



Illinois State Board of Education

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James T. Meeks
Chairman

Tony Smith, Ph.D.
State Superintendent of Education

MEMORANDUM

TO: James T. Meeks, Chairman, State Board of Education

FROM: Tony Smith, Ph.D. 
State Superintendent of Education

DATE: July 1, 2016

SUBJECT: Report of the School Security and Standards Task Force

Pursuant to its obligations under Public Act 98-0695, as amended by Public Act 99-0065, the School Security and Standards Task Force submits this report to the State Board of Education.

If you have questions or comments, please contact Stephanie Donovan, General Counsel, at (217) 782-8535.

SCHOOL SECURITY AND STANDARDS TASK FORCE



Report to the Illinois State Board of Education July 1, 2016

The School Security and Standards Task Force was created and operates pursuant
to Public Acts 98-0695 and 99-0065

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The membership of the School Security and Standards Task Force would like to extend a special note of gratitude to the hosts of the three public hearings held in furtherance of the work of the Task Force:

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We would also like to acknowledge and thank the following individuals for making presentations to the Task Force to help shape discussion and deliberations:

Trooper Mark Beagles, Illinois State Police

Jadine Chou, Chief of Security for Chicago Public Schools

Dr. Colleen Cicchetti, Pediatric Psychologist at Lurie Children's Hospital and Assistant Professor in Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine

David Esquith, Director of the Office of Safe and Healthy Students in the U.S. Department of Education

Kip Heinle, President of Illinois School Resource Officers Association

Chief Aaron Kustermann, Illinois State Police

Dr. Peter Langman, Psychologist with Langman Psychological Associates, LLC

Julia Rietz, Champaign County State's Attorney

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Public Act 98-0695, as amended by Public Act 99-0065, created the School Security and Standards Task Force (the “Task Force”) and directs it to survey the landscape of school security, make legislative recommendations, and develop minimum standards and model policies to strengthen the safety of schools in Illinois. The Task Force was composed of education leaders, parents, legislators, law enforcement officials, security professionals and architects and thus was well-equipped to carry out its charge.

The Task Force met periodically from August 2015 through June 2016, engaging in thoughtful discussion with experts and stakeholders with respect to how best to support schools and districts in the current fiscal climate without being overly prescriptive. Task Force members were cognizant of unfunded mandates, varying resource levels of school districts throughout the state, and the issue of local control. They sought to identify best practices that school districts could incorporate into existing programs/efforts that meet student safety goals irrespective of resources.

The Task Force submitted legislative recommendations and recommendations for consideration by schools and school districts on Jan. 1, 2016, in a *Report to the Illinois Governor and the General Assembly*. The following were the Task Force’s recommendations for legislative measures:

1. The Illinois School Security and Standards Task Force should be extended for an additional year in its current form.
2. In order to provide better evaluation of real-time staff training, the School Safety Drill Act should be amended to require one of the existing annual drills to be unscheduled and random.

The series of best practices highlighted by the Task Force that schools and school districts may choose to incorporate included recommendations regarding communications, training, the creation of threat assessment teams, the adoption of reference publications for school security design, the adoption of action procedures in the event of an incident, and the strengthening of relationships with law enforcement. See Appendix F for specific recommendations.

After submitting its January Report, the Task Force focused on making specific recommendations for model security plan policies for schools to access and use as guidelines. Task Force members worked through subcommittees to identify clear steps schools and districts can take, while being sensitive to their budget constraints. Ultimately, the Task Force recommends the following best practices in physical plant security, training, prevention, and security plan policy development:

1. Physical plant security measures that address access control, secure exterior and classroom doors, create discernable property lines, give law enforcement access to

communications systems and knock boxes, standardize security reference plans, employ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 428 as a reference, and implement law enforcement pull stations or alternative alarm systems.

2. Ongoing review and implementation of the School Safety Drill Act, implementation of an Emergency Operations Plan and periodic security vulnerability assessments, adoption of procedures for students and staff to follow in an event, consistent training opportunities, and staying updated on best practices. Longer-term goals include a website clearinghouse, credentialing system, and expanded education opportunities.
3. Incorporating the Prevention Subcommittee's "See, Hear and Speak Up" framework into district security planning.
4. Adopting the *Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operation Plans* and the *Sample School Emergency Operations Plan*, both created by FEMA in 2013, and including a district's architect of record in local adoption of such policies.

In its charge, the Task Force was directed to recommend funding for schools to use to enhance their security measures and such issues were regularly discussed. However, given the current fiscal climate of the state generally and concerns regarding education funding specifically, the Task Force did not feel empowered to make such recommendations. As such, the Task Force seeks to make recommendations and resources available to school districts without suggesting legislative or regulatory measures that may be cost prohibitive. School districts should be empowered to make informed decisions that local school communities feel are in the best interests of the students they serve. The Task Force strongly believes that these best practices and resources will be most useful to schools and school districts if they are formally and strategically communicated and disseminated. Should funding become available, technical assistance and training provided by the State Board of Education will also ensure that these best practices make Illinois schools safer and more secure.

Please note: Nothing in this report is meant to endorse a specific product or a specific company.

I. FRAMING THE ISSUE

Schools and school districts are the heart of healthy communities. It is critical that all Illinois students are provided with safe, secure, and nurturing learning environments so that they can reach their full potential. To this end, on September 16, 2015, the Illinois State Board of Education adopted a goal that every public school in Illinois will offer a safe and healthy learning environment for all students.

There are many factors that impact school security, including a school's physical plant; the training received by school personnel and responders; the communications between school personnel, responders, students, parents, and community members; and the efforts of school personnel, responders, and community members to build trusting relationships between students and teachers to foster healthy school climates and prevent incidents from occurring.

Illinois has made strides in adopting measures that promote school security. Illinois passed the Children's Mental Health Act in 2003, becoming the first state to develop learning standards for social and emotional learning. These competencies promote behavioral health, which increases safety and security in school; improve students' engagement and readiness to learn; and boost academic performance. Illinois' School Safety Drill Act, signed into law on August 16, 2005, requires schools and first responders to work together so that they are prepared in the event of an emergency. See Section III and Appendix J of this document for additional details on statutory provisions.

On December 14, 2012, 20 children and six adults were killed in an active shooter incident at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. A month later, Governor Pat Quinn convened a group of more than 50 representatives from the fields of education, public safety, mental health, and law enforcement to develop short- and long-term actions to further safeguard schools in Illinois. The School Security and Standards Task Force was borne of this workgroup. This past August, Task Force members accepted their charge of studying the security of schools in Illinois and making recommendations "to provide a safer learning environment for the children of this State."

The nation's schools are safer than they have ever been. Though active shooter events and isolated incidents of extreme violence may get more media attention, other types of violence and victimization happen more frequently and rates of these incidents are decreasing. The *Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2014* report, a joint publication of the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for Education Statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice Office, Office of Justice Programs, shows that between 2005 and 2011, the percentage of students who reported being bullied wavered from 28 to 32 percent; however, in 2013 this percentage dropped to 22 percent of students reporting having been bullied at school. Reports of theft, violent victimization, and serious violent victimization at school have declined. Fewer students have access to loaded guns and fewer students report that they have carried weapons on school property. Students' perceptions of personal safety at school have also improved. In 1995, 12

percent of students across the country reported being afraid of attack or harm at school, compared with only 3 percent in 2013.

Still, we do continue to face challenges. Research from Texas State University and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the U.S. Department of Justice indicates that between 2000 and 2010 there were 27 active shooter incidents in the nation's schools (*A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013*). Emergency planning is an under-utilized asset and violence prevention is underemphasized. Though the Task Force was borne out of reaction to Sandy Hook, schools should utilize emergency planning and crisis response for all hazards that may be faced.

Illinois' schools reflect the diversity of communities across the state. There are school districts with one school building and school districts with hundreds of schools. Some schools and school districts are located in municipalities or multiple municipalities that have fully staffed professional, full-time police departments and fire departments. Other schools are located in towns that may be served by one full-time police officer and a volunteer fire department. Every school district has its own needs, ideas, and vision when it comes to the safety of the students it serves. Ultimately, decisions as to how best to protect the most precious resources of such communities -- the children -- rest with local elected and appointed officials. We need to continue to think critically about how we can keep schools safe, prevent violence, and build school climates where all students can succeed. Students who feel engaged and supported in school will excel in healthy communities and continue to move Illinois forward.

II. PUBLIC ACTS 98-0695 AND 99-0065 AND THE DUTIES OF THE TASK FORCE

Signed into law and effective on July 3, 2014, Public Act 98-0695 created the School Security and Standards Task Force (the “Task Force”) within the State Board of Education. Membership on the Task Force includes individuals from the education, security, architectural, and law enforcement sectors, as well as parents and legislators. See Appendix C. Members were tasked with gathering information concerning security in schools as it presently exists. The Task Force was asked to:

- A. Receive reports and testimony from individuals, school district superintendents, principals, teachers, security experts, architects, engineers, and the law enforcement community;
- B. Create minimum standards for securing schools;
- C. Give consideration to securing the physical structures, security staffing recommendations, communications, security equipment, alarms, video and audio monitoring, school policies, egress and ingress, security plans, emergency exits and escape, and any other areas of security that the Task Force deems appropriate for securing schools;
- D. Create a model security plan policy;
- E. Suggest possible funding recommendations for schools to access for use in implementing enhanced security measures;
- F. On or before January 1, 2015, submit a report to the General Assembly and the Governor on specific recommendations for changes to the current law or other legislative measures; and
- G. On or before July 1, 2015, submit a report to the State Board of Education on specific recommendations for model security plan policies for schools to access and use as a guideline. This report is exempt from inspection and copying under Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act.

The Task Force's recommendations may include proposals for specific statutory changes and methods to foster cooperation among state agencies and between this state and local governments. The Task Force was to be abolished on July 1, 2015.

Subsequently, on July 16, 2015, Public Act 99-0065 extended the timelines for the Task Force’s reports to the General Assembly/Governor and the State Board of Education to January 1, 2016, and July 1, 2016, respectively. Further, the activity of the Task Force was extended through July 1, 2016.

III. CURRENT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

The School Safety Drill Act and its implementing regulations form the statutory and regulatory basis for the work of the Task Force. However, other statutes and rules have a direct impact on school safety and, as such, are given attention below. Please note that not all provisions addressing school safety in any facet can be addressed in detail in this section.

School Safety Drill Act 105 ILCS 128

Signed into law on August 16, 2005, via Public Act 094-0600 [105 ILCS 128, as further amended by Public Acts 98-0048, 98-0661, 98-0663, and 99-0078], the purpose of the School Safety Drill Act is to “establish minimum requirements and standards for schools to follow when conducting school safety drills and reviewing school emergency and crisis response plans and to encourage schools and first responders to work together for the safety of children. Communities and schools may exceed these requirements and standards” [105 ILCS 128/10].

Required Drills. During each academic year, each school is required to conduct a number of specific types of drills, some with the participation of local first responders. Pursuant to Section 20 of the School Safety Drill Act [105 ILCS 128/20], each school must conduct the following during each academic year:

- A. Three (3) evacuation fire evacuation drills, one of which must include participation by a local fire department or district. Note that schools may conduct additional evacuation drills to address other topics such as suspicious items, bombs threats, and the like;
- B. One (1) bus evacuation drill. With respect to public schools and nonpublic schools that receive public funds, curriculum in kindergarten through grade 12 shall account for the bus evacuation drill and include instruction on safe bus riding practices;
- C. One (1) law enforcement drill to address a shooting incident. The law enforcement drill must include participation by local law enforcement;
- D. One (1) severe weather and shelter-in-place drill to address tornado incidents. Note that schools may conduct additional severe weather and shelter-in-place drills to address other severe weather incidents and hazardous materials threats.

Annual Review. Each school district shall conduct an annual review of each of its schools’ emergency response plans, procedures, and protocols. The school district shall invite each of the following individuals/entities to participate in the annual review:

- A. Each building principal;
- B. Representatives from education-related organizations or associations deemed appropriate by the school district;

- C. Representatives from all local first responders (fire department/district, law enforcement agency, emergency medical services, any other first responder organization that has requested to participate);
- D. Any other individual or entity deemed appropriate by the school district.

Upon completion of the annual review, the school district shall submit a one-page report to the applicable regional superintendent of schools that indicates that the review took place; the parties that participated in the review; a statement that an effective review of plans has taken place; a statement that the district will implement such plans, protocols, procedures, and programs during the academic year; and authorization of the school board or designee.

Nonpublic schools shall hold an annual review that encompasses the measures identified in (B), (C), and (D) above and file an annual report with the Office of the State Fire Marshal.

Joint Rules of the Office of the State Fire Marshal and the Illinois State Board of Education
29 Ill Admin. Code 1500

Promulgated on August 18, 2006, joint rules of the Office of the State Fire Marshal and the Illinois State Board of Education establish “requirements for the annual review and updating of the protocols and procedures in each school's emergency and crisis response plan that is required by Section 25 of the School Safety Drill Act [105 ILCS 128/25], including the review of each school's compliance with the school safety drill requirements established in Section 15 of the Act” [29 Ill Admin. Code 1500.10]. The joint rules require specific topics and deliberation for each annual review required in the School Safety Drill Act, including concepts of operation and training and preparedness. The joint rules further define objectives of the drills required by the School Safety Drill Act, including notification and response, movement to safe areas, communication with first responders, and accounting for all occupants.

Health/Life Safety Statutory Provisions
Various References

The Illinois School Code provides for the effective oversight of school construction and facility management/safety through a variety of laws. Topics of such laws include, but are not limited to School Building Code [105 ILCS 5/2-3.12], Building Plans and Specifications [105 ILCS 5/3-14.20], Inspection of Schools [105 ILCS 5/3-14.21], Condemnation of Schools [105 ILCS 5/3-14.22], and Sprinkler Systems [105 ILCS 5/22-23].

Health/Life Safety Code for Public Schools
23 Ill Admin. Code Part 180

The Health/Life Safety Code for Public Schools is the set of regulations that oversees facility, construction, and design specifications of public schools in Illinois. These regulations apply to all public schools and districts in Illinois except the City of Chicago Public Schools District 299 and its schools. The Health/Life Safety Code for Public Schools defines minimum requirements

for the qualification of plan reviewers and inspectors, construction activities, facility inspections, and violation procedures.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE

As noted in the aforementioned discussion, on or before July 1, 2016, the Task Force must submit a report to the State Board of Education on specific recommendations for model security plan policies for schools to access and use as a guideline. To fulfill its obligations, the Task Force recommends to the State Board of Education the following best practices for schools and school districts to consider. For purposes of this report, the recommendations have been divided into A) Physical Plant; B) Training; C) Prevention; and D) Model Security Plan Policy. Please note that in making recommendations and identifying best practices, the Task Force does not support additional mandates being placed on school districts. Rather, the recommendations and best practices noted in this document are meant to inform school communities and provide resources for their review. School communities must be empowered to make security-related decisions that they feel are in the best interests of the people they serve.

A. Principles of Securing the Physical Plant

The Physical Plant Subcommittee and the Task Force reviewed and recommend certain specific design criteria pertaining to school buildings, the details of which are contained in Appendix G. Included within such recommendations are the adoption of expanded principals of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, which incorporates FEMA recommendations with respect to open space, parking, landscaping, and assurance of clear sight lines. Also included in the Subcommittee and Task Force recommendations, among other things, are best practices with respect to controlled and secure building access, interior and exterior locking mechanisms, first responder compatible school communications systems, knox box or equivalent access capabilities easily operable by first responders, wireless or wired law enforcement pull stations throughout school premises, and submission of school security floor plans/blueprints through the Illinois State Board of Education to the Illinois State Police Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center.

B. Training

The Training Subcommittee and the Task Force identified certain best practices as set forth in Appendix H. Among the multiple best practices cited are a recommendation that schools and school districts continually review and enforce the implementation of the provisions of the current School Safety Drill Act; adopt planning and appoint personnel consistent with the objectives of FEMA's *Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans*; include at least one school drill on a random, unscheduled, and not previously announced basis; and provide regular and consistent training with first responders, including at least yearly table-top exercises and tri-annual full-scale exercises that may or may not include re-enactments.

Training opportunities and continuing education will foster ongoing evaluation of existing processes and lead to safer environments through reflection, collaboration, and customization.

C. Prevention

During the course of its work, the Prevention Subcommittee and the Task Force created, vetted, and adopted the “See, Hear and Speak Up” framework for purposes of threat assessment. The framework’s purpose is to equip schoolchildren, parents, and the general public with knowledge to help recognize and report to school administration and/or law enforcement any information or threats about impending attacks on schools. This will better enable law enforcement to prevent attacks.

The federal concept of the “If You See Something, Say Something™” public awareness campaign is to alert people to speak up were they to observe something. But it does not provide substance in order to enable individuals to know what observed behaviors should generate concern. See Appendix I for the entire “See, Hear and Speak Up” framework.

D. Model Security Plan Policy

In fulfillment of its obligation to create a model security plan policy and in an effort not to duplicate work and re-create research-based policies that have already been developed, the Task Force recommends that districts adopt the *Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operation Plans* and the *Sample School Emergency Operations Plan*.

The *Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operation Plans* was developed by the U.S. Department of Education, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and FEMA. It includes the principles of school emergency management planning; outlines a planning process that engages community partners; and addresses topics that support school emergency planning, such as Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act implications, student privacy rights, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 guidelines, psychological first aid, active shooter situations, and how school climate can contribute to crises. See Appendix J.

The *Sample School Emergency Operations Plan* aligns completely with the Guide and is meant to be used for training purposes. It includes sample excerpts of a school emergency operations plan, such as a Threat/Hazard Assessments Summary, Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities, Training and Exercises, and Plan Development and Maintenance. It highlights the importance of tailoring all emergency operations plans to the specific threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities of a specific school or school district. See Appendix K.

The federal guidelines have been vetted extensively. They do not tell schools or school districts exactly what to include in their plans; they instead pose a series of questions, putting emphasis on the planning process. Using the federal guidelines will benefit Illinois schools should they decide to compete for school security grants in the future.

It is important to note that such federal guidance is already listed on the State Board of Education’s website as a series of resources. However, more targeted, intentional, and systematic communications of these guidelines should be employed to ensure that school districts are empowered with the knowledge to use these resources to benefit the communities

they serve. In such a way, the Task Force recommends that the State Board of Education embark on a communications effort to alert school communities to these existing resources.

Finally, in an effort to ensure that facets of securing the physical plant of a school facility conform to overall emergency operations planning, the Task Force also recommends that local adoption of model security plan policies include participation by the district's architect of record.

V. IN SUMMARY.....

The safety and well-being of our students are of the utmost importance to every teacher, administrator, law enforcement official, and emergency manager. Empowering schools and school districts with the tools to make security decisions in the best interests of students is critical to ensuring the physical and emotional safety of students and staff. Moving forward, the Task Force will work with districts, emergency managers, law enforcement, and other parties to ensure that meaningful resources are available for review by local administrators. The Task Force believes that implementing unfunded mandates with respect to securing schools is not practical and further drains already decreasing financial resources from communities. Rather, the Task Force would like to ensure that resources and recommendations are made available to school communities so that those on the ground can make decisions they feel best impact the people they serve.

