful assessment of the changing community contexts** of CPS’ schools throughout Chicago’s diverse neighborhoods, or for the schools recommended for closing. CPS did not have data on public and private-sector housing and community development initiatives with the exception of housing development by the Chicago Housing Authority. While CHA’s data is important, the agency’s redevelopment plans are limited to a handful of neighborhoods and will impact a very limited number of schools.

- **CPS did not seek written input from its sister agencies until three weeks before the final 10-Year Master Plan was put to a vote by the Board of Education.** If and when CPS held other meetings or made other efforts to coordinate with sister agencies on developing the Draft EFMP, this process was not adequately documented in the draft or Final Master Plan. CPS did not publish any community-specific housing or community development data in the Draft or Final EFMP except data from the Chicago Housing Authority. To its credit, CPS did meet with several sister agencies to better prepare for School Transitions before and after the Board of Education approved mass closings in May 2013; but not on development of the 10-Year Master Plan itself.

- **CPS’ data on school facility conditions – based on condition assessments and inspections by outside consultants-- were out of date for most of the schools in the district, and for most of the schools CPS...**
recommended for closure. Outdated, inaccurate, and incomplete information on the conditions of its school buildings compromised CPS’ ability to plan effectively for long-range facility management, maintenance and modernization.

- **Despite these data gaps, the CPS CEO’s 2012 proposal for immediate downsizing was based in part on estimates of “costs to maintain” the schools recommended for closings.** Updated facility condition assessments for these schools were not completed until after CPS recommended which schools to close.

- **As a result, CPS closed some schools that were in better physical condition than schools designated to be “Welcoming Schools” for displaced students.** CPS had to “fast-track” over $155 million in facility upgrades to its designated Welcoming Schools.

- **CPS ignored CEFTF input on national best practices and independent research and analysis about its space use formula.** The Task Force’s Master Planning Subcommittee referred CPS to other school districts’ master plans. The non-profit organization Raise Your Hand-Illinois (“RYH”) demonstrated that CPS’ space utilization formula exaggerated the extent of “under-utilization” and underestimated the extent of overcrowding. (See Appendix D for RYH’s detailed study.)

- **CPS’ data on current space use in schools throughout the district were out of date and incomplete** at the time that CPS shifted its focus to large-scale school closings.

- **Local schools had little opportunity to provide CPS with “real time” information on their actual space utilization before the CPS CEO recommended 50 schools for closure** (on March 31, 2013). Many schools were unaware of an email-based CPS “Appeals Process” to contest CPS’ utilization rankings.

- **Even though the BOE approved the 2013 school closings nearly 6 months before it adopted the EFMP, the final plan does not include the costs to manage and secure vacant schools, or a plan for their future re-use or disposition.** The Draft and Final EFMP did not provide proposed plans or even describe a process for maintaining and securing vacant schools, and determining their future use.

- **The EFMP does not include a full inventory of all CPS “surplus” real estate, such as vacant lots and shuttered school buildings which were closed years ago and remain vacant today.** The EFMP is “silent” on these matters, and on how CPS will transparently account to the public for the fate of its surplus properties. The EFMP also fails to address how any revenues generated from sales of vacant schools or other surplus real estate will be allocated for future spending.

- **CPS relied on outside consultants to perform demographic and enrollment projections, which were incomplete, and did not factor in either birth and morbidity rates, or community development trends.**

- **CPS’ current long-range facilities plan does not adequately address the school district’s plans to expand charter schools, or address the potential district-wide impacts or impacts on the remaining neighborhood public schools.**
Long range facility planning is a complex and multi-faceted challenge for any public school district. The CEFTF recognized the challenge, and made extensive efforts to share national “best practices” with CPS. IL Public Act 97-0474 as passed by the General Assembly in 2011, stipulates that in developing a long range plan, CPS must address several specific key questions at the heart of any effort to plan for the future of a school district: What is the community context of the schools? What will demographic, enrollment and community development trends be in the future decade? What is the educational vision of the district and how can it be aligned with facility planning? What is the condition of the schools today, and what are the district’s goals and capacity for improving them? How many schools and what kind of school facilities will the district need going forward? Because school buildings are teaching and learning “environments,” a sound facilities planning process needs to be driven by a publicly-understood and widely-supported vision for the district’s educational mission and programming, as well as students’ and communities’ needs.

The state reform law as passed gave CPS 15 months to develop a draft EFMP. The CEFTF sought to assist the district in long-range planning even before the reform law was enacted, by sharing its ongoing research on best practices and holding informational community forums about the Master Plan. From the Fall of 2011 through 2012, CPS performed minimal compliance with the reform act provisions such as publishing Space Utilization and Facility minimum standards. But the school district did not take steps to inform and train principals or Local School Councils, involve the public, or engage its sister government agencies in developing a plan or designing a planning process. CPS’ own neighborhood planning bodies known as “Community Action Councils”, and CPS parents’ input were at times disregarded. See Appendix B for a case study of community stakeholders’ attempts to have input into CPS’ long-range facility planning.

Gauging Future Needs

Space Utilization

How many schools and classrooms do we need? This is a key question that school districts ask when looking to the future and in managing their educational facilities from year to year. In 2012-2013, Chicagoans had an intense public debate over “Space Utilization”—rather than an explicit or structured civic discussion about a vision for CPS or the state-mandated long-term facilities plan. Instead, the school district focused on closing “under-utilized” schools.

The 2011 reform law required CPS to develop and publish for the first time the formula that the school district uses to calculate whether a school is overcrowded, under-utilized, or “efficient” in its use of available space. CPS complied by publishing “Space Utilization Standards” on its website on January 1st, 2012. However, once educators, parents, and the public became aware of CPS’ individual school rankings, the formula was challenged by a broad spectrum of stakeholders and researchers, including members of the CEFTF.

CPS School Actions and long-range planning are intimately intertwined, and can never be neatly separated. In an effort to expand the public’s and policy-makers’ understanding of CPS’ Space Utilization Formula and its impact on the EFMP, the CEFTF took a hard look at “the numbers” that CPS used to anticipate and plan for the district’s future need for school facilities and classroom space. CPS’ “Space Utilization Formula” was the sole criterion cited by CPS’ CEO in the published “School Action Guidelines” to be used to select schools for closings in 2013. The space use formula also provided CPS with its core set of assumptions for the EFMP. From the perspective of the school district’s leaders, the space use standards justified eliminating neighborhood public schools in several communities. CPS argued that the district had too much facility and classroom space (“capacity”), based on past
enrollment and demographic trends. Threatened communities and schools countered that CPS was not taking into consideration the actual, day-to-day uses of available space, waiting lists for Pre-K programs, and other factors that justified many schools’ “deviation” from CPS’ definition of “efficient” space use.

The CEFTF’s analysis addresses how CPS’ comprehensive plan was affected by the district’s Space Utilization formula. Most of the data used in the following charts and analyses that depict CPS’ understanding of its current and future facility and classroom space needs were provided to the CEFTF by CPS; other sources of data and analysis are identified. The CEFTF also analyzed national “best practices” for determining educationally-appropriate Space Utilization, and found that CPS is not using proven best practices to align space utilization with long-term facility master planning.

For any public school district the Space Utilization formula is vitally important for managing facilities year to year, and for long-range planning. Understanding and planning for educationally appropriate space design and use is essential for ensuring that schools are supporting high-quality instruction and a quality public education for all students. Teachers need the appropriate spaces and technology to deliver a 21st century curriculum, and to address the specific needs of their students – which differ according to the educational program content and the age, grade, and any learning challenges of the students. For example, teaching Pre-K or Kindergarten requires a very different kind of space than teaching 5th graders or high-school students.

Across the nation, public school district officials make judgments and set standards about the appropriate and effective use of instructional and other space through the prism of their educational vision. Definitions of “efficient” use of space will vary accordingly. No matter how varied from one school district to another, space use formulas generally reflect a district’s policies and goals for optimal class sizes, as well as the space requirements for special student populations and for the varied instructional programs the district is implementing or plans to introduce. The educational vision provides the foundation for determining how much space and what kind of facilities are currently needed and will be needed in the future.

In Chicago, however, the school district does not have consensus around a shared educational vision for the future of public education, or on the best methods for determining how many classrooms and school buildings CPS may need in the coming years. CPS does not factor into its formula the concerns of parents and educators about optimizing class size, and in some circumstances reducing class size; the current ISBE rules on class size for Special Education; or the class size guidelines in CPS’ collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Teachers’ Union. CPS does not vary its space utilization guidelines and formula based on goals and objectives (or even restrictions) for optimizing class size, or for the varying space needs for different ages and grades of students.

Instead, CPS’ formula allots roughly 74% of classrooms in any school building as “home rooms” and the rest for other uses, which CPS calls “ancillary”. In 2012-2013, when CPS applied its formula, district officials concluded that, “Half of our schools are half-empty.” The stage was set for a “crisis” of “under-utilization” demanding an urgent response by CPS to eliminate expenses (“wasteful spending”) on “half-empty” school buildings.

By using its space use formula to declare a crisis, CPS effectively pre-empted long-term planning. Because under-utilization designations would trigger neighborhood school closings, the district’s Space Utilization formula[^4]

[^4]: CPS’ website for the Space Utilization Formula:
http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/SpaceUtilizationStandards.pdf
became the lightning rod for public criticism and debate over the future “size” of the school district. CPS officials argued then, and still maintain that the district has to be better aligned with a declining enrollment, and operate fewer facilities. Other long-term planning considerations were thus overshadowed and not discussed in a structured or inclusive manner.

The CEFTF urged CPS to reserve judgment on “right sizing” until the school district had developed its long-range facilities plan and had gathered the data and input needed to make such a judgment.

The public focus and debate on CPS’ Space Utilization formula was increasingly fueled by communities’ growing anxieties about impending school closings. Designation as an “under-utilized” facility would determine a school’s fate, and whether or not it would be closed. But the debate also brought to the forefront the public’s concerns about looming increases in class sizes, overcrowding, and the needs of Special Education students. CPS held a series of community meetings across the city from January-March 2013, after announcing that the CEO was going to recommend mass school closings to occur at the end of that school year. Over 30,000 parents, community residents, and educators mobilized to attend. Stakeholders raised similar points consistently in every part of the city: They repeatedly challenged CPS’ school space utilization rankings as outdated and inaccurate. They pointed out that CPS’ formula ignored the space needs and class size caps for Special Education students. Principals, teachers and parents testified that their schools were not given credit when their schools used classrooms for creative purposes, important enrichment programs being carried out with partner organizations, in-school libraries, or one-on-one instruction for Special Education students. Some parents and educators who were familiar with the 2011 state reform law questioned why CPS was moving to close schools before the 10-year long-range master plan had even been drafted.

And over and over again, parents said they did not want their children in large classes with 30 and more students. Academic researchers cited a growing body of evidence that class size matters, particularly in early primary grades and for the educational success of low-income students of color in the early grades.

While community and housing development trends did not immediately rise to the forefront of the public debate about utilization in early 2013, several community and parent groups and elected officials did testify at both CPS and CEFTF hearings that anticipated positive changes in their neighborhoods would affect their schools’ future space needs; stakeholders were concerned that CPS was ignoring these trends.
Best Practices employed around the nation contrast sharply with CPS’ method for determining future facility space needs. The 2009 state law that created the CEFTF tasked the panel with examining policies and procedures that other major urban public school districts use to manage and plan for the future of their school facilities. The Task Force’s research was shared on an ongoing basis with CPS staff. Since the key goals of any long-range facilities plan are to ensure cost-effective management of existing school facilities over time and to anticipate a school district’s future facility maintenance, modernization, new construction and space capacity needs, the Task Force examined how other school districts anticipate their future space needs.

Other large urban public school districts incorporate their policies on space utilization in their long-range facilities plans. Key considerations typically used by other school districts include: Appropriate class sizes for each grade/age range of students; space needed for instructional programs to implement the district’s varied curricula; class size limits in collective bargaining agreements with teachers’ unions; special education class size limits; space standards for common-areas of facilities used by all students; square footage per student, which varies by age and grade; space allotted for teacher preparation; and standards for campus, athletics, and other non-instructional purposes. The following chart is a comparison of New York City’s space utilization formula and that of CPS. See the additional footnotes for examples from other school districts.

Table 1: COMPARISON—New York City Public Schools’ and CPS’ Space Use Formulas*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public School District</th>
<th>NYC</th>
<th>CPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does formula differ by grade?</td>
<td>Yes (Elementary, Middle School and High school)</td>
<td>Yes (High school and Elementary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does formula differ by room size?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does formula differ by programmatic use?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-3 class size limit?</td>
<td>20 pupils</td>
<td>25% of total classroom space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does formula differ for SPED?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Combined with Ancillary space allotment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum sq. ft. for classroom</td>
<td>500 square feet</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent room?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not account for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Prep Room?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not account for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialty rooms?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not account for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different formula for ES, MS &amp; HS?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* CPS does not include non-permanent structures in its utilization rate. Key: ES = Elementary, PreK-8; MS = Middle School; and HS = High School; SPED = Special Education

CPS’ current formula uses 600 square feet as a “typical” classroom size in its calculations (as stated by CPS staff in public meetings though not explicit in its written standards). CPS’ Space Use policy does state that its formula uses the prototype designs for new school construction which were developed after 1995. However, CPS operates schools that have been built and then often remodeled at various times over the past century. Some 160 of CPS

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school buildings are at least 100 years old; scores of schools were built in the 1970s in an era of extreme overcrowding; and about 50 schools and dozens of building additions (or annexes) have been built since 1990. Thus, the majority of CPS’ school facilities do not fit its own model and core assumptions:

“The baseline efficiency ranges are derived from the district’s new construction prototype schools. The prototype new construction school elementary school contains 39 classrooms: 30 dedicated general education homeroom classrooms and 9 ancillary classrooms. The 9 ancillary classrooms are generally programmed—though not required to be used—as 1 science room, 2 music/art rooms, 1 technology lab, 3 specialized education rooms, and 2 specialty classrooms.”

It is also important to note that CPS’ current formula does not take into consideration the factors stipulated in the 2011 reform law (IL Public Act 97-0474), that CPS must take into account in developing its space standards:

- The age/grade range of students
- Educational program space needs, and
- Space requirements for educating special-needs students (English Language Learners and students in Special Education who have Individual Educational Plans, known as IEPs).

The method by which a school district defines and assesses its school and classroom space needs has major ramifications for long-term planning. If the district relies exclusively upon a current “snapshot” of under-utilization, the potential need to preserve existing neighborhood public schools for future enrollment growth may be overlooked. The current “snapshot” data can lead district facility planners to under-estimate the extent of future overcrowding, compromising the district’s long-range planning for crowding relief. This is a major issue in Chicago, in light of the fact that CPS has proposed the unorthodox method of opening additional charter schools to relieve over-crowding, and because CPS’ master plan did not address whether past charter school proliferation contributed to under-utilization in some communities.

If Space Utilization is not properly contextualized, school districts may close schools that will be needed in the future, leading to higher capital costs to either “re-commission” (re-open) abandoned school buildings, or build new facilities in changing neighborhoods. In fact, in 2012 the mayoral-appointed Space Utilization Commission noted in its own report that San Francisco’s public school district experienced this problem. These concerns will be explored more in this section on “Gauging Future Needs,” as we examine whether CPS’ master plan adequately addresses community context, i.e., assessing and factoring in trends in Community and Housing Development. (See Appendix C for additional information on “best practices” in long-range facility planning.)

Space Utilization measures need to be adjusted and calibrated to students’ learning needs and to educational curricular goals and demands. A more fine-tuned analysis of educationally appropriate space use is key to determining the appropriate “size” of the district’s “footprint” (how many and what kind of schools will be needed to serve specific student populations; to create optimal learning and teaching environments with developmentally-appropriate class sizes for the varying ages of students in class; and to provide adequate space

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6 Ibid.

to support special-needs students, including CPS’ growing number of homeless students (“Students in Transitional Living Situations, or, “STLS” students), Limited English Speaking students, and students with learning and/or physical disabilities(students with Individual Education Plans).

**Taking Optimal Class Size and Class Size Limits into Account Changes the Picture:** In addition to the alternative analyses provided by school principals and parents, independent researchers from the non-profit organization **Raise Your Hand-IL** (hereafter, “RYH”) demonstrated how CPS’ current formula exaggerates “under-utilization” and under-estimates “overcrowding.”

RYH’s lead researcher Jeanne Marie Olson testified at the CEFTF’s December 13, 2012 meeting on the analysis of CPS’s utilization calculations in their “Apples to Apples” study. Using CPS’ own Space Utilization standards, she demonstrated a typical result when CPS’ formula is applied:

\[
\text{Total # of Classrooms} \times 76.9 = \text{Total # of Homerooms} \\
\text{Total # of Classrooms} - \text{Total # of Homerooms} = \text{Total # of Ancillary Classrooms} \\
\text{Total # of Homerooms} \times 30\text{ students per homeroom} = \text{Ideal Enrollment of Students at School}
\]

CPS uses a range of 20% above or below “ideal” class size to determine the degree of efficiency in space utilization. This translates as follows:

- **30 students per homeroom was the ideal** or “midpoint” of the range
- **30 students per homeroom + 20% MORE** was the “top” of the efficiency range
- **30 students per homeroom – 20%** was the “bottom” of the efficiency range.

After the top of the range is reached, CPS considers a school to be officially overcrowded. After enrollment goes below the bottom of its “efficiency” range, CPS then considers a school to be officially underutilized.

The problem with this formula was that in effect, it set a new maximum for the average number of students in the classroom before CPS considers that classroom (and ultimately the entire school) to be overcrowded. How?

Because **30 + (20% of 30) = 36**

(This can also be written as **30 \times 120\% = 36**)

Thus CPS’ current formula does not officially consider a school to be “overcrowded” until it has an average of 36 students in each homeroom.

Figure 1: 36 student maximum in each homeroom ≠ 30 student maximum in each homeroom

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8 [http://cpsapples2apples.wordpress.com/2012/12/04/space-utilization-show-your-work-part-1/](http://cpsapples2apples.wordpress.com/2012/12/04/space-utilization-show-your-work-part-1/)
As the Apples To Apples analysis demonstrates, recalculating the utilization rates using existing CPS class size guidelines has far-reaching implications for evaluating whether the school district has adequate classroom and facility space: When CPS’ own class size guidelines are taken into account, the number of schools that are under-utilized declines dramatically—from 20% “severely under-utilized” to 8%; and simultaneously, the number of schools that are over-crowded more than doubles - from 14% to 31%. Based on Apples to Apples’ recalculation of space utilization⁹, 6 of the 47 schools that CPS closed in 2013 and 5 of the 31 Welcoming Schools would see a change in their utilization ranking from “under-utilized” to “efficient.” (See Appendix D for Apples to Apples’ individual school calculations, and the chart below, illustrating how the RYH researchers recalculated space utilization for CPS schools.

Table 2: “Raise Your Hand Illinois” Utilization Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPS Utilization Categories</th>
<th>As reported by current CPS formula: [TOTAL # of classrooms x 76.9% x 30 students = ideal enrollment for any elementary school and ideal enrollment +/- 20% = overcrowding / underutilization]</th>
<th>Apples-to-Apples Corrected formula: [TOTAL # of classrooms x 76.9% x 25 students = ideal enrollment for any elementary school and ideal enrollment +/- 20% = overcrowding / underutilization]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Underutilized</td>
<td>50% (235/470 schools)</td>
<td>38% (178/470 schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underutilized by 50% or more</td>
<td>20% (92/470 schools)</td>
<td>8% (37/470 schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>14% (66/470 schools)</td>
<td>31% (147/470 schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>36% (169/470 schools)</td>
<td>31% (145/470 schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty seats</td>
<td>19% (62,695)</td>
<td>2.7% (7,467)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changing CPS’ space utilization formula to take into account CPS’ own class size guidelines produces a very different picture of what might be the “right size” of the district’s “footprint;” and which schools, in which communities should be preserved. CPS’ resulting long-range facilities master plan and the accompanying facilities capital plans of the district would need to be reconsidered accordingly.

CPS’ latest Space Utilization Rankings show little improvement in “efficiency”: In January 2014, CPS complied with the state reform law technical requirement to post updated Space Utilization Rankings for all of Chicago’s public schools, including charters on an annual basis. Prior to the release of the 2014 data, CPS reported to the CEFTF that the school district had increased efficiencies in space use as a result of the 2013 Closings. However, the Task Force has yet to receive a requested analysis of changes in class size at Welcoming Schools that was requested in October 2013. Meanwhile, Catalyst Chicago Magazine did an analysis of the updated January 2014 CPS Space Utilization Rankings (01.28.14). Using CPS’ data, the Catalyst reporter concludes that:

- “As more new schools, primarily charters, open each year, some traditional schools seem to be withering away.”

• “Fourteen schools are more than two-thirds empty, 10 of them neighborhood high schools with attendance boundaries. Those 10 schools comprise more than 20 percent of the remaining 45 neighborhood high schools.”

• “Overall, about 200 schools are rated as underutilized, compared to 296 schools last year.”

• “Only 15 of 48 welcoming schools—schools that took in students displaced by closings—moved from under-utilized to efficient. Some of the 33 schools that remain underutilized did not attract many students, despite significant investment from CPS. For example, CPS’ plan called for students from Kohn Elementary in the Roseland community to go to Cullen, Langston Hughes and Lavizzo Elementary Schools. Yet each of those three schools remains underutilized.”

• “Three neighborhoods with the most schools that are under-utilized—Chatham, South Shore and Austin—are all slated to get new schools within the next two years.”

• “The data include charter schools, with more than one-third of campuses—36 of 101—labeled as under-utilized.”

CPS maintains that “to the extent that the welcoming schools (and others that students chose to attend) continue to have space to accept even more students, this is a sign of good planning, and indicative of the magnitude of the problem we were confronting. Our utilization challenge was one likely to endure and worsen if not addressed, and both the designated welcoming schools and other schools that students chose to attend had sufficient space to take on more students.”

As shown in the New York example cited above (and in other examples cited in Appendix C, “Best Practices”) other major urban public school districts apply a more nuanced and balanced formula when determining efficient space and classroom use and undertaking long-range facility planning. Even more concerning, CPS’ own top administrators have publicly acknowledged and reported to the CEFTF that the characteristics of student populations were not factored into the formula, and referred to CPS’ formula as a “blunt instrument.” In rejecting other approaches to developing a more fine-tuned and student-centered space utilization formula, CPS current Space Utilization Standards policy states:

“...Alternate approaches were considered regarding model type. Some models make distinctions for different subject matter. The conclusion was that wide variability in program type does not make such a model dependable across the entire system. ... CPS finds the classroom-centric methodology on which the Guidelines are based to be significantly more sound and reliable than alternative models such as Building Gross Square Footage (GSF) models, where space utilization is measured on the basis of gross square footage per enrolled student. The conclusion was that wide variability among building types and ratios of non-instructional spaces to instructional spaces does not render an equitable or reliable measure of space utilization.”

CPS’ rejection of other school districts’ use of Building Gross Square Footage (GSF) overlooks two key reasons as to why other school districts do use such an approach: (1) All school facilities need common area spaces to

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function and are an important design consideration. Thus the GSF measure helps facility planners and managers to factor in the square footages of non-instructional space needed to support a school’s everyday operation. (2) When applying a GSF measure, other school districts relate it to standards as to how much “space per student” is needed to deliver developmentally-appropriate and educationally appropriate instruction which varies for grade and age levels and for the diverse student populations served.

Charter Expansion and Long-Range Planning: The CEFTF and the members of the public who testified to the Task Force are greatly concerned about CPS’ lack of transparency in its long-range facilities plan regarding the district’s charter expansion goals. The EFMP does not acknowledge or discuss the school district’s commitment to charter expansion embodied in the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Charter School Compact that CPS has signed. The EFMP did not attempt to assess or factor in the effects of opening new Charter schools on the district’s overall facility capacity, space utilization and enrollment trends. The expansion of Charter Schools directly impacts any thorough assessment of CPS’ space and facilities needs.

CPS acknowledges that the EFMP does not assess charters’ facilities or plan for their expansion, and maintains that:

“The educational facilities master plan is a facilities plan, focused on the needs of the buildings operated by the district. Other buildings, not operated by the district, are not within the scope of the law. The operators of CPS’s schools, whether the district, contract schools, charter schools, or other partners are outside the scope as well. Further, it must be emphasized that state law requires that CPS accept proposals for new charter schools and that it approves new charter schools that meet certain quality standards. Last year [2013], two charter schools that CPS denied were later approved by the state appeal board and now operate under the state’s authority, within the City of Chicago.”

Since 2011, CPS opened 33 new charter school campuses, with 23,368 slots. Even as CPS argued that the school district had “half-empty” schools and “too much capacity,” the district was expanding the number of classrooms and the number of school facilities through its charter expansion initiative. The district has in effect created a growing competition between schools for students to fill those slots. Additionally, CPS has had no guiding policy to determine where charters schools should operate. In fact, CPS often approves Charter School locations in close proximity to existing neighborhood public schools. Yet CPS does not address this apparent contradiction in its long-range Facilities Master Plan, and did not address charter expansion and siting issues during the debate over mass school closings and under-utilization, and “rightsizing” the district.

Where will Charter Schools expand or be added in the future? CPS issued and received responses to its Annual “Request for Proposals” (RFP) before the school board adopted the EFMP. CPS had received proposals for additional Charter grade expansions and/or additional campus openings from current charter operators, as well as proposals for more charter schools from Charter operators new to the District. Yet CPS does not address these various charter expansions in its 30 “Community” Plans in the EFMP. In several cases, CPS approved additional

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11 Chicago Public Schools Response-CEFTFReport-EMFP-SchoolActions

charter capacity, even though the sites of the additional charters were unknown at the time the school board approved their applications.

Figure 2: Charters and Charter Expansions Approved Since March 2012

CPS has approved an additional 10,776 seats at 17 charter schools with a location TBD (to be determined)
Current and Accurate Facility Condition Assessments

Case Study: The Interaction of CPS’ Space Utilization Formula and Facilities Assessments with Long-Term Planning: The Consolidation of Two Elementary Schools

The 2013 consolidation of Laura Ward Elementary School with the former Ryerson Elementary School into the “old” Ryerson facility minimized the facility space capacity available in the West Humboldt Park community for high-quality elementary schools, and resulted in a now overcrowded elementary school. According to CPS’ own academic accountability rating system\(^\text{13}\), the closed Ryerson Elementary School was a Level 2 School and was not on probation. Prior to the 2011–2012 school year, Ryerson had been a Level 1 school. The school received citywide attention for its 6-8th grade single-sex classrooms’ pilot program that demonstrated strong academic gains for the participating students\(^\text{14}\). It was the first school to pilot The Longer School Day before CPS implemented Mayor Emmanuel’s mandate for the program district-wide. The former Ryerson School creatively utilized some of its classrooms for important programs: a neighborhood health clinic; a Health and Fitness Center sponsored and funded by the Chicago Bulls NBA organization; a state-of-the-art Library and Media Center donated by Target; and “Recess Rooms” equipped with computers which also served as Community Resource Rooms. The Recess Rooms initiative was a positive response to parents’ safety concerns since the outdoor school grounds had often been frequented by drug dealers.

In the 2012–2013 School Year (SY2013), the year in which the school board voted to close the school, the former Ryerson’s enrollment was 398, while CPS calculated that the school had a capacity of 690 students. Thus, according to CPS, its utilization rate was 58%. When parents took it upon themselves to count their available classrooms and special education rooms not in use for the dedicated purposes and partnerships described above, they used CPS’ space use formula and determined that Ryerson was actually 77% utilized. The former Laura Ward building, which is now vacant, had a capacity for 720 students versus Ryerson’s capacity of 690 students, according to CPS. Due to the consolidation, in School Year 2013, the “new” Laura Ward no longer has space for many of the programs offered at the former Ryerson, and has a CPS utilization rate of 100%.

As for facility conditions and future needed improvements: According to the 2012 data from CPS’ and Mayor’s Utilization Commission advising CPS, the Ryerson building needed $16 million in facility upgrades, while Laura Ward needed over $9 million. In 2012–early 2013, the latest available CPS facility condition assessments for both buildings (done in 2008) documented lower estimates for both buildings, and the now-vacant Laura Ward building needed only $3 million in upgrades. CPS never clarified the conflicting information about the schools’ actual facility needs during the school board’s decision making process to consolidate both schools in the former Ryerson building. The community never got answers about the accuracy of CPS’ varying estimates of the needed maintenance dollars\(^\text{15}\).

\(^{13}\) Performance Policy Results and Probation Status: http://schoolreports.cps.edu/cpsedu/schooldata/2013_PerformancePolicy_Results_03262014.xlsx


Community Contexts and Community Change

In creating its 10-Year Educational Facilities Master Plan (EFMP), CPS faced a new and daunting challenge, to look forward and plan for Chicago’s neighborhoods’ future school facilities and space needs and needed capital investment in our schools. The long-range planning requirement set out in State law was intended to ensure that CPS aligned its future School Actions and facilities investments with its educational goals and principles, in order to better and more equitably address all students’ right to have access to a quality education in a high-quality public school facility. In examining the EFMP adopted by the school board in September 2013, the CEFTF found that:

- CPS made assumptions about communities’ needs and preferences that were not adequately based on public input;
- Vital data about changing community contexts and anticipated future redevelopment plans were missing; and
- Coordination with and feedback from CPS’ Sister Agencies was minimal and came late in the EFMP planning process.