Questions or comments with respect to this document, the Task Force, or its members may be sent to

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Additional information on the Task Force and its work, including meeting agendas, minutes, and work product, can be found at <http://www.isbe.net/SSSTF/default.htm>.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Public Act 98-0695

Appendix B: Public Act 99-0065

Appendix C: Roster of Task Force Members

Appendix D: Meeting Agendas and Minutes

Appendix E: Public Hearing Dates and Notice

Appendix F: Executive Summary and Recommendations from January 2016 Report

Appendix G: Physical Plant Recommendations

Appendix H: Training Subcommittee Recommendations

Appendix I: See, Hear and Speak Up

Appendix J: 2013 Federal Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operation Plans

Appendix K: Sample School Emergency Operations Plan

Appendix A: Public Act 98-0695

Public Act 098-0695

SB2747 Enrolled

LRB098 19398 NHT 54555 b

AN ACT concerning education.

**Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly:**

Section 5. The Freedom of Information Act is amended by changing Section 7 as follows:

(5 ILCS 140/7) (from Ch. 116, par. 207)

Sec. 7. Exemptions.

(1) When a request is made to inspect or copy a public record that contains information that is exempt from disclosure under this Section, but also contains information that is not exempt from disclosure, the public body may elect to redact the information that is exempt. The public body shall make the remaining information available for inspection and copying. Subject to this requirement, the following shall be exempt from inspection and copying:

(a) Information specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.

(b) Private information, unless disclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.

(b-5) Files, documents, and other data or databases maintained by one or more law enforcement agencies and specifically designed to provide information to one or more law enforcement agencies regarding the physical or mental status of one or more individual subjects.

(c) Personal information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information. "Unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" means the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information. The disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be

considered an invasion of personal privacy.

(d) Records in the possession of any public body created in the course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law enforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that disclosure would:

(i) interfere with pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency that is the recipient of the request;

(ii) interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings conducted by the public body that is the recipient of the request;

(iii) create a substantial likelihood that a person will be deprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing;

(iv) unavoidably disclose the identity of a confidential source, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, or persons who file complaints with or provide information to administrative, investigative, law enforcement, or penal agencies; except that the identities of witnesses to traffic accidents, traffic accident reports, and rescue reports shall be provided by agencies of local government, except when disclosure would interfere with an active criminal investigation conducted by the agency that is the recipient of the request;

(v) disclose unique or specialized investigative techniques other than those generally used and known or disclose internal documents of correctional agencies related to detection, observation or investigation of incidents of crime or misconduct, and disclosure would result in demonstrable harm to the agency or public body that is the recipient of the request;

(vi) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel or any other person; or

(vii) obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation by the agency that is the recipient of the request.

(d-5) A law enforcement record created for law enforcement purposes and contained in a shared electronic record management system if the law enforcement agency that

is the recipient of the request did not create the record, did not participate in or have a role in any of the events which are the subject of the record, and only has access to the record through the shared electronic record management system.

(e) Records that relate to or affect the security of correctional institutions and detention facilities.

(e-5) Records requested by persons committed to the Department of Corrections if those materials are available in the library of the correctional facility where the inmate is confined.

(e-6) Records requested by persons committed to the Department of Corrections if those materials include records from staff members' personnel files, staff rosters, or other staffing assignment information.

(e-7) Records requested by persons committed to the Department of Corrections if those materials are available through an administrative request to the Department of Corrections.

(f) Preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body. The exemption provided in this paragraph (f) extends to all those records of officers and agencies of the General Assembly that pertain to the preparation of legislative documents.

(g) Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person or business where the trade secrets or commercial or financial information are furnished under a claim that they are proprietary, privileged or confidential, and that disclosure of the trade secrets or commercial or financial information would cause competitive harm to the person or business, and only insofar as the claim directly applies to the records requested.

The information included under this exemption includes all trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained by a public body, including a public pension fund, from a private equity fund or a privately held company within the investment portfolio of a private equity fund as

a result of either investing or evaluating a potential investment of public funds in a private equity fund. The exemption contained in this item does not apply to the aggregate financial performance information of a private equity fund, nor to the identity of the fund's managers or general partners. The exemption contained in this item does not apply to the identity of a privately held company within the investment portfolio of a private equity fund, unless the disclosure of the identity of a privately held company may cause competitive harm.

Nothing contained in this paragraph (g) shall be construed to prevent a person or business from consenting to disclosure.

(h) Proposals and bids for any contract, grant, or agreement, including information which if it were disclosed would frustrate procurement or give an advantage to any person proposing to enter into a contractor agreement with the body, until an award or final selection is made. Information prepared by or for the body in preparation of a bid solicitation shall be exempt until an award or final selection is made.

(i) Valuable formulae, computer geographic systems, designs, drawings and research data obtained or produced by any public body when disclosure could reasonably be expected to produce private gain or public loss. The exemption for "computer geographic systems" provided in this paragraph (i) does not extend to requests made by news media as defined in Section 2 of this Act when the requested information is not otherwise exempt and the only purpose of the request is to access and disseminate information regarding the health, safety, welfare, or legal rights of the general public.

(j) The following information pertaining to educational matters:

(i) test questions, scoring keys and other examination data used to administer an academic examination;

(ii) information received by a primary or secondary school, college, or university under its procedures for the evaluation of faculty members by their academic peers;

(iii) information concerning a school or

university's adjudication of student disciplinary cases, but only to the extent that disclosure would unavoidably reveal the identity of the student; and

(iv) course materials or research materials used by faculty members.

(k) Architects' plans, engineers' technical submissions, and other construction related technical documents for projects not constructed or developed in whole or in part with public funds and the same for projects constructed or developed with public funds, including but not limited to power generating and distribution stations and other transmission and distribution facilities, water treatment facilities, airport facilities, sport stadiums, convention centers, and all government owned, operated, or occupied buildings, but only to the extent that disclosure would compromise security.

(l) Minutes of meetings of public bodies closed to the public as provided in the Open Meetings Act until the public body makes the minutes available to the public under Section 2.06 of the Open Meetings Act.

(m) Communications between a public body and an attorney or auditor representing the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising the public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal audits of public bodies.

(n) Records relating to a public body's adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases; however, this exemption shall not extend to the final outcome of cases in which discipline is imposed.

(o) Administrative or technical information associated with automated data processing operations, including but not limited to software, operating protocols, computer program abstracts, file layouts, source listings, object modules, load modules, user guides, documentation pertaining to all logical and physical design of computerized systems, employee manuals, and any other information that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security of the system or its data or the security of

materials exempt under this Section.

(p) Records relating to collective negotiating matters between public bodies and their employees or representatives, except that any final contract or agreement shall be subject to inspection and copying.

(q) Test questions, scoring keys, and other examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or employment.

(r) The records, documents, and information relating to real estate purchase negotiations until those negotiations have been completed or otherwise terminated. With regard to a parcel involved in a pending or actually and reasonably contemplated eminent domain proceeding under the Eminent Domain Act, records, documents and information relating to that parcel shall be exempt except as may be allowed under discovery rules adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court. The records, documents and information relating to a real estate sale shall be exempt until a sale is consummated.

(s) Any and all proprietary information and records related to the operation of an intergovernmental risk management association or self-insurance pool or jointly self-administered health and accident cooperative or pool. Insurance or self insurance (including any intergovernmental risk management association or self insurance pool) claims, loss or risk management information, records, data, advice or communications.

(t) Information contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public body responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions or insurance companies, unless disclosure is otherwise required by State law.

(u) Information that would disclose or might lead to the disclosure of secret or confidential information, codes, algorithms, programs, or private keys intended to be used to create electronic or digital signatures under the Electronic Commerce Security Act.

(v) Vulnerability assessments, security measures, and response policies or plans that are designed to identify, prevent, or respond to potential attacks upon a community's population or systems, facilities, or installations, the

destruction or contamination of which would constitute a clear and present danger to the health or safety of the community, but only to the extent that disclosure could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the measures or the safety of the personnel who implement them or the public. Information exempt under this item may include such things as details pertaining to the mobilization or deployment of personnel or equipment, to the operation of communication systems or protocols, or to tactical operations.

(w) (Blank).

(x) Maps and other records regarding the location or security of generation, transmission, distribution, storage, gathering, treatment, or switching facilities owned by a utility, by a power generator, or by the Illinois Power Agency.

(y) Information contained in or related to proposals, bids, or negotiations related to electric power procurement under Section 1-75 of the Illinois Power Agency Act and Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act that is determined to be confidential and proprietary by the Illinois Power Agency or by the Illinois Commerce Commission.

(z) Information about students exempted from disclosure under Sections 10-20.38 or 34-18.29 of the School Code, and information about undergraduate students enrolled at an institution of higher education exempted from disclosure under Section 25 of the Illinois Credit Card Marketing Act of 2009.

(aa) Information the disclosure of which is exempted under the Viatical Settlements Act of 2009.

(bb) Records and information provided to a mortality review team and records maintained by a mortality review team appointed under the Department of Juvenile Justice Mortality Review Team Act.

(cc) Information regarding interments, entombments, or inurnments of human remains that are submitted to the Cemetery Oversight Database under the Cemetery Care Act or the Cemetery Oversight Act, whichever is applicable.

(dd) Correspondence and records (i) that may not be disclosed under Section 11-9 of the Public Aid Code or (ii) that pertain to appeals under Section 11-8 of the Public

Aid Code.

(ee) The names, addresses, or other personal information of persons who are minors and are also participants and registrants in programs of park districts, forest preserve districts, conservation districts, recreation agencies, and special recreation associations.

(ff) The names, addresses, or other personal information of participants and registrants in programs of park districts, forest preserve districts, conservation districts, recreation agencies, and special recreation associations where such programs are targeted primarily to minors.

(gg) Confidential information described in Section 1-100 of the Illinois Independent Tax Tribunal Act of 2012.

(hh) The report submitted to the State Board of Education by the School Security and Standards Task Force under item (8) of subsection (d) of Section 2-3.160 ~~2-3.157~~ of the School Code and any information contained in that report.

(1.5) Any information exempt from disclosure under the Judicial Privacy Act shall be redacted from public records prior to disclosure under this Act.

(2) A public record that is not in the possession of a public body but is in the possession of a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the public body, and that directly relates to the governmental function and is not otherwise exempt under this Act, shall be considered a public record of the public body, for purposes of this Act.

(3) This Section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as stated in this Section or otherwise provided in this Act.

(Source: P.A. 97-333, eff. 8-12-11; 97-385, eff. 8-15-11; 97-452, eff. 8-19-11; 97-783, eff. 7-13-12; 97-813, eff. 7-13-12; 97-847, eff. 9-22-12; 97-1065, eff. 8-24-12; 97-1129, eff. 8-28-12; 98-463, eff. 8-16-13; 98-578, eff. 8-27-13.)

Section 10. The School Code is amended by adding Section 2-3.160 as follows:

(105 ILCS 5/2-3.160 new)

(Section scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2015)

Sec. 2-3.160. School Security and Standards Task Force.

(a) The School Security and Standards Task Force is created within the State Board of Education to study the security of schools in this State, make recommendations, and draft minimum standards for use by schools to make them more secure and to provide a safer learning environment for the children of this State. The Task Force shall consist of all of the following members:

(1) One member of the public who is a parent and one member of the Senate, appointed by the President of the Senate.

(2) One member of the public who is a parent and one member of the Senate, appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate.

(3) One member of the public who is a parent and one member of the House of Representatives, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(4) One member of the public who is a parent and one member of the House of Representatives, appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.

(5) A representative from the State Board of Education, appointed by the Chairperson of the State Board of Education.

(6) A representative from the Department of State Police, appointed by the Director of State Police.

(7) A representative from an association representing Illinois sheriffs, appointed by the Governor.

(8) A representative from an association representing Illinois chiefs of police, appointed by the Governor.

(9) A representative from an association representing Illinois firefighters, appointed by the Governor.

(10) A representative from an association representing Illinois regional superintendents of schools, appointed by the Governor.

(11) A representative from an association representing Illinois principals, appointed by the Governor.

(12) A representative from an association representing Illinois school boards, appointed by the Governor.

(13) A representative from the security consulting profession, appointed by the Governor.

(14) An architect or engineer who specializes in security issues, appointed by the Governor.

Members of the Task Force appointed by the Governor must be

individuals who have knowledge, experience, and expertise in the field of security or who have worked within the school system. The appointment of members by the Governor must reflect the geographic diversity of this State.

Members of the Task Force shall serve without compensation and shall not be reimbursed for their expenses.

(b) The Task Force shall meet initially at the call of the State Superintendent of Education. At this initial meeting, the Task Force shall elect a member as presiding officer of the Task Force by a majority vote of the membership of the Task Force. Thereafter, the Task Force shall meet at the call of the presiding officer.

(c) The State Board of Education shall provide administrative and other support to the Task Force.

(d) The Task Force shall make recommendations for minimum standards for security for the schools in this State. In making those recommendations, the Task Force shall do all of the following:

(1) Gather information concerning security in schools as it presently exists.

(2) Receive reports and testimony from individuals, school district superintendents, principals, teachers, security experts, architects, engineers, and the law enforcement community.

(3) Create minimum standards for securing schools.

(4) Give consideration to securing the physical structures, security staffing recommendations, communications, security equipment, alarms, video and audio monitoring, school policies, egress and ingress, security plans, emergency exits and escape, and any other areas of security that the Task Force deems appropriate for securing schools.

(5) Create a model security plan policy.

(6) Suggest possible funding recommendations for schools to access for use in implementing enhanced security measures.

(7) On or before January 1, 2015, submit a report to the General Assembly and the Governor on specific recommendations for changes to the current law or other legislative measures.

(8) On or before January 1, 2015, submit a report to the State Board of Education on specific recommendations for model security plan policies for schools to access and

use as a guideline. This report is exempt from inspection and copying under Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act.

The Task Force's recommendations may include proposals for specific statutory changes and methods to foster cooperation among State agencies and between this State and local government.

(e) The Task Force is abolished and this Section is repealed on July 1, 2015.

Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect upon becoming law.

Effective Date: 7/3/2014

Appendix B: Public Act 99-0065

Public Act 099-0065

SB1340 Enrolled

LRB099 03704 NHT 23887 b

AN ACT concerning education.

**Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly:**

Section 5. The School Code is amended by changing Section 2-3.160 as added by Public Act 98-695 and by renumbering and changing Section 2-3.160 as added by Public Act 98-705 as follows:

(105 ILCS 5/2-3.160)

(Section scheduled to be repealed on July 1, 2015)

Sec. 2-3.160. School Security and Standards Task Force.

(a) The School Security and Standards Task Force is created within the State Board of Education to study the security of schools in this State, make recommendations, and draft minimum standards for use by schools to make them more secure and to provide a safer learning environment for the children of this State. The Task Force shall consist of all of the following members:

(1) One member of the public who is a parent and one member of the Senate, appointed by the President of the Senate.

(2) One member of the public who is a parent and one member of the Senate, appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate.

(3) One member of the public who is a parent and one member of the House of Representatives, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(4) One member of the public who is a parent and one member of the House of Representatives, appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.

(5) A representative from the State Board of Education, appointed by the Chairperson of the State Board of Education.

(6) A representative from the Department of State Police, appointed by the Director of State Police.

(7) A representative from an association representing Illinois sheriffs, appointed by the Governor.

(8) A representative from an association representing Illinois chiefs of police, appointed by the Governor.

(9) A representative from an association representing Illinois firefighters, appointed by the Governor.

(10) A representative from an association representing Illinois regional superintendents of schools, appointed by the Governor.

(11) A representative from an association representing Illinois principals, appointed by the Governor.

(12) A representative from an association representing Illinois school boards, appointed by the Governor.

(13) A representative from the security consulting profession, appointed by the Governor.

(14) An architect or engineer who specializes in security issues, appointed by the Governor.

Members of the Task Force appointed by the Governor must be individuals who have knowledge, experience, and expertise in the field of security or who have worked within the school system. The appointment of members by the Governor must reflect the geographic diversity of this State.

Members of the Task Force shall serve without compensation and shall not be reimbursed for their expenses.

(b) The Task Force shall meet initially at the call of the State Superintendent of Education. At this initial meeting, the Task Force shall elect a member as presiding officer of the Task Force by a majority vote of the membership of the Task Force. Thereafter, the Task Force shall meet at the call of the presiding officer.

(c) The State Board of Education shall provide administrative and other support to the Task Force.

(d) The Task Force shall make recommendations for minimum standards for security for the schools in this State. In making those recommendations, the Task Force shall do all of the following:

(1) Gather information concerning security in schools as it presently exists.

(2) Receive reports and testimony from individuals, school district superintendents, principals, teachers, security experts, architects, engineers, and the law enforcement community.

(3) Create minimum standards for securing schools.

(4) Give consideration to securing the physical structures, security staffing recommendations, communications, security equipment, alarms, video and audio monitoring, school policies, egress and ingress,

security plans, emergency exits and escape, and any other areas of security that the Task Force deems appropriate for securing schools.

(5) Create a model security plan policy.

(6) Suggest possible funding recommendations for schools to access for use in implementing enhanced security measures.

(7) On or before January 1, 2016 ~~2015~~, submit a report to the General Assembly and the Governor on specific recommendations for changes to the current law or other legislative measures.

(8) On or before July 1, 2016 ~~January 1, 2015~~, submit a report to the State Board of Education on specific recommendations for model security plan policies for schools to access and use as a guideline. This report is exempt from inspection and copying under Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act.

The Task Force's recommendations may include proposals for specific statutory changes and methods to foster cooperation among State agencies and between this State and local government.

(e) The Task Force is abolished and this Section is repealed on July 2, 2016 ~~1, 2015~~.

(Source: P.A. 98-695, eff. 7-3-14.)

(105 ILCS 5/2-3.161)

Sec. 2-3.161 ~~2-3.160~~. Definition of dyslexia in rules; reading instruction advisory group.

(a) The State Board of Education shall adopt rules that incorporate an international definition of dyslexia into Part 226 of Title 23 of the Illinois Administrative Code.

(b) Subject to specific State appropriation or the availability of private donations, the State Board of Education shall establish an advisory group to develop a training module or training modules to provide education and professional development to teachers, school administrators, and other education professionals regarding multi-sensory, systematic, and sequential instruction in reading. This advisory group shall complete its work before December 15 ~~July 31~~, 2015 and is abolished on December 15 ~~July 31~~, 2015.

(Source: P.A. 98-705, eff. 7-14-14; revised 10-14-14.)

Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect upon becoming law.

Effective Date: 07/16/2015

Appendix C: Roster of Task Force Members



School Security and Standards Task Force

Appointment Roster

<p>The Honorable Neil Anderson State Senator, 36th District</p> <p>Appointed by the Senate Minority Leader</p>	<p>Jeffrey Aranowski Representative of the Illinois State Board of Education</p> <p>Appointed by the Chairman of the Illinois State Board of Education</p>
<p>Robert Bernat, MD, JD Parent</p> <p>Appointed by the Senate President</p>	<p>The Honorable Tom Cullerton State Senator, 23rd District</p> <p>Appointed by the Senate President</p>
<p>The Honorable Tom Demmer State Representative, 90th District</p> <p>Appointed by the House Minority Leader</p>	<p>Laura Frisch Parent</p> <p>Appointed by the Speaker of the House</p>
<p>William Patrick Hartshorn Representative from an association representing Illinois sheriffs</p> <p>Appointed by the Governor</p>	<p>David Henebry Architect or engineer who specializes in security issues</p> <p>Appointed by the Governor</p>
<p>Catherine McCrory Parent</p> <p>Appointed by the House Minority Leader</p>	<p>Patrick O'Connor Representative from an association representing Illinois chiefs of police</p> <p>Appointed by the Governor</p>
<p>Roger Schnitzler Representative from an association representing Illinois principals</p> <p>Appointed by the Governor</p>	<p>Ben Schwarm Representative from an association representing Illinois school boards</p> <p>Appointed by the Governor</p>
<p>The Honorable Carol Sente State Representative, 59th District</p> <p>Appointed by the Speaker of the House</p>	<p>John Simonton Parent</p> <p>Appointed by the Senate Minority Leader</p>
<p>Dave Tomlinson Representative from an association representing firefighters</p> <p>Appointed by the Governor</p>	<p>The Honorable Jeff Vose Representative from an association representing Illinois regional superintendents of schools</p> <p>Appointed by the Governor</p>
<p>Steven Wilder Representative from the security consulting profession</p> <p>Appointed by the Governor</p>	<p>Col. Tad Williams Representative from the Department of State Police</p> <p>Appointed by the Director of State Police</p>

Appendix D: Meeting Agendas and Minutes

School Security and Standards Task Force

Meeting Agenda

August 24, 2015

9:00 a.m.

James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
ISBE V-Tel Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601



Alzina Building
100 North First Street
V-Tel Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62777

-
- I. Roll Call
 - II. Opening Remarks and Introduction of Task Force Members
 - III. Task Force Procedural Issues
 - A. Open Meetings Act Requirements
 - B. Ethics Requirements
 - IV. Review and Adoption of Rules of Procedure
 - V. Selection of Task Force Chairperson and Vice Chairperson
 - VI. Review and Discussion of Public Acts 98-0695 and 99-0065 and the Task Force's Charge
 - VII. Determine Scope of Work and Establish Goals & Timelines
 - VIII. Discussion and Establishment of Subcommittees
 - IX. Public Comment
 - X. General Discussion on Other Topics by Task Force Members
 - XI. Adjourn

Task Force members wishing to participate via phone may use the following:

Telephone Number: 1-888-494-4032
Access Code: 3 6 3 3 7 5 2 7 0 9

**School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Summary**

Springfield - Illinois State Board of Education
Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois

Chicago - Illinois State Board of Education
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois

Monday, August 24, 2015
9:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

Amanda Elliott called the meeting to order shortly after 9:00 a.m. on August 24, 2015. A quorum was present.

Members Present

Robert Bernat
Laura Frisch
William Hartshorn
David Henebry
Roger Schnitzler
Ben Schwarm
Dave Tomlinson
Jeff Vose
Steven Wilder
Tad Williams

Members on the Phone

Jeff Aranowski
Tom Cullerton (Sen.)
Catherine McCrory
Patrick O'Connor
Carol Sente (Rep.)

Members Absent

Neil Anderson (Sen.)
Tom Demmer (Rep.)
John Simonton

Members of the Public

Sheila Sims, Legislative Aide for Senator Neil Anderson (phone)
Lyle Wind, ROE 51's Health/Life Safety Consultant

Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) Staff

Amanda Elliott
Hannah Rosenthal

Opening Remarks and Introduction of Task Force Members

Amanda Elliott welcomed the task force members and led introductions. In Springfield: Ben Schwarm introduced himself as the Deputy Director for the Illinois Association of School Boards. Jeff Vose introduced himself as the Sangamon County Regional Superintendent of Schools. David Henebry introduced himself as a certified education facility planner and architect, involved in school design for over 20 years. Tad Williams introduced himself as Lieutenant Colonel in the Division of Operations with the Illinois State Police; it is his 27th year in law enforcement. Pat Hartshorn introduced himself as the Sheriff in Vermillion County, who has been in law enforcement for 43 years and been an elected sheriff for 25 years. Dave Tomlinson introduced himself as a firefighter in Champaign who has been in the fire service for 30 years and was on the Champaign School Board for eight years, four of which he was Board President. Robert Bernat introduced himself as a physician and attorney, published in the Wall Street Journal and the Hill on the topic of school security and founder of the non-profit Safer Schools First. In Chicago: Steven Wilder introduced himself as President of Sorenson, Wilder & Associates based in Bourbonnais and a retired fire chief in Bradley, IL who spent 25 years as a field instructor with the Illinois Fire Service Institute. Laura Frisch introduced herself as a parent for 15 years and a teacher for 25 years, who has worked with children from preschool age through high school. Roger Schnitzler introduced himself as the Principal of Manteno High School who has been with Manteno for 25 years and who worked with Steve Wilder 12 years ago to develop a crisis plan for the district. On the phone: Jeff Aranowski introduced himself as the Division Supervisor for Public School Recognition within the Illinois State Board of Education and ISBE's liaison to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. Representative Carol Sente introduced herself as one of the sponsors of the bill; she serves on the Education, Curriculum and Policy Committee and owned an architectural firm that designed public buildings (including schools). Senator Tom Cullerton introduced himself as one of chief co-sponsors of the Senate bill. Pat O'Connor introduced himself as the past President of the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and the current President of Illinois Campus Chiefs; he is a threat assessment trainer and a FEMA active shooter and campus preparedness instructor.

Task Force Procedural Issues

Amanda Elliott instructed Task Force members to adopt rules and procedures for the Task Force. She asked members to complete Open Meetings Act (OMA) and Ethics Training as soon as possible, as both are required by law. Jeff Aranowski explained that because Task Force meetings have to comply with OMA, it is fitting to have rules of procedure.

Review and Adoption of Rules of Procedure

Motion: Moved by [REDACTED] and seconded by Robert Bernat and David Henebry. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Selection of Task Force Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson

Motion to consider Jeff Vose for Chairperson: Moved by Jeff Aranowski and seconded by Ben Schwarm. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Motion to consider Patrick O'Connor for Vice-Chairperson: Moved by Rep. Carol Sente and seconded by [REDACTED] (Robert Bernat?). Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Review and Discussion of Public Acts 98-0695 and 99-0065 and the Task Force's Charge

Chairperson Vose reviewed the purpose of the Task Force. He suggested the Task Force start by looking at what is currently being done in schools, what is working and what is not working. He clarified that the Task Force is focused strictly on K-12. Chairperson Vose noted that it was recently required that first responders had to be present during certain drills. Lyle Wind explained that in some situations in smaller districts, because of voluntary fire departments and part time police officers, it is difficult for first responders to get into meetings. He said he worked with sheriff in Sangamon County to make sure the sheriff was available to participate. He said that it is important to increase the number of first responders in meetings with school districts because they bring a different set of eyes to the situation. Ben Schwarm noted that all of the groups present at the Task Force meeting were involved in the original School Safety Drill Act. He said that it is important to have the statewide perspective because the state is very diverse. There are smaller communities so there cannot be a cookie-cutter approach. In a suburban area there are professional fire departments and professional police and even outreach branches of those who can go out into the community but there are also towns without a fire department. These towns do not have the same resources or time. Ben Schwarm continued, explaining that having the emergency responders in the building, at the drill or at the meeting can be difficult because school districts do not want them in schools on certain days (e.g., during school assessments). School districts cannot compel emergency responders to come. He noted that it could be mandated that first responders have to come to district meetings but if the meetings are held and first responders do not come, the school district is penalized. He emphasized the need for school district's due diligence in reaching out to first responders and having a system to schedule meetings in specific time frames. He noted, though, that in the end it is out of the district's control if first responders show up. Chairperson Vose responded that no data was currently being collected about law enforcement participation in drills but the Task Force could do a survey. Mr. Wind said that the form he uses does not track if the fire department or law enforcement were present for a drill, but looks to see if they were invited. Chairperson Vose clarified that ISBE has a guidance document for crisis management plans. ROEs will assist a district if asked, but schools typically take the guidance document and tailor their own management plan to the needs of the district. There are no set criteria; they just use the ISBE document as guidance. As a regional superintendent, Chairperson Vose said that he just checks to see if districts have drills. He clarified that Cook County has a process different from the rest of the state. Chairperson Vose mentioned that Mr. Wind has been sending blueprints of buildings to the state police but he did not know how consistently that was done. At the local level, Chairperson Vose said he has a monthly municipality chiefs meeting, and they accomplished getting electronic blueprints of all the buildings and eliminated architectural plans. He noted that he could see this as a possible recommendation.

Lyle Wind said that it is important that the electronic plans are current and kept updated with the local first responders. Governor Blagojevich mandated that plans be sent to state police but Mr. Wind was not sure where they went from there. Because it was a massive endeavor, Mr. Wind did not know if it was effective locally. Mr. Wind said he encourages his districts to send updates electronically to local first responders because they are the ones that are going to be there first and what they do initially is critical. First responders need to work with districts to confirm the first actions that are going to take place. Mr. Wind noted that districts in some suburban areas have intricate plans but he thinks it is costly to get them and revise them every year. Still, he believes that every school district can provide plans to their first responders because every school district has a 10-year survey and they can tweak and provide that to their first responders without greater cost. Pat O'Connor said that in the suburban Cook County area, they suggest that schools send the plans directly to local first responders. He believes that the state police will

say that sending everything electronically to them may be great in rural areas, but the updates may not realistically be used by state police because they are not going to be the first responders. In most situations, the loss of life takes place between 3 and 10 minutes. He said the superintendent or the building principal should check off that the current plans have been forwarded to local first responders.

Representative Sente expressed that some people on the task force have a deeper understanding than others. She asked, because of the way the information is presented and the amount of knowledge that various people have, if someone could summarize the differences throughout the state or follow up with her after the meeting. She asked if there is anything written about what exists today. Chairperson Vose responded that there is a crisis management plan guide on the ISBE website. He asked that this be sent out for the next meeting. He said there is a safety drill sign off sheet on all the different drills a school district has to conduct annually. In response to these requests, Amanda Elliott recommended that ISBE staff put together a more comprehensive, user-friendly 1-2 page fact sheet on current requirements, and also share the documents on the website.

Roger Schnitzler said that when the ROE comes to visit a school for their yearly life safety visit, the school is asked for drill sheets and for an annual crisis meeting with first responders. He believes that outside of this, there is variation between suburban school districts and small rural school districts. Mr. Schnitzler noted that he sends his crisis plan to other districts almost every year because there are school districts that are just developing their crisis plans. He explained that he and Steve Wilder began working on a crisis plan 12 years ago because they were part of a group in Kankakee County that was given federal dollars to actually develop and implement the plans. Mr. Schnitzler noted that administrators in suburban districts have time to work on these plans, but in many cases, outside of these districts, crisis plans do not exist. He said that in Manteno they complete three fire drills and two bus drills, but he explained that drills vary. Mr. Schnitzler used to notify his teachers when they were going to have a drill so that the teachers included the drills in their plans; however, he realized that a drill is not a drill if everyone knows when it is to occur and what to expect. Steven Wilder agreed that this was a glorified test of the fire alarms. First responders told Mr. Schnitzler to change his routine and he now holds drills at varying unexpected times. Mr. Schnitzler concluded that he does not doubt that schools are doing drills, but how drills are executed varies across Illinois.

Mr. Henebry explained that life safety reference plans have to be submitted to the ROE by all school districts, but they vary in quality. He noted that if a plan is on file, first responders have to have access to the plan within a minute of a call. He believes that there is no substitute for walking first responders through schools, and he does so when he commissions a new building. He also tries to post life safety plans throughout schools so that they are available. Mr. Henebry recalled witnessing a shooter in a school in Peoria District 150. Police responded and secured the school perimeter but they could not go into the school because communication coming out of the school was a challenge and they did not know what they were walking into. He said that luckily the shooter decided to leave the building and the students pointed at him as he exited, helping police identify him. Mr. Henebry emphasized that the whole situation lasted 7 minutes. He thought that the securing of the building was impressive but noted that if plans are going to be accessible to police, they need to get to police quickly and need to be legible. Robert Bernat responded that the situation Mr. Henebry described was exactly what happened at Columbine in 1999. The police officers were excellent at securing the perimeter, but they did not penetrate. Dr. Bernat asked ISBE staff to email Task Force members links to the federal model comprehensive guides for schools, institutions of higher education and houses of worship. He said it is helpful to know what the federal government is

thinking. Jeff Aranowski added that Illinois was awarded a very small grant of \$1.09 million to assist districts in drafting, maintaining or actually increasing the effectiveness of their emergency operation plan. He explained that some of the training will be rolled out. He said that ISBE is entering into an intergovernmental agreement with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency to conduct training for school districts, regional superintendents and building principals, as well as to develop a clearing house, a school safety center unique to Illinois (a website of best practices and training materials). Mr. Aranowski explained that the federal guidelines show that best practices are out there but he emphasized that the Task Force will be an intrinsic part of the planning process for the grant. The Homeland Security FEMA report was also mentioned.

Dr. Bernat was asked to give his presentation and Mr. Henebry offered to share his presentation as well. Dave Tomlinson said that as the task force moves forward, it is important to remember the smaller districts, which are not growth districts or money districts. In these districts, there will likely be a single PDF layout, not a blueprint. Mr. Tomlinson said that in general, fire departments do not use blueprints at all; they use a PDF file they can look at quickly. Small districts do not even use a PDF file. He noted that the Task Force should keep in mind that fire departments have tier two reporting that they do on chemicals but that after the reports are sent they just sit in an office in a fire or police department.

Chairperson Vose added that the Task Force should also keep consistency in mind. He explained that in Chatham School District, a suburban school district in Sangamon County, Mr. Wind established that first responders are the local police, followed by county and state police, and then maybe the city of Springfield. Chairperson Vose emphasized the consistency of drills, as every school seems to do it differently. He believes that drills should not be staged. He asked the Task Force if they should look into how drills are exercised. Mr. Schnitzler replied that they should define what a drill is.

██████████ acknowledged the debates over unannounced lockdowns and having police officers come through a building with semiautomatic weapons. Mr. Henebry agreed that the issue of school safety and security is emotionally charged, especially after Sandy Hook. He said that when he counted up all of the incidents over the past 20 years, there was three one-thousandths of a percent chance that a person was going to be affected by a school shooting and that a person is more likely to get hit by lightning or by a tornado. He believes that there are ways to mitigate the amount of damage that is done and create a safer environment. Mr. Schnitzler said that there are many different opinions as to how to run lockdown drills. He said he was an elementary principal for years and would not want police coming in for a drill, but now that he is a high school principal, he could see the opposite process take place. He added that there are also discrepancies in the expectations for lockdown drills. He thinks it is key that schools develop relationships with their first responders and understand how their first responders operate, to avoid the sort of situation that happened in Peoria.

Pat O'Connor said that in training chiefs and threat assessment teams, they recognize that some districts complete drills just based on convenience. He emphasized that if schools do not have unscheduled drills, the drills are not real; when districts schedule drills for convenience, it does not serve students and staff. He also said that he does not know why any police department would hold back in perimeter base in response to an active shooter because it is not recommended in the state or nationally. He said that local police departments are taught that entry teams need to get into schools right away.

Dr. Bernat replied to Mr. Henebry's earlier statement, agreeing that schools are still the safest places for kids. Dr. Bernat said, though, that the federal government uses different numbers than the numbers Mr. Henebry used. The federal government bases their statistics on the 2013 Texas State University study in which there were 84 active shooter events between 2000 and 2010 and 34 percent of them involved schools, which averaged nearly 3 school shootings a year. Dr. Bernat said that we do not hear about all school shootings but the Department of Education tracks them. He added that New York Times expanded the study to 2014 (which included Sandy Hook) and there has been acceleration.

Tad Williams returned to the issue of school blueprints. He said that the state police do not collect blueprints. He said that they collect floorplans, which are put into PDF. Each district commander has a PIO or SEO and it is their responsibility to keep the floorplans up to date. He said that the floorplans are put in an icon that is in every vehicle so police officers can click on it and bring up the floorplans for a given district. He agreed that the local sheriffs and deputies are going to get to a school before the state police but he thinks there should be a clearing house where the floorplans are somewhere statewide so that in the case that something happens, the local departments have backup.

Mr. Williams said that some school districts do not want police officers coming into schools with rifles but he believes that they need to get over this concern because that is how police officers are going to respond. He said he cannot speak for Peoria but he can guarantee that law enforcement has evolved. If there is a school shooting, the officers are going to go into a school whether or not they have a floorplan. Mr. Williams emphasized that the only way to make it more efficient and better is for school superintendents and school districts to stop being afraid of calling law enforcement in to practice scenarios. He said that law enforcement need to be involved and the drills cannot be planned with students and teachers. He believes that kids need to understand that they are going to see law enforcement. He recommended that to break students in, schools should be inviting law enforcement and firefighters to visit schools so that students are not as scared when the schools practice a scenario. He said that law enforcement and school districts need to work together. Laura Frisch expressed concern as a parent and as a teacher. Regarding police officers bringing rifles into schools, he said that schools do not have fires in a fire drill or tornadoes in a tornado drill. She explained that schools have drills so that kids are safe and so that school personnel understand what would happen. She said that law enforcement have come into the schools that she has worked in; for example, in her preschool class last year, she had the commander of the police department come in and talk to the kids. He showed them the gun that he wears and his badge so they understood what a police officer in a classroom looks like, but he did not need to bring in his rifle or riot gear. Mrs. Frisch emphasized that the Task Force at a certain point needs to think about children's psychological wellbeing when they talk about the types of drills and how we handle drills; having a full-blown force of police officers coming in during a drill is really scary for kids, even if it is a drill. The possibility of having a real shooter in a school is scary, but there is a certain point that schools do not make kids feel like they are actually in a fire or a tornado. Mr. Schwarm added that the Illinois Association of School Boards has opposed pieces of legislation that would require full-blown enactments for that very reason.

Chairperson Vose said the Task Force could hear one more comment before they discussed how they would proceed. Dr. Bernat agreed with both Mrs. Frisch and Mr. Williams. He said that in Highland Park they are starting with table top exercises, but they will be moving to what they do in Vernon Hills, where they bring police officers into schools when kids are not in school (on weekends) to familiarize police officers with the school and get their heartrates up. The officers rarely throw on their body armor or take

their ARs out of the trunk. Dr. Bernat said the officers do this because it is the practice that they think they need. They do not need to expose the kids to it; they need to expose officers to it. They use actors. Dr. Bernat thinks this is something the task force should consider.

Determine Scope of Work and Establish Goals & Timelines

Amanda Elliott suggested the Task Force look ahead and plan what materials members will need for the next meeting and their scope of work. She said that the statute requires the Task Force to submit a report to the General Assembly and Governor on or before January 1, 2016. She proposed the Task Force meet at least 4 times before the end of the year. Mrs. Elliott explained that given internal ISBE deadlines for putting reports together and submitting them, the Task Force needs to look to have a draft to review and approve by the beginning of December. She said that the Task Force should schedule a meeting in the next 3 weeks and that ISBE staff will send out a date. She added that Chicago and Springfield work well for logistical purposes. She said that ISBE staff will work with the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson to develop the agenda and that ISBE staff will put together a 1-2 page fact sheet about current drill requirements and safety plan meeting requirements. She said that Dr. Bernat and Mr. Henebry can present, 30 minutes each, at the next meeting depending on what the agenda looks like. She said that it would also make sense to complete a small survey of other states (looking, for example, for a clearing house of floorplans) to see how similar states to Illinois balance children's psychological wellbeing and safety. Mrs. Elliott added that, as Representative Sente would recall, in the committee hearing for the Task Force there was discussion on making sure the information does not fall into wrong hands. The Task Force will want to make sure that the information is secure and that only law enforcement and school personnel have access to it, as members would not want possible intruders to have access. Mr. Schwarm said that the Illinois Association of School Boards passed a bill this spring that was just signed into law that said that a school board can complete its security audit in closed session. He said that there is also a FOIA exemption.