Intergovernmental coordination and data sharing is vital if school districts are to plan for future, changing, community contexts. For most other urban public school districts, anticipating future community development is a critical step in long-range planning, because of the likelihood that urban neighborhoods change rapidly in today’s economy, with real estate markets and redevelopment trends also in flux. New York City’s public school system; Miami-Dade, FL’s Unified School District; the San Diego, CA and the Los Angeles Unified School Districts; and Washington, DC’s school district all work with their sister agencies to obtain the housing and community development data needed to factor in future community change into their enrollment and future class size projections. Around the nation, changes in the urban landscape and population are widely recognized by other school districts as directly related to the school district’s forecasting of future space and facilities’ needs.

Yet CPS’ EFMP does not put Chicago’s public schools in their changing community contexts. Instead, CPS appears to have made certain assumptions about neighborhood change in the absence of data. CPS also created a series of key assumptions that remain questionable and may have compromised the school district’s efforts to plan for students’ and communities’ future needs.

CPS is Unilaterally Re-Defining “Community”: CPS created its own set of new geographic boundaries for Chicago neighborhoods, defining 30 “Community” areas. CPS then used these new boundaries to cluster schools and neighborhoods, and create 30 “Community” Plans.

CPS did not vet the map with the CEFTF, its sister agencies, or with the public. CPS changed the community boundaries found in the universally-recognized official “Chicago Community Area” map. The commonly-used Community Area names and identities familiar to most Chicagoans are subsumed under CPS’ 30 “new” sets of community boundaries. CPS then made demographic projections based on these reconfigured Community boundaries, while using past enrollment data to define future classroom and facility needs. Moreover, as shown below, CPS’ new Community boundaries are sometimes misaligned with school attendance area boundaries and CPS’ own internal “maps” for clustering schools for administrative purposes.

CPS’ feedback on how it created the 30 “new” Communities is that:
“CPS defined 30 geographic areas for planning purposes, in line with how CPS believed communities are defining themselves today” . . [and that CPS’ “resources” (outside consulting demographers)] were “able to take census data and other data related to community development and have it applied to these 30 geographic areas — and to the specific geographic areas that are defined by our school boundaries.”

Figure 3: CPS’s New Community Areas

CPS’ NEW DEFINITION OF COMMUNITY BOUNDARIES SKewed ITS PLANNING FOR LOCAL SCHOOL FACILITIES AND EDUCATIONAL NEEDS.

CPS’ EFMP “COMMUNITIES” ARE NOT FAMILIAR TO THE PUBLIC, AND ARE OUT OF SYNCH WITH COMMONLY-USED DEFINITIONS and even CPS’ OWN INTERNAL ORGANIZATION.

Why is CPS’ Re-Map Important? The 2011 state law stipulates that in developing a long-range facilities plan, CPS must put schools in their community context, and consider planned and anticipated changes in community and housing development. CPS’ newly-defined Community boundaries do not align with the standard geographical “units of analysis” used by its sister agencies, the U.S. Census Bureau, the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, or others engaged in publicly-supported or private-sector urban redevelopment initiatives. The standard Chicago Community Area map is aligned with U.S. census tracts. The City of Chicago, State of Illinois, U.S. Dept. of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Education, most local governments, private charitable foundation, academic researchers, experts in urban planning and community development, and private developers routinely use the long-established official Chicago Community Area map. All public health and community-level data analysis done by the U.S. Census Bureau utilizes the recognized Chicago Community Area map boundaries. By inventing its own new boundaries, CPS compromised the process for assessing and understanding vital
Community Area data, including comparisons of demographic trends over time, trends in community characteristics, and tracking of community and housing development.

Moreover, in its EFMP CPS does not provide any analysis of community change and redevelopment in its “Community” profiles for its newly redefined 30 “Communities.” CPS does cite data from the Chicago Housing Authority regarding potential and planned future public housing development, but on closer examination of CHA’s comments on the Draft EFMP, CPS’ EFMP and CHA’s projections differ. Moreover, the CHA does not operate in all Chicago Community Areas; and while CHA redevelopment plans are vitally important in some neighborhoods, they have not and will not impact most of Chicago’s neighborhoods. Sometimes the geographic boundaries of CPS’ new community areas align with the borders of existing Chicago community areas, primarily because of either natural boundaries or major streets. However, many times the new boundaries dissect existing community areas. This new configuration also groups several community areas into one new area which is sometimes given a name unfamiliar to Chicago residents, such as “Sauganash” on the northwest side of the city. CPS also took it upon itself to eliminate community areas that have important histories and community-based organizations named after them, as if the importance of this sense of place is being erased. For example, the Kenwood-Oakland community is now in “Bronzeville” and the communities of Uptown and Rogers Park are now lumped together into “Ravenswood.”

CPS’ use of this new configuration creates yet another barrier for the public to “find” their schools in CPS’ Facilities Master Plan, since the EFMP is organized by CPS’ new Community areas. There is no index by School Name in the document.

The Meaning and Importance of CPS’ “Internal” Mapping by “Network”: Perhaps most disconcerting, the newly defined Community boundaries that school district used for its long-range facilities plan do not align with CPS’ own internal administrative “geographic units” for clustering, overseeing and evaluating schools. Currently CPS has 13 such clusters, previously called “Networks” and intermittently referred to as “Planning Zones,” that were established by the CEO in 2013. These geographic clusters do not always readily align with attendance area boundaries for the schools assigned to each of the 13 groupings.

Like most large school districts, CPS organizes and “clusters” its schools together into smaller geographic areas to help manage administrative support of the schools. Successive CPS administrations have frequently changed and re-named such clusters and geographical groupings over the years. In 2011, principals and parents knew their geographic clusters as “Areas: in 2012 CPS renamed them as “Networks” and reduced the number of school clusters from 17 to 13. Additionally, charter schools and Turnaround schools have their own distinct “Networks” apart from those designated to oversee other CPS (neighborhood) public schools.

When schools are re-assigned to different geographic Networks (or Planning Zones), there are direct and important consequences. Each Network/Planning Zone has an educational and administrative leader, referred to as the “Chief” who has direct supervisory and other far-reaching powers over the day-to-day operations of the schools in his/her charge. The Network Chiefs are responsible for:

- Ensuring that they are building effective schools with effective leaders by creating a professional development plan,

Collecting and assessing data to drive interventions,

Collaborating on best practices with other networks,

And enhancing community and parental involvement.

**Schools are compared to one another within their Network.** Perhaps most importantly, schools’ assignments to Networks (Planning Zones) are key to how they are evaluated under CPS’ Academic Accountability metrics and policies. CPS bases its rating of school performance on a series of metrics tied to a Network’s averages on several crucial data points, including the Network average on standardized tests. Thus the geographic grouping in which a school finds itself profoundly affects and defines its “relative” progress and performance, whether CPS judges that there has been adequate student progress compared to its “Network” peer schools, and whether a CPS “School Action” may be warranted. When a school is re-assigned to a geographic area (Network or Planning Zones) that has a higher average performance, that school may find its ranking is lowered, no matter how much progress has been achieved with its unique and discrete student population. CPS’ practice of frequent changes to its internal clustering and oversight of schools means that principals and school communities have had to repeatedly work with new leaders and shifting expectations, adding another form of stress and instability for school principals, teachers, students, and their families.

Since fiscal year 2011, there have been 209 geographic combinations of schools. The area with the most stability, where 25 schools have remained in the same geographic area/network, is the northwest side of the city. Part of the reason for the enormous lack of stability is the drastic number of openings and closings that have occurred in this same time period:

**Table 3: Number of Chicago Public School Restructurings 2011-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Total Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merged</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opened &amp; Closed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase-Out</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4: CPS’ District Map

The Chicago Public Schools’ School Leadership Model consists of 23 Area Offices, structured by elementary and high school areas. CPS manages and guides the 17 elementary and 6 high school areas. In the following pages, CPS is proud to share a closer look into each area highlighting a list of schools and the area’s accomplishments in the last year.

**CPS Areas**

**Elementary School Instruction Areas:**
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18

**High School Instruction Areas:**
19, 21, 23, 24, 25*, 26*

*Not shown. Please see pages 24 and 25.

**Instruction Area maps**
Maps on pages 3 to 25 show the locations of all of CPS’ 622 schools, using the following key:
- Elementary schools
- AMP schools
- High schools
- Community schools (map 25)
- Military schools (map 26)
- JROTC programs in high schools (map 26)
Figure 5: CPS’ New Planning Zones and Former Networks
Figure 6: Misalignment of CPS’ new geographic areas and school attendance boundaries

Many elementary school boundaries throughout the district overlap with CPS’ new geographic areas and planning zones.

While the new geographic areas and planning zones align, the schools do not, forcing CPS to assign schools to planning zones not entirely within the boundaries.

Legend

- CPS Network/Planning Zone 11
- Englewood
- Auburn Gresham
- CPS Elementary Attendance Boundary
Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force Report to the General Assembly

Chicago is a City of Changing Neighborhoods

Understanding Changing Communities with the Help of Sister Agencies: Community contexts and community change are vitally important dynamics to factor into CPS’ 10-Year Master Plan. The 2011 state law stipulated that CPS had to share its draft EFMP with its sister agencies, with the intent of fostering increased intergovernmental coordination and data sharing, and eliciting feedback from them on CPS’ Plan. CPS maintains that the district requested and got data on safety, recreation, public transit, and housing and other community redevelopment trends from some of the various agencies and departments that the CEFTF advised. Yet CPS did not send out a survey requesting written responses from other agencies until shortly before the school board was to vote on the final EFMP. Only data from the Chicago Housing Authority was incorporated into CPS’ plan. (See Appendix B for more details.) The CEFTF’s efforts to persuade CPS to convene an early joint Briefing for sister agencies (in 2012) were unsuccessful.

In the “universe” of community and housing development in Chicago, there is only one constant: Ongoing neighborhood change. While this makes long-term planning for Chicago’s public schools more complex, there are widely-recognized and reliable indicators, public records, and data sets that could and should guide the school district in anticipating future community change.

CPS cannot be expected to understand community and housing development trends and data sources on its own. However the planning process that produced the September 2013 EFMP adopted by the BOE did not take full advantage of the knowledge and expertise of the CEFTF, CPS’ sister agencies, or the numerous urban planning and community and housing development experts in Chicago. While it is widely understood that not all housing and community development initiatives and projects will generate anticipated new public school enrollment, there are many programs, projects, and plans that will. Tracking the development of affordable housing geared at families is vital to understanding where, when, and how the community context surrounding our public schools is likely to change.

Neighborhoods on Chicago’s south, southwest, and west sides have been hard hit in recent years by the home mortgage foreclosure crisis, and growing affordable housing shortages. In some neighborhoods, population declined in the wake of these housing problems. West side and south side neighborhoods that experienced high foreclosure rates have seen many of their neighborhood schools closed.

Yet some of these same neighborhoods are poised to see family housing units built or brought back “online” for families to occupy. Both non-profit and private development entities have plans to bring back foreclosed properties and affordable rental units. An analysis of these redevelopment trends must be part of CPS’ long-range planning. Anticipating neighborhood recovery is key to forecasting where and when Chicago’s neighborhoods will need future classroom and school facility capacity. In short, past trends are not future trends.

CPS does not have to do this research on its own. Sister agencies could and should provide the data. To understand the changing community context of its schools, at a minimum, CPS could and should have tapped data from the following sources:

The City of Chicago’s Tax Increment Financing Program: Chicago has more TIF districts than any other major city in the nation (with the exception of East St. Louis, IL, where the entire municipality has been declared a mega-TIF district). TIF is a financing tool that cities and towns use to spur redevelopment and job creation of many kinds,
from industrial expansion and commercial revitalization, to the construction and renovation of several types of housing stock. The City of Chicago has used TIF to encourage private and non-profit developers to rehab and/or build new affordable housing across the City.

Every TIF District in Chicago’s TIF Program is monitored and administered by the City’s Dept. of Housing & Economic Development (referred to as “DHED”). While CPS staff assured the CEFTF that the school district has conferred with DHED, the EFMP is missing any data analysis of TIF districts in which TIF-subsidized affordable, family-oriented housing development is being planned, or is already under construction.

**The City of Chicago’s Low-Income Housing Trust Fund:** The Trust Fund tracks other affordable housing redevelopment initiatives across the City. DHED also has several other community and housing redevelopment programs financed by other sources from which data on changing housing patterns and future housing unit development can be tracked.

**The State’s “Illinois Housing Development Authority” (“IHDA”):** administers a state-funded Low-Income Housing Trust Fund, and offers numerous initiatives to encourage the rehab, rental, and/or sale of foreclosed single-family homes to families across the state, including in Chicago. IHDA data are not included in CPS’ EFMP.

**City of Chicago and Cook County Land Trust Initiatives:** In tackling the after-effects of the home mortgage foreclosure crisis, both the City of Chicago and Cook County have launched initiatives to return single-family housing stock to occupancy by families. Both the City and the County have formed “Land Trust” programs to accelerate the acquisition, repair, and re-habitation of the tens of thousands of foreclosed homes in our communities by families. While these programs are new, their plans and projections of activity and output for the next decade are directly relevant to any analysis of changing neighborhoods in Chicago, and to developing a long-range facilities master plan.

**Unsubsidized and subsidized family housing development by the private sector** is another arena which CPS’ planners did not explore in developing the EFMP. In addition to data on affordable family housing development activity spurred by TIF and other City of Chicago, Cook County and IHDA initiatives, financial institutions (banks) and the real estate industry have data on housing development activity. In the wake of the mortgage foreclosure crisis, several of Chicago’s major financial institutions have developed and funded their own initiatives to bring back single-family housing in hard-hit Chicago neighborhoods. Private real estate developers are also buying foreclosed properties in large numbers (bulk sales), and tapping private financing to develop rental and family housing in Chicago. Yet CPS’ EFMP does not include any data from these sources.

While CPS made some efforts to fulfill the 2011 state law provisions for intergovernmental coordination and analysis of the future community context of its schools, these efforts were incomplete, and occurred late in the process of developing and adopting its long-range facilities plan.
ASSESSING THE COSTS OF SCHOOL CLOSINGS AND SCHOOL ACTIONS

The Dollars and Cents of School Actions, Mass School Closings & Restructuring Chicago’s Schools

To understand the effects of CPS’ 2012 and 2013 School Actions, Closings and other decisions that the school board made to radically re-structure Chicago’s schools, there are several cost factors that need to be evaluated. Did the closings in fact result in operating budget savings for the school district? What were the logistical costs and expenses for implementing CPS’ decisions in 2012 and 2013? What did CPS spend on student support services during these School Transitions? What is the cost of maintaining, securing, and “re-purposing” CPS’ closed and vacant school buildings; or ultimately demolishing vacant schools? Has the presence of a closed school building impacted neighborhood safety and property values? What future community reinvestment or other benefits could result from repurposing these vacant schools? What were the capital costs of preparing the Welcoming Schools? In 2013, what was the cost to taxpayers for CPS’ student safety initiative, the “Safe Passage” Program?

Table 4: School Closing Costs Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Closing Costs Estimates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Improvements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>78,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welcoming School Investments Total</td>
<td>233,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Closing Logistics Contract</td>
<td>30,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL KNOWN COSTS TO DATE:</td>
<td>263,900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CPS’ 2012 School Actions, Closings and Turnarounds

When the state reform law went into effect in August 2011, CEO Jean-Claude Brizard’s administration took a “soft” approach to School Actions in the 2011-2012 School Year, and limited the number of outright school closings while approving 10 new Turnarounds. In 2012 the school district approved: Five School Closings, 3 Phase-Outs, 5 Co-Locations, and the 10 Turnarounds. According to CPS’ report to the CEFTF, these Actions and Turnarounds directly impacted 9,552 students.

Yet an accounting of the costs and savings associated with the Actions approved by the school board in February 2012 are to date unknown. CPS has yet to report on what resources or extra funding the district provided to support Student Transitions. Some estimates can be made, however, about the costs associated with the Turnarounds implemented by the Academy for Urban School Leadership, not only in 2012, but in subsequent years as well:
Weighing Costs and Benefits of the 2013 Mass School Closings

In the 2012-2013 School Year (“SY2013”), Chicago Public Schools’ leaders and the Board of Education argued that in terms of future planning, the district’s highest priority was to address a looming $1 Billion deficit; and to do so, the district needed to “right size” the system. This translated into “shrinking the footprint” of the district through mass school closings that CPS argued would save money, and then enable the district to redistribute its available limited resources to benefit the remaining schools’ students. Cost savings from closings would “free up” scarce educational dollars for the full school day and the enriched curriculum CPS wanted to provide. But the district also argued that school closings would “save” CPS hundreds of millions by closing facilities that needed major capital improvements.

At her October 30th, 2012 Press Conference, just two weeks after becoming CPS’ CEO, Barbara Byrd-Bennett announced that the district faced an “under-utilization crisis” and that large-scale school closings would be needed to address CPS’ budget deficit. She and Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel also announced the formation of a

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17 The Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL) charges CPS $300,000 plus $420 per student to manage each of the schools it runs.
special mayorally-appointed Utilization Commission to “study” the crisis and advise CPS on how to close schools. Moreover she announced that CPS would ask the General Assembly to give CPS more time to identify which specific under-utilized schools CPS could no longer afford to operate. Five weeks after her appointment by the Mayor, CEO Byrd-Bennett went to the state capitol seeking to amend the key deadlines in the 2011 reform law which had been enacted in large measure to prevent CPS from making last-minute decisions about school closings near the end of a School Year. CPS and the Mayor prevailed; CPS was granted a one-time extension of the deadline by which to announce proposed School Closings and other School Actions, from the original deadline of Dec. 1st annually, to March 31st, 2013.

In the 6 months following CPS’ October 30th, 2012 announcements until the May 2013 board approval of School Actions, the school district did not provide the state legislature, Chicago City Council or the public with a “cost/benefit” analysis of the price tag for school closings. CPS did not provide any data-driven evaluation of the costs and benefits to students, educators, communities, or taxpayers. As of the date of publication of this Report, CPS has not reported to the school board, the public, aldermen, or the General Assembly how much money the district saved as a result of closing 47 schools at once.

The figures that CPS did release -- estimates of “capital cost avoidance” savings that large-scale school closings would generate-- were later revised downward. The CEFTF and independent journalists examined the data CPS did publicly disclose, and found that CPS’ figures for the “capital cost avoidance” savings from closing under-utilized schools were overstated by at least $100 million (a conservative estimate). The CEFTF also found discrepancies in CPS’ facilities condition assessments and recent capital spending data that did not support CPS’ selection of schools to be closed, and which schools should be kept open, based on a criterion of “too expensive to maintain.” It should also be noted that the state-required School Action Guidelines and Criteria adopted and published by CPS used only “under-utilization” as a criterion for 2013 School Actions. “Too expensive to maintain” and academic performance measures were not included as criteria, even though members of the Board of Education and the Mayor later repeatedly cited these as justifications for the mass school closings:

“By consolidating these schools, we can focus on successfully transitioning every child into a better performing school close to their current school. Each welcoming school will have the things that parents, teachers and CPS agree students need, such as a library with new books and digital materials, air conditioning, computer and science technology upgrades, counseling and social work support.” - CPS CEO Barbara Byrd-Bennett

By January 2013 CPS officials had publicly conceded that whatever operating budget savings the district might realize from school closings would not reduce its $1 Billion deficit for the upcoming fiscal year, but would be gradually realized over several years.

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The Cost of Closing and Shuttering Schools: As documented in the media and CPS Board Reports, the school board approved changes twice to the contract with its outside logistics contractor that ultimately more than tripled the original contract amount from $8.9 million to $30.2 million\(^{20}\). The logistics contractor was responsible for emptying the closed schools of all contents and boarding them up. A top CPS official told the press that the contract amount soared because CPS discovered that there was “a lot more stuff” in the schools than the district had anticipated”: “The volume of stuff that we ended up moving was three times higher than we estimated it was going to be. It was stunning how much more was in the schools than we anticipated\(^{21}.\)” CPS’ feedback to the CEFTF is that: "The increasing value of the contract was explained in detail in the board reports authorizing the increases. In essence the increases were due to two factors: one, we [CPS] increased the scope of the agreement to include a significant number of additional schools and two, a significant increase in the volume of materials (furniture, IT, instructional, equipment) that required relocation and/or redistribution\(^{11}\)." The school district also maintains that this significant cost over-run did not compromise CPS finances, and that overall transition costs remain within what was “budgeted”. But it should be noted that CPS did not disclose a “budget” in advance for implementing the closings.

The Capital Costs of the 2013 School Closings: CPS promised major facility improvements and amenities to designated Welcoming Schools. The school board approved funds for these capital projects by adopting a FY2013 Supplemental Capital Budget in April 2013 – a month before approving the school closings. At the April 24, 2013 Chicago Board of Education meeting, CPS approved the FY13 Amended Capital Budget, but the amended board resolution\(^{22}\) does not explain where the new money is coming from and only states the following:

"**Section 4:** The Project. The Board has determined to undertake the acquisition, construction, reconstruction and rehabilitation of certain educational facilities, including, but not limited to the facilities identified in the Amended Capital Budget (the “Project”).

**Section 5:** Reimbursement. The Board reasonably expects to be reimbursed for such expenditures with proceeds of its debt. The maximum principal amount of debt expected to be issued for the reimbursement of such expenditures is $370,000,000 plus additional such amounts necessary to fund costs of issuance, underwriter’s discount and all other appropriate and allowable expenses.”

It should also be noted that the public had little notice and virtually no input into the changes in CPS’ 2013 capital budget.

The FY2013 CPS capital budget more than tripled as a result. Newly-approved capital projects for designated Welcoming Schools and related promised amenities added over $179 Million to the FY13 capital budget, and added an additional $51.3 Million for improvements at schools undergoing “Co-Locations.” While these schools eventually got the promised capital improvements to their physical plants, the CEFTF learned from CPS reports to the Task Force that in some cases, the promised repairs and upgrades were not completed for “Day One” of the 2013-14 School Year as initially promised. Construction continued in several buildings at least until December


2013. However, CPS maintains that any construction work that remained to be done after the opening of schools was minor. The CEFTF requested but has yet to receive a final report from CPS with an analysis of the projects’ costs (on, over or below budget) and completion dates.

CPS had to “fast-track” these previously unplanned and un-scheduled capital improvements because the Welcoming Schools were not in a condition to accommodate the influx of new students and programs, or had outstanding capital needs that CPS had not addressed in prior years. Amenities such as air conditioning and iPads also added to the increase in CPS’ FY2013 capital spending, specifically and only for this special set of Welcoming Schools. Meanwhile, other pressing facility repairs needed in other schools were not funded.

Examining CPS’ Capital Spending on Welcoming Schools: To implement the 2013 School Closings and Consolidations, CPS “fast tracked” facility repairs and upgrades to designated Welcoming Schools. The district maintains that these capital expenditures would have been needed in any case. However, the CEFTF raised concerns about how this decision impacted CPS’ overall long-range planning, the selection of the designated Welcoming Schools, and the implications for availability of capital dollars to address pressing facility needs at other schools around the district.

IN 2013, 13 OF CPS’ DESIGNATED ‘WELCOMING SCHOOLS’ NEEDED MORE CAPITAL INVESTMENT THAN DID the SCHOOLS that CPS CLOSED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woods</td>
<td>$12,517,000</td>
<td>Bass</td>
<td>$19,823,000</td>
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<td>Northwest MS</td>
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<td>$4,210,000</td>
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<td>$8,135,000</td>
<td>Burnham @ Lawrence</td>
<td>$13,903,000</td>
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<td>$7,010,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canter MS</td>
<td>$10,245,000</td>
<td>Ray</td>
<td>$17,140,000</td>
<td>-$6,328,000</td>
<td>$1,570,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 When CPS first published the “Cost to Maintain” figures in the release of the 2012-2013 Space Utilization report in November 2012, the district included the amount it would cost to “fully modernize” each school, which includes modern science and computer labs, a library, full air conditioning throughout the school, ADA upgrades and a playlot if these items did not already exist. Prior to the release of this data, capital improvement needs were only listed on the Capital Improvement website and mainly included structural repairs to the inside and outside of the school, unless a playlot or lab was planned. Thus, this new “Cost to Maintain” amount is significantly higher than any previously published capital needs for each school in the district. CPS then updated this “Cost to Maintain” amount in January 2013 and again in April 2013, before most schools received an updated facility assessment, leading many people to question how CPS calculated these costs. “‘Zero trust’ after CPS admits it overstated savings from closed schools,” Linda Lutton, WBEZ. May 6, 2013. [http://www.wbez.org/news/education/zero-trust-after-cps-admits-it-overstated-savings-closing-schools-107044](http://www.wbez.org/news/education/zero-trust-after-cps-admits-it-overstated-savings-closing-schools-107044).
###from 1996 (when CPS launched its capital program) to 2012, CPS INVESTED MORE THAN $196 MILLION IN THE SCHOOLS THAT WERE CLOSED in 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paderewski</td>
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<td>Castellanos MS</td>
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<td>$1,770,000</td>
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<td>Trumbull</td>
<td>$15,356,000</td>
<td>McPherson</td>
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<td>$4,800,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melody</td>
<td>$9,893,000</td>
<td>Melody @ Delano</td>
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<td>Hughes, C.</td>
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<td>Jensen</td>
<td>$13,797,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peabody</td>
<td>$10,901,000</td>
<td>Otis</td>
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<td>$1,910,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marconi</td>
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<td>Tilton</td>
<td>$15,457,000</td>
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<td>$3,580,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$120,840,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$178,581,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>-$53,847,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$35,110,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“Sunk Costs” and “Replacement Costs”:** There are other “hidden costs” associated with school closings. In infrastructure and public facilities management, governments routinely evaluate whether to continue to operate and upgrade facilities and other physical infrastructure, when to replace them, or when to “de-commission” them, i.e., dispose of them by weighing such factors as: How much investment has already been made by the taxpayers? This is commonly referred to as “sunk costs.” This is a “hidden cost” that the public often does not see. When substantial investment has already been made, governments are often cautious about discarding those public assets, how to recoup past public investment in them, and weigh carefully the decision to step away.

**Recent facility improvements made to schools that were closed in 2013 did not seem to be a mitigating factor.** Facility condition deficits of designated Welcoming Schools did not rule them out as the new schools to receive displaced students. The criterion “too expensive to maintain” was applied and frequently referenced by CPS’ CEO and other key staff to justify the closings of 47 school buildings, even though that metric was not included in CPS’ published 2013 CPS School Action Guidelines and Criteria²⁴. Instead the School Action Guidelines include a passing reference that the CEO “may” consider other information on the “quality of the school facility” in deciding whether to take an Action, i.e., close a school.

²⁴ The 2012-013 School Action Guidelines only mention that the CEO “may” consider other information, including “quality of school facility”.

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**Planning for the Future of Chicago’s Public Schools: CEFTF Report**

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Table 8: CPS CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE SCHOOLS CLOSED IN 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Facility 25 (relocation to closed school)</th>
<th>Total CIP to date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMSTRONG, L</td>
<td>$2,612,019</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATTUCKS</td>
<td>$4,181,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONTEMPS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUCKINGHAM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURNHAM* (Lawrence)</td>
<td>$2,013,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALHOUN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANTER MIDDLE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURTENAY* (Stockton)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE DUPREY / VON HUMBOLDT</td>
<td>$16,350,520</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>DODGE</td>
<td>$7,816,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRAKE* (Williams)</td>
<td>$9,809,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EARLE* (Goodlow)</td>
<td>$3,829,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMMET</td>
<td>$4,939,898</td>
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<td>FISKE* (Sexton)</td>
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<td>GOLDBLATT</td>
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<td>HENSON</td>
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<td>KING</td>
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<td>Kohn</td>
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<td>MORGAN</td>
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<td>NEAR NORTH</td>
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<td>PERSHING EAST</td>
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<tr>
<td>POPE</td>
<td>$1,377,190</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROSS</td>
<td>$11,904,281</td>
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</table>

25 Schools with an asterisk refer to schools that moved into and replaced a closed school, so the facility they left behind is the one that is closed.
### School Facility (relocation to closed school) Total CIP to date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Facility</th>
<th>Total CIP to date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SONGHAI</td>
<td>$1,329,015</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEWART</td>
<td>$3,142,036</td>
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<td>TRUMBULL</td>
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<td>WADSWORTH (Dumas)</td>
<td>$15,111,525</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARD, L</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WENTWORTH (Altgeld)</td>
<td>$4,986,264</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEST PULLMAN</td>
<td>$8,034,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOODS</td>
<td>$2,323,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YALE</td>
<td>$3,527,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$196,231,493</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Deciding Whether to Renew, Replace or Demolish

Facility managers and planners also ask, “Is the facility beyond its “useful life”? Is it so dilapidated that continuing to maintain and use it is ‘cost prohibitive’”? Will we “need a new one”? Is it more cost-effective for government to have taxpayers pay to replace the old with the new? When a publicly-owned and operated facility that taxpayers have paid for is beyond its useful life, then the local government responsible for that public asset must decide whether to replace the structure, or stop using it and just get rid of it (often referred to as “decommissioning”). If a facility is torn down, demolition costs, which can be substantial, need to be factored into long-range capital spending plans. However, CPS’ Master Plan does not provide any contingency plan or projected budget for demolition costs.

Research by CEFTF members found that CPS has spent a total of $70,553,936 on demolishing 51 schools, school structures and modules since 2000, with an average cost of $783,933. CPS’ audit, called the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR), states that some of the 47 schools that were closed in 2013 have been identified as needing to be demolished and that “CPS recorded a liability for the estimated demolition cost of $18.7 million.”

### Anticipating Future Replacement Costs

What if CPS needs to provide a school in one of these neighborhoods in the future? The typical “replacement cost” in Chicago for a Pre-K-8th Grade elementary school building is now in the range of $35-$50 million to build a new facility. If CPS should need to replace any of these closed schools in the next decade, the cost to do so will likely exceed today’s construction costs.

### The Costs of “Mothballing” Vacant Schools

An additional consideration in determining the costs and benefits of closing schools is the cost to the school district to maintain and secure vacant buildings. Again, CPS failed to include any cost estimates for this expense in its 10-Year Master Plan, even though the district already had a large

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inventory of empty school buildings, vacant lots, and other CPS properties prior to adding 43 additional vacated schools in 2013 to this “portfolio”.

**What will happen to Vacant Schools?** CPS did not have a plan or process in place for deciding the future of closed schools until ten months after the school board approved the closings. Even though the school district already had several vacant school buildings that had been empty for years, and anticipated closing up to 50 more buildings, the costs to the district and a strategy to address their sale or repurposing are issues that the CPS Facilities Master Plan failed to address.

CPS is now in the process of determining the “Repurposing” of its closed and now vacant school buildings, 43 of them from the 2013 mass closings. To determine what to do with the school buildings that CPS closed in 2013, the school district has now embraced the recommendations of the mayoral-appointed Advisory Committee on School Repurposing & Community Development published in February 2014. The core strategy is to sell off as many of the 43 school buildings identified for “repurposing” to third parties as quickly as possible. School buildings that are not sold to a new owner/operator for use as something other than a public school in the next three years are recommended to be demolished.

The CEFTF does not know the exact number of empty schools that CPS owns, because the full inventory of CPS’ facilities assets was not part of its September 2013 Facilities Master Plan, and CPS has not responded to requests from the Task Force for this information. However, based on CPS reports to the CEFTF on its earlier efforts to sell off “surplus real estate” provided to the Task Force in the Summer and Fall of 2013, there are at least 5 additional vacant school buildings being offered for sale.

CPS’ feedback to the CEFTF states that the district does not include closed schools in the EMFP because it is not mandated to do so:

> “The EFMP indicated that an Advisory Committee had been formed to recommend a framework and implementation plan for school repurposing, the type of information that this committee would review and consider, and described the nature of the recommendations that were expected to be made. While the plan did not list specific facts concerning each vacated building, this is something that has been made available to the CEFTF and the general public, and it could be considered for future revisions. **The statute governing the content of the EFMP required only that CPS provide information about facilities operated by the District over the next 10 years - not facilities that are closed**.”

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29 The “Surplus Property” Status Reports that the CEFTF did get out of CPS in the Fall of 2013 list some— but NOT ALL— of CPS’ other properties up for sale, which include vacant lots, closed administrative buildings, closed Parent Child Centers, and some of the schools that CPS closed years ago. We STILL DON’T HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY.
The viability of CPS’ process for repurposing and/or selling off closed school buildings remains to be demonstrated. The CEFTF members continue to express concern that the purchase price that CPS is likely to get for the 43 schools being considered for repurposing will not begin to make taxpayers “whole” financially, either for the sunk costs (capital investments the public has already paid for), or for potential future replacement costs. Demolition costs remain yet another budgetary “wild card” for CPS.

**Other major urban school districts have struggled to find buyers and new uses for closed schools**. In February 2013, the Pew Charitable Trust published a study about the struggles of 12 public school districts to sell off or somehow repurpose their shuttered schools. The study found that:

- “Since 2005, the 12 districts have sold, leased or reused a total of 267 properties and still have 301 unused sites on the market, empty buildings that can cast a pall over their neighborhoods and be costly to seal, maintain and insure. And the act of selling a vacant school building, even at a low price, does not guarantee successful reuse, only a change of ownership.”

- “Sale prices for most shuttered schools have been between $200,000 and $1 million, frequently well below initial projections. In Cincinnati, 11 buildings and one vacant parcel were sold at auction for a total of $3.5 million in 2012, far less than an official valuation.”

- “More than 40 percent of the sold, leased or reused properties have gone to charter schools, and yet there is disagreement over whether this is desirable.”

**Some CPS “surplus” buildings have remained unsold and vacant for over a decade.** Recently CPS got $4 Million for a school building in the Lincoln Park neighborhood that has been empty for 10 years. The school district has not published a projected revenue goal or estimate for the revenue that CPS might gain from selling off or repurposing Chicago’s shuttered schools. In its dialogue with CPS about the interaction of school closings and long-range planning, the CEFTF had pointed to the difficulties other school districts face in trying to sell empty school buildings. The Task Force had urged the school district to develop plans and policies about the disposition of vacant schools in its Master Plan, rather than waiting until after the school board’s decision to close more schools.

Now that CPS has set up a process (March 2014), the CEFTF has raised concerns about the lack of public input, lack of publicity about and the inadequate transparency in CPS’ system for repurposing. The CEFTF has also raised concerns about CPS’ emphasis on outright sales rather than having a more balanced approach that would include Joint Use Agreements and leasing these facilities for community benefit or by sister agencies based on careful and inclusive planning and public dialogue. The Task Force remains gravely concerned that CPS has embraced an ambitious time line recommended by the Mayor’s Repurposing Advisory Committee that would rush most of the closed schools to bidding for purchase by third parties by June 2014. While there is a sense of urgency by all parties to not have empty schools remain vacant for long periods of time, as has so often been the case

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around the nation, the strategy of maximizing quick sales may not prove successful, or indeed be the most effective strategy for returning these public facilities to beneficial use.

**Equitable Capital Investment and Sound Facility Management:** The 2011 state reform law attempted to address the need for greater transparency and fairness in CPS’ decision making about School Actions and School Closings, and CPS’ allocation of its always-scarce capital dollars. In examining the costs of CPS’ 2013 mass closings, the CEFTF concluded that the school district’s lack of transparency and fairness in maintaining and upgrading Chicago’s public school facilities came at a high price. CPS’ opaque system for “prioritizing” capital investments, and its history of inequitable capital spending and poor facility management created a convenient “self-fulfilling prophecy” of deteriorating facilities in some cases, thus setting up some of the closed schools to be labeled as “too expensive to maintain”. Yet at the same time, in other cases CPS ignored the higher “quality” of the school facility to be closed or the facility deficits of some Welcoming Schools. At the same time that CPS chose to designate some Welcoming Schools that were in worse condition than their associated closed schools, some of the closed schools in poorer condition had suffered from years of deferred maintenance and had not received significant capital investment by CPS (see Table 8: CPS’ Capital Investment in the Schools Closed in 2013).

The dramatic increase in CPS’ FY2013 capital budget in order to fast-track facility upgrades for Welcoming Schools that had not been previously planned, scheduled, or prioritized in the FY2013 capital budget or 2013-2017 5-Year Capital Improvement Plan also meant that Welcoming Schools’ improvement projects “leapfrogged” over other longstanding capital needs of other schools. Deferring capital improvements in other schools in the district will likely result in worsening facility conditions in those schools. CPS has not provided an analysis of how the “fast tracked” improvements for designated Welcoming Schools might affect the availability of capital funding for other schools with outstanding facility needs. It should also be noted that the 17 “non-designated” Welcoming Schools which had an influx of 25 or more displaced students (and received some additional Transition funding) did not receive any facility improvements.

**Costs of Supporting Students’ Transitions after School Closings:** In its 2013 “Draft School Transition Plans,” which the 2011 state reform law requires CPS to release with its list of proposed School Closings, the district did not provide specifics about what resources it planned to allocate to support students’ transitions. State law requires CPS to allocate resources to support Transitions for at least one full year after taking School Actions, including Closings. School Transition Plans must include CPS’ plans for providing transportation, programmatic and social/emotional supports and the services that students in transition need to ensure their safe and educationally successful integration into their new schools. (See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the “Provisions and Requirements of IL P.A. 97-0474 as Amended”.)

During the School Closing debate, CEFTF members pointed out that CPS’ reliance on largely “boiler-plate language” in its Draft Transition Plans did not adequately fulfill the transition planning requirement in State law. CPS did announce and heavily emphasized its initiative to provide a new “Safe Passage” program to address parents’ safety concerns about students’ routes to their new schools; however, initially a budget and details for “Safe Passage” were lacking. And over the Summer of 2013, CPS “Transition Teams” did develop more detailed Transition Plans for individual designated Welcoming Schools, that provide greater detail about the supports transitioning students are to receive.

**CPS’ New Transition Funding Initiative:** At the CEFTF’s May 13th, 2013 meeting, CPS officials announced that for the first time, the district would provide a “School Transition Discretionary Fund” of $20,000 up to $200,000 per
Welcoming School to support transitions. The CEFTF requested that CPS disclose the details of this new initiative, specifically how much funding each Welcoming School would receive. CPS did not disclose this information to the task force for another six months.

When thousands of students did not choose their designated Welcoming School, but instead enrolled at other CPS schools, the district allocated approximately $527,000 to “non-designated” Welcoming schools that had enrolled 25 or more students from closed schools, to support and ease their new students’ transitions. The CEFTF took the initiative to advocate with CPS to provide this transition support to non-designated Welcoming Schools.

Table 9: Funds for 2013 School Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Total FY 2013</th>
<th>Total FY2014</th>
<th>Combined Total</th>
<th>Number of Schools (CPS Depts.)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>$485,141</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welcoming School</td>
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<td>Non-Designated Welcoming School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-Locations</td>
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<td>$142,914</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Office</td>
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<td>$68,270,185</td>
<td>$83,511,829</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CPS Interactive Budget\(^{32}\). Fund Group = School Transitions

In tracking CPS’ discretionary School Transition spending, the CEFTF discovered that there were 9 additional schools that enrolled 25 or more displaced students but did not receive School Transition funding.

\(^{32}\) [https://supplier.csc.cps.k12.il.us/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard](https://supplier.csc.cps.k12.il.us/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard)
ASSESSING IMPACTS OF SCHOOL ACTIONS & CLOSINGS ON STUDENTS

The impetus for the 2011 state reform law was a broad consensus that the most important question to ask when the school district takes drastic School Actions is, “Will CPS’ School Actions—including and especially School Closings—help students?” The state law charges the CEFTF with evaluating CPS’ facility-related decisions, including the effects of School Actions. The Task Force has consistently focused on trying to understand how students and schools have been impacted by CPS’ decisions to close or otherwise intervene in struggling schools.

Three years after the state reforms, CPS still does not have Board policies or clear procedures in place to evaluate the student-level impacts of school actions or the efficacy of its School Transition efforts in a systematic or timely manner. At the time of the 2012 Actions, the CEFTF urged CPS to work with the Task Force, educators, and parents to develop a meaningful evaluation tool to assess how students fare academically and adjust to their new settings in the wake of closures and other Actions. The Task Force urged that CPS evaluate educational and social/emotional well-being outcomes on the student-level.

In the wake of the 2012 School Actions, Closings and Turnarounds, the CEFTF posed two basic questions to CPS: “Where are the students now, and how are they doing?” In 2012, and even now, CPS had no policies or procedures to protect students academically. Notably, at the time of the 2012 Actions, the CEFTF counseled the school district to refrain from taking additional School Actions until the likely impacts on students could be assessed and made clear by the results of a comprehensive evaluation of past Actions. In short, the CEFTF urged CPS to carefully evaluate whether its interventions were benefitting students.

In the absence of such an evaluation tool, after the 2012 round of CPS School Actions, the CEFTF requested that CPS provide the Task Force with a “School Transition Report” that at a minimum, analyzed the re-assignment patterns for impacted students and at a minimum answer the question, “Where are they now?”

CPS did not provide that analysis to the CEFTF until February 11, 2013.

Student Impacts of CPS’ 2012 Actions and Turnarounds

CPS’ first set of “School Actions” approved after passage of the state reforms included Phase-Outs, Closings, Consolidations, Co-Locations, and related Attendance Area Boundary Changes triggered by the other Actions taken by the school board. Additionally, ten new “Turnarounds” were approved by the Board in February 2012, the highest number ever approved in a single year. Under the “Turnaround” intervention, CPS fires all adults in a school and turns over the school to a new management team. In 2012, CPS had an internal department that took over 4 struggling schools; while the school board gave management control of 6 other schools to the “Academy for Urban School Leadership,” a private non-profit organization which is the only outside group that CPS uses for Turnarounds. In 2012, 6,290 students were impacted by the 10 approved Turnarounds.

Given that two-thirds of all students affected by the school board’s interventions in 2012 were impacted by Turnarounds, the Task Force requested data on them from CPS. While Turnarounds were excluded from the reform law’s definition of “School Action” at the school district’s request, CPS has significantly increased the number of Turnaround interventions since 2006.
On November 1, 2011 CPS issued its first Draft School Actions Guidelines as required by state law. On December 1, 2011 the CPS CEO announced Proposed Actions, and followed the statutory time line for public hearings overseen by “Independent Hearing Officers” for the first time.

In January 2012, the Task Force issued Findings and Recommendations about the process CPS implemented. The CEFTF identified: A lack of specific, system-wide and clear criteria for each type of proposed School Action; resistance on CPS’ part to permit full stakeholder participation in decision making; the targeting of schools on Chicago’s West and South sides which were overwhelmingly both poor and African American in student composition; inadequate transition planning to ensure students’ safe and successful transitions to what were then called “Receiving” schools (“Welcoming Schools”); the absence of any evaluation of the student-level and school-wide impacts of past School Actions—even as CPS procrastinated on developing a process for drafting a 10-Year Educational Facilities Master Plan.

The most vulnerable students were destabilized: Homeless students were particularly affected. Cumulative years of school closings had already significantly undercut the school retention and stability requirements of the Federal McKinney-Bento Homeless Assistance Act. Prior CPS Actions and those approved in 2012 greatly impaired the legal right of homeless students to remain at their “home” schools (the school in which a homeless student was originally enrolled) as called for in the McKinney-Bento Act. By 2012, hundreds of homeless students had experienced repeated displacement and school re-assignments. Even as these concerns emerged, CPS further diminished the school choices, transportation options and services which had been promised to homeless students since the district’s 2004 agreement in the case of Salazar v. Edwards.

CPS did not provide the CEFTF with its analysis of the 2012 School Actions until a year after the school board acted (February 2012). When CPS finally provided an analysis of student re-assignment in February 2013, the Task Force learned that approximately 9,500 students across 23 schools had been directly impacted. It is important to note that, then as now, CPS did not “count” students in Welcoming (receiving) Schools as being “impacted” by School Actions.

Continuity and Stability for Students Impacted by Turnarounds: Other than giving management of a handful of schools to its now-defunct internal “Office of School Improvement,” CPS has relied exclusively on the Academy for Urban School Leadership to implement Turnarounds. Under AUSL-run Turnarounds, the principal and every teacher in a Turnaround school is fired, and replaced by hand-picked AUSL trainees. Over the past 8 years, AUSL

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has taken over 32 academically struggling public schools in recent years (AUSL currently manages 29 schools). Since Turnarounds are not included in the state’s statutory definition of “School Actions,” schools proposed for Turnarounds have fewer opportunities for public input and their students have fewer protections during the School Transition process. CPS is not required by state law to develop School Transition Plans for Turnarounds. However, based on CPS’ 2012 Report to the CEFTF, it is not entirely clear whether (or how many of) the very students that CPS intended to benefit from the Turnaround intervention stayed in place. It is not known how much impact the replacement of the principal, faculty and other adults with whom children and families had established trust, may have had on parents’ decisions not to keep their student in the school after CPS turned it over to AUSL.

From extensive public testimony to the CEFTF and at CPS Board meetings, we do know that parents and stakeholders have consistently pleaded for the school district to support whole school change led by the elected Local School Councils, parents and educators in place, rather than impose a Turnaround. They have asked CPS to allocate the comparable resources that AUSL receives, to support their local proposals for school improvement. Parents have testified in favor of a parent and educator driven and inclusive whole-school change strategy (rather than AUSL) because in part, they say that they want stability and continuity for their children. A key objection to the Turnaround model that was cited in parents’ testimonies is that it severs the teacher-student relationship and trust that had been established between families and their students’ teachers over time. A recent Catalyst Chicago analysis of Illinois State Teacher Service Records and CPS employee rosters found that:

- **“At 16 of the 17 schools that underwent a turnaround between 2007 and 2011, more than half of teachers hired in the first year of the turnaround left by the third year.”**

- **“Among all turnarounds, an average of two-thirds of new teachers left by year three, an attrition rate that is higher than for CPS overall—even among low-achieving, high-poverty, predominantly minority schools that typically have high turnover.”**

- **“The troubling trend has continued among newer turnarounds. In the 10 schools that were turned around last year (the 2012-2013 school year) a third of the faculty left by the start of the current school year. In comparison, only 7 percent of CPS schools have a third of teachers leave in one year.”**

In examining the district-wide rate for teachers leaving, the Catalyst’s researchers found that, “On average, the year-over-year turnover rate in CPS is 18 percent.” Yet CPS has never conducted an evaluation of how AUSL’s high teacher turn-over rate affects students in their Turnaround schools.

**“Missing” Students and Student Attrition:** According to CPS’ own data, after the 2012 School Actions and Turnarounds, over 430 students left the school district, dropped out or didn’t arrive for the 1st day of school in the new school year. Of the students from the 4 schools that closed outright that year, less than half – 47.8% -- elected to enroll in CPS’ designated “Welcoming” schools. In 2012, CPS did not provide additional funding to non-designated Welcoming Schools that enrolled displaced students. Only a handful of impacted students – 6.2% - enrolled in Charter Schools\(^34\).

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\(^34\) 02.11.13 Office of Accountability Report to the CEFTF.
Table 10: “Missing” Students – CPS’ 2012 School Actions and Turnarounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Students</th>
<th>Enrolled in CPS SY13</th>
<th>Transferred out of CPS</th>
<th>Did not arrive 1st day</th>
<th>Transferred to another CPS school but did not arrive</th>
<th>Dropped out/unable to locate</th>
<th>Total Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closings and co-locations</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnarounds</td>
<td>4916</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SY12 School Actions</td>
<td>6319</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: ENROLLMENT OF STUDENTS AFFECTED BY 2012 SY ACTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th># Students who Left before EOY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guggenheim</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lathrop</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the 10 Turnaround Schools, there was significant attrition at rates higher than district-wide averages. A Turnaround is intended as an “alternative” to closing the school outright, and aims to retain all of the current students in place while bringing in a new principal, faculty and adult staff “on-site.” The stated intent of this model is to create a new and better learning environment for the struggling students who need help the most. But CPS’ 2012 Report showed significant turnover of students at these schools: Student retention at AUSL’s 2012 six new Turnarounds ranged from 75% to 85%; while the 4 Turnarounds managed by CPS’ Internal “Office of School Improvement” retained between 76% to 88% of the students enrolled prior to the intervention. In short, the Turnarounds “lost” anywhere from 12-25% of the students they were intended to serve.

The Goal of Greater Community Input into School Actions was not achieved in 2012: One of the key goals of the 2011 reforms was to increase community, parental, and educator input into CPS’ decisions about whether to take School Actions, and if so, how to implement them. The hope was that greater inclusion in these decisions would help to mitigate students’ anxieties; smooth any transitions that did occur; and ensure that if re-assigned to a different school, students would be provided with better educational opportunities and outcomes.

But controversy has accompanied CPS’ implementation of the “due process” and community input requirements in P.A. 97-0474. The public had (and still has) many questions about what the law means: What must CPS do to demonstrate that affected families had input into the state-mandated School Transition Plans? Do “boiler plate” Draft School Transition Plans violate the law? Were CPS’ School Transition Plans sufficient to assure the successful educational and social transition of students to their “new” schools? Did CPS take sufficient public input – both from the families of impacted students and from the Welcoming Schools – to know what type and what level of resources would be needed to effectively and adequately support students in transition? Why wouldn’t CPS hold
“Community Meetings” in the school proposed for Actions, or hold at least one of the 3 required input meetings at the proposed Welcoming School? What is the test that CPS’ School Actions Criteria/Guidelines meet the state law’s requirements? Why weren’t there School Action criteria for each type of possible School Action? Does CPS have to “listen to” the Independent Hearing Officers that state law now requires CPS to use to conduct the formal public hearing on Proposed School Actions?

In 2012 the CEFTF documented that some CPS staff tried to circumvent the newly required public input process by leading parents at one school to believe that the Board had already decided to close their school before any hearings were held. At Guggenheim Elementary School in Englewood, parents were “advised” that no teachers would be available for the second semester. Students were transferred out of the school during the December 2011 Winter holiday vacation— even though Hearings were not scheduled until January 2012.

As for school community input into the 2012 School Transition Plans required by the 2011 state reform law, the Task Force was not able to find evidence that families and educators in any of the schools proposed for Actions, or in the proposed Welcoming Schools, had any input into developing them.

After taking extensive public testimony and directly observing CPS’ process, the CEFTF recommended changes in School Actions hearings; detailed, system-wide, evidence-based criteria for each type of proposed School Action; more detailed and inclusive planning for School Transitions; and without further delay, that CPS launch a robust public engagement effort to develop the long-term plan. The CEFTF took the position that pursuing School Actions before developing a long-range plan could be harmful and counter-productive.

Task Force members communicated to CPS that the intent of the state’s requirement that CPS have written School Action Guidelines and Criteria and a framework for robust public input into CPS’ School Action decisions, was to create a system of transparency and due process which includes parents and stakeholders as decision-makers. In no way is the statutory stipulation that CPS must have written Guidelines for School Actions intended to encourage CPS to take School Actions every year.

In 2012, the majority of impacted students did not enroll the following school year in higher-performing schools; by definition CPS approved Turnarounds at schools that the district rated as being at its lowest performance level. Analysis of academic progress of these schools since the Turnarounds were implemented was not available at the time of this report.

The only study evaluating the effects of school closures and other actions at the time (2011-2012) had been done by the University of Chicago’s Consortium on Chicago School Research in 2009. CCSR’s study showed that students only benefitted educationally from school closings if they were re-assigned to a “significantly higher-performing” school35.

35 “…CPS has defined “better” very differently than the Consortium. Marisa de la Torre, the author of the Consortium’s school closings study, said in order for students to get better academic results, the closings would have to result in students going to schools in the top quartile of all CPS schools.” When Schools Closed: Effects on Displaced Students in Chicago Public Schools (2009). University of Chicago Consortium on Chicago School Research. Retrieved from: http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/publications/CCSRSchoolClosings-Final.pdf
It remains unclear whether the majority of students impacted by the 2012 School Actions and Turnarounds remained in the school in which they re-enrolled the next school year; or how they are faring academically or in terms of social/emotional adjustment today.

**The 2013 Mass School Closings**

To its credit, and in large part due to the requirements imposed by the state reform law, CPS invested more time, money, staff and effort in carrying out the School Transitions for the students impacted by the 2013 mass closings than it had ever expended in any previous round of School Actions. CPS implemented a “Safe Passage” program to try to address the challenges facing students who would now have to attend school in unfamiliar neighborhoods, and areas where rival gangs created a climate of danger for children crossing their territories. A special team of in-house staff and outside consultants was put in place to manage the logistics of emptying out the closed buildings. Retired principals were hired to work with “Welcoming School” principals on Transition planning and student integration. For the first time, CPS encouraged outreach activities and events to try to bring together families and students from the closed and their designated Welcoming Schools. In its feedback to the CEFTF’s concerns about the initial lack of detail in the 2013 Draft School Transition Plans, CPS states:

"...[A]fter the vote [to approve the 2013 closings], each school had a Principal Transition Coordinator (PTF) that worked with the leadership at closing and welcoming schools to build a Welcoming Team to create the school-specific plan of support. The Welcoming Team consisted of 3 staff and 3 parents from each school. This group met throughout the spring to talk through what they value about each school, what their concerns are and how to move forward in designing a new school community."

"When we [CPS] announce [proposed School Actions], we are only required to proposed a draft transition plan. It is then our responsibility to update the draft as actions are approved. This was done and heavily impacted by local input as principals and their teams wrote the vast majority of certain sections. Updated transition plans include dozens of pages specific to the school outlining their academic and social/emotional plans. The updated plans are online at the cps.edu/qualityschools/pages/parents.aspx."

CPS’ new “Transition” Discretionary Fund allocated additional monies to designated Welcoming Schools. When the district realized that once again (as in 2012), that large numbers of directly impacted students were not enrolling in CPS’ designated Welcoming Schools, the Transition Fund initiative was expanded to allocate some additional financial support to “non-designated Welcoming Schools”--schools that enrolled 25 or more students from closed schools. To date CPS has not reported how designated and non-designated Welcoming Schools used their discretionary transition funding, or whether these dollars are being spent for ongoing social/emotional support services or academic purposes during this first year of students’ transitions.

The results of CPS’ expanded transition efforts appear to have been successful in some cases, but uneven, according to anecdotal evidence provided by impacted families to the CEFTF. Additionally, the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless (CCH) found that while additional teams of outside “facilitators” were hired to support homeless students’ transitions, their training was hurried and inadequate. Few services or activities were offered for homeless students over the summer of 2013 prior to students’ transition to Welcoming Schools. Many homeless families reported to CCH that there was little advance preparation for the Fall 2013 semester; i.e., no transportation arrangements, clearly assigned classes, sports, tutoring or other supports were put in place in advance. Rather, these families were told to simply show up in the Fall at their child’s new school and ask again for those services.
CPS needs to track and evaluate how Designated and “Non-Designated” Welcoming Schools spent their School Transition funds: CPS has reported that overall, the district spent $78 million for “programmatic and other supports” in designated Welcoming Schools and those non-designated Welcoming Schools that enrolled 25 or more displaced students. CPS has not published an expenditure report for the use of these dollars yet, but the most important consideration is to assess whether and how these extra resources supported students in transition. Were these discretionary dollars used in ways that helped displaced students succeed in their new schools?

There are two conflicting data sources for the transition funds. One is the CPS Interactive Budget, which is an online database for the entire district’s annual operating budget. This database has a fund category entitled “School Transitions.” This budget includes “Co-Locations”, schools that share a facility with other public schools and charter schools. The second data source is CPS’ Report on Transition Funding provided to the CEFTF (November 14, 2013 meeting). In that report, CPS stated that designated Welcoming Schools were allocated $192.45 per student; and non-designated Welcoming Schools received $524.47 per student. The funding was to be programmed at the Welcoming School’s discretion to support the School transitions. CPS encouraged Welcoming Schools to organize picnics and other events for the staff, students and parents of the closing and receiving schools to get to know each other. It is not yet been reported as to how these funds were utilized; if or in which Welcoming Schools any of the discretionary spending went to support services for vulnerable students, or to instructional support for the students in transition; and how much money may have been spent on “meet and greet” events.

Without full disclosure, transparent information sharing, and a thorough evaluation of School Transitions by CPS, it remains unclear whether and how well the school district delivered the promised transition services.

IN 2013, THE MASS SCHOOL CLOSINGS DIRECTLY IMPACTED 11,729 STUDENTS.

BUT, BASED ON CPS’ ATTENDANCE and ENROLLMENT FIGURES FROM THE 20TH DAY OF SY 2013-14, ONLY 10,882 ENROLLED IN CPS.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OTHER 871 CHILDREN?

Student Reassignment: Where exactly did students from closed schools go? Based on the data CPS provided to the CEFTF in February 2014, on average about 58% of all students directly impacted by CPS’ 2013 school closings enrolled in a CPS-designated Welcoming School. However, this figure varied greatly from case to case. In some instances, less than 25% of impacted students chose to enroll in CPS’ designated Welcoming School36. Moreover, as explained in greater detail in Table 12 below, hundreds of directly impacted students from schools that are now closed are no longer in any CPS school.