Mrs. Elliott encouraged the Task Force to think about what it wants to include in its report. Dr. Bernat mentioned that on October 22, David Esquith from the U.S. Department of Education who leads the federal task force (FEMA, FBI, Homeland Security, etc.) will be in Illinois. Mr. Esquith volunteered to talk to the Task Force about the federal model comprehensive guides and any other topics of interest. Mr. Schwarm said that the Task Force may also want to look at the policies for school boards and school districts written by the Illinois Association of School Boards (IASB). At least $\frac{3}{4}$ school districts in the state use IASB's policies, which are very comprehensive and updated them monthly. In its security policy, IASB not only says what is required by law but also links to information on the ISBE website and information from FEMA and Homeland Security. School boards and districts are using or can use this. Mr. Schwarm added that the Task Force should ask what the districts are actually doing with the material and if they are implementing anything. He said he could develop a list of materials IASB is giving to schools. Mrs. Elliott reminded the Task Force that many members are security personnel, but the Task Force needs to keep in mind that some items discussed may already be required of school districts and districts have a lot on their plates. She said the Task Force wants to ensure school safety but also wants to find a balance and not add too many mandates or requirements. She suggested that the Task Force examine what districts are already doing and what can be improved without adding a lot to their plates. Mr. Tomlinson said that regarding educational curricular issues, the Risk Watch Curriculum through the Safe Kids Coalition, National Safe Kids, has already been approved by ISBE as far as the Illinois Learning Standards. He said it touches on the age appropriate issues that Task Force members discussed, but allows firefighters and police officers and poison control to come into schools.

Discussion and Establishment of Subcommittees

Chairperson Vose asked if the Task Force wanted to establish any subcommittees for what was discussed at the meeting and what the roles and topics of the subcommittees would be. Dr. Bernat recommended that the Task Force have a subcommittee that is a liaison to task forces of other states. He said that he knows other task forces exist because he went to a meeting in Washington, D.C. He said that Virginia and Texas are far ahead of other states. He volunteered to chair the liaison subcommittee. Mr. Williams, Representative Sente and Mr. Henebry also joined the liaison subcommittee. Oklahoma and Massachusetts were mentioned as other states to investigate. Chairperson Vose asked how the Task Force would like to report out and how the subcommittee should proceed. Dr. Bernat questioned what other states would be able to share with the Task Force and advised that the subcommittee do research before reaching out to other states. He said that David Esquith may help connect the Task Force with the task forces of other states. Several members of the Task Force said they also sit on the Illinois Terrorism Task Force.

Representative Sente asked the Task Force if they should orchestrate a subcommittee to write the report, as it would be difficult for 18 people to write it together. Mrs. Elliott explained that ISBE staff members typically take a first stab at a report together and then share it with the larger group for comment. Mr. Schwarm suggested that the Task Force wait until its next meeting to see if other subcommittees will be needed, as other issues would likely pop up later. Chairperson Vose expressed an interest in compiling best practices for crisis management plans and training. He suggested looking at what is done most efficiently and effectively within a suburban, rural or urban district. Mr. Schwarm said that IEMA has talked about best practices and told the Task Force that he would check with IEMA to make sure they are not duplicating efforts. He believed they were working on developing criteria for schools that were not punitive but which would potentially result in a school being labeled a “star safety school.” Chairperson Vose recalled a grant that districts could apply for but [REDACTED] responded that it was open last year and the money is now gone. The grant was only for hardware purchases; it would pay for an alarm system for doors and windows. Chairperson Vose asked if there was another grant that recruited schools to help develop their plans.

[REDACTED] expressed concern with the Task Force’s 4 month timeline, as Oklahoma spent a year on its task force. Chairperson Vose responded that this was a decision made by statute and Mrs. Elliott agreed that the deadline was dictated to the Task Force. Representative Sente expressed concern about the date of the Task Force’s next meeting. Legislators do not know when they will return to Springfield each week but it is often Tuesday through Thursday with a week’s notice, so Mondays or Fridays will be better days for them to meet until the budget is complete. She said both the Senate and the House are usually not in session. Mrs. Elliott replied that ISBE staff will check to see if the videoconference rooms were available.

Chairperson Vose reiterated that the subcommittee would try to get information from other task forces. Mrs. Elliott advised that the task force’s final reports are likely posted on their websites. She asked Task Force members to work with Hannah Rosenthal before reaching out to make sure that ISBE is managing the work of the task force. Chairperson Vose reiterated that Dr. Bernat’s and Mr. Henebry’s presentations would happen at the next meeting and that Task Force members should also collect current documents on what districts are required to do. He said that Task Force members also expressed interest in talking more about drill discrepancies and inconsistencies. Mr. Tomlinson added that he attended a lockdown drill where authorities were supposed to be present. The officers assigned to be at the drill had a live call and they have to prioritize a live call over a scheduled drill. Mr. Tomlinson said that he went to another

lockdown drill where school teachers and staff did not understand what they were supposed to be doing. He noted that this drill was important because the district and officers learned where their weaknesses were.

Dr. Bernat said that the federal government has changed its view about lockdowns; students and teachers are now taught to "run, hide, fight" instead of sheltering in place. It is a priority to get students out of the building, through windows or other openings. Mr. Schnitzler replied that there are different opinions on what schools should do, so working with local first responders is key. He explained that there are theories that if students are directed to run, a sharp shooter could be waiting for people to exit the building. He emphasized that if first responders tell students and school personnel to sit still, they should sit still. Dr. Bernat agreed that there are new issues to consider that did not exist years ago and he emphasized that the International Association of Chiefs of Police has promoted the "run, hide, fight" model.

Mr. Wind returned to discussion of the Drill Act, saying that he believes it is successful as written. He said it would be beneficial to have overriding parameters as to what components make a good drill. He explained that schools continue with what they have always done and do not think about the components of a drill. He said he thinks there is a glossary of terms which may be helpful for the Task Force.

Chairperson Vose said that the Task Force needed to focus on the schedule moving forward. Mrs. Elliott said that ISBE staff will work on dates in the next couple of days, and send out an agenda and materials to be reviewed as soon as possible. Mr. Schnitzler asked that ISBE staff also send out contact information for the Task Force members.

Cathy McCrory asked if subcommittees should be based on location so people can communicate better or if subcommittees will be formed of members from all over the state. Mrs. Elliott replied that it is important to have a diversity of backgrounds on each subcommittee, so diversity will trump proximity of members.

Dr. Bernat said that he views school security as triad: mental health (the most difficult), slowing down an intruder and getting first responders to the school faster. He said that the mental health piece includes a See Something, Say Something program, which he thinks may be "extremely problematic." He said the Task Force should think about including a piece not to address the problem but to say that the problem needs to be addressed, and get the right people involved to help with that leg of the triad. He emphasized that from a preventive point, the mental health leg of the triad is the only time that schools and law enforcement are on the offensive. Dr. Bernat added that the school shooters Task Force members are most familiar with have all had severe psychiatric issues. Mr. Henebry said that it is important to keep a weapon from even getting into a school, as once a weapon is in a school, there is an potential that someone is going to die no matter how well school personnel and law enforcement respond. He said he read material from Homeland Security that said that there is a mentally ill population that is a ticking time bomb. He added that the "Lanzas twenty years ago" were medicated or institutionalized but today they are not. Chairperson Vose explained that at a regional level alternative education is provided for smaller school districts, which urban and larger suburban districts can manage. He noted that in Manard, the ROE has partnered with Lincoln Prairie Hospital to begin working with students when they start to see incidents or have concerns about mental illness. Dr. Bernat said the See Something, Say Something program is similar, but the problem is that no one knows what to put in such a program. He said that if schools tell students, on an age appropriate basis, to tell a trusted adult about kids who wear black, about kids who consider themselves goth, or about kids who play violent video games, there would be so many false positives, but you have to

start somewhere. Chairperson Vose said he has monthly school superintendent meetings and there is a great need for assistance in regards to mental illness, so this is something the Task Force needs to look at. Mr. Wilder agreed with Mr. Henebry about keeping shooters out of the school to begin with. He hopes the Task Force will address features of physical security in school buildings. He said that schools go in diametrically opposite directions with regard to physical security. Some schools remain incredibly vulnerable from a physical plant perspective so many of these buildings. Mr. Wilder said he hopes the Task Force will address this issue. Mr. Schwarm agreed with Mr. Wilder and said that all school districts want their buildings to be safer, but it will come down to a money issue. It is more difficult to fit old buildings with security technology than it is to fit new buildings. Dr. Bernat agreed that one size does not fit all. Mr. Wilder said the Task Force should find compromising minimum standards because many vendors try to sell districts more products than they actually need. Dr. Bernat added that security involves training in addition to the physical plant. Mr. Wilder agreed and said he uses an approach called P2T2 for the four elements of security: People, Programs, Training and Technology. He said that so often schools just want to throw money at technology. Dr. Bernat concurred, noting that a school's secretary often runs the security vestibule at the front door. If the secretary does not have the training, a school could have the best technology system in the world but its security will fail.

Chairperson Vose concluded that the Task Force is working on a date and has a healthy agenda, including the presentations. Mrs. Elliott said that ISBE staff will work to establish all the dates between before December and will see if October 22 is a possibility. Mrs. Frisch said that September 14 is Rosh Hashanah. Mrs. Elliott said she would reach out to Representative Sente to find different dates. Chairperson Vose asked if there would be a cost for David Esquith to meet with the Task Force and Dr. Bernat said there would not be, as Mr. Esquith will be in Chicago for other purposes and volunteered because he knows about the Task Force. Mrs. Elliot reminded the Task Force that it is important that everything is circulated through the Chairperson and ISBE staff so that there are no conflicting agenda items.

Adjourn

Mrs. Elliott asked if there was a motion to adjourn.

Motion: Moved by Chairperson Vose and seconded by [REDACTED]. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

School Security and Standards Task Force

Meeting Agenda

September 10, 2015

1:00 p.m.

James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601



Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62777

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- I. Call to Order and Welcome
 - II. Roll Call
 - III. Approval of Minutes from August 24, 2015 Task Force Meeting
 - IV. Review of School Safety Provisions
 - V. Member Presentation: Dr. Robert Bernat
 - VI. Member Presentation: Mr. David Henebry
 - VII. Jadine Chou, Chief of Security for Chicago Public Schools
 - XIII. Public Hearings/Testimony Logistics and Scheduling
 - IX. Public Comment
 - X. New Business and Open Discussion
 - XI. Adjourn

Task Force members wishing to participate via phone may use the following:

Telephone Number: 1-888-494-4032
Access Code: 3 6 3 3 7 5 2 7 0 9

**School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Summary**

Springfield - Illinois State Board of Education
Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois

Chicago - Illinois State Board of Education
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois

Thursday, September 10, 2015
1:00 p.m.

Chairman Vose called the meeting to order at 1:04pm.

Members Present

Jeff Aranowski
Robert Bernat
Laura Frisch
David Henebry
Cathy McCrory
Jeff Vose (Chairman)
Steven Wilder
Tad Williams

Members on the Phone

Neil Anderson (Sen.)
Pat O'Connor (Vice-Chair)
Carol Sente (Rep.)
Roger Schnitzler
John Simonton
Dave Tomlinson

Members Absent

Tom Cullerton (Sen.)
Tom Demmer (Rep.)
Pat Hartshorn
Ben Schwarm

Members of the Public

Jadine Chou, Chief School Safety & Security Officer for Chicago Public Schools
Nick Giannini, Chief of Staff for Senator Tom Cullerton
Antonio Ruiz, Deputy Chief Strategic Safety Initiatives for Chicago Public Schools
Deanna Sullivan, Director of Governmental Relations for Illinois Association of School Boards
Lyle Wind, ROE 51's Health/Life Safety Consultant

Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) Staff

Amanda Elliott
Hannah Rosenthal

Approval of Minutes from August 24, 2015 Task Force Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by David Henebry and seconded by Pat O'Connor.
Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Review of School Safety Provisions

Jeff Aranowski gave an overview of the current statutory requirements for school safety drills. He reviewed the four categories of required drills: evacuation drills, bus evacuation drills, law enforcement drills to address a shooting incident and severe weather drills. He said that it may be helpful for the Task Force to discuss districts' best practices and what is not working. Pat O'Connor said that farther south in Illinois he sees less local law enforcement involvement in drills, as drills often require overtime for small agencies. Mr. Aranowski added that this is not a criticism of law enforcement or educational systems. He recognizes that resources are thin. Mr. O'Connor said that law enforcement cooperation requires planning in advance. Mr. Aranowski said that the statute requires that a school give 30 days' notice to those involved in the annual review of its crisis response plan. The sign-off of the plan is provided to the regional superintendent. The State Board accepts reports from regional superintendents to ensure that they are in compliance.

Member Presentation: Dr. Robert Bernat

Robert Bernat introduced his presentation on "The School Security Triad: A Methodology of Organization" and explained how he became interested in school security. He has written articles for *The Wall Street Journal* and *The Hill* and he founded the non-profit Safer Schools First. Dr. Bernat said that according to a 2013 Texas State University study and a 2002 joint Department of Education (ED) and Secret Service report entitled "The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States," law enforcement ends active shooter incidents in schools only 27% of the time. Between those 2000 and 2010, there were 84 active shooter incidents. Thirty-four percent involved schools, which means nearly 2.85 incidents in schools per year. Dr. Bernat gave examples of incidents in Georgia, New Mexico and California since 2013.

Dr. Bernat said that control is a key element in an armed assault. When challenged by armed security and law enforcement, a perpetrator's feeling of control is threatened. Many active shooters take their own lives. He explained that between 2000 and 2010, pistols were used 60% of the time, long guns (including assault rifles) were used 27% of the time and shotguns were used 9% of the time. Dr. Bernat reviewed the chain of events in Sandy Hook and noted that it was not the failure to plan, but the failure of the plan. He shared the results of the Illinois School District 112 Task Force on School Security on which he also serves. The District 112 task force consists of police and fire chiefs, school resource officers (SROs), parents, school district administrators, teachers and security advisors. Recommendations from District 112's task force included: security vestibules; schoolwide intercoms; distinctive alarms that cannot be confused with fire alarms; uniform visitor and volunteer admissions policies; training and software; wireless alarm notification systems including blue boxes; and under-desk alarms. District 112 is serving as a beta test for blue boxes. The District's task force also recommended a review, in conjunction with the fire department, of possible use of 3M ballistic window film, as well as training of all staff regarding admissions vetting policies, vestibule procedures and plan details. Additionally, the District's task force suggested a review of the new federal "Run, Hide, Fight" recommendations; table top and live exercises with volunteer actors, police officers and fire department paramedics (with police using body armor and weapons without students in the school); and a review of

classroom emergency kits to include water, energy bars, pressure dressings, plastic buckets and shower curtains. Dr. Bernat said that districts need a compendium of best practices concerning hardware, software, architecture, construction, and training. School districts should be required to form their own task forces to make decisions and the State should provide these task forces with detailed information.

Dr. Bernat spoke about the first leg of triad, which is intercepting an event before harm is done. He differentiated between politically motivated and nonpolitically motivated perpetrators. Dr. Bernat referred to the politically motivated attack on a school in the Russian Federation on Sept. 1, 2004. In the case of political attacks, districts need to rely on CIA and FBI intelligence and local SWAT teams, as there is little local law enforcement can do to intercept these attacks. In nonpolitical attacks, perpetrators are often driven by sense of paranoia and seek retribution. Dr. Bernat recounted what happened at Columbine and Newtown and the signs that the perpetrators displayed. He asked how the State can go on the offensive and noted that Illinois cannot remake a broken national mental health system. He said the State should focus on better intelligence, a key portion of which is a "See Something, Say Something" program. He cited a recent incident in Minnesota as evidence that "See Something, Say Something" works. Acting "weird" is not a sufficiently rigorous criterion to use to assess a potential threat and guides such as black clothing and violent video games would lead to many false positives. Dr. Bernat said that the Task Force should enlist the help of child psychologists to help craft guides to give students, parents, teachers, and communities the tools to help find potential threats. The Task Force will need to plow new ground for the first leg of the triad. Dr. Bernat ended his presentation by saying that Illinois needs to stay informed of new developments.

Mr. Aranowski said that a team at Western Illinois University is doing behavioral threat assessment trainings for school administrators. He suggested that Task Force members take a look at their curriculum and see if they want to promote it or suggest recommendations. He said that there is a lot the Task Force can do that will not cost districts money. Dr. Bernat agreed that training is cost effective. He said that schools need to have very clear policies and school secretaries need to be empowered to enforce the policies. Cathy McCrory asked if public schools in Illinois are given any funding to bring them up to speed on current regulations. Mr. Aranowski said that there are federal grants but they are small and competitive. There are Health/ Life Safety funds for structural issues and grants from the federal government to state education agencies to provide training, but there is no money specifically designed for districts to use. Mr. Henebry said that Life Safety Bonding can be accessed for security expenditures. Laura Frisch asked at what point resources become a mandate, as far as educating teachers, administrators and staff. Chairman Vose said that all school administrators are required to do an administrative academy annually and teachers are required to get professional development credits every year. The Task Force should consider these avenues.

Member Presentation: Mr. David Henebry

Mr. Henebry introduced his presentation on murder/ suicide school attacks. He said that there is never going to be a fool proof solution; the solutions will aim to reduce the odds of an attack, contain a situation until authorities arrive, and improve survivability during an incident. Mr. Henebry discussed the chain of events in the shootings at Sandy Hook and Columbine. He said that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report shows that most schools have limited or archaic technology. Schools need at least one layer of redundancy to eliminate single-point vulnerabilities and maintain communication systems, power/life safety systems and security systems in case shooters become more sophisticated. Mr. Henebry referenced Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) standards, which are built on three strategies:

- Territoriality – well-defined boundaries and placement
- Natural Surveillance – good visibility (no blind entrances or mazes) to maximize eyes on the street and facility
- Access Control – placement of entrances and exits that makes it easier to access, manage and defend schools

Mr. Henebry said that most schools use cameras but they are band aid solutions for direct observation. He spoke about the hardware used for access control, including bullet proof glass and sniffer technology. He advocated for allowing law enforcement to use schools for training during the summer to test their response times and acquaint themselves with the buildings. He said that whether or not schools arm staff members is a difficult decision. Mr. Henebry noted that financial resources – and how schools choose to use them – are important to consider. One school district laid off its two SROs and invested in the arts and the school's scores improved.

Mr. Henebry encouraged the Task Force to think about mental health. He said that FEMA and Homeland Security reports all come back to behavioral or emotional issues. According to the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, one in five young people have one or more mental, emotional or behavioral disorders at any given time. He emphasized that much of youth exposure to violence occurs at school or on the way to school. Exposure to violence is associated with children's development of various mental health problems. A reciprocal relationship exists between academic achievement and mental health outcomes. Bullied students do not pay attention in class if they are thinking about how to get home from school safely.

Mr. Henebry concluded his presentation with physical plant recommendations and a sample school design. He discussed schools with ID scans for students and all visitors, vestibules with locked doors, monitors in SRO offices, classrooms with direct access to the outdoors, and schools organized in villages so that parts of a school can be completely locked down. Steven Wilder noted that audible detection recognizes the sound of gunfire based on frequency and decibel level and activates systems. Mr. Henebry explained that sniffer technology scans for gun powder residue; shots do not need to be fired.

Jadine Chou, Chief of Security for Chicago Public Schools

Jadine Chou outlined Chicago Public Schools' (CPS) approach to school safety and security. She said that if a school is fortified too much, it will feel like a prison. CPS believes that schools should take a more positive approach by setting the bar high. CPS is the third largest district in the country with 640 schools and approximately 400,000 students. Twelve people manage the security of all schools in the District. There are 1,100 security officers (one in every school) and armed SROs in 75 high schools. CPS also has crisis, climate and flex teams. If there is a traumatic incident, the crisis team offers grief counseling, and if they see a threat on Facebook, they complete a homicidal ideation threat assessment. The climate and flex teams calm students down. CPS has a 24/7 Student Safety Center which keeps everyone in the district informed. If there is a shooting near a school, the school will go on lockdown. CPS' Safe Passage program employs close to 1,300 community members to keep watch along safe routes. CPS has not had a serious incident since 2011 and the district has seen a 26% reduction in crime along those routes.

Ms. Chou said that CPS takes a holistic approach to safety and believes that safety is much more than law enforcement. The District emphasizes prevention and intervention. If CPS can keep students in school and help them succeed, students will be less likely to join gangs or become isolated. Ms. Chou explained the impact of school suspension policies. CPS is committed to eliminating the school-to-prison

pipeline. Forty-nine percent of students who enter high school with three suspensions on their record eventually drop out altogether and most students who get suspended will be suspended at least one more time. CPS understands the diversity of students it serves. Suspensions are seen most among students of color. Ms. Chou noted that CPS had a record first day attendance rate this year of 94.8%. In the past, CPS security officers were very enforcement-focused, but they now focus on proactive and supportive approaches. CPS security officers have training in conflict resolution and trauma-informed care. They are trained to look for signs of mental health concerns and to make appropriate referrals. CPS also recently revamped its student code of conduct. The District is moving toward more classroom management and restorative practices. Ms. Chou highlighted CPS' intervention strategies. They have 5-8 interventions a month on average. The CPS team monitors social media pages (only public sources), goes to the homes of students, catches guns, hospitalizes students, and gets them the help they need. Resources include youth programming, mentoring, and grief counseling. Ms. Chou shared CPS' results from last year: out of school suspensions were down 60%, referrals to arrests were down 40%, and referrals to expulsions were down 69%. She emphasized that safety is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Ms. Chou identified CPS' phases of emergency management planning: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. She said that half the battle is having access control and proper visitor procedures. CPS works hard to establish a climate that encourages students and staff to report issues. CPS has a hotline for people to call and every threat is taken seriously. CPS does threat assessments in conjunction with the Chicago Police Department (CPD). All staff members are trained on how to look for suspicious or erratic behavior. CPS has security cameras in 70% of its schools, which are tied to the city's 911 cameras.

Regarding preparedness, CPS follows Evacuation, Lockdown, Shelter-In-Place, All Clear (ELSA) protocol. Every school has its own emergency plan that is stored in the Facility Incident Management System (FIMS), a database the District shares with its first responder partners (Chicago Police Department and Chicago Fire Department). Staff and students are trained regularly and the District has a new training webinar with Chicago's Chief of Police and Fire Commissioner. CPS does not endorse "Run, Hide, Fight." In an active shooter situation, teachers would lock classroom doors, and students would go into hiding mode with the lights off and wait for police. Ms. Chou said that there is always a CPD officer within a minute of a school. In rural districts where first responders have a five minute response time, schools would need a different plan. Every CPS school has a pre-defined emergency management team, including an incident commander, internal information officer, and safety officer. CPS has 100% compliance with safety drills every year. CPS also has a dedicated team of safety professionals solely responsible for emergency plans. Every school has a custom plan that is updated every year, which supports ownership at the local level. Finally, CPS has a close partnership with first responders. They have a conference call every morning and CPS Safety Operations is co-located with the Emergency Management Center.

Ms. Chou noted the differences across Illinois. She said that suburban districts in Chicago are becoming a lot more urbanized. CPS has not had a school shooting since 1992, though there were three shootings in 1992. High school students in CPS have to go through metal detectors. Dr. Bernat asked why all of the school shootings have taken place outside of urban areas. Ms. Chou explained how CPS works actively and proactively. CPS has partnered with the University of Chicago to measure the effectiveness of the District's strategies. Ms. Chou recommends that other districts use strategies such as social media monitoring and a threat assessment process. The demographic of active shooters as 18 to 24 year-old white males is not always the case. CPS has a very close relationship with the Department of Children

and Family Services, the Department of Human Services, and mental health services at Lurie Children's Hospital. Ms. Chou said CPS strongly believes this is a mental health problem.

Chairman Vose explained that in more rural areas, the individual who manages security could be the head custodian or the buildings and grounds person. He asked if CPS holds ongoing training with building administrators and staff. Ms. Chou said CPS holds training for the deans in charge of discipline and SROs. She receives many requests for ad hoc training. CPS offers trainings on de-escalation and threat assessment, but the district requires CPD to give an all-clear when there are threats. CPS uses Crisis Prevention Institute (CPI) curriculum as a basis for its trainings. The District gives webinars and Ms. Chou travels to speak with other districts. Mr. Aranowski said his takeaway was the importance of a comprehensive, supportive school community. He asked Ms. Chou if the District offers customized training for frontline staff, principals and teachers. Ms. Chou said that a lot of schools do not have the luxury of having security officers at the front desk and that the CPS team gives customized trainings based on what a school needs. Ms. Frisch asked if CPS' budget changed when the district added these pieces. Ms. Chou said that the budget has decreased 20% since she started. CPS' cut 25% of its SROs. CPS' budget is \$100 million including the Safe Passage program (\$18 million) and all security officers.

Lyle Wind noted the importance of relationships and trust between the adults and students in a school. Communication within the school and between school personnel and first responders is also critical. Schools must be proactive. Mr. Henebry asked about individual student records. He said that in Peoria, some students move through several schools within one year. Every time students move, the new school has to learn about them so their individual learning plans move with them. Ms. Chou said there is a lot of movement in CPS, but many families want to keep their kids in the same school. Ms. Frisch noted that teachers get files on their students but social workers cannot give their files to teachers. As a teacher, most of the issues she has had are with parents. Ms. Chou said that her office in CPS works closely with the Office of Social and Emotional Learning. Regarding the transfer of records and privacy issues, Mr. Aranowski said that there are restrictions through the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Illinois School Student Records Act (ISSRA). Mr. Aranowski reminded the Task Force that one of its charges is thinking about how the law needs to or does not need to be changed. Ms. Chou said that when she speaks with other states, Illinois is actually progressive when it comes to school security. The fact that Illinois requires safety drills is positive. She encouraged Task Force members to be cautious about "Run, Hide, Fight."

Public Hearings/Testimony Logistics and Scheduling

Chairman Vose proposed that the Task Force hold three public hearings across the State – in Northern, Central and Southern Illinois. He recommended working with Regional Offices of Education and Intermediate Service Centers. Mr. Aranowski agreed that part of the charge of the Task Force is to hear testimony. He said that getting out into the community adds legitimacy. Chairman Vose suggested a press release to publicize the public hearings. Deanna Sullivan from the Illinois Association of School Boards (IASB) could communicate the information to school boards. Amanda Elliott said that for the next meeting the Task Force needs to get dates out for the public hearings.

New Business and Open Discussion

Chairman Vose confirmed that David Esquith of the U.S. Department of Education will be coming to Task Force's October 22 meeting. Chairman Vose asked if the Liaison Subcommittee members could compile the information they have gathered to share with the rest of the Task Force. Hannah Rosenthal will post

the materials on the Task Force website. Chairman Vose emphasized that the Task Force needs to be transparent. The Liaison Subcommittee has four members, so a majority of a quorum is two or more. Mr. Aranowski added that the Task Force's enabling legislation exempts the model security plan (which will be submitted to the Board) from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), but all of the deliberations to get there are subject to the Open Meetings Act. He reminded Task Force members that as an advisory body, they can schedule phone calls and do not have to physically meet.

Mr. Wilder noted that some states have accreditation programs for school security administrators. Chairman Vose added that other states have mandated, computerized training for districts. Mr. O'Connor explained that some of what the Task Force is looking at already exists in higher education. He is a Threat Assessment Trainer and has facilitated trainings for 9 years. Mr. O'Connor said that the Task Force can find cheap, practical training goals that already exist in the State that they can move into K-12. It will be cost-efficient for small and large districts because the models already exist.

Dr. Bernat said that the work of the Task Force needs to be a continuing process so that the Task Force's recommendations are not out of date by the time people read them. Chairman Vose suggested that the Task Force be brought under Illinois Terrorism Task Force umbrella. Tad Williams warned that there may be too much competition and recommended that it stand alone. Mr. Aranowski noted that Illinois was awarded a very small grant to help K-12 develop high quality emergency operations plans. ISBE is doing this through an intergovernmental agreement with Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA). Mr. Aranowski wants the work of the Task Force to inform the grant. One of the main purposes of the grant is to ensure that there is sustainability past the grant period. There may be resources available to have the grant fund part of a more permanent group outside of ISBE. Mr. Williams noted that there are bodies besides IEMA that could be the fiduciary for these grants. Amanda Elliott reminded the Task Force to keep in mind that their recommendations will be nonbinding.

Looking forward to the Task Force's October 22 meeting, Chairman Vose said that the Liaison Subcommittee should give an update. Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Wilder will see what data they can gather on the accreditation process. Chairman Vose reminded Task Force members to focus on what they want to report out to the General Assembly. Representative Sente asked if her peers wanted to reach out to local superintendents in their areas and see if they have any feedback on what should be changed. She meets with her local superintendents regularly. Representative Sente also proposed the creation of a physical plant best practices subcommittee. Chairman Vose asked if Task Force members should fill out a Google Doc or a survey so that members' main concerns would be compiled. Mr. O'Connor suggested that by highlighting five or six recommendations, the Task Force will be able to narrow its purpose and put together the report.

Adjourn

The meeting was adjourned at 4:00 p.m.

School Security and Standards Task Force

Meeting Agenda
(Revised 10/21/15)

October 22, 2015
9:00 a.m.

James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601



Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62777

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- I. Call to Order and Welcome
 - II. Roll Call
 - III. Approval of Minutes from September 10, 2015 Task Force Meeting
 - IV. Mr. David Esquith, Director of the Office of Safe and Healthy Students in the U.S. Department of Education
 - V. Dr. Peter Langman, Psychologist with Langman Psychological Associates, LLC and author of *School Shooters: Understanding High School, College, and Adult Perpetrators* and *Why Kids Kill: Inside the Minds of School Shooters*
 - VI. Subcommittee Assignments
 - VII. Public Hearings/Testimony Logistics and Scheduling
 - VIII. Public Comment
 - IX. New Business and Open Discussion
 - X. Adjourn

Task Force members wishing to participate via phone may use the following:

Telephone Number: 1-888-494-4032
Access Code: 3 6 3 3 7 5 2 7 0 9

**School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Summary**

Springfield - Illinois State Board of Education
Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois

Chicago - Illinois State Board of Education
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois

Thursday, October 22, 2015
9:00 a.m.

Chairman Vose called the meeting to order at 9:04 a.m.

Members Present

Jeff Aranowski
Robert Bernat
Laura Frisch
David Henebry
Catherine McCrory
Roger Schnitzler
Ben Schwarm
Dave Tomlinson
Jeff Vose
Steven Wilder

Members on the Phone

Pat Hartshorn
Pat O'Connor
Carol Sente, Rep.
John Simonton

Members Absent

Neil Anderson, Sen.
Tom Cullerton, Sen.
Tom Demmer, Rep.
Tad Williams

Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) Staff

Katherine Galloway
Hannah Rosenthal

Members of the Public

David Esquith

Nick Giannini, Chief of Staff for Tom Cullerton
Chris Goodsnyder
Ted Kanellakas
Dr. Peter Langman
Gary Salgers

Approval of Minutes from September 10, 2015 Task Force Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by Ben Schwarm and seconded by Pat O'Connor. Voice vote.
Motion carried.

Mr. David Esquith, Director of the Office of Safe and Healthy Students in the U.S. Department of Education

Jeff Aranowski introduced David Esquith. Mr. Aranowski said that last year Illinois was awarded a grant from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) for emergency management. As a result, the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) is entering into an intergovernmental agreement with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA). Mr. Esquith is the federal program lead and Illinois has received great support from his office. Mr. Aranowski said that Mr. Esquith will speak about what is happening nationally and Mr. Aranowski will interject with Illinois-specific information on the grant. Mr. Aranowski said that the ISBE and IEMA are creating the Illinois School Safety Center which will serve as a data clearinghouse for best practices and real time answers to questions, and will also provide regional trainings. Regional superintendents and district administrators in Illinois will be able to take the information back to their constituents.

Mr. Esquith thanked the Task Force for the opportunity to speak. He said he hopes to give Task Force members insight as to what ED is doing, as well as some of the emerging issues and concerns that the Department has about how states and school districts are addressing emergency planning and school safety. He added that he hopes Task Force members come away from his presentation recognizing that schools are safer now than they have ever been. ED has data from its indicators of school crime and safety which suggest that schools continue to be safe havens in communities across the country. Mr. Esquith said he would talk about thinking slow, rationally and statistically. The Department is finding that in emergency planning at the school and school district level, people are in a panic and are not thinking rationally and statistically about the real threats and hazards that they face. Mr. Esquith acknowledged that while schools are safer than they have ever been, there are still significant challenges. He said that emergency planning is an asset underutilized by school districts and schools. There is a great deal more that can be done with emergency operations plans that will allow schools to address some of their biggest social issues, threats and hazards in a systematic and thoughtful way. Right now schools are approaching safety inefficiently. They should use their emergency operations plans as the centerpiece of their planning so that it is done more thoroughly.

Mr. Esquith said that the data in his presentation come from a report that ED puts out annually with the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Justice Programs called "Indicators of School Crime and Safety." The percentage of students who reported being afraid of attack or harm in school decreased from 12 percent in

1995 to 3 percent in 2013. Mr. Esquith said that this idea of kids feeling safe at school is very important to school climate and academic achievement. Students who are afraid or are concerned that they may be attacked or harmed could not be in a worse position to try to learn. Mr. Aranowski said that this statistic is interesting considering the supposed increase of things like bullying. Illinois administers a school climate survey every other year. Mr. Esquith noted that in school safety and emergency planning there is a difference between the perception and reality of what the threats and hazards are. The percentage of students who reported ever being threatened or injured with a weapon on school property has decreased over the last decade from 9 percent in 2003 to 7 percent in 2013. Between 1993 and 2013, the total reports of students carrying weapons once in the past 30 days in schools has declined from 12 percent to 5 percent. The percentage of 12 to 18 year olds reporting access to loaded guns without adult permission has decreased from 7 percent to 4 percent. Nonfatal student and teacher victimization is down from 11.4 percent to 1.8 percent.

Mr. Esquith concluded that there is significantly less victimization going on in schools than there was over a decade ago. Bullying had been hovering at between 28 and 32 percent from 2005 to 2011, but it dropped down to 22 percent in 2013. Mr. Esquith said that the Department thinks that some of this decrease is due to improved school climate. When schools try to approach issues such as bullying, substance abuse and teen dating violence on a case by case basis, they are not able to change much. It is an important lesson in terms of school safety and school climate to deal with issues broadly at the base and try to move the needle on a number of issues at one time. This efficiency applies to emergency planning as well. Laura Frisch asked if the decrease includes the fact that in earlier years of the study, the children did not realize that they were culpable for what they did via text or online. She is curious if texting and cyberbullying - and students understanding that they were culpable for this behavior - had any effect. Mr. Esquith replied that cyberbullying was down to about 7 percent in 2013 and it has since been stuck at 9 percent. He said that the statistics on bullying and cyberbullying are separate. Mr. Aranowski explained that Illinois had an anti-bullying task force five years ago composed of teachers, students, and lawmakers. The recommendation of the task force was that schools will not solve bullying by going after bullying. They need to create a climate within schools that is conducive to learning and peer-to-peer relationships. Mr. Aranowski said that the takeaway was comprehensive school transformation. If schools create this positive climate they will see a decrease in bullying and an increase in academic achievement. Mr. Esquith added that schools have wasted a lot of money buying and running anti-bullying programs with assemblies and speakers. These programs have no evidence behind them and have very little impact. ED encourages schools to invest in people as opposed to programs and technology. School shootings have been prevented when students have reported shooters to adults, and students are willing to do so when a level of trust has been built between staff and students. Schools have finite budgets and they have to prioritize where they are going to put their dollars to get the maximum use out of them and keep students safe. Mr. Esquith said that his two daughters are in elementary school and the last thing they need is an armed guard standing at the door of their elementary school. If the school could bring on one new staff person, he would want the school to bring on a reading specialist or a social worker. Mr. Esquith added that the rate of nonfatal victimization against students 12 to 18 years old significantly decreased between 1992 and 2013.

Mr. Esquith gave Task Force members a math problem. A ball and a bat together cost a \$1.10. The bat costs \$1 more than the ball. He asked Task Force members how much the ball costs. The answer that he receives

90 percent of the time within the first 10 seconds of asking this question is 10 cents, but the correct answer is 5 cents. Mr. Esquith said that there is a book called "Thinking, Fast and Slow." The premise of the book is that when people think quickly, it is a matter of reflex and habituation and when they think slowly, they think statistically. Mr. Esquith explained that this idea of thinking fast and slow can be applied to looking at school safety data. He encouraged those working to improve school safety to be analytic and systematic in terms of identifying the real threats in schools, and considering how best to prevent, respond to and recover from them. He said that too often those working to improve school safety think fast and respond emotionally instead of using a statistical narrative.

Mr. Esquith showed Task Force members a chart from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) 2013 report of active shooter incidents. He explained that active shooter incidents are not the same thing as school shootings. An active shooter incident is an incident when someone goes into an environment intending to kill everyone. Most active shooter incidents are suicides. The FBI concluded that there was a significant increase in the number of active shooter incidents. Their data caused a lot anxiety and stress and encouraged more people to direct their attention to active shooter incidents. ED did its own analysis of active shooter incidents in schools and found that there was one more active shooter incident in schools between 2000 and 2006 than between 2007 and 2013. Mr. Esquith said that the number of active shooter incidents in schools is not consistent with the FBI graph. He does not aim to diminish the impact of any active shooter incident in a school. He has visited Newtown five times since the tragedy and knows that there will be a cloud over the community for a generation. Still, he noted that an individual is 6 to 10 times more likely to be struck by lightning than to have an active shooter incident at her child's school. Mr. Aranowski asked if there is any evidence to suggest that there are an increasing number of fatalities in these active shooter situations. Mr. Esquith said that he is not sure that the difference in impact of an active shooter incident can be distinguished by the number of people that are killed. Active shooter incidents are tragic and their impact on the community is horrific. At the same time they are extremely rare. Mr. Esquith said that a challenge in school safety and security is identifying the proportional response that should be made after active shooter incidents in comparison with everything else that can happen in a school, recognizing how infrequent active shooter incidents are and how large their impact is. He said that active shooter incident drills are dominating emergency planning in many schools. Schools are not thinking slowly about school safety and as a result may be wasting precious time and resources and scaring students. Active shooter drills in schools provoke a secondary trauma for elementary school students as schools are conveying a message to students that they are not safe. Mr. Esquith asked how schools can hold drills or exercises without bringing in SWAT teams.

Mr. Esquith said that there have been a total of 111 school shootings since Newtown. He distinguished a school shooting from an active shooter incident. A school shooting can be everything from a gun going off accidentally in a school to someone getting into a fight with another person at school to a person coming to school intending to kill someone. School shootings are generally interpersonal deaths. Accidental shootings are not included in these data. Mr. Esquith said that one of the trends that he is seeing in school district is the arming of teachers. ED opposes this vehemently. Since the beginning of the school year this year, four guns that teachers have brought to schools have gone off accidentally. He said that insurance companies are thinking slow on this and pulling their coverage of school districts that are arming teachers or raising their premiums through the ceiling. He said that this indicates that a person is much more likely to incur a

serious injury from a gun going off accidentally than actually having an active shooter incident at their school.