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36 CEFTF Update on SY 2013 Actions. Q1 Update. February 24, 2014
### Table 12: Analysis of Student Assignment for All Students Impacted by 2013 Closings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Closed School Name</th>
<th>N of Impacted Students</th>
<th>N of Enrolled and Active Students</th>
<th>N at Designated New School</th>
<th>N at Designated from School Reports</th>
<th>% Actively Enrolled at Designated per CPS (=D2/C2)</th>
<th>% Actively Enrolled per School Reports (=E2/C2)</th>
<th>% of Actively Enrolled at Designated School (=E2/B2)</th>
<th>% Impacted at Designated School (=E2/B2)</th>
<th>N Left CPS</th>
<th>N Missing</th>
<th>Total Left CPS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altgeld</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>76.20%</td>
<td>75.60%</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armstrong L</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57.80%</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banneker</td>
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<td>228</td>
<td>226</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>Bethune</td>
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<td>Delano</td>
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<td>287</td>
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<td>245</td>
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<td>55.30%</td>
<td>50.30%</td>
<td>50.30%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>78.50%</td>
<td>66.10%</td>
<td>60.60%</td>
<td>60.60%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>78.50%</td>
<td>78.20%</td>
<td>73.60%</td>
<td>73.60%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marconi</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>44.80%</td>
<td>41.40%</td>
<td>36.40%</td>
<td>36.40%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>77.90%</td>
<td>77.90%</td>
<td>74.00%</td>
<td>74.00%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>78.70%</td>
<td>77.70%</td>
<td>72.00%</td>
<td>72.00%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>74.30%</td>
<td>66.70%</td>
<td>60.10%</td>
<td>60.10%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near North</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>98.20%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overton</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>60.50%</td>
<td>51.00%</td>
<td>46.30%</td>
<td>46.30%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owens</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>81.50%</td>
<td>81.10%</td>
<td>70.60%</td>
<td>70.60%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paderewski</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42.10%</td>
<td>42.10%</td>
<td>39.30%</td>
<td>39.30%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkman</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>47.80%</td>
<td>41.00%</td>
<td>36.50%</td>
<td>36.50%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peabody</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>77.50%</td>
<td>77.00%</td>
<td>76.30%</td>
<td>76.30%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Not to Charters: It should also be noted that even fewer of the students impacted by the 2013 School Closings chose to enroll in Charter Schools than had enrolled in Charters after the 2012 School Actions and Turnarounds – only 4.6% in 2013, as compared with 6.2% in 2012.

The “Diaspora” Effect: Thousands of students scattered and enrolled in dozens of other schools which CPS had not chosen to be the official Welcoming School’ for them. CPS officials believe that this was a positive sign of parents choosing different options for their children:

"...while students were provided with a designated welcoming school and a new "neighborhood school" to which they would be assigned if they did not exercise other options, that CPS also supported students in finding other options if they thought some other school suited them better and expected that some student would make choices to go to schools other than the welcoming school. We focused investments and supports on the designated welcoming schools, and also directed additional funds to schools that were not designated as official welcoming schools, but which were schools in which many students chose to enroll... Our figures indicated that in 2013, 73% of the students from a closed school that re-enrolled at CPS went either to a designated welcoming school or to Kellman - which, while not officially designated as a "welcoming school," was moved into the Bethune building, in response to community
feedback, and was opened back up to enrollment to provide the students from the closed school to return to their former building. This is one example of CPS responding to community concerns and the requests of elected officials, not a sign of poor planning, as the CEFTF would lead the public and legislators to believe."

**Designated Welcoming Schools had Transition Teams, Non-Designated Welcoming Schools did not:** This dispersion of students across the city led CPS to give some “non-designated’ Welcoming Schools additional funds to ease transitions. This expanded effort on CPS’ part was laudable but unplanned, and the uses and effects of the additional funding are not known. The arrival of displaced students at so many additional schools was also not anticipated by those principals, and the question must be asked: How did this influx of unexpected transfer students from closed schools affect the non-designated Welcoming Schools? Were these unanticipated enrollments disruptive? How are these schools coping? The impacts of integrating new students at both Welcoming and non-designated Welcoming Schools—including those that did not receive Transition funding—need to be carefully studied, tracked, and evaluated by the school district.

**Table 13: CPS WELCOMING SCHOOLS THAT ENROLLED THE FEWEST STUDENTS FROM CLOSED SCHOOLS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Closed School</th>
<th># Impacted Students</th>
<th>Total Enrolled</th>
<th>% at Designated School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henson</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethune</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pope</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bontemps</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pullman</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near North</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marconi</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkman</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songhai</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paderewski</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garfield Park</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckingham</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woods</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overton</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DuPrey</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calhoun</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldblatt</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohn</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CPS Office of Accountability—Based on Enrollments as of the 20th Day of SY 2013-14

**Once again (as in 2012) CPS isn’t sure about what happened to hundreds of students:** CPS does not want to talk about the 322 students who went “missing” during the 2013 transitions. In addition to the students who had not shown up for the 2014 School Year, 549 left the district. Altogether, 871 students are no longer enrolled in CPS, a
district that is already losing so many students every year that declining enrollment prompted the district to close schools.

In CPS’ February 24, 2014 Report to the CEFTF on the 2013 School Actions and Transitions, district officials only highlighted the number of students who “left” the district; when questioned by Task Force members, CPS staff would not discuss the number of students that were lost. It was only after inputting all of the data from CPS’ Feb. 24th, 2014 Report that the CEFTF was able to calculate that 322 students were lost from the system, similar in scale to the number of students who did not show up after the School Actions were approved in SY2012.

While it may seem insignificant that 3% of the students went missing, it is not insignificant in light of the fact that these are elementary school age children who should have been cared for by the district and who need to be in school. Every child is important and valuable. If a child was “lost” on a field trip, the school would be held liable. Below is the list of schools that “lost” the greatest number of children:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Total Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>King</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohn</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pullman</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkman</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altgeld</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodlow</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmet</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henson</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldblatt</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overton</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Impacts on Chicago’s Most Vulnerable Kids: Homeless and At-Risk Students

Chicago Public Schools’ most vulnerable students were hard hit once again by the 2013 School Closings as well as by previous CPS School Actions. In working with the CEFTF in assessing student impacts of the 2013 Closings, the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless looked at poverty and homelessness rates for all students enrolled in both the closed and designated Welcoming Schools and found that homeless, Minority and low-income children were disproportionately impacted:

- 88 percent were African American, and 93 percent were low-income, as compared to 42% African American and 85% low-income for the school district as a whole.
- 8 percent were homeless, while students experiencing homelessness constituted only around 4 percent of CPS’ overall student population.
Research has shown that the combination of high residential mobility and school mobility can have particularly devastating effects on learning and behavior for children living in poverty and those who are experiencing homelessness. Some research\(^37\) suggests that homeless students suffer from significantly higher rates of trauma, chronic illness, hunger and learning disabilities than do other students.

**Schools with high concentrations of homeless students were not spared. Nor were vulnerable student populations who had previously experienced displacement and reassignment to different schools due to previous CPS School Actions.** For example, Crispus Attucks Elementary in Chicago’s Bronzeville community had been relocated by CPS Actions twice before. In 2013, Attucks had 131 identified homeless students when CPS consolidated the school with Beethoven Elementary—which already had 74 identified homeless students. Beethoven had previously served as a Welcoming School and had already had an influx of additional homeless students because of a CPS School Action\(^38\).

In December 2013, the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless (CCH) conducted a statewide survey that asked public school districts and Regional Offices of Education about the level of services reaching children and teens identified as homeless students. The Coalition has served on the CEFTF since the inception of the Task Force in 2010. Sixty-seven percent of Survey recipients, 36 of 54 sub-grantees under the federal McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, responded to CCH’s survey. CCH’s key findings include:

- 52% responded that more than half of their homeless students do not receive needed tutoring or access to preschool.
- 56% said that less than half of homeless students received counseling.
- 44% said their staffing capacity to identify and enroll homeless students is limited or very limited.
- 21% responded that less than half of homeless students get transportation assistance to get to and from school.

The Illinois State Board of Education has proposed to restore $3 million in FY2015 state funding for grants to school districts for services to homeless students, but the proposal must still be approved by the Governor and the General Assembly. Funding was awarded for only one year, during FY09, though homeless enrollment in schools across Illinois has more than doubled over the past five years to 54,892 in the last school year (2012-13\(^39\)).

**In providing feedback to the CEFTF, CPS maintains that there was no true disparate impact on vulnerable children.** Instead CPS states that:

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\(^38\) School Year 2012-13 school-by-school figures for homeless students, based upon the CPS data available in 2013 are charted at: [http://www.chicagohomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Closings-Charts-Revised.pdf](http://www.chicagohomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Closings-Charts-Revised.pdf)

“(1) the population of school aged children in several African-American communities in Chicago dropped by 25-40% between the 2000 and 2010 census; (2) CPS' reinvestments into facility upgrades, technology upgrades, academic investments, and social and emotional investments were directed at these same communities; (3) CPS provided specialized supports to Students in Temporary Living Situations, English Language Learners, and Students with IEPs; (4) that the interim report indicated that the students in these priority groups are faring well.”

See Appendix F for the CPS CEO's March 26, 2014 “Mid Year School Consolidation Report” to school board members in its entirety. It is important to note that the CEO's Report is not published on the Board of Education website, or CPS’ general website.

**Academic Performance of Closed and Welcoming Schools**

**Do We Know How the Students Are Doing Now?** While CPS' opening argument for mass school closings was a crisis of “under-utilization” – just “too many” schools and “seats” for the number of students -- ultimately, CPS made several key arguments to justify them: Reduce the district’s operating and capital costs, redistribute scarce resources to remaining schools, and send students to “better” schools.

While academic performance was not a criterion in the CPS CEO’s published School Actions Guidelines and Criteria, CPS' Board members and the Mayor repeatedly cited the need to “rescue” children from “failing schools”, and promised that school closings would result in a better education for both impacted students and students throughout the school district. State law provides only that when the school district takes School Actions, CPS must offer impacted students “options” to attend a higher-performing school.

The Consortium on Chicago School Research’s 2009 study on the impacts of school closings had found that students only benefit academically when they move to a “dramatically” higher performing school⁴⁰. The CEFTF attempted to assess whether students impacted by the 2013 mass school closings did in fact gain access to a higher-performing school, and how to measure whether their new schools are “significantly” higher performing.

The **Task Force found that CPS' own data show that CPS did not always send children to significantly higher-performing schools**. Some of the closed schools were ranked at “Level 2” on CPS' academic accountability scale; while 21 Welcoming Schools were already on academic probation, or “Level 3”. Moreover, in 2013, CPS introduced a new Academic Accountability scale that is being implemented in SY 2014-15. So the public will not know how the latest round of school closings impacted the academic progress of Welcoming Schools for some time; and when CPS releases those rankings, the district will be using a non-comparable metric. Moreover the data will be aggregated at the whole school level, rather than tracking student-level outcomes.

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IN 21 CASES, CPS SENT STUDENTS FROM CLOSED SCHOOLS TO SCHOOLS ON ACADEMIC PROBATION. WHILE CPS DOES NOT COUNT STUDENTS AT WELCOMING SCHOOLS AS “IMPACTED,” HOW WILL THE INTEGRATED STUDENT POPULATIONS AT THESE ALREADY-STRUGGLING SCHOOLS FARE ACADEMICALLY OVER TIME?

11 CLOSED SCHOOLS WERE NOT ON PROBATION, BUT WERE AT “LEVEL 2” ON CPS’ 2013 ACADEMIC ACCOUNTABILITY SCALE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 15: Enrollment of students impacted by 2013 Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated welcoming schools on probation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated welcoming schools on probation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SY2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students from closed schools enrolled in designated schools on probation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students from closed schools enrolled in any school on probation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the chart above shows, over half of the students from the 2013 school actions are currently enrolled at a school on academic probation. The graph below shows that some students from closed school are enrolled in Level 1 schools, which is a positive outcome for some of the students impacted by the school closings. However, 80% of the students are in Level 2 or Level 3 schools.

**Figure 7: Comparison of Academic Performance of Closed and Welcoming Schools**

Summary of Student Enrollment by School Performance: Below is a summary of the number of students who are now enrolled at schools that have a higher or lower percentage point total on CPS’ annual Performance Policy. The University of Chicago CCSR 2009 study on school closings stated that students would need to attend a school
that is in the top quartile on standardized tests in order to experience a positive academic effect from moving to a new school as a result of a school closing. The table below analyzes schools’ entire CPS Performance Policy score, which includes the standardized test, attendance, and “value-added” gains in reading and math. CPS used these criteria in determining if the welcoming school was “better performing.\(^{41}\)

**Table 16: Academic Criteria Welcoming Schools for 2013 School Actions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Criteria</th>
<th># Students</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total at worse performing</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total whose designated welcoming school had lower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance policy percentage points</td>
<td>2,298</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total whose designated welcoming school is similarly</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total at slightly better performing (&gt;2 - 8 % pts higher)</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total at better performing (&gt;10 % pts higher)</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total at significantly better performing (&gt;20% pts)</td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total impacted</td>
<td>11,729</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enrolled</td>
<td>10,858</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total left the district</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total missing</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Continuing Support for Transitions:** CPS gives Charter schools and AUSL Turnaround Schools 5 years to demonstrate growth in student achievement. Will Welcoming Schools continue to get comparable support and patience?

As of the publication of this Report, It is unclear whether CPS will provide Welcoming and non-designated Welcoming Schools with additional funding after this year. In fact Welcoming Schools may lose funding next year as CPS’ “Student Based Budgeting” comes into full effect, especially at those Welcoming Schools that did not attract as many students as CPS initially projected and planned for in its “matching” of closed and Welcoming

\(^{41}\) “Higher performing school” means:

1. receiving a higher level on the Performance Policy for the 2011-2012 school year, or
2. if the 2011-2012 school year level on the Performance Policy is equal, higher performing means performing higher on the majority of the following metrics:
   - for elementary schools – for the 2011-2012 school year, percentage of points on the Performance Policy, ISAT composite meets or exceeds score, Value Added reading, and Value Added math,
   - for high schools – for the 2011-2012 school year, percentage of points on the Performance Policy, PSAE composite meets or exceeds score, EPAS gains percentile in reading, and EPAS gains percentile in math, or
3. for elementary schools, if the 2011-2012 school year level on the Performance Policy is equal and the school does not have Value Added metrics, higher performing means a higher percentage of points on the Performance Policy and a higher ISAT meets or exceeds score for the 2011-2012 school year, or
4. for high schools, if the 2011-2012 school year level on the Performance Policy is equal and the school does not have EPAS metrics, higher performing means a higher percentage of points on the Performance Policy and a higher PSAE composite meets or exceeds score.

Retrieved from: [http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Pages/2013GuidelinesforSchoolActions.aspx](http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Pages/2013GuidelinesforSchoolActions.aspx)
Schools. Current state law does not require CPS to provide additional transition supports beyond the first year following School Closings and other School Actions. The exception is Turnaround Schools, which receive 5 years of CPS funding and support.

**Student Safety:** In some instances, the effectiveness of Safe Passage programs has come into question, and a few had massive turnover in workers. But CPS funding for the Safe Passage program and transportation provided to displaced students during the first year of transition may or may not continue into Year 2.

**Social/Emotional Well-Being:** While CPS has reported that as of the 20th Day of classes of the 2013-14 School Year, on average 95% of impacted homeless students had re-enrolled in district schools, little is known about what supports these highly-vulnerable students are receiving. Some schools report continuing struggles with integrating new students, a rise in disciplinary incidents, and morale problems. Since CPS reports that designated Welcoming Schools’ Transition Teams did develop detailed Transition Plans to ensure that students are receiving social/emotional supports, it will be important to evaluate the implementation and outcomes of the plans.

**Parent Involvement:** It is widely recognized and supported by research that students fare better when there is strong parental involvement in their schools. The extent of parent participation in Welcoming Schools by families from the closed schools is not yet known, although the CEFTF has requested specific data from CPS. Results of the April 2014 Local School Council elections have not yet been analyzed and will need to monitored to determine to what extent parents from closed schools and Welcoming Schools are both represented on LSCs. Other indicators of parent involvement also need to be identified, and data gathered to assess how well the “new” families have been integrated into the life of their children’s new schools.

**Instructional and Staffing Continuity:** How were teachers and staff impacted by the 2013 School Closings? Despite repeated requests for analysis of teacher and staff displacement, CPS has not reported to the CEFTF yet about teacher and staff transitions (how many educators “followed” their students to their new schools). Continuity in student-teacher and student-support staff relationships is another measure that should be considered in developing a comprehensive evaluation of School Transitions.

**Continuity of External Partnerships and Special Programs:** In the 2013 School Closings hearings and debates, parents and communities repeatedly raised concerns to the CEFTF and CPS about the potential loss of special resource programs and partnerships that benefitted students and families in the now-closed schools, and whether comparable programs and services would be available in Welcoming Schools. A full evaluation and comparison of students’ access to comparable programs and support services is greatly needed, and should be part of a comprehensive assessment of the student-level impacts of CPS’ School Actions, Closings, and Turnarounds.

The CEFTF has always maintained that the most important questions that the district should ask before and after making decisions to take School Actions and Closings is, “Do students benefit from these Actions, and if so, how?”

In recent years, education public policy at every level of government has increasingly required “evidence-based” performance evaluation of principals’, teachers’, and students’ performance. With its requirements for public input and “due process” in CPS’ School Actions decision-making and mandatory School Transition Plans, the state
reform law attempted to move CPS to take steps toward evaluating the effects and outcomes of its School Actions decisions.

The CEFTF continues to urge CPS to establish a policy for systematic evaluation of School Actions Outcomes and School Transitions. Currently CPS has yet to establish a policy or procedures to evaluate the impacts on all affected students inclusive of students in Welcoming Schools; or to evaluate CPS’ School Transition planning and implementation. While the Task Force applauds the additional and pro-active efforts the district made in the Summer of 2013 to ease School Transitions, many questions remain about if and how effective these steps were, or if the school district will sustain support for students’ transitions beyond the first year of implementation.

A comprehensive evaluation of the mass school closings and CPS’ other Actions and Turnarounds must and should include a holistic, systematic evaluation of student-level and school-level impacts of these decisions, and measure and report on student academic outcomes and social/emotional well-being – as well as provide full transparency on the financial costs and benefits of these Actions.

The CEFTF’s analysis of the 2012 and 2013 School Actions, Turnarounds and mass School Closings shows that:

- CPS cannot account for hundreds of children who did not re-enroll in the school district or show up for school in the wake of these interventions. To fully assess the impacts of its decisions to close and re-structure our public schools, it is important for CPS to try to ascertain the whereabouts of the nearly 700 students whose schools were closed and who did not re-enroll in CPS or show up for the first day of school in the following year.

- The loss of students who either did not re-enroll in the school district or who are unaccounted for in the wake of the 2013 mass school closings is equivalent to 30% of the overall decline in CPS enrollment for the current school year.

- School Transition Planning has been flawed in the past, but is beginning to move in a better direction. For two consecutive cycles of School Actions, Turnarounds, and School Closings, CPS’ designated Welcoming Schools failed to attract far fewer students than CPS hoped.

- CPS has not tracked or evaluated how its Discretionary Transition Fund was used, and whether it supported successful social-emotional and academic transitions for displaced students.

- CPS has not fully evaluated the effects on Welcoming Schools’ students, especially in the non-designated welcoming schools—where displaced students are still being integrated into a new school community.
HOW WE CAN MOVE FORWARD: CEFTF DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS

Build Capacity for Sound Long-Range, Comprehensive Planning

1. CPS’ 10-Year Master Plan must be substantively revised. The EFMP must be based on broad public input, a reformed space utilization formula, corrected population and enrollment projections, and analysis of current and planned community and housing redevelopment. This should be done by July 1, 2015, rather than the current statutory deadline of June 2016. CPS should embrace and adapt some of the best practices for public engagement that have been tested and used in other major cities, and work more closely with its sister agencies to revise the current EFMP.

Expand Public Engagement

Chicago Public Schools should embrace and implement the CEFTF’s recommendations for expanded public engagement in order to create a shared vision of the school district’s educational goals, as well as to get the input needed to revise the EFMP and build public support for the 10-Year Plan. The Task Force has proposed several strategies for engaging stakeholders in revamping the EFMP:

- CPS should utilize its considerable capacity for communicating through the media and for outreach to all CPS parents/guardians of public school students to notify the public of the district’s community engagement efforts for revamping the long-range Educational Facilities Master Plan. Press Releases and press conferences, “robo-calls”, letters sent home with students, announcements and fliers at Report Card Pick-Up events and at meetings of the district’s nine “Community Action Councils” and other parent involvement bodies would all help to dramatically increase public awareness and parent engagement in planning for the future of Chicago’s public schools.

- Open and inclusive parent-community meetings should be held in each of CPS’ 30 “Community” Areas to present CPS’ current Community Plans, to get public feedback on revisions to the EFMP’s Community boundaries, CPS’ needs assessments, and proposals for educational program changes and types of schools. These sessions should be widely publicized in advance (at least 14-days’ prior notice).

- CPS should work with Local School Councils to develop school-level facility and campus master plans for each school. LSCs must meet at least twice a year to discuss their schools’ ‘Continuous Improvement Work Plans.” These meetings offer a ready opportunity to engage educators, school staff, parents and community members in developing a long-range plan for facility and campus improvements that would support the implementation of the schools’ educational goals and programs.

- CPS needs to re-examine and re-calibrate its critically important Space Utilization standards by January 2015, by taking the following action steps:
  - Conduct a series of meetings in 2014 with the Chicago Principals and Administrators Association (CPAA), the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU), and advocates for CPS’ most vulnerable students (Special Education, Homeless, and LEP), to get their input on effective and instructionally-appropriate allocations of space.
  - Solicit “real time” input from Local School Councils and principal sat the beginning and end of every school year on how individual schools are utilizing available space and place to do so in
the coming school year. This would be a means of updating CPS’ information on school-community partnerships as well.

- Afford CPS planners the benefit of professional development support offered by the Council of Educational Facility Planners International (CEFPI).

- Hold a focused dialogue and consultation with the CEFTF’s Master Planning Committee, which has already gathered extensive research on national best practices in developing Space Utilization assessments and policies in other urban school districts.

- Revisit and revise its School Utilization standards at least every two years to reflect and keep pace with educational program changes and demographic changes. If and when revisions to its Space Utilization Standards are proposed, CPS should seek feedback from educators (CPAA and CTU) and the public through a well-publicized public comment period and Public Hearing.

**Strengthen Intergovernmental Collaborations and Coordination**

Chicago Public Schools needs the assistance of its Sister Agencies to understand and better anticipate changing community contexts to effectively plan for the future of Chicago’s public schools. Strengthened intergovernmental coordination and data sharing will also help CPS to better project potential funding sources for its long-range facilities master plan. Between now and July 2015, CPS needs to have a time table and work plan for getting data and input from several key sister agencies partners and other non-profit and private-sector data sources.

CPS could partner with the City of Chicago Dept. of Housing & Economic Development to convene “Community Development Round Tables” with these partners, and to get the data needed for revamping the EFMP:

- DHED: TIF District plans and data on affordable family housing development plans being incentivized by the City’s TIF Program.

- City of Chicago Low-Income Housing Trust Fund and State of Illinois Housing Trust Fund: Data on affordable housing development under way or in planning stages.

- Illinois Housing Development Authority: Data on state, local, and private (financial industry) initiatives to rehab and rent and/or sell previously foreclosed properties to families.

- City of Chicago and Cook County Land Trusts: Data on their initiatives to reclaim and establish occupancy by families in formerly foreclosed properties throughout Chicago.

- Financial Institutions with a presence in Chicago and Private Developers: Data on multi-family rental and single-family housing development and rehab.

- Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP): Data on demographic trends in the region.

- Chicago Transit Authority: Strengthen coordination with CTA’s planning for transit service planning and rail system enhancements that impact parents and high school students’ access to Chicago’s public high schools.

- Chicago Park District: Further coordination with the Park District on collaborative programming and shared use of facilities.
The City’s Dept. of Housing & Economic Development is uniquely suited to aid the school district in coordinating and collaborating with all of the sister agencies and other potential partners listed above.

**Envision Schools as Anchors for Revitalized Communities**

The real estate industry has long understood the economic importance of high-quality, walkable neighborhood public schools to local housing values and overall attractiveness of local real-estate sub-markets. Housing values and sales prices are directly affected by whether or not homes and rental properties can be marketed as “close to great public schools.” In Chicago, this widely-recognized rubric is frequently cited in debates over changes in schools’ attendance area boundaries, the public’s concerns about persistent vacancy of closed schools buildings, and the elimination of neighborhood public school locations. Private investment and residential housing development are attracted to those communities with strong neighborhood public schools.

In Lincoln Park the widespread recognition of these dynamics was a major theme in the recent controversy over whether to build an $18 million Annex at Abraham Lincoln Elementary School for overcrowding relief. Parents and property owners living near the school and who opposed the Annex project testified repeatedly to the BOE and to the CEFTF, that an otherwise unwanted and unnecessary expansion of Abraham Lincoln was being driven by a minority of parents who did not want their students to be re-assigned out of ALES’ attendance area because of the effect on their property values. In low-income neighborhoods gradually recovering from the Great Recession and home mortgage foreclosure crisis, the absence of a high-quality, walkable neighborhood public school only serves to perpetuate low housing and real estate values. Lacking a local school, communities find it harder to attract reinvestment in their local housing stock, or new home buyers.

Neighborhood public schools can and should serve as anchors for revitalized communities. The opportunity and challenge facing Chicago and its public school district is: What Chicagoans desire and envision for the future, and what can we learn about future redevelopment plans - rather than accepting past neighborhood decline as a “GIVEN.”

1. **CPS and the City should not wait until after schools have already been closed to recognize that our public schools are Community Anchors.** In following the recommendations from the Mayor’s Advisory Committee on School Repurposing & Community Development, CPS is beginning to take steps toward acknowledging the value of school facilities as physical assets and community anchors. The frustration
that the CEFTF has heard from the public is that CPS and the City did not seek to stabilize and reinvigorate neighborhoods by leveraging the presence of the local school when communities sought reinvestment in their communities and schools. Going forward, and with the revamping of its 10-Year Master Plan as the gateway opportunity, the school district can collaborate with community stakeholders and their local government to invest in improving neighborhood schools AND the neighborhoods they were built to serve.

The CEFTF strongly recommends that CPS work with the City of Chicago to implement initiatives similar to those documented in the University of California-Berkeley’s Center for Cities and Schools (“CCS”) issued a Report on the “Mechanics” of intergovernmental collaboration as a guide for cities and their school districts to work with the public to develop and implement a forward-looking vision for revitalizing their communities and their public schools:

- **As the Center for Cities and Schools suggests, the City and CPS are already pursuing one strategy, the replication of the “Harlem Children’s Zone” mode through President Obama’s “Promise Neighborhoods” initiative.** However, this approach requires extraordinary federal and local public and private funding commitments and thus in itself is not a “silver bullet” strategy to unify urban planning and neighborhood revitalization with coordinated strategies to improve neighborhood schools.

- **CCS also cites the success of School-Oriented Community Development projects in St. Louis, MO and Atlanta, Ga.** In this model, affordable housing developers in the private sector (such as McCormick, Baron & Salazar) and the nonprofit Enterprise Community Partners have successfully planned housing rehab projects and built new housing around public schools that serve as the “centerpiece” of the development.

- **“Schools as Centers of Community”:** CCS also documents success stories of municipalities employing a “smart growth” approach in which developers, urban planners and city government intentionally and strategically locate services, programs, and activities in public schools. CCS’s report states, this strategy “is an important example of how planning and community development practice is increasingly aware of the complex and reciprocal relations between the built environment and learning opportunities.” Use of existing schools as centers and destinations for community services and activities results in a cost-effective and optimal utilization of the existing public asset (the school facility), and leverages other efficiencies in service delivery.

The Center for Cities and Schools Report also provides practical tools and strategies to help a public school district like CPS participate in and benefit from structured collaborations with other local units of government and the private and non-profit sectors.

2. **Use Chicago’s TIF Program to Promote “School-Centered” Community Revitalization:** Chicago could and should initiate neighborhood redevelopment plans that target areas around existing school facility infrastructure, and specifically around those schools that have experienced declining enrollment due to housing stock decline, affordable housing shortages, and disinvestment. Similar to the strategy of “Transit-Oriented Development,” Chicago can incentivize infill housing development and housing stock

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rehabilitation on the blocks surrounding existing school buildings that have additional classroom capacity and land and housing stock available for redevelopment. TIF districts can be found in every one of Chicago’s 50 Wards, and could be judiciously drawn upon for funding to encourage housing renovation of existing housing stock – another physical asset of the city – and geographically target development of new affordable family-occupancy housing stock. The end result of more pro-active and targeted housing investment will be an expanding tax base for the City of Chicago, and the provision of decent housing for Chicago’s families.

3. **Dissolve the State’s Charter School Authorizing Authority.**

No Illinois public school district should have to deal with the “wild card” of having to accept and accommodate charter expansions approved by a State Authority that has the power to overrule the local district. There is consensus among all members of the CEFTF, including the school district, in support of this recommended policy change.

4. **Conduct a candid and inclusive public dialogue about the role of charter schools within Chicago’s public school district.**

In order to develop its long-range educational vision and facilities master plan, CPS needs to undertake an open public discussion of the role of Charters in Chicago. Currently there is no strong public consensus about charter schools, or their future expansion in the school district. CPS needs to hold a series of focus groups and public forums to hear the full range of concerns, opinions, and suggestions from the public. Then and only then will CPS be able to effectively integrate planning for charter schools into a broader, district-wide strategic educational and facilities plan.