Chris Goodsnyder of Safer Schools First said that his niece was at Sandy Hook and she had a close friend who did not survive. She is still coping with the after effects of losing a friend and what she witnessed that day. Mr. Goodsnyder asked if training schools and first responders on how to handle an active shooter situation increases survivability in the event of an incident or if regardless of the amount of training they receive, schools and first responders cannot outmaneuver an active shooter. He asked if there are any studies that focus on the effectiveness of training in terms of helping staff and students survive. Mr. Esquith said he is not familiar with any studies. School districts that have done exercises and are prepared generally say that the training was helpful. There are so few of these incidents that it is difficult to take away any in-depth analysis of how effective the training was and what would have happened had schools and first responders not been trained. Mr. Esquith said that there needs to be training for active shooter incidents , but it is just one of the threats and hazards that schools need to prepare for. He advised that schools be thoughtful about training and exercises to make sure they are appropriate for who they are training. Training teachers is different from training second and third graders so the messages that these groups receive may differ. Mr. Esquith noted that schools can train through tabletop exercises.

Cathy McCrory said that when shootings happen she has conversations with her kids. She asked if there is a way to educate parents about how to have these conversations with their kids and make their kids feel safe. Are any jurisdictions going beyond the schools and reaching out to parents? Mr. Esquith explained that if schools are doing their emergency operations planning correctly, parents will be involved. Parents should be part of the core planning team that will talk about what information needs to be provided to students, parents, and visitors in the school. Laura Frisch explained the lockdown drill that her school hosted the same day that a school in Washington had a lockdown drill. None of the teachers in her school spoke about a shooter or a person with a gun. Her school talks more about tornados and fires because these are things that kids can understand. Mr. Esquith commended Ms. Frisch's school for thinking slow. Ms. Frisch said that schools can prepare their students every day by teaching them to listen and to walk in a line.

Mr. Aranowski said that schools are in a position where they are checking boxes without thinking about if their efforts are making the school safer. State and federal regulations put administrators and schools in a position where they are reactionary, rather than giving administrators and schools the flexibility to do what they need to do and approach school safety from a more reasonable perspective. Robert Bernat agreed that if students are scared by the drills, schools have not accomplished anything. He explained, though, that police need drills as they have very few instances to tactically encounter what they would in an active shooter situation. Dr. Bernat said that what a lot of communities have and what others are working toward is, on days when school is not in session, letting police use schools for drills. Looking at a diagram of a school is very different from walking through or running through a school. Mr. Esquith agreed that it is important for first responders to be familiar with a school. They should not go into a school for the first time during an emergency. Fire and rescue departments also need to be familiarized with schools. Roger Schnitzler said that what schools are told they are supposed to do is different from what Ms. Frisch's principal is doing and what he is doing. Mr. Schnitzler explained that the law is specific but he thinks it goes

overboard. Schools are supposed to have an active shooter during a drill but at his school they just go into lockdown. Ms. McCrory concurred with Mr. Esquith that all first responders need to participate. In the town she lives in, police have never include the fire department or paramedics in their meetings. Pat O'Connor said that the Illinois Campus Law Enforcement Administrators Association is training police chiefs in the State to do a comprehensive plan with their fire departments. Fire chiefs in Illinois are trained to stand down and not enter a building until it is secure. Mr. O'Connor said he does not believe that schools should use active shooter drills and he does not recommend that any of his chiefs in the State do live drills with students in classrooms. "Shelter" or "lockdown" drills should be the terms used. Bringing law enforcement into a school when students are present creates trauma and should never be done. Staff should be trained separately with the police department. Mr. Esquith said that school districts start paying attention when there are lawsuits. Parents are suing because their children are traumatized and teachers unions are suing because someone burst into a staff meeting with a gun drawn to replicate a real incident.

Mr. Esquith said that middle school is where bullying peaks. The best way to keep violence down in schools and the best prevention against active shooters is to establish trust between students and adults. Mr. Esquith added that a significant number of teachers are still victimized in schools every year. In 2011-12, 10 percent of public school teachers reported being threatened with injury by students from their school. In 2011-12, 6 percent of public school teachers reported being physically attacked by a student from their school in the past 12 months. Mr. Schnitzler said that in elementary schools, teachers are afraid of their students' parents, not the students. Mr. Esquith explained gangs are a significant issue in rural, suburban and urban areas. There is a heroin epidemic in the country as well as widespread abuse of prescription drugs. Mr. Esquith said that one of the issues that school administrators face is what incidents they report to the police. There is a lot of discretion that schools and administrators have in terms of what happens in a school and whether they report it to the police. That has ramifications for students. Twenty-five percent of middle schoolers experienced bullying last year and only half of them reported it to an adult. This suggests that students have tried reporting incidents to adults before and nothing happened, or that the consequences of reporting are worse than the bullying itself. When police are brought onto a school campus and a student is jailed, the student's life changes significantly. ED has data that show that more absences for a student mean a higher likelihood of ending up in prison. More encounters with police also mean a higher likelihood of ending up in prison. There are a significant number of school districts in rural, urban and suburban areas that are dealing with young girls being lured into prostitution by gangs. Mr. Esquith said that gang involvement, drug and alcohol abuse, and human trafficking can be addressed in a school's emergency operations plan. Schools tend stovepipe these issues with school committees but they can use their emergency operations plans to figure out how prevent, respond to and recover from these issues.

Mr. Esquith said he has been doing a lot of work recently on countering violent extremism and the radicalization of students in schools. He advised schools to build this into their emergency operations plans through their threat assessment processes. ED puts out a guide with DOJ, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Homeland Security, the FBI and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that lays out a six step process for developing a school emergency operations plan. ED also has training and technical assistance that it provides to school districts and states. Mr. Esquith said that the grant Mr. Aranowski is leading is a grant ED made to states to promote building state capacity as well as to

help school districts develop their emergency operations plans. Most school emergency operations plans are not comprehensive. Usually someone at the school district level develops a template and gives it to the assistant principal of a school to check boxes. There is little planning and minimal training. ED and the other agencies recommend that schools develop a core planning team made up of teachers, administrators, parents, students and community partners. A school's core planning team should then conduct threat assessments, site assessments, and school climate assessments, determining the school's vulnerabilities and the probability that something will happen. After identifying the threats and hazards that a school may face, the school should develop goals and objectives for how to prevent, respond to and recover from these threats and hazards. Most schools just have response plans and do not include prevention. A school's plan should be shared with the community. Mr. Esquith said that if his children's school had \$20,000, he would not put it into bulletproof glass. When first responders, administrators, parents, and teachers are involved, schools make much better decisions about where to spend their money, rather than quick emotional decisions.

Dr. Bernat asked Mr. Esquith if he would advocate that each school district form its own local task force to examine these things and determine what's appropriate for them. Mr. Esquith replied that this should happen at the schoolhouse level. Every school is different and has different vulnerabilities. There are things that will make schools safer that do not cost anything. Every kid knows where the incidents occur in a school building. ED recommends that core planning teams at the high school level involve high school students. Mr. Esquith added that building trust should be part of emergency operations planning. With kids on the core planning team at the high school level, they will talk about vulnerabilities and school climate. Ms. McCrory asked if middle school is the formative period psychologically for future school shooters? Mr. Esquith explained that it is important to move away from the idea of the school shooter's mentality. There are so few incidents that there is no profile. Mr. Esquith does not think it is productive to try to make associations with students in middle school and who becomes a shooter. Schools are better off putting their time and attention into building trust with middle schoolers than trying to do behavioral profiles of middle schoolers who may become shooters. Mr. Esquith congratulated Task Force members for their work and encouraged them to continue working to improve the school system. He said that it is important for policymakers to keep these issues on the table and to hear from a diverse group of stakeholders. Without this kind of feedback and input, it is easy for people to start thinking slow.

Dr. Peter Langman, Psychologist with Langman Psychological Associates, LLC and author of *School Shooters: Understanding High School, College, and Adult Perpetrators* and *Why Kids Kill: Inside the Minds of School Shooters*

Peter Langman introduced himself as a psychologist who got into the work of school safety and security in the wake of Columbine. He was working in a psychiatric hospital with children and adolescents and a string of potential school shooters started coming through the hospital. His job was to evaluate them for the potential risk of actually carrying out mass murder. Since then, he has written two books on the topic and he maintains a website Schoolshooters.info. Dr. Langman explained that his focus is what is going on in the minds and lives of the perpetrators. He currently has 95 perpetrators on his website with close to 350 documents relating to school shooters, school safety, threat assessment, and violence prevention. He tries to understand the perpetrators' behaviors, warning signs, and what kind of events pushed them to

violence. He looks into the rejections and failures that have made them feel rage, as well as depressed or suicidal. Dr. Langman said that if schools can identify youth at risk and if they know the warning signs, school shootings can be stopped. He emphasized the importance of early intervention through threat assessment. Schools all over the nation are well trained in emergency response but many schools are not doing the early intervention threat assessment piece to recognize warning signs, evaluate threats and intervene when appropriate. Emergency response is vitally important, but the first pass should be training faculty, staff and students in threat assessment.

Mr. Goodsnyder commented that there seems to be a false causation where people attribute shootings to psychiatric problems. From his perspective, having Asperger's, for example, may make a person a recluse or alienated from his schoolmates and vulnerable to being bullied. He asked Dr. Langman if it is the actual disorder that many school shooters are suffering from that is somehow predictive of violence as opposed the disorder making them vulnerable to being ostracized. Dr. Langman said there is no direct line between a psychiatric diagnosis and acts of violence. The diagnosis may have secondary effects such as causing alienation. He said there is a fine balance to maintain between mental illness and acts of violence. For example, schizophrenics are no more likely to be violent than the average population. When you look at the population of school shooters, many of them, especially as they get older, are schizophrenic but many of them are not. Dr. Langman emphasized that it is not the schizophrenia that causes the violence: it is a combination of what is going on psychologically and what is going on in their lives. The diagnosis is not predictive of violence but there may be mental health issues that could be caught a lot earlier and help prevent people from becoming violent.

Dr. Bernat asked Dr. Langman if he thinks a community in general should be sensitized to potential warning signs. Dr. Langman said he calls perpetrators average adults when they are 19 years old or older and have no apparent or recent connection to the school they attack. It can be very difficult for a school to prevent attacks by people who have no relationship with the school because the school does not even know they exist. Dr. Langman said that on his website, users can search for shooters by the kinds of the schools they attack, and whether or not they were secondary school perpetrators, college perpetrators or average adult perpetrators. Mr. O'Connor said that in higher ed, Illinois has been successful in its threat assessment processes in terms of prevention or engagement of people who may be suffering from isolation or mental health issues. He said that K-12 has not moved to threat assessment in the way higher ed has. In K-12, schools are dealing with parental mental health issues as well as student, faculty and staff mental health issues. Mr. O'Connor asked Dr. Langman if he thinks there is a strong need for threat assessment at the K-12 level. Dr. Langman said it would be helpful at the middle and high school levels, but students in elementary school are not carrying out attacks. Mr. Schwarm asked Dr. Langman about the ways to intervene and prevent attacks. When should school district personnel say they have identified a student as a possible threat, and then what? Dr. Langman said it depends on when the student is identified as a threat. If a student is caught early, he recommends counseling or evaluation for mental health issues. This becomes a matter of resources (if a school has counselor or psychologist on staff). If the issue is more serious and if the student is on edge of suicide or homicide, then he recommends hospitalization and treatment. If the student has accumulated guns or bombs, then it becomes a legal issue. Dr. Langman said that law enforcement can do what schools cannot do, including searching the home, looking at computers, etc. Secondary school shooters often come from really dysfunctional families. There may be physical abuse

in the home, parental alcoholism, or sexual abuse, so child protective services may need to get involved. Mr. Schwarm asked Dr. Langman at what point school personnel should go to the student's parents and say their child may be a threat to the school. If school personnel are not licensed psychologists, how do they make that determination? Dr. Langman said that schools should have trained threat assessment teams made up of administrators, faculty members and counseling staff. Before schools refer students to services, they need to investigate the threats. Mr. Schwarm asked if schools can do anything before there is actual proof of a threat. Dr. Langman explained that a student would have to do something to come to the attention of school personnel. It may be comments to a friend or something he writes in a paper to a teacher and not a violent threat. Dr. Bernat reiterated that building trust will help a school interdict a potential incident. If a student is aware of something, he will feel comfortable speaking with an adult. Dr. Bernat asked Dr. Langman how, on an age appropriate basis, schools should acquaint people with warning signs, particularly younger students. Dr. Langman suggested that schools present the material at an assembly or in smaller groups. He said schools should educate around what to look for by using examples of shootings where students knew something and did or did not come forward. Dr. Langman emphasized the importance of distinguishing snitching or tattletaling from reporting a safety concern. Schools should encourage students to report their friends, too. Dr. Bernat said that he would not know how to share this message with younger students without scaring them.

Ms. McCrory asked how teachers are trained if they are being asked to get involved in threat assessment. Do teachers take classes in social work or psychology to help them recognize these threats? Dr. Langman responded that most teachers are not being trained, which is why he emphasizes the importance of training for professionals in mental health, law enforcement and education that teach common warning signs. He presents training participants with actual student writings and asks them how they would respond if they were handed a given piece of writing. David Henebry reiterated that mental health does not always indicate who is going to perpetrate a violent attack but he wonders if there is a way to identify the percentage of the population that is inclined to perpetrate. Dr. Langman said he looks at school shooters in terms of three categories: psychopathic personalities, psychotic shooters who are often schizophrenic, and traumatized shooters. He noted the concept of leakage - sharing violent intentions - which shows up in comments to peers, assignments students hand in, and on social media. Schools and law enforcement should be looking for leakage.

Dave Tomlinson asked how Task Force members can translate all of the information they have received into actionable recommendations for policymakers and educators to actually make schools safer. Dr. Langman said that there is no one thing that is going to take care of the problem but there are many things that can be done, some at the governmental level in terms of funding for child protective services, mental health services, and more counselors in schools. There is also training schools in threat assessment and the physical security piece. Dr. Langman noted that there is a lot of work being done in architecture for safety, such as how schools are built and what kind of locks they have on the doors. There are multiple angles to minimize risk. Mr. Aranowski noted that the Task Force may not need to recommend additional legislation but could instead recommend flexibility for districts to meet the needs of their communities. Task Force members could focus on best practices, professional development and increased state support. Chairman Vose said that at the elementary level, his school had a behavioral threat assessment team composed of the school psychologist, social worker and assistant principals. The team met every Friday to evaluate

where students were. He asked Dr. Langman if the schools he works with have threat assessment teams. Dr. Langman said that he thinks that a weekly meeting among key school personnel is an excellent system but he does not think most schools have it. Some schools in Pennsylvania have a student assistance program where they track kids who are struggling and get them the help they need. Oftentimes school personnel with different information do not communicate.

Subcommittee Assignments

Chairman Vose reminded Task Force members of the survey that the Liaison Subcommittee sent out asking each individual about the three areas where they would like to see improvement, their areas of expertise, and the components they recommend need to be in a model security plan. Chairman Vose asked Hannah Rosenthal to share the results of the subcommittee survey. Hannah sent out an email on October 15 with subcommittee assignments and chairs. The four subcommittees are physical plant, training, communication, prevention. Chairman Vose said that the subcommittees should review the reports of the seven states, identify best practices and form recommendations. They need to work through Ms. Rosenthal to schedule meetings and post agendas, and designate someone to take minutes at every meeting. Chairman Vose emphasized that Task Force members need to move quickly so that they have a draft by December to submit to the General Assembly on or before January 1. Mr. Aranowski reminded Task Force members that if they need to convene additional full group meetings, they can also hold strict teleconferences. Chairman Vose said he thinks the Task Force may need at least three more meetings. He thinks that there are good things currently in law but the Task Force may need to fine-tune. If the Subcommittee chairs get their groups together the Task Force will be on the right track. Mr. Schwarm said he likes Mr. Esquith's approach of focusing on the school and what the school can do. The Task Force does not have to have legislative recommendations. Mr. Schwarm said that Illinois' Safety Drill Act is really good, which he did not realize until he looked at the reports of the other states. The other states seem to be trying to get to where Illinois already is. Mr. Schwarm added that the Illinois Association of School Boards (IASB) writes policies for school districts and right now about 70 percent of all school districts in the State use the policy service. IASB's school board policies regarding school safety include having safety teams in the district and by school building, and involving parents, community members and first responders. He will give Ms. Rosenthal a sample policy to send out for Task Force members to look at as they begin their subcommittee work.

Bernat reminded the Task Force that the North Shore School District 112 school security task force can serve as a model. There are 12 schools in District 112. He asked Ms. Rosenthal to resend the reports from District 112 to Task Force members. Ms. McCrory asked for clarification on what "communications" means in the context of the Communications Subcommittee. Should the Subcommittee be looking at how schools are communicating with parents, first and second responders, or internally with students and staff? Ms. Frisch asked if the Subcommittee should think about how the Task Force communicates with the public. Dr. Bernat said he thinks about it in two ways: the message that is being communicated and how it is being communicated to students, parents, etc. He said the Communications Subcommittee should also consider what systems work to communicate something if there is an issue and how schools communicate with first responders to reduce response times. Dr. Bernat reminded Task Force members about the blue boxes used by District 112 to reduce response times. Ms. McCrory confirmed that the Communications Subcommittee

will study both mode and message. Mr. Aranowski said that there is a communications appendix in the federal guidance developed by ED. He encouraged the subcommittees to use the federal document as a blueprint. Chairman Vose asked Task Force members to let him know if they are uncomfortable with their subcommittee assignments. The Liaison Subcommittee tried to match people with their areas of expertise. Mr. Esquith referred Task Force members to ED's Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center website (Rems.ed.gov) with model practices and training guides that school districts across the country are using. Chairman Vose asked Ms. Rosenthal to send the website link and federal guidance out to the Task Force again. Mr. O'Connor reminded Task Force members that they should plan for the lowest common denominator in putting financial pressures on some of the smaller districts. If the bar is too high, the districts will not achieve what they need to achieve. Dr. Bernat again shared his recommendation that local task forces be mandated. He reiterated that school security changes over time so some semblance of the Task Force should continue on as an advisory body. Mr. Schwarm noted that the Illinois Terrorism Task Force has an ongoing subcommittee on school safety. Mr. O'Connor said he thinks it would be easy for the Task Force to recommend that there are working groups at the local level.

Public Hearings/Testimony Logistics and Scheduling

Chairman Vose shared his plan to host one public hearing in Springfield, one in Lombard, and one at John Logan College in Marion. Chairman Vose, Mr. Aranowski and Ms. Rosenthal will work together to set up dates.

New Business and Open Discussion

Chairman Vose said that Tad Williams is going to bring Mark Beagles to speak with the Task Force about collecting floorplans. Chairman Vose also found a group called Navigate that can hold floorplans and pictures of buildings online. Dr. Bernat said he would like to know more about the capabilities of police when it comes to prevention. Police will follow up on social media if they are given leads but they are not trolling social media sites. John Simonton said that Aaron Kustermann with the Illinois State Police is an excellent resource. Chairman Vose said he would like to have a full meeting scheduled for early in the third week of November. Dr. Bernat reminded Task Force members that he circulated the rough draft of his prevention document. Representative Sente said that usually when committees are writing a report, a committee member starts thinking about what will be included in the report. She asked if the Task Force is ready to do this. The topics for a table of contents may come from the subcommittees. Chairman Vose said that Task Force members should discuss this after the subcommittees meet.

Adjourn

Motion to adjourn: Moved by Ben Schwarm and seconded by Steve Wilder. Voice vote. **Motion carried.** The meeting was adjourned at 11:31 a.m.

School Security and Standards Task Force

Meeting Agenda

November 17, 2015

1:00 p.m.