5. **The General Assembly should study and consider creation of a State “School Planning & Construction Authority”.**

There are models of state-level School Construction Authorities in several other states, including California, Ohio, and New Jersey. These agencies were typically established to ensure fiscally-sound capital planning and equitable school construction spending when states issue School Construction bonds. While Illinois has historically lagged behind many other states in providing local school districts with school facility funding, times of austerity require careful attention to competing needs and good planning. The Authority would approve or reject school districts’ plans for new construction and major capital renovations and help districts with financing facilities construction and modernization, information management, educational facilities planning, and public engagement associated with best practice planning.

6. **The State of Illinois should increase its funding of public schools’ facilities’ needs.**

Illinois ranks in the “bottom 20” of all 50 states in the percentage it contributes to local public school districts’ facility needs. With expanded and consistent state funding, local public school districts will be able to do better long-range planning, since state capital funding would be more reliable. The State should examine and consider new revenue sources, such as a modest “Financial Transaction Tax” to help pay for public school construction, modernization, and other facility needs. The State could also help public school districts gain access to more revenue from their own local property tax base by amending state TIF law to allow school districts to “opt out” of TIF districts; limit use of TIF to rigorously-defined “blighted” areas; and establish clear rules for municipalities to define, declare, and redistribute “TIF Surpluses” to other local taxing bodies.
Ensuring Cost-Effective, Fiscally Responsible Facility Management

1. The General Assembly should mandate conservation of the public’s investment in our existing public school buildings whenever feasible.

Public schools are public assets for which taxpayers have already paid. CPS and the Mayor should be required to have an open public process to plan for re-use of closed school buildings that emphasizes use of existing, closed school buildings for community and (non-charter) educational purposes; and for future “re-commissioning” as public schools (in the event that CPS needs to open more schools in the future). The budget “wild cards” for CPS of costs for prolonged maintenance and security of shuttered buildings, future demolition costs to tear down existing schools, and rising future “replacement costs” to build a new school where one once stood, should prompt the General Assembly to support CPS in efforts to conserve its existing physical assets.

2. The General Assembly should require CPS to make “Joint Use” of schools by CPS’ “sister agencies”, other local governments, and non-profit partners a high priority. There should be State incentives to reward CPS and other public school districts for Joint Use and cost-sharing agreements; CPS, the City and its Public Building Commission should be required to seek out Joint Uses before disposing of a public school building.

3. CPS should be required to develop a plan to maintain and secure a school before finalizing school closings. Such a plan should include and disclose projected costs for “mothballing” a facility and estimated demolition costs.

4. Proceeds from any sale of a closed school and any other surplus school district real estate should be allocated and invested in the neediest school facilities in low-income neighborhoods. These investments will help stabilize schools, make schools more attractive choices to parents and increase future enrollments, while encouraging reinvestment in the surrounding area.

Ensuring Safe and Educationally Successful Transitions For Students

1. Any further School Actions, Turnarounds, and Charter expansions should be put “on hold” until a truly comprehensive long-range plan is developed, and until CPS can provide definitive data that these Actions have benefitted the actual students who were impacted. Instead CPS should focus on supporting whole school improvement in existing neighborhood public schools. The CEFTF recommends that:

   • CPS should develop and implement a comprehensive evaluation of the costs and benefits—both financial and educational—of past School Actions, School Closings and Turnarounds, to assess whether CPS’ current school intervention and restructuring policies have benefitted students educationally, and at what cost to the taxpayer. Such an evaluation should be undertaken in 2014, and become a matter of ongoing policy for the school district.

   • CPS’ Turnaround model needs to be carefully scrutinized, and alternative “whole school change” strategies and implementers should be considered, to help academically struggling schools. CPS should end its “No Bid” practice of relying exclusively on AUSL in light of the costs, mixed student outcomes, and high student and teacher turnover rates in AUSL schools.
• Instead CPS could and should work with educators and Local School Councils on more effective targeting, management, and implementation of alternatives approaches to whole school change such as federal School Improvement Grants (SIG). In the past, there have been questions of accountability and effectiveness raised with some SIG programs that could be remedied by more careful and inclusive advance planning, professional development for principals and teachers, and increased local control and transparency.

2. **The Hearing process for Proposed School Actions should be reformed.**

Changes are needed to the 2011 reform law to:

• Clarify and strengthen the role of the Independent Hearing Officer in evaluating and potentially overruling the CPS CEO’s recommendations.

• Entitle schools proposed for an Action to propose and get a written response from the district to an Alternative Plan of Action for school improvement.

• Require CPS to define specific metrics and any qualitative factors on which each type of proposed School Action is based. Specific metrics are needed to effectively evaluate outcomes.

3. **CPS should be required to provide 5 years of sustained, intensive academic and financial supports to current (and any future) non-Charter “Designated Welcoming Schools” and non-designated welcoming schools.**

Particularly when students are displaced and re-assigned to different schools as a result of CPS’ decisions to close, consolidate, or phase out a school (over more than one year), students need stable and continuing supports to help them progress educationally and make successful social and emotional adjustments. One year of transition support is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure that all impacted students (as more broadly defined to include students in Welcoming Schools) will experience a successful transition. CPS has set the precedent of providing new charter schools and new Turnarounds with multi-year support. It is only equitable that the same principle should apply to students impacted by CPS’ School Actions and to their Welcoming Schools to ensure success.

Additionally, CPS’ budgeting for School Transitions should be disclosed as part of the required “Draft” and final “School Transition Plans.”

Specific steps to ensure parents’, principals’ and teachers’, and Local School Councils’ input should be required in developing Transition Plans.

Parents and students should get timely provision of any identified, needed support services, especially and including over the intervening summer break between Board approval of Actions and the following school year in which Actions go into effect.

**Improve Transparency and Accountability**

1. **The General Assembly should require CPS to produce an Annual Report tracking student-level impacts of its past (and any future) School Actions.** The school district needs to rigorously evaluate whether its interventions in neighborhood schools have “worked,” i.e., truly improved educational outcomes for children. Such an evaluation must also weigh the effects on “Welcoming Schools” and their students.
Moreover, the definition of “School Actions” in State Law should be expanded to include “Opening of New Schools,” “Charter Expansions” (both adding more campuses of current charter operators and approving new Charter operators), “Turnarounds,” “Changes in Academic Focus,” “Grade Restructurings,” and all “Attendance-Area Boundary Changes”.

2. CPS’ capital construction Bond Issues should be subject to Voter approval through binding referenda. State law should not exempt CPS from requirements for voter approval for school construction bonds.

3. CPS should be required by State Law to establish and disclose a school-to-school comparison and ranking of its priority capital investments every year in its Annual Capital Budget, its 5-Year Capital Improvement Plans (CIPs), and 10-Year Master Plan. This will help ensure greater transparency and equity in its capital spending, and good stewardship and conservation of the existing public assets for which taxpayers have already paid. The EFMP should also provide expanded and detailed reporting on charter school facilities, and CPS’ and non-CPS funding of them.

4. CPS should be required to hold annual public hearings on its Capital Budgets, with at least 14-day advance public notice and advance public disclosure of every school’s Capital Needs Report. A “State of our School” Report should inform parents of their school’s current facility condition and needs; recent and planned investments; and be distributed twice a year at CPS’ “Report Card Pick-Up” days.

5. The State of Illinois should be more transparent about its State school construction investments. The ILGA, ISBE, and/or the IL Capital Development Board should disclose proposals for state funding for CPS school capital projects. The ILGA could hold public hearings in Chicago to inform the public and get community feedback. Approved state funded school capital projects, including grants to CPS and “Earmarks” for individual schools should be disclosed to the public and to the individual recipient school and its duly-elected Local School Council or parent advisory body.
On August 20th, 2011, Illinois Governor Patrick Quinn signed Public Act 097-0474. The reform law requires Chicago Public School District 299 to conduct more thorough, comprehensive and transparent planning around school facilities planning and its inter-connected relationship to school actions – closings, openings, consolidations, co-sharing, and phase-outs. The law is based on the following premise:

*CPS must establish an equitable and effective school facility development process. Quality educational facilities are essential; the public school is a major institution in our communities, equitable and efficient use of facilities as resources is essential across all groups; school openings, closings, consolidations, turnarounds, phase-outs, construction, repairs, modernizations, boundary changes and other facility-decision have profound impacts on education in our communities, and local governance through LSC law and community input must be consistent with facility-related decisions.*

The General Assembly approved changes to the 2011 statute in the November 2012 Veto Session of the Legislature:

- Granted a one-time only delay in the deadline for CPS to propose School Actions to March 31, 2013; thereafter the school district must revert to the original deadline of announcing proposed School Actions by December 1st of every year.
- Extended the time table for the release of the Draft 10-Year Educational Facilities Master Plan to May 1st, 2013; and extended the deadline for the school board to adopt the EFMP to October 1st, 2013.
- Changed the deadline for publication of Draft School Action Guidelines and Criteria to October 1st of each year (changed from the original deadline of November 1st of each year).
- Strengthened some student protections (continuation of student support services) when CPS takes School Actions.

The Educational Facilities Planning law mandates the following:

1) **PLANNING & TRANSPARENCY**
   - CPS must create a 10-year Educational Facility Master Plan to better coordinate school capital improvements, repairs, renovations, and school actions in an effective and equitable way aligned to educational goals and vision at the citywide, community, and local school level.
   - CPS must create an annual 5-year Capital Improvement Plan that details who gets what capital renovations, modernizations, new construction, and repairs with the costs associated with them and justification for the need.
   - CPS must produce an annual capital Expenditure Report so that the public can track the actual spending and construction that took place compared to what was projected.
   - CPS must announce by December 1st of each year (before the application deadline for selective enrollment schools) all proposed school actions along with a written announcement explaining its reasons for wanting to take a School Action and provide a written School Transition Plan to support and aid students and schools impacted if/when School Actions are approved by the CPS Board.
   - CPS must publish a list of all property owned or leased by or to CPS by January 1st, and update it annually
   - CPS must publish and post to its website all lease agreements where they are the lessor or lessee.
   - A list of Independent hearing offices must be published by the....

2) **OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY**
   - The General Assembly Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force will remain in place, and actively monitor CPS compliance with the law. The CEFTF will hold its own open meetings and public hearings as needed, and issue an annual report on CPS’ implementation of the new law for the Governor, Illinois General Assembly, CPS, and Mayor of Chicago.
   - The Educational Facility Master Planning process must have extensive community input, and coordination with other local governments and elected officials – including elected Local School Councils.

**UPCOMING BENCHMARKS BASED ON THE MANDATED TIMELINE***
GUIDELINES FOR SCHOOL ACTIONS

CPS must prepare and publish guidelines for school actions. The guidelines shall:

- Outline the academic and non-academic criteria for a school action
- Be subject to a public comment period of at least 21 days before CPS Board approval

INDEPENDENT HEARING OFFICERS

The CPS general counsel shall compile and publish a list of independent hearing offices by November 1st of each year. The hearing officer shall have the following qualifications:

- Be a licensed attorney eligible to practice law in Illinois
- Not be an employee of the Board
- Must not have represented the Board, its employees, or any labor organization representing its employees, any local school council, or any charter or contract school in any capacity within the last year
- They will issue a written report that summarizes the hearing and determines whether the CPS CEO complied with the requirements of guidelines for School Actions.

SCHOOL ACTIONS

CPS shall publish notice of all proposed school actions to be taken at the close of the current academic year consistent with the School Actions Guidelines. A written notice of the proposed School Actions shall include:

- A written statement of the basis for the school action
- An explanation of how the school action meets the criteria set forth in the guidelines
- A draft School Transition Plan identifying the items required in Section 34-225 for all schools affected by the school action
- A date, time, and place of the hearing or meeting

The School Actions Written Notice will be:

- Provided to the principal, staff, LSC and parents or guardians of any school that is subject to the proposed school action
- Provided to the State Senator, State Representative, and Alderman for the school or schools that are subject to the proposed school action
- Published on the CPS website
- Published at least 30 calendar days in advance of a public hearing or meeting
- Published in a newspaper of general circulation

CPS shall designate at least 3 opportunities to elicit public comment at a hearing or meeting on a proposed school action and shall:

- Convene at least one public hearing at CPS Central Office
- Convene at least 2 additional public hearings or meetings at a location convenient to the school community subject to the proposed school action
- Public meetings shall be conducted by a representative of the CEO. A summary of the public meeting shall be published on the CPS website within 5 calendar days after the meeting.

A School Transition Plan requires all approved school actions will require CPS work with the local school educators and families of the affected schools to ensure successful integration of affected students into new
learning environments. It identifies and commits specific resources for implementation of the School Transition Plan for a minimum of the full first academic year after the Board approves a school action. A School Transition Plan includes services to support:

- The academic, social, and emotional needs of students
- Students with disabilities, homeless students, and English Language Learners
- Security and safety issues
- Options to enroll in higher performing schools
- Informational briefings regarding the choice of schools that include all pertinent information to enable the parents or guardian and child to make an informed choice, including the option to visit the schools of choice prior to making a decisions
- The provision of appropriate transportation where practical.

Public Hearings will be conducted by a qualified independent hearing officer. The general counsel shall compile and publish a list of independent hearing offices by November 1st of each year.

- The CPS CEO shall publish the hearing officer’s report on the CPS website within 5 calendar days after receiving the report and at least 15 dates prior to any Board action being taken.

If the CEO proposes a school action without following the mandates, the proposed school action shall not be approved by the Board during the school year in which the school action was proposed.

No Board decision regarding a proposed school action may take place less than 60 days after the announcement of the proposed school action.

2012 January 1st

EDUCATIONAL FACILITY STANDARDS: SPACE UTILIZATION STANDARDS & FACILITY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

CPS must publish Space Utilization Standards on the district’s website where the standards will include:

- How CPS calculates design capacity, considering specific primary and secondary program needs, shared campuses, after school programming, the individual school facility needs based on programming, grade and age ranges, and shared use by governmental and/or community agencies
- How CPS determines efficient use of space based on educational programming design capacity
- How often space is used and needed
- What the standards are for overcrowding and underutilization

CPS must propose minimum and optimal Facility Performance Standards that address:

- Thermal comfort
- Daylight
- Acoustics
- Indoor air quality
- Furniture ergonomics for students and staff
- Technology
- Life safety
- ADA accessibility
- Plumbing and washroom access
- Environmental hazards
- Walkability

CPS will hold at least one public hearing and submit the proposed educational facilities standards to each LSC and to the Chicago Public Building Commission for review and comment before adopting. CPS may always make amendments per the law’s procedures.
Both the Educational Facility Space Utilization Standards and Performance Standards will be published on the CPS website by January 1, 2012.

CAPITAL NEEDS REVIEW PROCESS

CPS will develop a capital needs review process that includes:

- A comprehensive bi-annual assessment of the capital needs at each facility owned, leased, or operated by CPS
- The development of an assessment form to be used by the schools to provide a school-based capital, maintenance, utility, and repair needs assessment report and recommendations aligned with the educational program and goals of the individual school

PROPERTY & LEASED FACILITIES (Updated Annually)

CPS must publish a list of all property owned by or leased to CPS on its website and update this list annually.

- For each property listed, the most recent facility standards review and any capital improvement projects pending or planned or completed in the 2-year period prior to publication shall be outlined.
- All lease agreements where CPS is the lessor or lessee must be published on the website for the duration of the lease. Temporary facility use, right of entry, and other temporary license agreements not exceeding one year are not subject to this requirement.

A summary of the lease agreements should be posted on the website and include:

- A description of the leasehold
- The full legal name of the parties to the agreement
- The term of the agreement
- The rent amount
- The party responsible for maintenance, capital improvements, utilities, and other expenses

2012 Approximately May 1st & Annually

1-YEAR CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN

CPS will publish a proposed 1-year Capital Improvement Plan beginning with the fiscal year 2013 (July 1, 2012) that will be posted to CPS’ website at least 60 days prior to the end of the prior fiscal year (approximately May 1st) and be subject to public review and comment of at least 3 public hearings. The 1-year Capital Improvement Plan will include:

- Description of the scope of the project
- Justification for the project
- Status of the project, including amount funded (percentage if appropriate), percentage complete, and approved start and end dates
- Original approved cost and current approved cost for each project
- The impact of the project on the district’s operative budget
- The name of each school and facility affected by a project
- All funding sources for the project
- Any relationship of the project to the needs assessment submitted by the school
- Any relationship to the district’s 10-year Educational Facilities Master Plan

CPS will adopt a final 1-year Capital Improvement Plan no more than 45 days after adopting the annual budget.
5-YEAR CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN (with 1-year CIP)

CPS will publish a proposed 5-year Capital Improvement Plan with the proposed 1-year Capital Improvement Plan beginning with the fiscal year 2013 (July 1, 2012). The 5-year Capital Improvement Plan:

- Will include proposed capital improvements for the next 4 years and when practicable, the same information for each proposed project that is required for the 1-year Capital Improvement Plan.
- The Plan will be published on the CPS website.
- The Plan will be distributed to all principals.
- The Plan will be assessed annually.
- The Plan requires an annual Expenditure Report within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year that will be published on the CPS website.

2012 December & Annually

SPACE UTILIZATION REPORT

CPS will publish an annual Space Utilization Report for each school building it operates.

2012 Approximately September 30th & Annually

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE REPORT

For the Fiscal Year 2012, CPS will publish and post on its website an annual Capital Expenditure Report within 90 days after the end of the Fiscal Year (approximately September 30, 2012).

Beginning with the Fiscal Year 2013 (July 1, 2012) and thereafter, CPS will publish and post on its website an annual Capital Expenditure Report that explains the differences between projected capital projects in the 5-year Capital Improvement Plan and the capital projects authorized in the proposed 1-year Capital Improvement Plan within 90 days after the end of the Fiscal Year (approximately September 30, 2013) that will include the following:

- Expenditures on all schools receiving capital projects an which funds were expended in that fiscal year, even if the project was not initiative or completed that fiscal year
- Identification of capital projects that aligned with the school-based facility needs assessment and recommendations of school principals or were the result of other public input
- The levels of appropriate actually provided to the district for capital projects in the fiscal year by the city, the State, and the federal government, with a comparison of the level of funding against funding levels for the prior 5 years
- A summary comparison of annual capital expenses and the corresponding 1-year capital improvement plan

2012 December 31st & Annually

SPACE UTILIZATION REPORT

CPS must publish an annual Space Utilization Report for each school operated by the district on its website.

2013 January 1st

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE CPS EDUCATIONAL FACILITY MASTER PLAN

For the next six months the plan will be distributed to the public and a process will be in place for feedback.

- It will be distributed to the City of Chicago, Cook County, Chicago Park District, Chicago Housing Authority, Chicago Transit Authority, CPS Schools (“attendance centers”), and Charter Schools operating within the CPS District.
- It will be distributed to each State Senator and State Representative of Chicago, to the Mayor of Chicago, and to each Alderman in Chicago.
- Each school will make the Plan available to the LSC or alternative advisory body and to the parents, guardians, and staff of the school.
CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN REVIEW PROCESS

CPS will publish a capital needs review process that includes a comprehensive, bi-annual assessment of the capital needs at each facility owned, leased, or operated by the district. The review process will include:

- The development of an assessment form to be used by schools to provide a school-based capital, maintenance, utility, and repairs needs assessment report and recommendations that are aligned with the educational program and goals of the school.

2013 July 1st

EDUCATIONAL FACILITY MASTER PLAN

CPS’ first 10-year Educational Facility Master Plan is approved

- The 10-Year Plan will be approved every 5 years
- Updates will take place every 2.5 years
- The plan will include community area level plans and individual school master plans with options for addressing the facility space needs for each facility operated by the district over a 10-year period

The Educational Facility Master Plan that will be published on the CPS website will include:

- CPS guiding educational goals and standards
- A brief description of the types of instructional programs and services delivered in its schools
- A description of the process, procedure, and timeline for community participation in the development of the plan
- The enrollment capacity of each school and its rate of utilization
- A report on the assessment of each school’s building and site conditions
- A data table with historical and projected enrollment data by school and by grade
- A community analysis, including a study of current and projected demographics, land usage, transportation plans, residential housing and commercial development, private schools, plans for water and sewage service expansion or redevelopment, and institutions of higher education
- An analysis of the facility needs and requirements of the district
- Identification of potential sources of funding for the implementation of the Educational Facility Master Plan.

2016 January 1st & every 5 years

CPS SUBMITS A DRAFT EDUCATIONAL AND FACILITY MASTER PLAN FOR REVIEW

- It reflects the progress achieved during the first 2.5 years.

Nothing prevents the CPS district from taking emergency action to protect the health and safety of students and staff in a school. In the event of an emergency that results in closing all or part of a school facility, including compliance with a directive of a duly authorized public safety agency or CPS to take all steps necessary to protect the safety of students and staff including relocating the school to another location or closing the school. In such cases, CPS will provide written notice of the basis for the emergency action within 2 days after declaring the emergency and will publish the steps that have been taken or will be taken to address the emergency within 10 days after declaring the emergency. The notice will be posted on the district’s website and provided to the principal, the LSC, and the State Senator, the State Representative, and the Alderman of the school in this emergency action. The notice shall explain why CPS could not comply with the provisions of this law.

IL P.A. 97-0474 also re-authorizes the continuation of the Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force, and tasks the CEFTF with monitoring and evaluating CPS’ implementation of the state reforms. The CEFTF is to issue at least one report annually to the General Assembly, the Governor, Chicago Public Schools, and the Mayor of the City of Chicago. The Task Force is also authorized to conduct its own public hearings as needed; consult with pro bono experts as needed; seek broad community input; and continue research on best practices in educational facilities planning and management.
APPENDIX B: CPS’ Outreach for Public Input into the 10-Year EFMP

**Background:** As part of monitoring Chicago Public Schools’ implementation of the 2011 State Law, the Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force closely followed and analyzed CPS’ outreach to the public. This Appendix provides a detailed analysis and time line, in order to help the public and policy makers assess if the school district’s efforts to engage the public in developing the Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan were effective and appropriate in light of what the state law stipulates.

**Detailed Time Line of the Development of the EFMP**

**August 2011**

IL Public Act 97-0474 was signed into law, requiring the development of the EFMP. The original statutory deadlines were: Jan. 1, 2013 for release of a Draft, final EFMP to be adopted by the BOE by July 1, 2013. From the time this requirement was enacted, Chicago Public Schools had 16 months to develop a Draft Master Plan. When the statute was amended in November 2012, CPS was given an additional 5 months to draft the EFMP. Despite the CEFTF’s recommendations for a detailed, step-by-step robust public engagement process, CPS failed to do any outreach or public education about the EFMP in 2011 or 2012.

The CEFTF made several requests to then-CPS Chief Executive Officer Jean Claude Brizard to meet with the Task Force to discuss CPS’ plans for implementing the state reform measures and development of the EFMP. While he never attended a CEFTF meeting, the CEO met briefly with Task Force representatives in September 2011. Yet, CPS did not take any steps to engage the public in the planning process following that meeting.

**October 2011**

At the Oct. 14, 2011 CEFTF meeting, then-CPS Chief Operating Officer Tim Cawley stated that CPS already had a master facilities plan that put low-performing, under-utilized schools as CPS’ lowest priority for any further or future repairs and capital investment. His statement came 2-1/2 months before CPS published the Facilities and Space Utilization standards required by IL P.A. 97-0474. Despite multiple requests for a copy of the plan alluded to by Mr. Cawley, the CEFTF never received “it”.

**The Year 2012**

On Jan. 1st, 2012 CPS complied with the state law provisions to post Facilities and Space Utilization standards online on its website. Neither the Task Force nor the public had input into the development of these standards, even though analysis and projection of space needs is a critical part of long-range facilities planning by public school districts. Members of the CEFTF questioned the space use formula’s basic assumptions, and in mid-January, reported in its 2012 Annual Report that the Task Force found the CPS formula to be out of compliance with the provisions of the 2011 state law: The reform act specified that CPS Space Utilization standards were to have taken into account educational program needs by grade and age range of students, including those of special needs students; community use; and shared use of facilities by external partners or other government agencies (e.g., health clinics, after-school programs, adult education programs, etc). Throughout the year, the CEFTF repeatedly urged CPS to reconsider and revise its space utilization formula.

**July – September 2012**

Over the summer of 2012, the CEFTF’s Master Planning Subcommittee continued its ongoing research on national best practices for developing a master facilities plan that the CEFTF initiated in 2010. Based on its research and public input at CEFTF meetings held in August, the Subcommittee provided CPS with a detailed community engagement and intergovernmental coordination outreach plan for getting public input for the EFMP. The proposal included: Sample outreach letters for parents, LSCs, principals, elected officials and sister agencies; and a proposed time line for implementation. The CEFTF proposed a Joint CPS-CEFTF Briefing of Sister Agencies on the EFMP for October 2012. CPS initially agreed; and Task Force members and CPS officials planned the event.
together. However, in early September, CPS cancelled the event. CPS also experienced the first teachers’ strike in 25 years that month. From January - September 2012, CPS did not or was not able to take any steps to begin the EFMP planning process or public engagement around the long-range plan.

### October 2012

On October 11, 2012 CPS CEO Jean-Claude Brizard abruptly resigned. He was CPS’ 3rd CEO since the CEFTF was impaneled (preceded by Ron Huberman and Interim CPS CEO Terry Mazany); several other key CPS Central Office personnel also left the district that year. On October 15th, 2012 Mayor Emanuel announced that Barbara Byrd Bennett would serve as the new CPS CEO.

On October 30, 2012, just 2 weeks after her appointment, Ms. Byrd-Bennett announced that CPS would ask the General Assembly in its upcoming Veto session to amend the state reform law and extend the deadline for proposing School Actions from 12.01.12 to 03.31.13. CPS’ position was that CPS needed to urgently “right size” the school district due to an “under utilization crisis” in order to address its budget deficit. The day prior to her announcement, Mayor Emanuel appointed an advisory “Space Utilization Commission” to examine the “under-utilization crisis.”

### November 2012 – General Assembly Veto Session

The CEFTF advised CPS and state lawmakers not to change the School Actions decision making time table; and pointed out that CPS is not required to take School Actions every year. Rather CPS could and should focus on development of the Draft Master Plan to put any decisions regarding “right sizing” of the district’s footprint in context. CPS did not have current data on facilities conditions, had not undertaken a Community Analysis in coordination with sister agencies, and had not started the public engagement process. Nevertheless, the General Assembly granted the School Actions deadline extension. Additionally, the time table for the EFMP was altered: The deadline to release a Draft Master Plan was extended to May 1, 2013; adoption by the Board was pushed back to October 1, 2013.

CEFTF members repeatedly advised CPS to not “put the cart before the horse, “ i.e., make decisions to close schools before the long-range planning process had occurred. Parents, educators, and community groups gave public testimony in Springfield supporting the development of a long range plan prior to any further School Actions or “right sizing” steps; and opposing the extended deadline for proposing School Actions.

In late November, 2012, CPS took its first steps to get input on the EFMP, through a “Principals’ and Local School Council Chairs’ Survey” disseminated to principals by email. But the Survey was overshadowed by and literally “lost” by most principals as the public reacted with alarm about the specter of mass school closings that would not be decided until May 2013 – just a month before the end of the school year. An urgent and often heated debate over under-utilization ensued. By the end of 2012, CPS had received very few responses to the Principal and LSC Survey. The CEFTF urged CPS to take steps to extend and expand input opportunities for principals, teachers, and the general public to have substantive input into the development of the EFMP.

### Late January – Mid-March 2013

Beginning in the last week of January 2013 and through the first week of March, CPS held a series of community meetings around the city on under-utilization and CPS’ plan to undertake mass school closures in the upcoming school year. Over 30,000 members of the public attended. Oral and written statements submitted at the meetings, along with eye witness accounts (including observations by Task Force members), and media reports showed widespread public opposition to school closings. Public testimonies at these meetings frequently cited the reform law’s requirement for a long-range plan, and questioned why CPS was moving to close schools before the mandated long-range plan had been developed. In the CEFTF’s meetings during those months, CPS officials informed the Task Force that CPS would not focus on outreach for the EFMP until after the BOE voted on proposed School Actions (May 22, 2013). Instead, CPS staff reported that they were preparing for School
Transitions. The CEFTF decided to hold its own community hearings on the master plan and school utilization. The Task Force members repeatedly requested that CPS share the Draft EFMP before its release on May 1st with the Task Force, a request which CPS declined.

In Feb-March 2013: CPS implemented the “Textizen” project, posting placards on selected CTA transit routes to elicit texts from the public about the 10-Year Plan. The CEFTF learned this initiative had been launched after the fact; and then expressed concerns about its format, CPS’ failure to publicize it widely or provide an explanation of the EFMP; and pointed out the exclusion of several key CTA bus and rail routes from the texting project. CPS also posted an online public input survey “My CPS Vision” on its website, but failed to publicize it or give advance notice to parents, LSCs, CACs, or the CEFTF. Both techniques produced very limited public input. At the CEFTF’s urging, CPS re-sent its email Survey to Principals and LCS Chairs, and extended the response deadline several times. With the March 31st deadline for CPS to announce proposed School Closings looming, and the May 1st deadline to release a Draft EFMP not far behind, these CPS public input projects are prime examples of the district doing “too little, too late” to develop the EFMP.