James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601



Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62777

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- I. Call to Order and Welcome
 - II. Roll Call
 - III. Approval of Minutes from October 22, 2015 Task Force Meeting
 - IV. Public Hearings Debrief
 - V. Subcommittee Updates
 - VI. Recommendations for Legislative Action
 - VII. Public Comment
 - VIII. Open Discussion and Next Steps
 - IX. Dr. Colleen Cicchetti, Pediatric Psychologist at Lurie Children's Hospital and Assistant Professor in Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine
 - X. Adjourn

Task Force members wishing to participate via phone may use the following:

Telephone Number: 1-888-494-4032
Access Code: 3 6 3 3 7 5 2 7 0 9

**School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Summary**

Springfield - Illinois State Board of Education
Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois

Chicago - Illinois State Board of Education
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois

Tuesday, November 17, 2015
1:00 p.m.

Chairman Vose called the meeting to order at 1:03 p.m.

Members Present

Jeff Aranowski
Robert Bernat
David Henebry
Ben Schwarm
Dave Tomlinson
Jeff Vose
Tad Williams

Members on the Phone

Catherine McCrory
Pat O'Connor
Roger Schnitzler
John Simonton

Members Absent

Neil Anderson, Sen.
Tom Cullerton, Sen.
Tom Demmer, Rep.
Laura Frisch
Pat Hartshorn
Carol Sente, Rep.
Steven Wilder

Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) Staff

Hannah Rosenthal

Members of the Public

Mark Beagles

Colleen Cicchetti,
Nick Giannini, Chief of Staff for Tom Cullerton
Aaron Kustermann

Approval of Minutes from October 22, 2015 Task Force Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by Dave Tomlinson and seconded by Pat O'Connor. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Public Hearings Debrief

Chairman Jeff Vose said that several Task Force members attended the public hearing at Universal Technology Institute in Lisle, Illinois on Tuesday, November 10 and the hearing in Springfield at the Illinois Association of School Boards office on Thursday, November 12. Chairman Vose invited Jeff Aranowski to share his perspective on the public hearings and then other Task Force members to weigh in. Mr. Aranowski thanked Mr. Schwarm for organizing the two hearings. He said that the 11 attendees at the first hearing were vocal. It was a good cross-section of individuals: there was representation on the structural side, a school resource officer (SRO), Randy Braverman from Oak Park and River Forest, and an attendee from DuPage County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (attending in a personal capacity). At the hearing, they spoke about how the impetus for the Task Force was Sandy Hook, but the charge is broader and more comprehensive. They discussed best practices in terms of door locks, glass window panes, etc. There was not a lot of emphasis on modifying current rules or legislation. The conversation focused on training and resources being available to school districts, building principals, maintenance workers, etc. Maintenance workers are often the central component to a school's emergency plan. Mr. Aranowski said that the November 12 public hearing was more intimate. There were two architectural consultants that work with school districts in Oak Brook, a member of the press, and a chief fiscal officer/ operations manager from Champaign. Mr. Aranowski said the chief fiscal officer had great feedback in terms of comparing what the law says with the reality of what schools face on a daily basis. Mr. Aranowski said he would send minutes and notes from the hearings and any additional materials before the next Task Force meeting. Hannah Rosenthal will circulate electronic documents. Bob Bernat said that Randy Braverman has been in touch with him and invited Task Force members to take a tour of Oak Park/ River Forest. Dr. Bernat and Mr. Aranowski said that Mr. Braverman is proactive and has done a good job. Chairman Vose asked Dr. Bernat to share dates and information with Ms. Rosenthal to send out to the Task Force regarding the visit to Oak Park.

Mr. Schwarm said that the conversation in Lisle was almost all about training and preparedness, and in Springfield it was almost all about facilities and building security. He felt that the attendees knew their material and that the hearings were overall successful. David Henebry said that a superintendent in attendance said that a school safety and security training should be one of the required trainings for teachers, but he wanted some of the 32 trainings currently required by statute that are not necessarily beneficial to teachers eliminated to make room for this training. Mr. Henebry also heard a comment about the FEMA 428 handbook, which he thinks is very comprehensive. The Task Force may want to list it as a reference to be utilized. Chairman Vose said that a representative from Unit 4 School District

talked about a youth assessment center developed by a community coalition that involves the state's attorney, police, the regional planning commission from the county and the school district. The center uses a preventative model and thinks about discipline as restorative instead of exclusionary. Dave Tomlinson said that he will check with the district's Superintendent, Dr. Judy Wiegand, to see if the Task Force can have access to more information about what is happening in Champaign. Chairman Vose confirmed that the December 2 public hearing will be at John Logan College in Southern Illinois. Mr. Aranowski and Mr. Schwarm will be there.

Subcommittee Updates

Mr. Schwarm said that all members of the Training Subcommittee participated in a conference call. There was consensus about the direction of the Subcommittee in terms of recommendations. They have minutes and a draft Subcommittee report, which will be brought to the full Task Force for discussion at the next meeting.

Mr. Henebry said that the Physical Plant Subcommittee tried to set up a meeting but it did not work with everyone's schedule, so he spoke with Steve Wilder and Dr. Bernat. They have started to develop draft recommendations and are editing them, but Mr. Henebry has not received feedback from everyone on the Subcommittee. He will take a look at what came out of the public hearings.

Cathy McCrory said that the Communications Subcommittee had a general discussion about breaking down communications into pre-, during and post-event communications, as well as who is involved in communications at each of these points. Ms. McCrory said that Subcommittee members reviewed what Illinois currently has in place and members agreed to look at the other state reports in comparison to Illinois. She reviewed New Jersey and Massachusetts and found that Illinois is excelling above what they have in place. Mr. Tomlinson submitted a report on his states. Ms. McCrory said Subcommittee members have not had a chance to review everything but they want to do more with best practices because of the differences in populations and the economic abilities of schools to institute what the Task Force recommends. The Communications Subcommittee plans to reconvene in the next couple of weeks to identify best practices from other reports.

Dr. Bernat said that the Prevention Subcommittee decided to put together the rudiments of a "See, Hear and Speak Up" program. "See Something, Say Something" is trademarked by the Department of Homeland Security. Task Force members have received the current draft of the memorandum. Dr. Bernat said that the idea is to give people tools to recognize and prevent issues. He would like to, after more polishing and a few more filled in footnotes, have the permission of the Task Force to circulate to experts in the area, including the psychiatry departments at Harvard and Northwestern. Dr. Bernat sees this as forming the underpinnings of a policy and also fitting into training. He said he leaves it to Chairman Vose to determine how to get permission from the Task Force to send this out with the Task Force seal on it. Mr. Aranowski said that if members review the memo and let Ms. Rosenthal know if they have any suggestions, he thinks Chairman Vose can send an email before the next meeting saying the Task Force is ready to move forward with circulating the document externally. Mr. Tomlinson asked

Dr. Bernat if the Task Force is recommending or advocating the creation of a new “See, Hear and Speak Up” program or if Dr. Bernat is advocating that the Task Force take a position on best practices or programs like “See, Hear and Speak Up” that may or may not exist yet. Mr. Tomlinson said he is uncomfortable with a state level task force advocating for a specific program that does not allow for some latitude in a school district. Regarding “See Something, Say Something,” Mr. Tomlinson said that on the fire side, they have a bunch of slogans that people remember because they were large-scale focused messages. Dr. Bernat said that “See, Hear and Speak Up” is not an orchestrated campaign. The purpose is to try to give people of all ages tools so that if they see something a light bulb goes on. Mr. Tomlinson said that the copyright symbol on the document implies that it is a program that already exist; Dr. Bernat said he included the copyright symbol as a placeholder because he did not want “See, Hear and Speak Up” to be taken. Mr. Schwarm said he would not be comfortable having the document sent out on behalf of the whole Task Force before reading it. Mr. Schwarm and Mr. O’Connor said the Task Force should focus on sharing best practices. Dr. Bernat clarified that his memo has no mandate in it whatsoever. He calls it a program, but it does not exist on the federal level or any state level that he is aware of. He thought it would be prudent for the Prevention Subcommittee to do something that has never been done by trying to address the third leg of the triad. Mr. Aranowski explained that he did not see the Task Force adopting the memo without voting on it in a meeting. He said that Dr. Bernat is just looking for it to be vetted externally with experts in the field. Mr. Tomlinson said that if Dr. Bernat wants to move forward by himself he can, but the Task Force cannot advocate for the memo without public discussion. Dr. Bernat said that he thinks it would be better for him to go to the experts and say the Task Force has asked them for their comments rather than going by himself. Chairman Vose concluded that Task Force members need to review Dr. Bernat’s document and have a discussion at the next meeting about recommendations moving forward.

Chairman Vose said the Training Subcommittee should be a model for the other subcommittees: Mr. Schwarm, Chairman of the Training Subcommittee, created a one-pager and submitted it to all subcommittee members. Chairman Vose said that this document and the other materials coming out of subcommittees should be sent out for review before the next Task Force meeting.

Public Comment

Mr. Williams introduced Aaron Kustermann, Chief of Intelligence for the Illinois State Police (ISP), and Trooper Mark Beagles, a staff officer in the Division of Operations. Mr. Williams said Mr. Beagles will give Task Force members a rundown of the school floorplans, how they were collected, who has access, etc. The Task Force has been discussing whether this should be a statewide initiative. Mr. Kustermann will give an overview of the mapping the State Police is doing with mass shootings. Mr. Beagles said the safety floorplan collection was launched under Mr. Kustermann’s guidance in 2007. ISP’s safety education officers reached out to all elementary and high schools to submit school floorplans in PDF form to Illinois’ Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center (STIC) to put in a repository. They only asked for facilities that have students in them (no administrative buildings). The repository has not been updated since 2008, so they will want to update it. Chairman Vose asked if schools are required by statute to update it and Mr. Williams said they were at that time. Mr. Beagles said that they were

looking to create a one-stop shop for all of law enforcement. There are 102 counties in Illinois but a lot of overlap, so if there is a major incident, people may be coming in from outside jurisdictions. The general public does not have access to the plans. Mr. Kustermann said that part of the STIC playbook if something were to happen is to automatically send the floorplans to responders. The modernization of this will involve uploading all the floorplans into a new tool that will be available on any smartphone that is on the ISP network. Right now law enforcement must have an in-car computer. Mr. Kustermann explained that the plan is for interns to audit the repository to make sure they have all the updated plans. Regarding communication, ISP has 90 percent of police agencies' email addresses in addition to the Illinois Wireless Information Network (IWIN).

Mr. Henebry questioned the consistency of the plans and the way they are presented. When he creates a life safety reference plan for a new school he can set up layers and turn them on and off, including a layer for school security plans. He wants to develop a standard for consistency and readability because law enforcement do not have time to interpret plans. He is thinking about using one color for all student-occupied spaces, one color for circulation, and one color for all unoccupied spaces. Task Force members also discussed identifying rooms that lock, and whether they lock from the inside or the outside. Mr. Tomlinson said there is an issue with information overload that first responders do not always need. The fire side will break doors whether or not they lock.

Mr. Schwarm said that the tricky part is not to have an overreach. This would help ISP a lot but if a local school district already has a plan with their local responders and it works for them, the Task Force has to be careful about forcing them to make changes. Mr. Williams said that ISP's statewide repository is a last resort. Mr. Beagles explained that this is very important in rural, smaller areas where ISP is the police agency or where the local department has limited capabilities. Mr. Kustermann said that almost 90 percent of the school floorplans they received are legitimate, not hand drawings or scanned blueprints. The vast majority of them are crisp and architecturally drawn because so many of these school districts had been renovated in the past 10 years. Mr. Kustermann said it would not be a bad idea after the audit in January for ISP to work on getting the word out to the remaining districts that have not given ISP their floorplans. Mr. Schwarm added that there are vendors working on floorplans and getting traction with school districts and their local responders. The vendors could also get their floorplans to ISP. Mr. Henebry said that from an architect's standpoint, it would take 6 hours to produce a floorplan for most schools. For bigger campuses with multiple buildings it might get up to 16-20 hours, which he does not see as a big investment. Mr. Henebry said the safety reference plans schools are required to provide to the regional office have too much information and would confuse the plan in an event. Chairman Vose and Mr. Schwarm agreed that a best practice would be for districts to get accurate and up-to-date floorplans to local police and ISP.

Mr. Kustermann showed Task Force members a map of mass shootings in the U.S. ISP tracks workplace, school, open air shootings, etc. Mr. Williams said that there is a national chatroom and the majority of fusion centers throughout the nation talk when an incident happens. Mr. Kustermann showed Task Force members another tool that has dots and information for every offense, including sex offenders and drug deals. ISP uses the dots to educate incident commanders and safety officers on scene. Mr.

Williams added that they use maps like this for responding to critical incidents so law enforcement know where a staging area is, where the media will be, where road closures are, etc.

Ms. McCrory asked if there is a communications component to this to ask schools to submit plans if they have not done so. She also asked whether this would be a mandate or a best practice. Mr. Tomlinson said that this is already mandated on multiple fronts. Through OSHA 1910.38, every public organization over 10 employees has to have an emergency operations plan. Schools are not exempt. The question is going to be: even with a mandate, what is happening with the plans after school districts turn them in? Mr. Tomlinson said there is probably not a mandate on the fire side and he is not sure about the police side. In practicality, different areas have different resources. A single officer downstate or very small volunteer departments have to be able to do something with a plan when they get it. Ms. McCrory asked if there is a step missing without a mandate to pass the information on. Mr. Schwarm said there may be a step missing for local responders to pass plans along to ISP, but locally this is being done. Mr. Henebry said that having a single database for all agencies (whether local, county, state, or federal responders) to go to where the information is consistent and accurate will make it easier to pass along information when there are leadership changes. Mr. Tomlinson suggested using the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) and the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) to collect the data and communicate. Chairman Vose said that ISP will need to work on getting floorplans from the remaining 10 percent of districts, as well as updating floorplans from the other districts. Mr. Kustermann said that when there was funding available, he would go out to school districts and communicate this to them. Maybe ISP could do another roadshow and explain the resources to communities. Mr. Tomlinson said that he uses building floorplans in 8 out of 10 responses to emergencies. It is a huge advantage for responders to have access to the repository, especially for people who are not familiar with schools. Dr. Bernat asked if there are floorplans for private and parochial schools in the database and said that it would be a good idea to have floorplans from these schools.

Dr. Bernat said that people who would do harm in the future frequently use social media. Mr. Kustermann confirmed that ISP does not troll social media when they do not have well-established criminal predicate. He said that the intelligence conversation needs to happen in closed session. Mr. Williams said that he can bring Task Force members to STIC. Mr. Schwarm said there are services for school districts that troll social media in the radius around school buildings. Mr. O'Connor explained that most local police agencies do have investigative social media tools based off of investigative procedures. Many colleges' marketing departments look at social media.

Recommendations for Legislative Action

Mr. Aranowski reiterated the Task Force's deadlines. On January 1, 2016, the Task Force has to have a report on legislative recommendations to the General Assembly and the Governor's Office, and on July 1, 2016, the Task Force needs to have a series of recommendations on school security policies to the State Board of Education. In terms of identifying best practices and procedures, Mr. Aranowski suggested that the Task Force look at the process in three steps. He suggested that the report to the General Assembly and the Governor include only those things that require legislative action. He thinks it

can be a short list, and he would advocate that it be a null list. The report could be a brief description of the current law, the function of the Task Force, and what the Task Force will do before its dissolution, including identifying and pushing out best practices. Mr. Aranowski recommended that the Task Force not put any best practices in the legislative report and that it focuses on legislation. Later reports can focus on best practice recommendations from all of the committees. Mr. Aranowski added that using the word mandate is meaningful to school districts because they do not need any additional unfunded mandates. He said that if the Task Force were to recommend any additional mandates, the process would return to a compliance system with checkboxes and minimal compliance as a result. He thinks that the Task Force should move toward technical assistance and enabling districts to make decisions in the best interest of their kids. With the exception of recommending that the General Assembly have a separate appropriation line for school security outside of health life safety, he suggests that the Task Force not recommend any mandates.

Mr. Henebry said that life safety bonding is an acceptable method of funding security projects. Most school districts should be up to date on health life safety issues so they should have bonding capacity. He understands that life safety funds are only for the physical plant and will not cover training, etc., but he can see some recommendations coming out of the Task Force that have minor costs, from a physical standpoint. Mr. Henebry said that he disagrees that the Task Force cannot mandate changes to physical environments. School districts could not afford ADA changes. Mr. Schwarm agreed with Mr. Aranowski's approach to unfunded mandates. Even under life safety there are still tax caps. The legislature is talking about a property tax freeze so districts may not even be able to access life safety funds. If the Task Force puts out a mandate, funds will be taken away from other places. Mr. Henebry said that if schools did not make ADA changes by the 10 year survey, it was emphasized that they would need to get it done but there was nothing punitive. Mr. Henebry thinks that the Task Force needs to set a precedent that buildings be modified physically to be safe. Mr. Schwarm said that schools districts want to have the safest buildings they can have, but they do not have the money. Mr. Tomlinson said he was not sure if the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL) applied to life safety. Legislatively, building codes also come up; when a school enhances one thing, the threshold of bringing things up to code changes. Mr. Henebry said that the rules do not require districts to do more than they have to. Mr. Tomlinson said that the Task Force should be careful about recommending legislative mandates around building issues. He recommends that it be mandated in the School Safety Drill Act that schools provide copies of their updated emergency and crisis response plans to first responders. The phrase "may be given" should be changed to "shall." Mr. Schwarm said the Task Force may recommend that the property tax cap law bring life safety funds out from under the cap to be used for school safety projects.

Task Force members discussed Dr. Bernat's idea of a more permanent version of the Task Force. Mr. Williams said that Don Kauerauf, the chairman of the Illinois Terrorism Task Force (ITTF), called him and said the idea of incorporating the School Security and Standards Task Force is off the table. The School Security and Standards Task Force needs a funding mechanism. There is Homeland Security money administered through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) and ITTF to committees for projects; ITTF's school safety subcommittee receives money this way. Mr. Williams suggested expanding the subcommittee or opening a new one, but all of the money through April of 2017 is spoken for.

Twenty percent of the money that comes into ITTF goes to state entities and 80 percent goes to local entities. This would be considered a state entity.

Next Steps

Mr. Aranowski said that the Task Force will need a final draft of the report to the General Assembly and the Governor by the third week of December. He asked that Task Force members share their ideas, either individually or through subcommittees, in the next two weeks. Mr. Aranowski emphasized that he would like to stay away from unfunded mandates to school districts, as it is not a good environment right now and anything that comes with a price tag will most likely not go anywhere. He does not want that to jeopardize the legitimacy of the Task Force's work. Chairman Vose made Friday, December 4 the deadline for emailing legislative ideas so that Task Force members will have time to review the material and can vote at their December 15 meeting. Mr. Williams asked if Task Force members can make recommendations for legislative mandates later down the road when they have time to fully discuss them. Mr. Aranowski said that these recommendations could be incorporated into the July recommendations. The Task Force could say that they learned more since submitting the report to the General Assembly and that the General Assembly should consider "x." The Task Force can also make recommendations for legislative action to the bill's sponsor instead of to the whole General Assembly. Mr. Aranowski emphasized that Task Force members should be present at the December 15 meeting so that there is a quorum. Task Force members should also review the communications from the field that Ms. Rosenthal has sent out. Mr. Aranowski thanked Ms. Rosenthal for her help with the Task Force.