April-May 2013
CPS staff stated at monthly CEFTF meetings that they were sifting through the Jan-March 2013 public testimonies at CPS’ meetings on closing under-utilized schools, to extract any public comments that staff considered “relevant” to the long-range plan. CEFTF members objected, since the public was not told about the EFMP at these meetings, or that their testimonies would be “counted” as input to the Draft Master Plan.

- April 17th: CPS holds 3 concurrent Public Hearings on a Supplemental FY2013 capital budget unveiling its proposed capital investments in proposed Welcoming Schools. The CEFTF, schools and the public were not notified until a few days before the hearings. Parents’ groups, LSCs and principals testified to the CEFTF afterwards that attendance at these meetings was very low. CPS has yet to respond to repeated CEFTF requests for sign-in sheets for these meetings.
- April 29th: CPS gave CEFTF Co-Chair State Rep. Soto and a few Task Force members a verbal briefing on the Draft EFMP, accompanied by a viewing of a PowerPoint presentation. The presentation and the draft EFMP were not made available to the Task Force. CEFTF members had to review the draft Master Plan after CPS posted it on the school district’s website.
- April 30th: CPS posted the Draft EFMP online to comply with the revised statutory deadline of May 1st.
- May 22nd: The Chicago Board of Education approved the largest-scale school closures and consolidations in the school district’s history.

Late May-September 2013
CPS staff focused on School Transitions. Public outreach about the Draft Master Plan and efforts at intergovernmental coordination were minimal. At monthly CEFTF meetings, Task Force members asked when CPS would hold public hearings on the Master Plan; questioned the EFMP’s demographic and enrollment projections, and requested that CPS disclose what input and data sets the school district received from its sister agencies. From late May (after the school board approved the mass school closings)through June 2013, CPS staff made presentations about the Draft Master Plan at various previously-scheduled events for parent and community advisory bodies that the district routinely convenes. The Draft Master Plan was just one of several agenda items at these meetings; CPS’ presentations were general.

Throughout July-Aug 2013, the CEFTF continued to urge CPS to expand its public engagement efforts and coordination with CPS’ sister agencies. CPS and the CEFTF agreed to cancel efforts to re-schedule an Intergovernmental Briefing for sister agencies in early August due to lack of time to confirm attendees. In August, as an alternative to a Briefing, Task Force members proposed surveying Sister Agencies. As an attempt to get some additional feedback on the Draft Plan, the CEFTF sent its own survey to Chicago elected officials in August. The response was minimal: The 5 Aldermen and 2 state lawmakers who did respond stated that CPS had yet to brief them on the EFMP, or seek their input on future re-use of closed schools. CPS sent a written survey to its
Sister Agencies on Sept. 4, 2013, with minimal results. A few agencies responded after the school board had already adopted the Master Plan (September 25th, 2013).

Between Sept. 3rd –Sept. 11th, with just a few weeks remaining before the scheduled board vote to adopt the EFMP, CPS held five “Community Meetings” on the EFMP. CPS’ fliers for these events advertised them as “Information Sessions”.

- **Sept. 4th, 2013**: One day after the first Community Meeting has already been held, CPS posted a Press Release on its website referring to these meetings as “Public Hearings”—even though the CPS website calendar of “Upcoming Key Events” listed these events as “Community Meetings”. Outreach for the meetings themselves, and for similar “Information Sessions” for LSCs was minimal. The Local School Councils’ information sessions were poorly advertised and attended.
- **Sept. 23rd, 2013**: CPS posted a substantially revised EFMP around 4 pm, allowing less than 48 hours for the public, sister agencies, elected officials and the CEFTF to review the changes CPS staff had made to the May 1st Draft. The Task Force did not receive a preview copy of the revised Plan.
- **Sept. 25th, 2013**: The Board of Education adopted the 10-Year Educational Facilities Master Plan. Despite the statutory requirement that CPS align School Actions with its EFMP, no clear rationales were provided in the adopted EFMP as to how these closures advance the district’s long-term strategic plan.

**What Tools and Methods did CPS use to get input from the public and “Sister Agencies”?**

1. **The LSC/Principal Survey**: As the Jan. 1st, 2013 original deadline to release a Draft EFMP approached, CPS Central Office staff emailed school principals a survey on Nov. 1st, 2012, and gave them 2 weeks to respond. But in mid-November 2012, the General Assembly amended IL P.A. 97-0474 and extended CPS’ deadline to release a Draft Master Plan to May 1, 2013. CPS extended the deadline for the Principal/LSC Survey three times due to low response rates. At Community Hearings convened by the CEFTF during the first four months of 2013, the Task Force got widespread feedback from across the city that many principals and LSCs were unaware of the survey. Eventually, CPS reported to the CEFTF that over 400 principals and/or LSC chairs responded, including charter schools.

In reviewing the survey instrument and how CPS disseminated it to schools, the Task Force found numerous problems:
- CPS did not seek input from other Task Force members (including the President of the Chicago Principals and Administrators Assoc.) to write the survey questions, explain its significance, publicize it to LSCs or how it could be most effectively disseminated.
- Principals received the survey in the midst of the public controversy over whether their schools might be closed.
- The volume of email directives and email surveys sent to Principals from CPS’ Central Office on a weekly basis contributed to the initial low response rates. Since CPS did not provide any guidance or context to Principals about the EFMP, many respondents were not aware of the potential importance of their answers.
- Only Local School Council Chairs received the emailed survey, and again had little to no time to meet with parents and other LSC members, or collaborate with their principals on their schools’ survey responses. LSC Chairs received no advance explanation of the significance of the survey, or guidance on how to respond.
  - While CPS did direct the principal and the LSC chair to collaborate to complete the survey, as the CEFTF had recommended, schools were not adequately prepared to provide meaningful responses.
- The survey format was not conducive to addressing the complex issues of comprehensive planning for the school’s future facility and campus capital plans. The sections provided for respondents to fill in narrative answers were limited to 50 characters. In that limited amount of space, principals and LSC chairs were required to answer important questions such as:
  - “Please describe any significant change in programs provided or academic focus at your school in the past ten years.”
“Please describe any historical impact on your school by School Actions (e.g., closures, consolidations, co-locations, etc.).”

“Please provide a brief description of the educational priorities of your school”

“Please describe any specific challenges you face and your improvement plan to overcome those challenges”

“Do you have any urgent facility needs or concerns that you believe that CPS should be aware of?”

The survey then goes on to ask the schools to rank their needs in order of importance on the following topics:

1. Student academic resources or programs
2. Health/wellness resources or programs
3. Social/emotional resources or programs
4. Community programs/services
5. Enhancements to the learning conditions within the facility

2. CPS’ Use of Transcripts from its NETWORK MEETINGS, Jan. 28, 2013 – March 6, 2013

**Stated Purpose of the Meetings:** The “Under Utilization Crisis” and the Need to “Right Size” the district.

CPS did not disclose to the meeting attendees that CPS staffers would subsequently “harvest” some statements from community members’ testimonies and “count” them as “input” to the EFMP. During and after these sessions, the CEFTF received testimonies and complaints from parents and stakeholders that CPS’ transcripts of their testimonies at the Under-Utilization meetings were not accurate. The CPS staffer assigned to sift through transcripts to identify “public input” into the 10-Year EFMP was a recently arrived Broad Foundation Resident.

3. The CPS “TEXTIZEN” social media initiative, March-April 2013

- Had no advance publicity to CPS parents and stakeholders to explain the project.
- Used a “Forced Choice” format that was over-simplified, restrictive, superficial, and misleading.
- Did not track the type of respondents who sent in text messages. It is unclear if respondents were parents of CPS students, students, Chicago residents, or suburbanites.

CPS reported conflicting and inconsistent information to the CEFTF, as to which CTA transit routes displayed the Textizen placards during the 2-month “campaign”. Major CTA bus and rail routes on the south, west, northwest, and southwest sides did not display the Textizen placards.

4. “MyCPSVision” Web Page

- Elicited low response levels
- Did not track the background of respondents
- Was poorly publicized, and not contextualized

5. Post-May 1, 2013: CPS’ Web Page on the Draft EFMP

- [FacilitiesPlan@cps.edu](mailto:FacilitiesPlan@cps.edu) was not widely publicized CPS parents, LSCS, or other stakeholders.
- Was difficult to find on CPS’ website.

**Public input and concerns:** In 2013 The CEFTF documented the concerns of the public about CPS’ school closures/consolidations and their dynamic interrelationship with creating a long-term plan for Chicago’s public school facilities. This occurred through over a dozen open subcommittee meetings and 4 Community Hearings. The Task Force also received written reports submitted by parents, school principals, LSCs, CACs, and community organizations and Special Education advocates. Additional input was submitted to the CEFTF via surveys and emails to the task force email address, and at community and school meetings to which CEFTF members were
invited. CEFTF members also attended and observed CPS’ “Under-Utilization” meetings and hearings, and those held by CPS’ “Utilization Commission.” Based on this input, the key concerns expressed by the public include:

- **Inaccurate and unsupported facility cost estimates**: Scores of school contested CPS’ assertions that the schools on the closing list were too dilapidated to repair or repurpose. Trumbull reported that CPS refused to substantiate the $16 million in capital improvement needs it claims that Trumbull needs. CPS repeatedly claimed that it would save hundreds of millions of dollars in deferred maintenance over 10 years from the closed schools. However CPS itself quietly lowered its estimates of “capital cost avoidance” in the Draft EFMP. Analysis by the Task Force’s Master Planning subcommittee and several independent education policy journalists found that CPS was relying on badly outdated facility condition assessments. Almost every school that testified to the Task Force disputed CPS’ figures, while CPS failed to provide any documentation to support the district’s claims.

Many of the schools CPS was about to close were in far better condition than the designated receiving schools. Parents, building engineers and principals testified that their schools already had the facility improvements and amenities that CPS promised to the Welcoming Schools – air conditioning, science labs, computer labs and playgrounds.

- **Inaccurate and inappropriate Utilization Rankings**: Virtually every school on the Feb. 2013 list of 129 potential closures challenged the accuracy of CPS’ space or facility assessments. The only redress that schools had to dispute CPS’ calculation was to e-mail a CPS staff member in the Office of Strategy Management to file an “appeal.” This option was not widely publicized, but was announced by CPS staff at a CEFTF meeting and subsequently communicated to schools informally by the Task Force. If principals were notified, again the volume of Central Office emails received meant that many principals did not realize they could appeal. According to CPS, only 19 schools e-mailed them with an appeal. Of those, Cameron Elementary went from “under-utilized” to “efficient” and Jamieson Elementary went from “efficient” to “over-crowded.”

- **Outdated and inaccurate classroom counts**: Many schools testified to the CEFTF and at CPS-sponsored meetings that CPS did not accurately count their special education classes, computer labs, or rooms being used by community partners, or take into account space used for special programs funded by federal or other outside grants that require specific space allocation (e.g., parent-child centers, intensive literacy or math instruction, etc). Several schools with widely-acclaimed and award-winning programs (such as Lafayette’s music program) objected that CPS did not take those programs into consideration when assessing the schools’ space use. In addition to determining in part which schools CPS chose to close, CPS’ flawed utilization formula also undermined accurate forecasting of future capacity needs, precisely because it fails to calculate educational programming space needs and Special Education class size limits.

- **Concern that consolidations will increase Class Sizes, Overcrowding**: See Appendix D for a detailed independent analysis by IL Raise Your Hand of the increased class sizes and school overcrowding likely to result from CPS’ mass school closures/consolidations.

**What Steps did CPS Take to Plan for Schools in their Community Contexts?**

CPS did not seek written feedback from its sister agencies until September 4, 2013, well after the Draft EFMP had already been written. A handful of agencies submitted comments and data relevant to the EFMP in September 2013, just days before the school board adopted the final version of the long-range plan; a few submitted their written feedback after the school board had already adopted the EFMP (Sept. 25th, 2013).

Most notable and relevant was the input from the Chicago Housing Authority. However the data that CHA provided did not fully align with what the CPS final EFMP reports.

CPS did not receive housing development data from the City’s Dept. of Housing & Economic Development, City of Chicago Low-Income Housing Trust Fund or Land Trust, Cook County (the Cook County Land Trust), or other sources in the non-profit and private sectors that the CEFTF recommended to the school district.
## Projected impact of planned public housing

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<td></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Overton</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>Catherine Cook expansion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CPS did not consider or factor in major City Redevelopment Initiatives: One example illustrates this failure to conduct a Community Context analysis: On March 17, 2013, the Mayor’s Office announced a $3 billion public-private partnership for long-term neighborhood redevelopment in Englewood, Pullman, Rogers Park, Uptown, Little Village, Bronzeville and the Eisenhower Corridor. The disconnect between the rush to downsize the district’s footprint and the lack of a long-range plan with a forward-looking perspective, was further demonstrated during the debate over school closings by very specific and current research that Aldermen and school/community groups put before CPS decision makers:

- Bronzeville’s Community Action Council (CAC) – one of 8 CPS-sanctioned community-level planning groups – argued against any more school closings or consolidations in its community in its November 2012 Strategic Plan and February 2013 report to CPS’ Utilization Commission, citing the ongoing and impending development of 500 new housing units in Bronzeville in just the next 2 years.
- Alderman Bob Fioretti reported that a new housing development in proximity to Calhoun Elementary School was under way.
- Testimony from the Tri-Taylor Community Organization cited the history of poor educational planning in that community, resulting in the demolition of Jacob Riis Elementary School in 2006 when now, housing redevelopment in that neighborhood will likely require a new school in the area.

A Case Study on the Failure of CPS to Take Community Input: The Bronzeville Community Action Council’s Strategic Plan and Community Analysis

On November 7, 2012, the Bronzeville CAC submitted the following Strategic Plan for the public schools in its planning area. CACs were created by the school district and are staffed by CPS personnel. The Bronzeville CAC’s efforts to help shape CPS’ 10-Year Master Plan were largely ignored. Instead their Strategic Plan and subsequent presentation to CPS’ Utilization Commission in February 2013 (see below) could and should have been a model for community planning and public engagement in CPS’ master plan.

Element #1: A community of Bronzeville schools that works together, shares resources and takes collective responsibility for the success of all Bronzeville children.
• Common goals for students and their families.
• Common understanding of school effectiveness.
• Shared resources to support improved instruction.

**Element #2: A variety of rigorous school and extracurricular options for children and families.**

• Bronzeville organized into 4 geographic areas of approximately 10 schools which share resources and responsibility for delivering effective education to the families living in the area.
• With community input, individual schools differentiate their curricular and extracurricular programs to appeal to the interests and needs of individual students and families.
• Specialty curricular (e.g., custom courses) and extracurricular programs (e.g., a Bronzeville jazz band), offered at a single school, are available to all students enrolled in the area.
• All families have access to all the schools in the quadrant, including transportation to and from the school when necessary.
• Full-day early childhood education available to all pre-school children at locations within the area.
• Effective alternative school programs available to students, either enrolled or no longer enrolled (no “push-outs”) within the area.
• Career and technical education high school programs that prepare students for existing jobs and higher education.
• All schools, including charters [and parochial schools], within the quadrant work together and when useful, pool human and financial resources to address the needs of students.
• All school leaders have some shared responsibility for the success of all the students within the area.

**Element 3: A system for helping families access and make well-informed decisions about school and extracurricular enrollment and social services.**

• Families will access all services, including information about school programming and performance, at all Bronzeville schools.
• School buildings serve as a hub for providing education, social service, health care and employment support to Bronzeville families.

**Element 4: Rich student experiences from early childhood education through high school that build on Bronzeville’s history and culture and utilize all the community’s resources.**

• Bronzeville schools are safe and just.
• Bronzeville schools build the self-esteem of students based on an understanding of the history of both the Bronzeville community and their individual families.
• Bronzeville community collectively recognizes and honors student achievement and improvement.
• All students have access to state of the art learning technology.
• Students may enroll in extracurricular activities across the school community.

**Element 5: Comprehensive supports for families located in schools that help parents help their children to be successful**

• Family/student supports.
• Encourage the creation of jobs within the Bronzeville community.
• Identify one or more lead community organizations to coordinate services to parents in each quadrant.

**Element 6: Provide our youngest children (birth through grade 3) and their parents with high quality early learning opportunities in school and in the community.**

• Work with CPS, IDHS, child care centers and providers and other stakeholders to develop a Bronzeville multi-year early childhood (birth through grade 3) education agenda.
• Work toward universal enrollment of all birth through Pre-K children in early learning.
• Develop a coherent, rigorous pre-K through 3 curriculum in all Bronzeville schools.
• Provide teachers, parents and care givers with education and professional development that increases their capacity to help young children to be successful in school.
• Identify and use appropriate assessments to track progress and inform instruction and support for children.

Element 7: Robust support for teachers and school leaders to improve the quality and rigor of instruction.

• Strong partnerships with John Price and Sean Stalling, the elementary and high school chiefs of schools.
• Shared resources to support improved instruction.
• Cross school activities to expose teachers to rigorous instruction and support the development of their practice.
• Support for the recruitment and development of school principals who can ensure high quality instruction for all students.
• Common student assessment systems in all schools that are focused on measuring student growth.
• A shared commitment to ensure that all Bronzeville students meet the following expectations:
  • Entering kindergarten grade ready to read
  • Reading to learn in 3rd grade
  • On track to graduate in 9th grade
  • Graduating in 12th grade prepared for success in college and/or a career

Element 8: A community governance structure that represents the interests of the Bronzeville community, facilitates collaboration among schools and other service providers, and communicates progress to all stakeholders.

• The CAC serves as an advocate, facilitator and communicator of the vision for Bronzeville schools.
• CPS management, support and incentive structures are aligned with Bronzeville community boundaries.
• Strong links exist between elementary schools, high schools and local colleges.

Element 9: Effective and efficient use of existing and new resources to support Bronzeville schools (includes facilities, people, funding).

• Bronzeville CAC expects to be at the table for all decisions about the use of Bronzeville school facilities including:
  – Creation of new schools in existing/new buildings
  – Planning for major renovation and capital investments
  – Closure or consolidation of schools
  – Analysis of actual or projected population changes that impact school enrollment
  – Conducting needs assessments, recruiting school operators and issuing RFPs for new schools
  – Capital decisions based on an independent and transparent assessment
• School facilities should meet the instructional needs of the school including:
  – Air conditioning
  – Technology
  – Access to gardens and other activities that supplement instruction
  – Health and safety, e.g., elimination of rodents
• Factors to consider in managing Bronzeville school facilities
  – Distance students need to travel to school; access to transportation
  – Consider the impact of new CHA replacement housing; collaborate with CHA to develop shared projections of the impact on school enrollment
  – Access to charters for new residents; existing charters have waiting lists
  – Number of under-enrolled schools
• Examine innovative ways to use “excess” school space.
• Develop a Bronzeville School brand that will be shared by all schools.
• Identify and utilize all the available resources in the community to help schools.

On February 20, 2013, the Bronzeville CAC made a presentation to CPS’ Utilization Committee, and provided its Alternative Community Analysis and objections to any further School Closings in their community. The following analysis is from this presentation.
Summary of School Actions in Bronzeville Since 2001

- 19 Neighborhood Schools Closed, Phased-Out, or Turned Around (24 actions including new schools that opened)
  - 15 elementary schools
  - 4 high schools
  - 13 Neighborhood Elementary Schools Closed
    - 9 for underutilization
    - 2 for performance
    - 2 for structural reasons
    - Should be enough to offset the population loss associated with the demolition of CHA housing
  - 3 Neighborhood High Schools Closed/Phased-Out (performance)
  - 3 Elementary School Turnarounds and 1 High School Turnaround

- The Replacements
  - 16 New Schools with City-Wide Attendance
    - 7 elementary schools (3 small schools, 3 charters, 1 magnet)
    - 9 high schools (5 charters, 3 selective enrollment, 1 military)
    - 3 vacant buildings

- Community Impact Despite Community Concerns
  - 9 neighborhood elementary schools were closed due to underutilization, but were replaced with 7 city-wide elementary schools
  - Net gain of 5 high schools (all city-wide enrollment)
  - Impossible to create K-12 pipeline because there are too few feeder schools
  - Loss of schools that are eligible to be receiving schools
  - Under-enrolled/under-resourced schools
  - There are now 21 high schools in the Bronzeville area and only one will be a neighborhood high school (Phillips) after Dyett phase-out is complete. We need to build up our neighborhood schools to prevent Phillips from being underutilized
  - 3 vacant buildings
  - Most of these new city-wide enrollment schools are located along the State Street, King Drive, and 35th Street Corridor
    - Because of its CTA stops, central location, and high number of fast food restaurants, 35th street is over-run with thousands of high school students every day, creating serious safety concerns
    - At least 14 2nd District police officers required at dismissal everyday along 35th St. to control “mayhem”
    - Local businesses and CTA trains and buses are overwhelmed
  - Every school in Bronzeville has been either directly impacted by school actions or has received a significant number of school actions as a result of school actions, but were not officially labeled as “receiving schools”, which means they received no extra resources (see below)
Difficult to hire great teachers and other staff when your school is on the closing list every year

- **Student Impact from Last Year’s School Actions in Bronzeville** (excluding eighth and twelfth grade students)
  - 1,542 students directly impacted
  - 164 elementary students had to attend and adjust to a new school
  - 30 high school students had to attend and adjust to a new school
  - CPS has indicated they do not want to take action on a school that has recently been a receiving school. **117 students from Bronzeville went to schools that were not designated as receiving schools** and therefore received no resources for being a receiving school. **Every neighborhood school in Bronzeville has received new students** as a result of previous actions within the last 2-3 years.
  - 14 students enrolled at an alternative high school
  - 32 students from affected schools left CPS
  - 49 students from affected schools dropped out or did not show up

**Overview of Bronzeville Schools**

- **Utilization**
  - At least two of Bronzeville’s schools on this year’s closing list have had their utilization numbers altered by CPS within the last two months (Wells and Drake). **CPS’ data needs to be checked and then rechecked before making decisions that impact the lives of thousands of children and their families.**
  - The population loss associated with the demolition of the CHA housing projects should already be accounted for with the 13 neighborhood schools already shuttered. **It is largely because of CPS policy that many of our schools are considered “underutilized” (i.e. proliferation of charter schools).**
  - With the redevelopment of CHA mixed-income housing and the projected population growth of school-age students in Bronzeville, we need to keep our neighborhood schools open to prevent overcrowding in the future.
  - **Every neighborhood school in Bronzeville is considered “underutilized” by CPS’s standards.** However, given the high concentration of students who need extra resources and smaller classes, **Bronzeville’s neighborhood schools need space beyond the 30 students/classroom metric used by CPS (see chart).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Avg. Bronzeville Neighborhood Elementary Schools</th>
<th>% of total CPS Students</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low-Income %</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STLS %</td>
<td>12.93%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>9.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP %</td>
<td>14.33%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- **Safety** – Almost every school on the list **does not have an eligible neighborhood school to receive students within CPS’ safe distance (.8 miles)**
- **Performance** – Although most of our schools are on level 3, several are trending upwards. Additionally, the BCAC has conducted several learning walks to collect much needed qualitative information about positive changes occurring at each school and resources needed to improve the school. Bronzeville schools are under resourced, which impedes their ability to score high on standardized tests. For example, many of our schools
lack basic technology services, which is problematic because much of the test prep work is online. Almost every elementary school in Bronzeville that is still on the list:

- Exceeds the national average for either reading or math growth targets (one by as much as 19 percentage points)
- Showing positive growth indexes in both reading and math

**Leadership** – Almost every one of Bronzeville’s neighborhood schools has a principal who has been at that school for less than 2 years. CPS’s own performance metrics use two years of data. These leaders need a chance to implement their ideas to increase both performance and enrollment.

**Partnerships** – Every school in Bronzeville has developed strong partnerships with organizations in the community including, but not limited to: Centers for New Horizons, Real Men Read, Institute for Positive Living, Polished Pebbles, IIT, UIC, ICO, Ada S. McKinley, Stateway Community Partners, Quad Communities Development Corporation, and the Bronzeville Community Action Council.

**Community Support Centers/Health Centers**

- 2 elementary schools are home to community-based health clinics (Reavis and Beethoven) that provide needed medical care to students and parents (Parkman has ICO Eye Clinic).
- Two Child-Parent Centers in the area, however one is at a magnet school and the other is less than 5 blocks from it and the location is not liked by the parents who use it (as a result of Chi-Arts moving into Doolittle).

**Overview of Bronzeville Community**

**Population** - Bronzeville has a higher population density of school-age children than both Chicago and the U.S., especially 0-5 years old. Along with families coming to Bronzeville as a result of the CHA redevelopment, these children will need quality neighborhood schools to attend.

**Income and Unemployment** - Parents cannot afford the transportation costs associated with their children having to travel farther to and from school.
57% of people live below the poverty line for a family of three or four ($19,090 and $23,050/yr.) compared to 46% for the city – 11 percentage points than the city

Residents of Bronzeville are twice as likely to be unemployed than the city as a whole

Bronzeville’s single-headed households (77%) are 41 percentage points higher than that of the city-at-large (41%) and Bronzeville’s single, female-headed households (62%) are 18 percentage points higher than that of the city-at-large (44%)
**Household Makeup**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Bronzeville</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Married Households</td>
<td>40.55%</td>
<td>77.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Those, Female Householder, No Husband Present with Children Under 18</td>
<td>43.82%</td>
<td>62.02%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Educational Obtainment – Bronzeville’s drop-out rate is almost 8 percentage points higher than that of the city-at-large. The chart above demonstrates why Bronzeville needs more early childhood resources and quality neighborhood schools.

2010 Highest Education Level Attained (Population Age 25+) for Chicago, IL

- Did Not Complete High School
- Completed High School
- Some College
- Completed Associate Degree
- Completed Bachelors Degree
- Completed Graduate Degree

- Crime and Gangs
  - Although public safety improvements have been made, children have been exposed to increased opportunities to encounter violence as a result of previous schools actions.
Because there are fewer neighborhood options, will have to travel unsafe distances to and from school as a result of any closures in Bronzeville this year. There are over 10 active gangs in the Bronzeville area (see map).

About 70 assaults, burglaries, or other criminal encounters have occurred within the last two months during school hours in public places where children might travel.

### 2010 Crime Rate Indexes for Chicago, IL

* 60653 is the zip code most associated with Bronzeville

- **Some of the Housing Developments Being Built in Bronzeville (at least 500 new units coming in the next two years).**
  - 130 units for Lakefront properties (40th and Lake Park, under construction right now). There will be a mix of 1, 2, and 3 bedroom units of mixed income housing. Those kids would go to Robinson or Fuller.
  - Rehab of Lake Park Place (high rises on 39th and Lake Park) should be finished before summer, and that they will be leasing about 100 or so CHA units.
  - Shops and Lofts on 47th (SW corner of 47th and Cottage) that will include 155 new units of mixed income housing by 2014.
  - Park Boulevard is set to close Phase 2B this spring, which will be 108 new units of mixed income housing, a mix of 1, 2, 3, and 4 bedrooms, which will probably be ready for occupancy late 2014.
APPENDIX C: Best Practices in Education Facility Management & Planning

Bibliography Compiled by the CEFTF Master Planning Committee

Sources: National Clearinghouse For Educational Facilities of the National Institute For Building Science
“BEST” – Building Educational Success Together, Washington, DC

Background: The CEFTF’s Master Planning Committee has researched best practices in facility planning and management since the Task Force’s inception in 2010. The bibliography presented here was first shared with Chicago Public Schools in early 2011, prior to the enactment of IL Public Act 97-0474, which requires CPS to have a 10-Year Educational Facilities Master Plan. The CEFTF provided CPS, the 2012 Utilization Commission, and the Mayor’s Advisory Committee on School Repurposing & Community Development with updates on the Master Planning Committee’s best practices research over the years.

I. LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOL FACILITIES

- GENERAL

Mastering the Plan. [Using an Educational Adequacy Assessment.]
Haria, Hitesh; American School Board Journal; v196 n10, p37,38; Oct 2009
Discusses facilities master planning, citing the St. Paul Public Schools example of assessing all properties for physical condition and educational adequacy. Elements of an assessment are outlined, and the use of the outcome to prioritize projects is addressed.


Master Facilities Plan Evaluation Checklist.
(21st Century School Fund, Washington, DC, 2008)
Provides a tool to assess a master facilities plan as it relates to vision, creation of high quality public education, vibrant and safe neighborhoods, fairness, comprehensiveness, coordination with other agencies, accuracy of data, feasibility, and openness to the public. The assessment tool was created for District of Columbia input, but is general enough to be of use to any school district. 10p.

Guides new and experienced school planners from the conception of educational needs through occupancy and use of the completed facilities. Chapters follow the planning, design, and occupancy processes in sequence as follows: forming the educational plan, creating community partnerships, establishing a master plan, writing educational specifications, addressing design guidelines, evaluating and selecting the site, infusing technology, integrating sustainable design, working with a design team, evaluating project delivery options, identifying cost and funding options, monitoring construction, integrating maintenance and operations, and assessing the completed project. Numerous references, photographs, drawings, figures, and a glossary are included. 386p.

TO ORDER: Council of Education Facility Planners Int'l., 9180 East Desert Cove Drive, Suite 104, Scottsdale, AZ, 85260, Tel: 480-391-0840, Fax: 480-391-0940.
http://www.cefpi.org/i4a/ams/amsstore
Integrated Sustainable Architecture.
http://www.peterli.com/spm/resources/articles/archive.php?article_id=2382
Pender, Donald; School Planning and Management; v48 n10 , p44,45 ; Oct 2009
Outlines four key characteristics of a sustainable school master plan: 1) supporting learning through integration of varying spaces, furnishings, and technologies; 2) putting schools at the centers of communities; 3) creating high-performance facilities; and 4) taking a long-term view.

Facilities Master Plan (San Francisco, California).
http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.cfm?page=ops.master_plan
(San Francisco Unified School District, San Francisco, CA , 2002)
This facilities master plan provides the framework for the facilities improvement program for the San Francisco Unified School District. The plan contains: educational goals, a demographic report, capacity studies, facilities assessments, cost models, funding sources evaluation and project recommendations. 379p. TO ORDER: San Francisco Unified School District, School Operations, 135 Van Ness Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102; Tel: (415) 355-6979

Master Plan Guidelines for 2009-2011 Biennium. [Arkansas]
Presents the Arkansas Division of Public School Academic Facilities and Transportation's requirements for master plans to be submitted by the state's districts. Elements detailed include: 1) a district overview that includes demographics, a community profile, educational considerations, and a master plan narrative summary; 2) facilities information that covers insurance, custodial plans, maintenance, renovation, repairs; 3) project information for new facilities or major renovations; and 4) district financial statistics. 37p.

An Overview of Facilities Master Planning.
http://www.peterli.com/archive/cpm/1223.shtm
Abramson, Paul; Burnap, Ed College Planning and Management; v9 n10 , p50-53,55 ; Oct 2006
Details issues in school facilities master planning, emphasizing the consideration of educational program, assessment of needs, analysis and planning issues, and then forming the plan. The plan is to be considered a living document, not a final solution.

- COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

21st Century School Fund: PK-12 Educational Facilities Master Plan Evaluation Guide

Inspired Planning.
http://asumag.com/Construction/long-range-facility-planning-200908/
Erickson, Paul
American School and University; v81 n13 , p140-142 ; Aug 2009
Discusses the benefits of a long range facilities plan to a school district, how to work with the community to launch and reach consensus in a plan, and the standard components of a plan.

Expedited, Effective, and Efficient.
Glover, Troy; Watson, Robb
School Planning and Management; v47 n11 , p45-47 ; Nov 2008
Reviews an expedited school facilities master planning process in Ohio’s South-Western City School District. An aggressive meeting schedule, extensive community input, and attention to equity enabled the District to create a plan that normally would have taken 10 to 12 months in three.
(Virginia Beach City Public Schools, 2007)  
Virginia Beach City Public Schools is committed to providing state-of-the art schools to its approximately 72,000 students. Testimony to this is the fact that 22 schools have been replaced or renovated since 1996. This describes the purpose of the Long-Range School Facility Master Plan Steering Committee and how the community will be involved.

Cincinnati Embarks on Ten-Year Plan.  
http://www.schoolconstructionnews.com/index.cfm?do=otm&action=archive&otm_id=102  
Leisner, Hava School Construction News; v7 n4 , p31,32 ; May 2004  
Presents an interview with Michael L. Burson, director of facilities at Cincinnati Public Schools, in which he describes the district's 10-year master plan to renovate or replace all its schools by 2013. Middle schools are being eliminated, large high schools are being subdivided into smaller units within a facility, and elementary schools are being assembled from a "kit of parts" that can be arranged to suit the site and community.

Looking at the Long Range.  
http://asumag.com/mag/university_looking_long_range/  
Rydeen, James E.; Erickson, Paul W. American School and University; v75 n3 , p352-53 ; Nov 2002  
Describes how developing a master plan can help school districts anticipate their facility needs and the problems that may arise, and help school administrators articulate their expectations to educational planners and architects.

Planning Educational Facilities for the Next Century.  
This book examines each phase in the process of planning capital projects and those individuals in the schools who make decisions about the buildings students will use. It uses the long range planning process of the school system as the vehicle for providing the proper housing for students and programs. Program development, student enrollment projections, existing facility evaluation, and financial planning are discussed. Further areas address the development of the capital improvement program, architect employment, educational specifications development, the federal regulations in planning educational facilities, design phase monitoring, construction project bidding and construction phase management, and technology planning. Appendices provide sample forms and correspondence such as the standard forms of agreement between owner and architect and between owner and contractor, a middle school appraisal form, site selection flow chart, a flow chart for developing educational specifications, job description for construction supervisor, a planning process evaluation form, and school planning checklist. 299p.  
TO ORDER: Association of School Business Officials International, 11401 N. Shore Dr., Reston, VA 20190; Tel: 703-478-0405.  
http://aspointl.org/Publications/  

An Overview of the Facilities Master Plan Process Purpose.  
http://www.eric.ed.gov/contentdelivery  
(Presentation by HMC Architecture Interior Planning; Coalition for Adequate School Housing, Sacramento, CA , Feb 2000)  
This paper provides a description of facilities master plans and the process of creating one. The plan serves as a guide for assessing the need for facility improvements and capital investments to implement them, including justification for developer fees. The facilities master plan determines the scope of repairs, modernization, upgrades, and new construction needed to serve the current and future school facilities.
needs of the community. It also assesses the variety of federal, state, and local funding sources and financing options available to the district and provides a prudent view of the scope of projects that may reasonably be accomplished with available funds. The paper addresses how the planning process begins; forming the teams and committees; setting the vision, mission, and goals; sample vision and mission statements and goals; initial planning activities; activities of the architect, educational planner, and demographer; and a master plan outline. 12p.

(California School Facilities Planning Division, Sacramento, CA, 1986)
This guide assists school districts in the development of a comprehensive facilities master plan. The guide includes sections on educational program, how to evaluate the utilization and condition of existing facilities, how to conduct a demographic study, and how to implement and evaluate the master plan. 32p.

- FORECASTING FUTURE FACILITY NEEDS-SPACE UTILIZATION STANDARDS AND COMMUNITY CONTEXT
  A Moving Target: Using Demographics in Your School Construction Plan
  http://www.asbj.com/MainMenuCategory/Archive/2008/October
  Sack-Min, Joetta
  American School Board Journal; v195 n10 , p20-23 ; Oct 2008
  Discusses use of demographic information in school planning, including predicting areas of growth that will need schools and areas of decline that may necessitate closing or consolidating schools. Costs of maintaining underutilized or vacant schools, the practice retaining them in case of an unforeseen upswing, the negative effects of school closures on neighborhoods, and some particular issues surrounding shifts between neighborhoods within metropolitan areas are considered.
  TO ORDER: American School Board Journal, 1680 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314; Tel: 703-838-6722; http://www.asbj.com

  The Impact of the Housing Market on School Facility Planning.
  Healy, Tracy
  Educational Facility Planner; v41 n4 , p18-21 ; 2007
  Discusses educational planning in the wake of a housing slump, advising school districts to identify multiple resources, gather data, and seek partnerships. Districts should pay close attention to live birth counts, enrollment in elementary schools, and migration patterns as well as to new housing starts and building permits. Includes three references.

  Mapping it Out.
  http://asumag.com/mag/university_mapping/
  Hwang, Lee
  American School and University; v79 n4 , p34-36 ; Dec 2006
  Reviews uses for geographic information systems (GIS) in predicting enrollments, planning curricula, locating new schools, and master planning. A variety of information on residential growth, ethnicity, socioeconomic conditions, boundaries, and land use can be layered within GIS programming.

  Learning from the Past?
  http://www.peterli.com/archive/spm/1236.shtm
  Abramson, Paul
  School Planning and Management; v45 10 , p78 ; Oct 2006
  Recounts the effect of the "baby boom" on school construction, followed by that of the decline of births beginning in the mid 1960's. Insight on interpreting current record enrollments is offered, with some
districts reporting growth and others decline. Deficiencies in the standard cohort survival method of predicting enrollment are attributed to rapidly changing local economics and housing patterns.

**Using Demography and Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in School District Planning.**
McKibben, Jerome; Cropper, Matthew
Educational Facility Planner; v41 n4, p9-13; 2007
Details use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) information in enrollment forecasting, long-range facility planning, and redistricting. Recent advances in this field help demographers accurately forecast small population trends and smaller attendance areas. Census data is currently available in block-sized increments that detail demographic and migration trends.

**Still Crowded Out: School Construction Fails to Keep Up with Manhattan Building Boom.**
(Manhattan Borough President's Office, New York, Sep 2008)
Reports on New York City's continuing plans for residential growth, without adding school space to accommodate the occupants. New 2008 units permitted will, by the city's own estimate, produce as many as 1,100 new children, much of that growth in neighborhoods where the schools are now at or over capacity. Borough officials and the teachers union call on using the upcoming five-year capital plan to create a public/private partnership to solve the problem, assuming that mayoral control of the school system is used to the extent that it could be. City Hall oversees the various city agencies involved in school construction and has access to public and private entities across a wide spectrum. 32p.

**Avoiding the Costly Mistake.**
Carey, Kelley
American School Board Journal; v196 n7, p26-28; Jul 2009
Advises on properly projecting enrollment before building new schools. Tools for more precise projections, typical mistakes, computer mapping, and correct use of demographic data are described.

**Master Plan Update 10: K-8 Space Allocation.**
http://net.cmsdnet.net/Administration/BACdocuments/MasterPlanTen.doc
(Bond Accountability Commission, Cleveland, OH, Jul 21, 2009)
Reports on a mismatching of Cleveland school construction to enrollment trends. The report describes three neighborhoods in which enrollment has fallen for years, but are planned for more students in 2015 than they have now. The report recommends that the capital plan should be adjusted before each construction segment, based on the latest student counts. It also illustrates that enrollment fell in every neighborhood of the District over the last 11 years, though a few were relatively stable last year. Planners should begin fixing inequalities by trimming the Master Plan enrollments of yet-to-be-built schools in neighborhoods scheduled for more future space than they need today. The trimmed space should be added to the plan for schools in neighborhoods where enrollments are most stable. 14p.

- **CAPITAL BUDGETING AND FACILITY MANAGEMENT**

  **State Spending on PK-12 Public School Facilities.**
  21st Century School Fund, Washington, DC

  **Proposition MM: Repairing our Neighborhood Schools.** [San Diego, California]
  http://sandi.net/propmm/
  (San Diego City Schools, CA, 2006)
  Provides information on and reports on the progress of San Diego's Proposition MM, a $1.51 billion bond measure that funds modernization of 161 existing schools and construction of 12 new and three rebuilt...
schools. Also included on the website is a history of the proposition, the long range facilities master plan, status of new/rebuilt schools, environmental impact reports, designs, maps, advice on naming a new school and planning a ribbon cutting event, and other links.

FMI K-12 Public School Construction Management.
(FMI, Raleigh, NC , 2005)
Presents the results of a survey of the largest 500 school systems in the U.S. that discusses top issues in construction management, trends in school construction, master planning practices, funding, project management practices, commissioning, prototype schools, and sustainability. 26p.
TO ORDER: Contact Phil Warner at Pwarner@fminet.com, Tel: 919-785-9357

• CLASS SIZE
“Does Class Size Matter?”
Author: schanzenbach, D.W., Northwestern University (February 2014)
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/does-class-size-matter
“...summarizes the academic literature on the impact of class size and finds that class size is an important determinant of a variety of student outcomes, ranging from test scores to broader life outcomes. Smaller classes are particularly effective at raising achievement levels of low-income and minority children.

“Class Size: Counting Students Can Count”
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/class-size-counting-students-can-count
“... all reduced class size initiatives are not alike, and must be carefully crafted to assure that schools and students reap the maximum benefits from smaller classes.”

• JOINT USE POLICIES
A Policy Framework for Joint Use. Published by Building Educational Success Together-BEST and the Center for Cities and Schools, University of California at Berkeley, February 2014

Joint Use Cost Calculator for School Facilities. Published By: 21CSF and the Center for Cities and Schools,
Abstract | XLS

Partnerships for Joint Use: Expanding the Use of Public School Infrastructure to Benefit Students and Communities. Published By: Center for Cities and Schools and CEFPI
Abstract | PDF

Joint Use of Public Schools: A Framework for a New Social Contract
Published By: 21CSF and the Center for Cities and Schools
Abstract | PDF

San Francisco’s Public School Facilities as Public Assets: A Shared Understanding and Policy Recommendations for the Community Use of Schools
Published By: Center for Cities and Schools
Abstract | PDF

Appendix D: Raise Your Hand (RYH) “Apples to Apples” Study of Elementary School Space Utilization

Background: Raise Your Hand-IL is an independent not-for-profit organization of parents of Chicago Public School students. RYH conducted an analysis of CPS’ Space Utilization standards, and found that the school district’s formula exaggerated the degree of under-utilization and under-stated the extent of overcrowding in the school district (see Chapter II of the CEFTF 2013 Report, “Comprehensive Facility Planning.”

In releasing its research to the media and the public, Raise Your Hand summarized their findings as follows:

**Flawed Formula Categorizes Some of CPS’ Highest Performing Schools as “Underutilized” Placing them at Risk for Closure**

CHICAGO, December 3, 2012 – In its second phase of reporting, “Apples to Apples,” an independent investigation of Chicago Public Schools (CPS) data, reveals that CPS’ school utilization report is based on a flawed mathematical formula and therefore has revealed misleading numbers related to utilization at elementary schools in 2011-2012. According to publicly reported figures by CPS, 235 of 470 CPS elementary schools or 50% were reported as underutilized. However, Apples to Apples researchers have uncovered a significant flaw in the CPS utilization formula that, when corrected reveals only 178 schools or 38% were underutilized – a 24% discrepancy. In addition, schools reported as underutilized by 50% or more, and thus potentially under consideration for closure, are also misrepresented, with CPS reporting 20% or 92 elementary schools in this category. Using the corrected formula this number drops drastically to 8% or only 37 schools.

The corrected calculation also reveals a much higher rate of overcrowding than reported. Based on the CPS formula, only 14% of elementary schools were dealing with overcrowding. However, the corrected calculation reveals that nearly one third (31%) of elementary schools were overcrowded in 2011-2012. [see below for side by side comparison]

See more at: [http://ilraiseyourhand.org/content/apples-apples-release-underutilized-cps-elem-schools-overestimated-24-overcrowding-higher-re#sthash.DurSlbjW.dpuf](http://ilraiseyourhand.org/content/apples-apples-release-underutilized-cps-elem-schools-overestimated-24-overcrowding-higher-re#sthash.DurSlbjW.dpuf)

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<td>efficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOODS</td>
<td>Closure</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td>under utilized</td>
<td>-41%</td>
<td>under utilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YALE</td>
<td>Closure</td>
<td>-74%</td>
<td>under utilized</td>
<td>-68%</td>
<td>under utilized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note on school action categories:

**Closure** = School and its facility closed

**Closed receiving school** = the school itself closed, but the facility remained open and a new school moved in; both the students from the closed school and the new school are now together in the closed school’s facility but under the administration of the new school that moved in.

**Move to new school** = the school facility closed and the school moved into the facility of a closed school, bringing the students and taking over the administration; both the students from the closed school and the school that moved in are now together.

**Receiving school** = the school received students from a school closure, also referred to as the “Welcoming School”.
### Appendix E: CPS’ “Most Under-Utilized” Schools in School Year 2012 - 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking of Utilization</th>
<th>Chicago Community Area</th>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>20th Day enrollment as of SY 2012-2013</th>
<th>Ideal enrollment of the School</th>
<th>Utilization rate as of SY 2012-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near West</td>
<td>MONTEFIORE</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>ACT CHTR ES</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Near West</td>
<td>DETT</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bronzeville</td>
<td>PERSHING MIDDLE</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Englewood</td>
<td>YALE</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Humboldt Park</td>
<td>DUPREY</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>SUMNER</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>CATHER</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>GOLDBLATT</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pilsen - Little Village</td>
<td>PADEREWSKI</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Auburn Gresham</td>
<td>MORGAN</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Near West</td>
<td>HOPE CONTR ES</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>North Lawndale</td>
<td>HENSON</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>MELODY</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Near West</td>
<td>BROWN, W</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>North Lawndale</td>
<td>POPE</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Englewood</td>
<td>HINTON</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Bronzeville</td>
<td>DRAKE</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>ARMSTRONG, L</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Humboldt Park</td>
<td>LAFAYETTE</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Woodlawn</td>
<td>DUMAS TECH ACAD</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>DELANO</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Englewood</td>
<td>HOLMES</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>GREGORY</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Lincoln Park</td>
<td>MANIERRE</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Humboldt Park</td>
<td>CHOPIN</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Hyde Park</td>
<td>REAVIS</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Far South Side</td>
<td>KOHN</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>South Shore</td>
<td>MADISON</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Woodlawn</td>
<td>TILL</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Woodlawn</td>
<td>ROSS</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Auburn Gresham</td>
<td>GRESHAM</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Bronzeville</td>
<td>BURKE</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking of Utilization</td>
<td>Chicago Community Area</td>
<td>School Name</td>
<td>20th Day enrollment as of SY 2012-2013</td>
<td>Ideal enrollment of the School</td>
<td>Utilization rate as of SY 2012-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td>AVALON PARK</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Near West</td>
<td>SMYTH</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>North Lawndale</td>
<td>HERZL</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Pilsen - Little Village</td>
<td>PEREZ</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>GARFIELD PARK</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td>SCHMID</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Bronzeville</td>
<td>ROBINSON</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>TILTON</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>PICCOLO</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>North Lawndale</td>
<td>CROWN</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>North Lawndale</td>
<td>MASON</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Beverly</td>
<td>ESMOND</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Garfield - West Humboldt</td>
<td>HEFFERAN</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Humboldt Park</td>
<td>VON HUMBOLDT</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Auburn Gresham</td>
<td>JACKSON, M</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Ravenswood</td>
<td>STEWART</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Englewood</td>
<td>BASS</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX F: CPS’ Feedback and Input to the CEFTF Report

Background: Chicago Public Schools provided detailed feedback on the CEFTF Report and made the March 26, 2014 “Mid Year School Consolidation Report” available to the Task Force. CPS’ comments, perspectives and analysis are included in this Appendix.

Chicago Public Schools CEO Mid-Year School Consolidation Report to Board of Education, March 26, 2014

Every child in every neighborhood in Chicago deserves access to a high quality education that prepares them to graduate 100% college ready and 100% college bound. But for too long, children in certain parts of Chicago had been cheated out of the resources they needed to succeed in the classroom, because they were in underutilized, under-resourced schools.

Last school year, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) had space for 511,000 students, but only 403,000 were enrolled in our schools. Half of our schools were underutilized and nearly 140 were more than half-empty. This meant that resources across the district were spread too thinly and were not being used in the best interest of our students and school communities. CPS was spending money on half-empty buildings instead of redirecting those limited resources to ensure a high quality education for every student in every neighborhood.

As a result of this crisis, CPS CEO Barbara Byrd-Bennett created a Commission on School Utilization to begin a community dialogue around potential school consolidations and the impact that a more efficiently-run district would have on students and school communities. The Commission held several meetings throughout the City to engage residents in this dialogue and to engage CPS staff regarding the district’s capacity to effectively implement school consolidations. The Commission’s final report stated that school consolidations were justified if students were moved into better educational environments. Furthermore, the Commission identified that CPS could effectively implement 80 school consolidations and recommended that CPS make the necessary investments to effectively implement the consolidations.

In March, 2013 CEO Byrd-Bennett issued school consolidation recommendations that took the recommendations made by the Commission on School Utilization into account. These initial recommendations led CPS staff to engage in another round of community dialogue about the CEO’s proposal. The CEO’s proposal was narrowed following this round of community input.

In May 2013, the Chicago School Board of Education approved a proposal to close 49 underutilized elementary schools and one high school program, and co-locate eleven other schools. This action allowed Chicago Public Schools to not only offer students opportunities to enroll in higher performing schools but also saved the District about $41 million in annual operating expenses, which in the first year was reinvested in our welcoming schools across the City of Chicago in order to create a quality, 21st Century education for every child.

The Board of Education’s decision to consolidate underutilized schools was informed by the recommendations of the Independent Commission on School Utilization and a comprehensive and coordinated engagement process that took place over seven months and allowed more than 34,000 members of the school community to provide feedback.

Following the board’s decision, the District made an unprecedented $155 million investment to outfit 55 Welcoming Schools with the resources that parents, teachers and CPS agree students need, such as new science labs, engineering labs, computers, wireless access, libraries, art rooms, air conditioners and other needed building repairs. To help ease the transition and create safe, positive learning environments CPS also invested in more
robust social and emotional supports for students and developed cultural integration programs to build strong, supportive school communities.

A mid-year analysis conducted by Chicago Public Schools shows promising trends for students involved in last year’s school consolidations and underscores the District’s comprehensive approach to providing a smooth transition for students in their new schools. The findings include:

- About half of students from schools that closed or consolidated in 2013 have improved attendance in SY13-14.
- Priority-groups of students that are particularly at-risk, diverse learners and those in temporary living situations have slightly higher rates of attendance in SY13-14 compared to last school year.
- Reported misconducts for students from closed or consolidated schools have decreased slightly from 9.9% to 9% in SY13-14, whether those students attended their designated welcoming school or chose another school.
- Grade point averages in core subjects such as English, math, reading and science have increased slightly for students involved in school transitions.
- The percentage of students in grades 3-8 who are "on-track" for graduation has also risen slightly among all types of students.

These early successes suggested by the mid-year data analysis reaffirm the District’s commitment to investing so heavily in the transition process, from making needed facility improvements to equipping welcoming schools with additional social and emotional learning supports for students to also ensuring that the district offered students opportunities to attend higher performing welcoming schools.

Facilities Investments

CPS has delivered on its $155 million commitment for capital investments in all Welcoming Schools, providing additional resources to help ease the transition for students, teachers, principals and staff. The investments included:

- Air conditioning in every welcoming school classroom;
- A library in every welcoming school;
- Customized school safety plans;
- User-ready laptops and iPads for all students in grade 3-8;
- New and upgraded technology supports;
- Improved Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accessibility;
- Upgraded facilities; and
- Improved food service capacity.

CPS also made several IT Infrastructure investments including:

- Installing over 2,100 wireless access points and 830 switches;
- Upgrading or installing 77 fiber circuits into schools;
- Moving or changing over 3,700 physical phones and 7,800 phone lines;
- Delivering and installing over 20,000 devices, including 15,000 iPads;
- Deploying 66 servers supporting 750 security cameras in 61 schools;
- Constructing new or upgrading science labs, computer labs, engineering labs and media labs.

Programmatic Investments
CPS invested $78 Million in additional instruction and programming, expanding learning opportunities as well as social and emotional support for students. This has resulted in strengthened neighborhood schools that provide:

- 10 new STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math) programs, six new International Baccalaureate (IB) programmes and a new Fine Arts program in welcoming schools to ensure that students in every neighborhood have access to high-quality programs;
- Specialized academic Support;
- Cultural Integration Support;
- Social and Emotional Student Support;
- Additional support for students with disabilities, those in temporary living situations, and English language learners; and
- A dedicated principal transition coordinator (PTC) for every school to ensure that the school transition process occurred smoothly.

Safety Investments

CPS worked in partnership with the Chicago Police Department (CPD), community members and city agencies to expand Safe Passage routes and provide safe learning environments. This collaboration built upon the work CPS and CPD do every day through its Safe Passage partnership at nearly 40 schools.

The District hired an additional 600 Safe Passage workers representing 18 different community organizations who were specifically assigned to Welcoming Schools, ensuring that students could get to and from school safely. Safe Passage routes were designated by the CPD after months of collaboration with parents, principals, and community members.

There have been no major incidents involving students on Safe Passage routes near Welcoming schools during the program's operational hours. In the few instances where an issue arose, police say the response time by officers was immediate, often times leading to arrest, because they were staffing the route along with other city workers.

Mid-Year Data Analysis

CPS conducted a mid-year analysis of several data points to track the progress of students impacted by school consolidations. The results of that analysis show that attendance, GPAs and student on-track rates are up for students who were impacted by school consolidations - this includes increases for our diverse learners (students with IEPs) as well as those students in temporary living situations (STLS). The analysis also shows that misconducts are down when compared to the same time period last year for students whose school was closed.

CPS CEO Barbara Byrd-Bennett has been and continues to be committed to ensuring that proper supports are given to students with IEPs and students in temporary living situations. The analysis below shows that these students are seeing positive gains in attendance, GPS, and on-track rates showing that CPS met its commitment to these students.

These positive results are due to the focused effort CPS placed on the transition process that was implemented in the spring and summer of 2013 and the engagement from the school community that has worked together to ensure our students enjoyed a smooth transition.

Attendance Rates

Attendance rates for CPS students impacted by last year's school consolidations have increased. Graph 1 below compares 2013 and 2014 Quarter 2 attendance rates for students who were in closing, welcoming and non-
actions schools at the end of SY 2013. Attendance rates as of the end of Quarter 2 are up this year compared to attendance rates at the end of Quarter 2 in SY 2013 for all groups of students.

Graph 1: Q2 Attendance Rates by Impacted Status

![Graph 1: Q2 Attendance Rates by Impacted Status](image)

**The statistics in the black boxes reflect the percentage when comparing last year’s student’s attendance to this year’s student attendance. Over half of students from closed schools improved their attendance this year, higher than the District’s average at schools unaffected by consolidations.

Attendance by School Choice

Graph 2 presents attendance rates for impacted students by school choice. Attendance rates increased for impacted students who chose to attend their designated Welcoming school. Similarly, students from designated Welcoming Schools and students not impacted by actions who chose to remain enrolled at the same school have slightly higher attendance rates than those who chose to switch schools.

Graph 2: Attendance Rates by School Choice Status

![Graph 2: Attendance Rates by School Choice Status](image)

Attendance by Student Demographic Variables

Graphs 3 and 4 present student attendance rates as of Quarter 2 2013 and Quarter 2 2014 for Students in Temporary Living Situations (STLS) and Students with an IEP. These graphs mirror the slight increases seen in overall attendance for impacted and non-impacted students. These two student populations typically have lower attendance rates compared to their peers, regardless of whether they were impacted by school consolidations.
Graph 3: Attendance Rates at Quarter 2 by STLS (Students in Temporary Living Situation) Status

Graph 4: Attendance Rates at Quarter 2 by IEP Status

Misconduct

Graph 5 shows that students impacted by school consolidations have seen their rates of misconduct decrease through Quarter 2, regardless of whether they enrolled in their designated Welcoming School or chose another school option. This trend is further indication that the District's investments into social-emotional learning and creating positive learning environments is working.
Graph 5: Percent of Students with Any Misconduct by Action Status

Misconducts by Student Demographics

Graphs 6 and 7 show the percent of impacted students with any misconduct by demographic variables, including Students in Temporary Living Situations and those with IEPs. Both student populations showed decreases in their rates of misconduct.

Graph 6: Percent of Students in Temporary Living Situations with Any Misconduct

Graph 7: Percent of Students with an IEP with Any Misconduct
GPA in Core Courses

Unweighted grade-point averages were calculated using Quarters 1 and 2 grades in core classes (e.g., math, reading, English, science, history/social sciences). As can be seen in graph 8, across all groups, GPAs increased from SY2013 to SY2014.

Graph 8: GPA by Impacted Status

GPA by Student Demographic Variables

Graphs 9, 10, and 11 present Quarter 2 average GPA by impacted status and student demographics. These graphs generally mirror the increases seen overall in GPA.

Graph 9: GPA by Impacted Status and STLS Status
Graph 10 shows that across all impacted statuses, students with an IEP are showing GPA gains, more so than students without an IEP.

**Graph 10: GPA by Impacted Status and IEP Status**

On-Track Rates

The percentage of students who are "on-track" for graduation is increasing for those involved in school transitions. On-Track status is calculated for students in grades 3-8. A student is considered to be on track if she/he meets both of the following conditions:
1. Attendance, YTD, is 92% or higher; and
2. The lowest mark is a C or better in both Reading and Math.

While all groups of students showed increases in On-Track rates from Quarter 2 of SY2013 to Quarter 2 of SY2014, students from designated welcoming schools and students not impacted by actions showed more substantial increases.

**Graph 12: On-Track Rates by Impacted Status**

On-Track Rates by Student Demographic Variables
Students in Temporary living Situations show greater increases in On-Track rates across all groups of impacted students compared to their peers that are not in temporary living situations.

Graph 13: On-Track Rates by Impacted Status and STLS Status

CPS Response to CEFTF Report, May 16, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CEFTF EFMP Finding and CPS Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1)</strong> CPS failed to start work on developing the 10 year master plan for 15 months after the enactment of the state reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is incorrect. CPS developed Facility Standards ~8/1/11 - 12/31/11 (Made public approx. 12/31/11). CPS developed the Space Utilization Standards, made public on January 1, 2012. Through February 2012, CPS developed and tested a revised Assessment Tool and issued an RFP for Assessment Services ~3/5/12. CPS Contract negotiations and sign-off for the assessments took place ~4/1/12 - 6/15/12 and Biennial Assessments in response to Public Act 097-0474 began ~6/15/12. (All CPS owned and leased educational facilities assessed and made public in 12/13.) All of these are important inputs and conditions precedent to development of the plan. In October 2012, CPS held Community Engagement Forums within each of its five collaboratives to gather feedback on facilities priorities. Further, during this time, CPS also was developing the community areas and related analysis, conducting assessments of our utilization, our program footprint, population and demographic trends, and our utilization needs, all of which informed our plan and were incorporated into the public draft of May 2013.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **2)** The EFMP was based on minimal public input. |
| CPS made extensive and multi-faceted outreach attempts for public input both prior to the publication of the Draft EFMP and after the publication of the Draft. Prior to the draft, CPS sought extensive and multi-faceted input, from a variety of constituents, using a variety of modalities. CPS held five community engagement forums to gain input on space utilization and performance standards and on facilities and educational programming priorities; CPS surveyed school principals and LSC chairpersons, promoted a “Textizen” campaign on City of Chicago buses and rail, enabling community members to send text messages, and developed a social media site for users to provide their thoughts about facility issues and needs. This is all in addition to the public meetings that were held related to potential school closures, which was one aspect of facilities planning. Following the publication of the draft, held 25 meetings and hearings. These included meetings with the Parent Involvement Advisory Board, the Parent Advisory Council Collaboratives, the Local School Council Advisory Board, the Community Actions Councils, a meeting of Citywide Clergy, a student forum, LSC member meetings (4 meetings,
### CEFTF EFMP Finding and CPS Response

**across the city, between September 10-12, and 5 public hearings, across the city, between September 3-11.**
Further we maintained a public mailbox for comments, surveyed members of the public and continued the Textizen campaign.

3) **Turnover in CPS leadership and repeated internal reorganizations between 2011 and 2013, and reluctance to proactively seek out public input all limited CPS' progress in developing the plan.**

*CPS met ALL legislative deadlines for the publication of the draft and the final EFMP and sought public input both prior to the draft and after the draft was published. The legislation that created the current timeline was negotiated with task force members and sponsored by CEFTF chairs.*

4) **CPS' poor execution of the planning process fell short of full implementation of the GA's 2011 policy reforms of transparency, expanded public input, better facility management, in creating a forward looking vision.**

As the CEFTF acknowledges, the EFMP includes new mechanisms and more data that create greater transparency and accountability around CPS' plans for its school buildings and "has been a huge step in the right direction." The CEFTF's assertion that the plan "fell short of full implementation" rests largely on CEFTF disagreeing with particular aspects of CPS' plan that were within CPS' discretion to define and which were open to public review and comment, such as the community areas that were used for purposes of demographic and planning purposes.

5) **The district failed to plan for schools in their community context**

CPS defined 30 geographic areas for planning purposes, in line with how CPS believed communities are defining themselves today. This, we felt, was more meaningful than 77 community areas - 75 of which were defined in the 1920s and which do not reflect the ways communities define themselves today, or freeways that have been constructed, or students' current enrollment patterns. While this may make comparisons to some historical datasets more complicated, these definitions did NOT limit CPS' ability to avail itself of census data - CPS resources are able to take census data and other data related to community development and have it applied to these 30 geographic areas - and to the specific geographic areas that are defined by our school boundaries.

6) **Did not conduct a comprehensive "Community Analysis" of future housing and community development and other community change trends.**

CPS obtained demographic projections related to each of the thirty community areas that CPS defined and, separately, for each of the individual neighborhood schools. This data relied upon information collected from a variety of sources, including the US Census, data from the United States postal service, and data related to housing permits. This was supplemented with additional planning information obtained from other government bodies. Certain findings related to this analysis and other information related to the community level were included in the EFMP.

7) **Did not coordinate with all local governments as the law required.**

CPS conducted outreach to city agencies and departments to inform them of the 10 year planning process and seek their cooperation and input. While not all of these agencies' information and plans were explicitly referenced in the EFMP we received information from the Department of Housing and Economic Development, Chicago Housing Authority, Chicago Metropolitan Area Planning, Chicago Transit Authority, Chicago Park District, Chicago Department of Transportation, and the Office of Budget Management. CPS and the CEFTF also sent surveys specifically related to the EFMP to several additional governmental bodies: Chicago Department of Family and Support Services, Chicago Public Libraries, Cook County Department of Planning and Development, Cook County Bureau of Economic Development, Chicago Department of Health, and Chicago-Cook Workforce Development Partnership.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CEFTF EFMP Finding and CPS Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8) Created space utilization standards that did not conform with the statute of meeting best practice educational facility planning and management standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CEFTF objects to the current CPS standard that assigns all elementary school buildings of the same number of classrooms the same capacity figure, and all high school buildings of the same number of classrooms the same capacity figure. Instead, CEFTF prefers a standard that would lead two buildings of identical size to have different capacities and a standard that could shift year by year, without any change in the size of the building. Arguments could be made that either one is a superior approach, and the legislation requiring CPS to develop and publish utilization rates is at best unclear as to its intent. The statute explicitly defines the utilization rate that CPS must set as &quot;the percentage achieved by dividing the school's actual enrollment by its design capacity.&quot; Design capacity is not specifically defined in the statute, but typically is defined as the theoretical maximum output of a system in a given period under ideal conditions. This is different from effective capacity, which is the capacity one expects to achieve given current operating constraints, which could include the type of students or program in the building in any given year. The report asserts that CPS' space use standards would not consider a school to be overcrowded unless it had on average 36 students per class. This analysis is deeply flawed in that it rests on an assumption that as a school's enrollment grows, it would not begin to use any of its dedicated space to serve as additional homerooms or that such schools do not have modular classrooms or leased classrooms to use, which many of our overcrowded schools do and which are not counted as &quot;permanent capacity&quot; for the purposes of the space use formula. Schools such as Burley and Little Village serve as two examples: each is overcrowded, but has an average homeroom class size below 27 and no homerooms above 33. Across the city, CPS has 71 schools that have modular classrooms (a total of 390 classrooms) and 28 schools that have leased classrooms (a total 217.5 classrooms). If these spaces were included as &quot;permanent&quot; classrooms for purposes of the utilization formula, 33 schools that are identified as overcrowded would no longer be considered overcrowded. The report implies that CPS' space use standards would not consider a school to be overcrowded unless it had on average 36 students per class. This analysis is deeply flawed in that it rests on an assumption that as a school's enrollment grows, it would not begin to use any of its dedicated space to serve as additional homerooms, which is what schools facing high enrollment typically do. Further, it does not reflect that PreK classrooms are often run as 2 or 3 part-day shifts, and therefore can readily hold up to 60 students over the course of the day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Chose to focus on and implement mass school closings before developing a long range facilities plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation that created the current timeline was negotiated with task force members and sponsored by the CEFTF Chairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) CPS omitted important requirements for public input when preparing the Master Facilities Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is false. CPS met all applicable requirements and had a multi-faceted, multi-modal, and comprehensive plan of engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) CEO did not hold required public hearings on the draft plan. Instead, held informal &quot;Community Briefing Sessions&quot; a few weeks before the board adopted the EFMP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In addition to many other forms of community engagement on the draft plan, CPS held public hearings, as identified in this September 4, 2013 press release. <a href="http://www.cps.edu/NEWS/PRESS_RELEASES/Pages/PR1_09_04_2013.aspx">http://www.cps.edu/NEWS/PRESS_RELEASES/Pages/PR1_09_04_2013.aspx</a>. These hearings all provided an opportunity to provide public comment and all who attended who wished to speak were given an opportunity to do so. As the pro bono advisor to the CEFTF has stated, there are no proscribed definitions of what a &quot;public hearing&quot; requires, and the report does not identify what CEFTF specifically feels these meetings lacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Did not conduct the needed public input to develop the required school-level master facilities plans. Final EFMP does not include school-specific master plans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**CEFTF EFMP Finding and CPS Response**

For every school, the main body of the EFMP identifies whether the school will be considered a priority for mechanical and/or envelope restorations, and provides a recommendation as to the building should be renovated, maintained, or decommissioned. Similar language appears on the individual school pages for every school and these pages include additional information, including year-by-year, grade-by-grade 10 year enrollment projections. CPS solicited feedback on facility conditions and needs not only from elected officials and the general public, we also sent surveys to principals and LSCs for feedback. All groups were given an opportunity to participate in community meetings as well.

### 13) CPS does not have a comprehensive long-range capital plan for Chicago's schools

A five year capital plan is posted on our website and is updated yearly. The website tool that CPS now uses provides unprecedented transparency into spending plans by category, by school, by geography, with online tools that enable the public both to map and sort the planned projects.

### 14) EFMP does not clearly prioritize its district-wide facility needs, or rank which schools will receive improvements in order of district-wide priorities.

The EFMP made great strides in articulating a set of district priorities, identifying the costs of meeting our long term facility aspirations, identifying certain school needs as priorities for particular schools, and creating transparency into how schools compare against one another at a particular point in time along significant dimensions, including their capacity, repair needs, and upgrade needs. Forced rankings of all projects over a ten year period sounds attractive, but needs to be tempered with the reality that not all facility needs or priorities can be predicted at the school level over such a long period of time. Weather events happen, boilers go out, windows leak, enrollment levels change, external funding for projects becomes available. You can never have a true list, particularly over a long time frame, and the more precisely specific rankings are defined, particularly over a decade-long period, the greater the risk for unmet expectations, accusations of broken promises and the belief that there has been the type of "leapfrogging" that CEFTF aims to prevent.

### 15) The school district and the Mayor continue to make piecemeal decisions on major school construction and facility investment projects

The EFMP articulated an aspiration that every school would provide safe, healthy and supportive learning environments that include sufficient space for all of the students in the building, equitable access to advanced technology, play lots, modern computer and media labs, air conditioned classrooms, libraries and ADA accessibility. It articulated three major areas of focus, including repairs and modernization, alleviating overcrowding, and investing in access to quality education options, including selective enrollment schools, STEM schools, IB schools, and CTE programs. The recent announcement of a proposed 1 and 5 year capital plan is aligned to these same goals, including spending on overcrowding relief, selective enrollment and IB expansions, IT investments, and facility repairs. Many of the large investments in that plan were identified in the plan; many are supported in whole or in part by state funds or funds that are under Aldermanic control and neither the opportunity to obtain those funds for CPS, nor the uses to which the elected officials would want to deploy those funds was known at the time of the EFMP’s approval. Regardless of whether they could be specified at the time or whether we have full latitude on how such money might be spent, all of the investments are in line with the district’s needs and priorities identified in the public plan.

### 16) Since the school board adopted the plan, the Mayor and school district have announced over $163 million in major school facility investments that were not clearly or identified in the EFMP
In the EFMP we stated that we would expand selective enrollment seats, that we would expand IB programs, that we would work toward air conditioning all of our buildings, and that we would address overcrowding. We also identified a variety of factors that we would consider when addressing overcrowding that go far beyond a static utilization rate snapshot when prioritizing schools or areas for additional capacity, including the enrollment projections, the size of the school, the availability of land, the lack of dedicated lunchrooms, auditoriums, and gymnasiums, the condition of existing temporary capacity, the performance of the school and many other factors. These are the factors that we considered when making our overcrowding recommendations, not the static snapshot that the CEFTF refers to when trying to portray decisions as "piecemeal".

17) CPS' EFMP does not address the effects of its Charter School expansion plans on the overall facilities needs or enrollment trends of the school district, despite the fact that since 2011 CPS has opened 33 new charter school campuses with 23,368 slots

The educational facilities master plan is a facilities plan, focused on the needs of the buildings operated by the district. Other buildings, not operated by the district, are not within the scope of the law. The operators of CPS's schools, whether the district, contract schools, charter schools, or other partners are outside the scope as well. Further, it must be emphasized that state law requires that CPS accept proposals for new charter schools and that it approve new charter schools that meet certain quality standards. Last year, two charter schools that CPS denied were later approved by the state appeal board and now operate under the state's authority, within the City of Chicago.

18) CPS' EFMP does not establish a planning process for repurposing of its closed publicly owned buildings; and lacks an asset management plan for its real property. EFMP did not include a full inventory of CPS facilities and real estate holdings or a process to plan for the future re-use of closed school buildings and other "surplus" real estate assets.

The EFMP indicated that an Advisory Committee had been formed to recommend a framework and implementation plan for school repurposing, the type of information that this committee would review and consider, and described the nature of the recommendations that were expected to be made. While the plan did not list specific facts concerning each vacated building, this is something that has been made available to the CEFTF and the general public, and it could be considered for future revisions. The statute governing the content of the EFMP required only that CPS provide information about facilities operated by the District over the next 10 years - not facilities that are closed.

19) CPS has scores of empty school buildings throughout the city.

No comment

20) CPS finally announced its school repurposing process 10 months after approving the closings, but details about when the public will have input are not yet determined.

The Mayor's Advisory Committee on School Repurposing was established to recommend the closed school building repurposing process. The committee's report was issued on February 7th, 2014. CPS will administer the process stipulated in the report. We have completed two Aldermanic briefings, established a comprehensive website and will retain brokers to professionally represent the portfolio. Community input is being provided via Aldermanic designated meetings and they are ongoing. The meeting details are determined by the Alderman.

21) Final approval of the 12-13 school year mass closings came so late in the year that impacted students and their families missed the deadline to apply for selected enrollment options, and with little time to plan for the upcoming school year.
Because final decisions were made later in the school year, there was greater academic focus than there may have been had closures been announced earlier. Principals, teachers, and staff remained on task and focused and the academic results for last year and this year suggest that our students benefitted from the timing of the announcements. CPS reopened magnet cluster and neighborhood school seats with space and worked with every school to facilitate helping students understand and exercise options. Most of our returning students chose to enroll in the designated welcoming schools, in which CPS made substantial facilities, programmatic, technology, and social/emotional benefits. Others chose to enroll in other CPS schools that we made available to them.

22) CPS did not adhere to the input of elected officials and the analysis by reputable researchers on the negative effect of school closings on class size.

CPS met with many elected officials, consulted with them on proposed actions, and accepted many of their recommendations. Many of their recommendations were consistent with the guidance CPS received from the Independent Commission on School Utilization, whose recommendations were adopted by CPS. Many schools that were underutilized were not closed, consistent with elected officials' preferences. Other schools were initially recommended for closure, but were removed from consideration prior the board vote, and two schools had their closures delayed or phased out, in response to elected official and community input. With respect to class sizes specifically, CEFTF ignores the fact that underutilized schools were more likely to have over-sized and mixed grade classrooms, and that as a result of the closings there are far fewer oversized and split grade classrooms than there were in the closing and welcoming schools last year. Moreover, since the welcoming schools have more students now, they also have larger budgets to support more staff. We have not seen an increase in class size in the welcoming schools as a result of the additional students that they now serve.

23) CPS rejected the feedback and advice of its Independent Hearing Officers. CPS rejected the vast majority of their findings when they recommended against a proposed school action, including against proposed closings.

We accepted the feedback of the independent hearing officers. The vast majority of the reports, 51 of 60, stated that CPS had complied with all requirements. A small number reviewed similar materials and opined that additional detail should have been provided in the draft transition plans. We updated those transition plans with additional detail prior to the Board’s vote to address the concerns expressed.

24) Planning for transition was lacking

CPS strongly disputes this finding. When we announce, we are only required to propose a draft transition plan. It is then our responsibility to update the draft as actions are approved. This was done and heavily impacted by local input as principals and their teams wrote the vast majority of certain sections. Updated transition plans include dozens of pages specific to the school outlining their academic and social/emotional plans. The updated plans are online at the cps.edu/quality schools. An example of such plans can be found: http://schoolinfo.cps.edu/SchoolActions/Download.aspx?fid=3039. Furthermore, after the Board’s vote, each school had a Principal Transition Coordinator (PTC) that worked with the leadership at closing and welcoming schools to build a Welcoming Team to create the school-specific plan of support. The Welcoming Team consisted of 3 staff and 3 parents from each school. This group met throughout the spring to talk through what they value about each school, what their concerns are and how to move forward in designing a new school community. The Welcoming Team built a Cultural Integration Plan with activities to take place throughout the summer and the following school year. Spring and summer activities included things like: Open houses, Mural projects, Visiting arts performances, Picnics. In addition, each Welcoming School (without significant construction barriers) was to host a Welcome Week in early August. This week included days for joint faculty professional development, student activities and engagement with a community arts or health partners. Each Welcoming school was supported in meeting certain baseline expectations for academic support, including: Joint discussion of student trends, needs and proposed interventions, Joint professional development with faculty, Outreach to parents.
### 25) Required "school transition plans" were largely boilerplate with little to no local input in their creation

Safety and security plans also were tailored to the school’s needs. CPS worked in partnership with the Chicago Police Department, parents, and local community groups to finalize school transition safety plans. We expanded Safe Passage routes to provide safe learning environments, hiring an additional 600 Safe Passage workers representing 18 different community organizations who were specifically assigned to Welcoming Schools, ensuring that students could get to and from school safely. There have been no major incidents involving students on Safe Passage routes near Welcoming schools during the program’s operational hours. Other supports included security staff from the sending schools following the children to the welcoming school, enhancing school safety technology where gaps exist, and providing students who enrolled in a welcoming school 0.8 miles or more from the closing school shuttle bus service from the closing school or a designated alternate site pick up location. (Note: this will be provided until students graduate from the highest grade at the school.) In some other instances where the distances were shorter, we also provided shuttles.

### 26) In both 2012 and 2013, the Welcoming Schools that CPS designated to absorb displaced students failed to attract the majority of students from closed schools

The CEFTF would have the public believe both: (1) that because the announcement of actions came later in the year than in the past, that students did not have sufficient time to make choices about where to attend school and (2) that students expressed choice to a surprising degree. These are highly inconsistent and contradictory findings. The reality is that, while students were provided with a designated welcoming school and a new "neighborhood school" to which they would be assigned if they did not exercise other options, that CPS also supported students in finding other options if they thought some other school suited them better and expected that some student would make choices to go to schools other than the welcoming school. We focused investments and supports on the designated welcoming schools, and also directed additional funds to schools that were not designated as official welcoming schools, but which were schools in which many students chose to enroll. CEFTF contorts several figures to contend that in 2013 less than half chose not to go to designated welcoming schools. Our figures indicated that in 2013, 73% of the students from a closed school that re-enrolled at CPS went either to a designated welcoming school or to Kellman - which, while not officially designated as a "welcoming school," was moved into the Bethune building, in response to community feedback, and was opened back up to enrollment to provide the students from the closed school to return to their former building. This is one example of CPS responding to community concerns and the requests of elected officials, not a sign of poor planning, as the CEFTF would lead the public and legislators to believe.

### 27) CPS still has no defined system or policies in place to evaluate its actions, or track student level impacts and outcomes of school closings and other School Actions (such as attendance boundary changes, phase outs and co-locations)

CPS is tracking the outcomes of students impacted by actions. On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, during the March Chicago Board of Education Meeting, CPS released a Mid-Year Report on School Consolidations. The report described data that was tracked for students affected by the 2013 school actions. Examples of data that was tracked include attendance, misconducts, GPA in Core Courses, and on-track rates. This report was emailed to Elected Officials and the CEFTF. Results have been reported not only for all students impacted by closures, but...
### CEFTF EFMP Finding and CPS Response

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>CPS Response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28) <strong>Academic and social/emotional benefits to students have not been substantiated</strong>&lt;br&gt;As indicated in the Mid-Year Report on School Consolidations, both academic outcomes and social and emotional outcomes for students impacted by actions have been promising. As part of the transition, social and emotional supports, included: Six to eight weeks of classroom based Healing Circles or Stress &amp; Coping skill building lessons for stress reduction and emotional support and access to highly structured interventions for smaller groups of students in need of more individualized attention. In addition, each Welcoming school was required to meet baseline expectations for maintaining a strong positive learning climate, as well as ensuring social and emotional support for all students. Schools were supported through training and consultation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29) <strong>CPS has not published a report tracking where students displaced are today or how students are faring</strong>&lt;br&gt;This is incorrect. On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, during the March Chicago Board of Education Meeting, CPS released a Mid-Year Report on School Consolidations. The report described data that was tracked for students affected by the 2013 school actions. Examples of data that was tracked include attendance, misconducts, GPA in Core Courses, and on-track rates. This report was emailed to Elected Officials and the CEFTF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30) <strong>The impacts of school closings on welcoming schools and their students are not part of CPS’ definition of impacted students and have not been analyzed or reported</strong>&lt;br&gt;This is untrue. CPS also is measuring how our students that were in welcoming schools are doing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31) <strong>In 2012 and 2013, communities of color and the most vulnerable students, including those experiencing homelessness and those with disabilities, bore the brunt of CPS’ actions</strong>&lt;br&gt;The report’s commentary neglects four key facts: (1) the population of school aged children in several African-American communities in Chicago dropped by 25-40% between the 2000 and 2010 census; (2) CPS’ reinvestments into facility upgrades, technology upgrades, academic investments, and social and emotional investments were directed at these same communities (3) CPS provided specialized supports to Students in Temporary Living Situations, English Language Learners, and Students with IEPs; (4) that the interim report indicated that the students in these priority groups are faring well.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32) <strong>CPS has not issued a report on the full costs of, or savings from the 2012 or 13 school actions, closings or transitions. Despite the district’s rationale that the closings would produce savings, CPS cut $168 million from school budgets</strong>&lt;br&gt;Despite other efforts to streamline our budget, CPS faces a structural deficit approaching $1 billion a year, largely driven by a $400M increase in pension payment. The pension payment alone is equal to $1000 per student and school budgets were impacted by $62M as a result of this impact. Over the long term, CPS estimates yearly savings from the utilization-based closures of nearly $40 million per year to our operating budget, plus additional capital budget savings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33) <strong>CPS more than tripled its FY2013 capital budget to upgrade designated welcoming schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
### CEFTF EFMP Finding and CPS Response

CPS spent $155 million to upgrade technology, install new science and computer labs, make long awaited repairs, and improve the school buildings in the impacted communities. These were not expenses necessitated by the closings; they were investments into these communities that we would not otherwise have been able to make if we continued to spread our resources too thin. In addition to these investments by CPS, there were investments made by our sister agencies. Over the summer, the Department of Buildings investigated more than 1,100 complaints of vacant buildings in the Safe Passage zones and demolished four buildings (10731 S. Wentworth, 10550 S. State, 5947 S. May and 6142 S. May). As of July 30, the Department of Streets and Sanitation had addressed nearly 22,000 issues along the proposed Safe Passage routes, including: Addressed nearly 400 abandoned vehicle complaints; Removed more than 1,900 instances of graffiti; Trimmed more than 3,200 trees; Mowed more than 6,100 lots; and Completed more than 4,400 rodent abatements.

As of July 30, the Department of Transportation had completed:
- 240 Alley Light outages
- 269 Street Light outages
- 618 Street light all out resolutions
- 863 Street Paint marking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>34)</th>
<th>Projected logistical costs of the 2013 school closings was three times higher than the original</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No comment</td>
<td></td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>35)</th>
<th>The contract to empty and board up the buildings went from $8.9M to $30.9M</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This language mischaracterizes the nature of the contract. It refers to the logistics services contract which was a comprehensive engagement that covered all related logistics activities. The increasing value of the contract was explained in detail in the board reports authorizing the increases. In essence the increases were due to two factors: one, we increased the scope of the agreement to include a significant number of additional schools and two, a significant increase in the volume of materials (furniture, IT, instructional, equipment) that required relocation and / or redistribution.</td>
<td></td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>36)</th>
<th>CPS has shown little improvement in &quot;efficiency&quot;</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is inarguable that the designated welcoming schools now have more students in them than they would have otherwise, and as a result have a larger budget than they would have otherwise to support their students’ needs. To the extent that the welcoming schools (and others that students chose to attend) continue to have space to accept even more students, this is a sign of good planning, and indicative of the magnitude of the problem we were confronting. Our utilization challenge was one likely to endure and worsen if not addressed, and both the designated welcoming schools and other schools that students chose to attend had sufficient space to take on more students. That certain designated welcoming schools did not receive many students was not a surprise. Some of the closing schools did not have many students to start with. In some instances, there were several welcoming schools and designated welcoming schools were assigned based on where the students resided and some of those schools received a greater portion of the closing school's boundary than others. In another instance, in response to community feedback, we moved a non-welcoming school into the closed school's building and gave the students the opportunity to choose either one - or exercise other options. Many students predictably decided to return to their building.</td>
<td></td>
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## Neighborhood Schools Ranked by Space Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space Index Rank</th>
<th>School ID</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Planning Zone</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>ES or HS</th>
<th>20th DAY 2013-14 School Enrollment</th>
<th>Total # CR</th>
<th>IC</th>
<th>School's Space Utilization Index</th>
<th>Space Use Status - Permanent</th>
<th>Mobile CR’s</th>
<th>Leased CR’s</th>
<th>Adj IC</th>
<th>Adj Util</th>
<th>Space Use Status - Adjusted</th>
<th>Resolution or Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>609810</td>
<td>BRIDGE</td>
<td>Reed-Dunning</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>219%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>130%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>Land purchased for construction of new school immediately to the north - funding is the barrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>610120</td>
<td>PECK</td>
<td>McKinley Park</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>206%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>125%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>New Southwest Area Elementary School announced, state funded, expected to provide relief - FY15 capital plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>610148</td>
<td>CHAVEZ</td>
<td>McKinley Park</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>197%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Out-of-area enrollment is very large; below 100% when leased space considered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>609935</td>
<td>GALLISTEL</td>
<td>Far East Side</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>1326</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>192%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>New Southeast Area Elementary School announced, state funded, expected to provide relief - FY15 capital plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>610117</td>
<td>PASTEUR</td>
<td>McKinley Park</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>1222</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>185%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>107%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>New Southwestern Area Elementary School announced, state funded, expected to provide relief - FY15 capital plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>610291</td>
<td>LEE</td>
<td>Chicago Lawn</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>183%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>117%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>New Southwestern Area Elementary School announced, state funded, expected to provide relief - FY15 capital plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>609772</td>
<td>ADDAMS</td>
<td>Far East Side</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>180%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>111%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>New Southwestern Area Elementary School announced, state funded, expected to provide relief - FY15 capital plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>610230</td>
<td>WILDWOOD</td>
<td>Sauganash</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>177%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>128%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>New Southwestern Area Elementary School announced, state funded, expected to provide relief - FY15 capital plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>610105</td>
<td>ORIOLE PARK</td>
<td>Sauganash</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>169%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>New Southeast Area Elementary School announced, state funded, expected to provide relief - FY15 capital plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>609903</td>
<td>EDWARDS</td>
<td>McKinley Park</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>169%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>New Southwestern Area Elementary School announced, state funded, expected to provide relief - FY15 capital plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Index Rank</td>
<td>School ID</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>Planning Zone</td>
<td>School Type</td>
<td>ES or HS</td>
<td>20th DAY 2013-14 School Enrollment</td>
<td>Total # CR</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>School’s Space Utilization Index</td>
<td>Space Use Status - Permanent</td>
<td>Mobile CR’s</td>
<td>Leased CR’s</td>
<td>Adj IC</td>
<td>Adj Util</td>
<td>Space Use Status - Adjusted</td>
<td>Resolution or Recommendation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>610137</td>
<td>PRUSSING</td>
<td>Albany Irving</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>164%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>127%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>to provide relief - FY15 capital plan d Annex recently proposed - in FY15 capital plan Annex approved in FY14 supplemental budget Annex recently proposed - in FY15 capital plan d Additional 6 modular classrooms proposed - in FY15 capital plan d Recently received linked annex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>609960</td>
<td>HALE</td>
<td>MDW</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>161%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>116%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Monitoring; with mobiles, below 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>609956</td>
<td>GRIMES</td>
<td>MDW</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>159%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Monitoring; with mobiles, below 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>609829</td>
<td>BURROUGHS</td>
<td>McKinley Park</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>157%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>124%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>609893</td>
<td>DORE</td>
<td>MDW</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>154%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>127%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>Offered leased space formerly used by Hale for use as a branch and turned it down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>610068</td>
<td>HANSON</td>
<td>Cragin</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>1612</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>154%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>609973</td>
<td>ZAPATA</td>
<td>Pilsen - Little Village</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>153%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>104%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>610170</td>
<td>COLUMBIA EXPLORERS</td>
<td>McKinley Park</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>1083</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>150%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>109%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDICIES: Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force Report to the General Assembly

#### Appendix F, Continued: Neighborhood Schools Ranked by Space Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space Index Rank</th>
<th>School ID</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Planning Zone</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>20th DAY 2013-14 School Enrollment</th>
<th>Total # CR</th>
<th>IC</th>
<th>School's Space Utilization Index</th>
<th>School Use Status - Permanent</th>
<th>Mobile CR's</th>
<th>Leased Cr's</th>
<th>Adj IC</th>
<th>Adj Util</th>
<th>Space Use Status - Adjusted</th>
<th>Resolution or Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>609836</td>
<td>CANTY</td>
<td>Reed-Dunning</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>150%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>609874</td>
<td>DIRKSEN</td>
<td>Reed-Dunning</td>
<td>District, non-alternative</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>149%</td>
<td>Overcrowded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>112%</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Excludes charters, specialty schools, and hybrid citywide/neighborhood schools.