Dr. Colleen Cicchetti, Pediatric Psychologist at Lurie Children's Hospital and Assistant Professor in Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine

Colleen Cicchetti thanked the Task Force for inviting her to present. She has been with Lurie Children's for about 25 years and has become increasingly interested in working to bring mental health services to students. Dr. Cicchetti spoke about addressing violence at its core by identifying kids who are having issues, preventing these issues, and providing services to kids in a timely matter to keep schools safe and to help kids be successful. She emphasized that violence is preventable and not inevitable. Still, data from the Center for Disease Control shows that suicide and homicide are the second and third causes of death among young people. Using a prevention/ public health approach, it is important to think about people injuring others and themselves, and the cycle of those who are impacted. There are kids who have witnessed traumatic events, those who have lost friends, parents who have lost children, teachers who are afraid of going to work because of the stress and trauma in their communities, etc. In events where media brings attention, the situation becomes scarier. Dr. Cicchetti emphasized the violence in Chicago, particularly youth violence. About 45 percent of the murder victims in Chicago are between the ages of 17 and 25, and they only make up about 15 percent of the population. She asked Task Force members what is being done to keep kids out of the juvenile justice system. Dr. Cicchetti explained that the fact that a 9 year-old was intentionally shot makes kids feel a greater sense of danger.

Dr. Cicchetti turned the discussion to the topic of trauma, which can be broken down into a traumatic event, the experience and the effect. In a family with domestic violence, one child could exhibit evidence of trauma and another may not. There is also trauma that happens once versus trauma that happens repeatedly. Traumas have a cumulative impact. In many cases kids do not develop Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder because they are experiencing traumas that have no post. Kids who experience traumatic loss may have visions that do not go away. The interventions for these kids that happen in school have to focus on traumatic grief. Dr. Cicchetti said she studied kids in kindergarten through second grade in Cicero. Kids under 7 years old on average had been exposed to 6 traumatic events already (severe levels of trauma). Any adult who experienced 4 events in their childhood is at high risk for low outcomes on every single public health and mental health indicator.

Dr. Cicchetti said that trauma impacts how kids view the world around them, whether they feel the world is safe, whether they feel that they are competent and able to function, and changes in their physical and mental health. Neurodevelopmental data show changes in the brain from exposure to stress and trauma, as well as the impact of being alert all the time. Because of this data, people are starting to think about trauma and its effects differently. Mr. Aranowski said that as ISBE's homeless student coordinator, he understands the value of trauma-informed care in terms of supporting students who have experienced poverty and domestic violence. Dr. Cicchetti said that grades, attendance and behavior are impacted by trauma and violence, but grades, attendance and behavior also affect how schools are evaluated and how resources are distributed. She emphasized that, for kids to be successful, trauma and violence have to be addressed in addition to academics. There is data from 2006 in Chicago that crosswalks high crime areas in the city and reading scores. Kids in communities with the most violent crime have the lowest scores. Early warning indicator research shows that in 6th grade, if students are having trouble with attendance, if they already have at least one unsatisfactory behavior grade or if they are failing a class, they have only a 15 to 25 percent chance of graduating. Dr. Cicchetti said that it is important to think about how education and mass incarceration relate.

Dr. Cicchetti said that only about 20 to 25 percent of the kids who need mental health services are getting them, across states and considering access through private insurance and Medicaid. About 70 to 80 percent of kids who are getting mental health services are getting them in schools. Dr. Cicchetti said that educators cannot be expected to provide mental health services in the roles that they have, so there need to be school-community collaborations. Lurie is trying to identify kids that need additional supports and deliver those supports in school to ensure that they are ready to learn. She said that it is important to think about schools as places to deliver services because it is difficult to get these services to kids in other places. A youth risk behavior survey in 2013 in Illinois showed that about a third of Chicago Public Schools students said they had severe symptoms of depression where they felt hopeless and sad for two weeks in a row during the school year and 15 percent said they had seriously considered attempting suicide. Interventions improve performance in school.

Dr. Cicchetti also discussed stigma reduction. Until they get past stigma, parents will not ask for help. Institutions have to do a better job communicating with families. If kids are not getting the support they need when they are young, it will affect their abilities to be employed and they will not be as successful.

Dr. Cicchetti noted that families have trouble managing systems to get mental health services because of a lack of coordination between systems. Illinois' Children's Mental Health Act of 2003 was designed to fix this lack of coordination. Dr. Cicchetti said that school districts need to do a better job of addressing the social emotional skills that kids need to be successful. In 2003, Illinois was the first state with learning standards for social emotional learning. ISBE has done a lot of work to disseminate best practices. Dr. Cicchetti said that schools have to start with what they need to do for all kids and then what they need to do for kids who need additional support. Teachers need the tools to help identify those kids that need more support and get them the services they need. Dr. Cicchetti believes that by doing this in schools, kids will receive services earlier, it will decrease the stigma around mental health services, and it will increase kids' ability to come to school ready to learn. Group interventions are much more normative for kids and it is helpful for them to learn skills in a group setting.

Dr. Cicchetti introduced the multi-tiered system of supports, which fits into the public health model of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention and interventions. Through the multi-tiered system of supports, all kids would be taught strategies for managing self-regulation, social problems and peer conflict. Kids at risk from exposure to trauma would receive small group interventions and kids that are showing clear symptoms of mental illness or mental health difficulties would receive more targeted support. In many school districts, the social work and psychology resources are allocated based on who is in special education, but this model says that all kids need to be taught social skills, self-awareness, problem-solving, and coping skills. Most schools do not pushback against building this curriculum as these skills help keep communities safer. Dr. Cicchetti also asked how schools can change their climate through more restorative justice and fewer punitive responses. It is important to keep students in school and teach them how to manage their emotions. Dr. Cicchetti calls bullying programs the "gateway drug to social emotional learning," as bully prevention is one part of social emotional learning.

Dr. Bernat said that trauma is one of the drivers in creating behaviors that are correlated with people taking actions against others in schools. Although very imperfect, he thinks that there are behaviors people can watch for. He asked Dr. Cicchetti how she would best communicate those behaviors to adults and students. Dr. Cicchetti explained that there are no behaviors that definitely predict these outcomes. She suggests an approach that helps kids feel safe and supported in schools, by teaching them self-regulation and coping strategies, and helping them develop resilience and feel some connection to school. As kids become disengaged in school, they are at risk of dropping out and at risk of social isolation. As Adam Lanza became more and more mentally ill, he also became more and more isolated from the world around him. Dr. Cicchetti recommended creating strategies and environments where adults are connected with all students. Teachers are the gatekeepers who know their students and pay attention to signs and symptoms, but they need to know the questions to ask and the resources to refer students to. Dr. Cicchetti said that teachers need to be trained in mental health first aid. ISBE is supporting a pilot to train non-mental health providers to recognize signs and symptoms. Local librarians also want mental health first aid. To engage kids in the process of decreasing stigma around mental health, Dr. Cicchetti recommended peer mental health educators. She emphasized that kids cannot be trained to be a part of this if they do not have the social emotional learning background. Coordinated care across systems and behavioral health teams in schools are important.

Dr. Cicchetti said that Illinois has done a good job using state and federal dollars to provide mental health services in schools, but these are education dollars. She would like Medicaid to support mental health services in schools. A piece of this is education but there is also a piece that is looking at reimbursable mental health services for diagnosable disorders. She has heard from her community mental health agency partners that reimbursements are very small. Mr. Tomlinson noted the overrepresentation in special education. He supports efforts to reduce stigma and said that the framework for social emotional learning is a best practice that the Task Force should advocate for. Strategies should be taught to all students and resources should be targeted to those who need it most. Task Force members talked about best practices in districts, relationships with service providers, and issues with the reimbursement model. Dr. Cicchetti said she is seeing the benefit of being more prevention-oriented. She highlighted the multi-tiered system of supports and the importance of aligning resources to that model. Her recommendations for the Task Force included: 1) looking at the Mental Health Act of 2003 and pushing the multi-tiered system of supports model and social emotional learning in schools; 2) reforming mental health reimbursements, building school provider capacities, and increasing allocations so there can be more mental health services in schools; 3) getting away from supporting children's mental health through grants; 4) building the school-community partnership model; and 5) raising the bar on the professional level for those providing mental health services.

Adjourn

Motion to adjourn: Moved by Bob Bernat and seconded by Dave Tomlinson. Voice vote. **Motion carried.** The meeting was adjourned at 4:23 p.m.

School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Agenda

December 15, 2015
1:00 p.m.

James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601



Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62777

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- I. Call to Order and Welcome
 - II. Roll Call
 - III. Approval of Minutes from November 17, 2015 Task Force Meeting
 - IV. Debrief of Carterville Public Hearing
 - V. Discussion of “See, Hear and Speak Up” Memorandum
 - VI. Discussion and Approval of Recommendations for Legislative Action
 - VII. Discussion and Approval of ISBE Staff Putting Together Report to the General Assembly and the Governor
 - VIII. Public Comment
 - IX. Open Discussion and Next Steps
 - X. Adjourn

Task Force members wishing to participate via phone may use the following:

Telephone Number: 1-888-494-4032
Access Code: 3 6 3 3 7 5 2 7 0 9

**School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Summary**

Springfield - Illinois State Board of Education
Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois

Chicago - Illinois State Board of Education
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois

Tuesday, December 15, 2015
1:00 p.m.

Chairman Vose called the meeting to order at 1:08 p.m.

Members Present

Jeff Aranowski
Robert Bernat
Tom Demmer, Rep.
David Henebry
Roger Schnitzler
Ben Schwarm
Dave Tomlinson
Jeff Vose
Steven Wilder

Members on the Phone

Neil Anderson, Sen.
Tom Cullerton, Sen.
Laura Frisch
Catherine McCrory
Pat O'Connor
Carol Sente, Rep.
John Simonton

Members Absent

Pat Hartshorn
Tad Williams

Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) Staff

Hannah Rosenthal

Members of the Public

Nick Giannini, Chief of Staff for Tom Cullerton

Approval of Minutes from November 17, 2015 Task Force Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by David Henebry and seconded by Dave Tomlinson. Voice vote.
Motion carried.

Debrief of Carterville Public Hearing

Jeff Aranowski, Ben Schwarm and Chairman Vose were present at the hearing. Mr. Aranowski said that the attendees included a couple of school administrators, one fire department official from the central Illinois area, and a regional superintendent. The attendees reflected a need for technical assistance and the extension of existing resources and training opportunities to school districts. Chairman Vose said they spoke about when it is appropriate to take action if a staff member has a concern about a student. One administrator said the teachers and administrators in the building are considered mandated reporters. Another individual said that training for all types of hazards – beyond security – should be considered in this process. Ron and Sandy Ellis, school security trainers, talked about building a culture and climate in a school so students and staff are prepared for any type of hazard. Mr. and Mrs. Ellis presented their school safety drill best practices and procedures. Jeff Aranowski has those resources if Task Force members are interested (including a DVD that addresses evacuation, shelter, bomb threats, lockdowns and bus evacuations).

Discussion of “See, Hear and Speak Up” Memorandum

Chairman Vose outlined the ground rules for the voting process. For the first vote, there will be a motion, a second, a discussion and then a roll call vote. Task Force members can choose between yes, no and present. Robert Bernat would like to have his “See, Hear and Speak Up” memorandum vetted with experts in the field, including experts from Northwestern, Harvard and other states. Dr. Bernat said that his memo is the first cut of the rudiments of a “See, Hear and Speak Up” program and is designed to educate the general public, parents and students, not professionals. In researching past events, it is clear that many signs were missed or ignored because people had not been acquainted with what to look for. Dr. Bernat clarified that the program would profile behaviors, not individuals. He has noticed that in many instances there has been leakage by the people who have intentionally committed these acts. Dr. Bernat thought it was necessary to come up with something easily understandable, so if students come across a situation they will have the confidence to speak with a trusted adult. Dr. Bernat clarified that his document is written as a memo from the Prevention Subcommittee to the Task Force. He would like it to be a Task Force draft product and to have the Task Force seal on it because that is the only way he thinks experts will give constructive criticism. Mr. Aranowski clarified that the Task Force will not be adopting a “See, Hear and Speak Up” program or recommending that it be implemented in all schools until the Task Force meets again to discuss the feedback they received. The motion is just seeking feedback before the Task Force proceeds to adopt, modify or reject the proposal. David Henebry said that he has read reports written by the Secret Service, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and they all say the best way to deal with an attack is to catch it before it happens. Dave Tomlinson said that DHS has a “See Something, Say Something” program that has been vetted at very high levels across the country. Mr. Tomlinson recognized that DHS programs are not at the level they should be, but he suggests that Task Force members make it a goal to enhance the “See Something, Say Something” material because DHS is trying to get one message across. Dr. Bernat agreed that there should not be competing taglines but “See Something, Say Something” cannot be used with DHS permission because

of the trademark. Representative Sente said that she is concerned about being too prescriptive. Several Task Force members expressed reservations about advocating for one program specifically. Representative Sente asked if Task Force members can say that the *concept* is what they are advocating and recommending. She said she would have rather seen the Task Force move forward and let local districts implement something similar but because that is not an option on the floor, she will vote yes.

Motion to put the Task Force's name and seal on the "See, Hear and Speak Up" document, not as an endorsement but in order for it to come from the Task Force en masse, to receive feedback, questions and concerns from experts in the field so the Task Force can deliberate at a future time as to whether or not to adopt this as a recommendation for statewide distribution: Moved by Jeff Aranowski motioned and seconded by Steve Wilder. Roll call vote: Anderson, Yes; Aranowski, Yes; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Yes; Demmer, Yes; Frisch, Not Present; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O'Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Yes; Schwarm, Yes; Sente, Yes; Simonton, Yes; Tomlinson, Yes; Vose, Yes; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Not Present. **The motion passed with 15 yes votes.**

Discussion and Approval of Recommendations for Legislative Action (Recommendation List Attached)

Chairman Vose reiterated the ground rules. There are 22 recommendations to be voted on. Chairman Vose asked if any of the recommendations can be consolidated. In this voting process, the four options are yes, no, present and refer to committee. There will be a motion, a second, a discussion and a roll call vote.

Recommendations #1 and #2: Mr. Aranowski said that he is not trying to put a price tag on student safety but he has concerns with respect to broader statutory mandates for districts, whether funded or unfunded. Mr. Aranowski said that his two recommendations are meant to be read together. Recommendation #1 is that the Task Force proposes no additional statutory mandates to be placed onto school districts. Since 2009, there have been 150 laws passed affecting schools with nearly 300 mandates. At the same time, education funding has been cut \$3 billion. Mr. Aranowski's Recommendation #2 does not absolve the Task Force of the responsibility to provide tools, resources and technical assistance to those on the ground making decisions in the best interest of their kids. He thinks the bulk of Task Force work should be focused on what the Task Force is providing the State Board of Education on July 1 (the model security policies), the products that Task Force members develop as a group in the interim and share on their website, and the outreach and public hearings in school districts.

Motion for the Task Force to recommend that no additional statutory requirements or mandates be placed onto school districts: Moved by Roger Schnitzler and seconded by Ben Schwarm. Discussion: Dr. Bernat said he agrees with Mr. Aranowski that there should be no other statutory mandates and districts should not be tasked with things they cannot afford or do not want to afford, except for his Recommendation #3. He learned from the North Shore School District 112 Task Force that there may be glaring deficiencies in a school district or a private or parochial school that will never come to light unless the people in charge think about it. He does not think there is much, if any, cost involved, but he does not think districts will form their own task forces unless they are required to do so. Dr. Bernat said that if a local task force meets and decides that what the district is doing is adequate, the task force has done its job. Steve Wilder agreed that giving districts the opportunity to form local committees adds to the success of the Task Force's work. One of the first things the Task Force addressed at formation was the fact that the situations around the state differ in terms of response

times, capabilities and staffing. Mr. Henebry expressed concern that if the Task Force does not establish a baseline expectation that expenditures will be required to make facilities safer and deadlines are needed, facilities will not be made safer. Most schools in Illinois have the same security setup Sandy Hook had. Mr. Henebry said he understands the current climate in Illinois as far as funding, but the Task Force is making long-term recommendations.

Mr. Tomlinson noted that if the Task Force approves Recommendation #1 as is, the discussion will be over because Recommendation #1 says there will be no additional mandates. Mr. Schwarm said that almost everything he thinks the Task Force wants to do is already embedded in current law or current school policy. He does not think the Task Force should make further requirements right now, make districts spend more money or penalize them. Task Force members can look into the implementation of current laws in the spring if necessary. Task Force members should focus on helping districts get to where they want them to be by offering best practices and model policies and removing obstacles. Mr. Aranowski said that an annual meeting is already required for first responders, principals and district-level officials. Task Force members could consider this a local task force. Representative Demmer said that he is a member of the Lieutenant Governor's Local Government Consolidation and Unfunded Mandates Task Force and members have spent a lot of time looking at the myriad of unfunded mandates that come down on school districts and other units of local government. In Representative Demmer's legislative district there are school districts with one building and school districts with multiple campuses. If they all have to deal with things in a certain way, it will put a lot of stress on them. Representative Demmer proposed that school districts work with the Regional Offices of Education (ROEs). He said that suggesting that unfunded mandates are the way to drive action presupposes that there is not a desire for that action already in school districts. The Task Force should provide recommendations and empower local school districts to make decisions that fit their circumstances. Mr. Schwarm said that the School Safety Drill Act ("Drill Act") requires school districts to have school safety designees. Task Force members should see how they can make sure school districts and local responders are doing what the Drill Act says. Representative Sente said that she does not want to add unfunded mandates. Rather than explain each time why she is voting no, she agrees with Representative Demmer that the proposals should be recommendations rather than cut in stone. Mr. Aranowski said that Task Force members, colleagues and constituents spent a lot of time developing recommendations so he has no problem withdrawing his motion if Task Force members want to talk about each of the recommendations and then Recommendations #1 and #2 at the end. Task Force members can vote (up, down or refer to committee) after a short presentation on each recommendation.

*Motion withdrawn by Jeff Aranowski. Voice vote. **Task Force will move to Recommendation #3.***

Recommendation #3: Dr. Bernat said he understands an annual meeting is required, but it is not sufficient. He does not intend to impose costs on districts but he thinks they should have working committees to analyze what is happening in a district on an ongoing basis. Mr. Schwarm reiterated that the district team and coordinator do not go away after their annual meeting, as that is just the minimum requirement. The Drill Act as it is now written says that all local responders have to be at the annual meeting. It is incumbent on first responders to identify any deficiencies in their training or procedures, and these have to be filed at the ROE. Dr. Bernat said that if these groups were functioning well, Illinois would be in a better situation. Mr. Schnitzler noted that money is the limiting factor. He could spend \$60,000 putting ballistic-proof glass up and take away

a teacher from a classroom or he could keep the teacher and hope that funding comes from the state for the glass. Mr. Schnitzler doubts that a district-level task force will improve the situation any more. His building's safety team already meets monthly, which Dr. Bernat applauded. Mr. Wilder added that District 61 in his hometown has also formed a task force that meets throughout the year. The district is spending money in much better ways because there are different ideas and thought processes at the table. Mr. Henebry said that the architect of record and ROE need to be present. Mr. Tomlinson said that meetings happen much more frequently than Task Force members think. A lot of what comes out of those meetings is not published because it is safety procedure and the law allows for it to be addressed in executive session. Representative Sente added that parents are included in the school district task forces and some superintendents in her district worry that this may be a confidentiality issue. Chairman Vose said that he is not opposed to these recommendations being shared at the ROEs' monthly superintendents' or monthly principals' meetings. ISBE could assist in this with CPS.

Recommendation #4: Dr. Bernat reminded Task Force members that David Esquith from the U.S. Department of Education recommended that the Task Force continue on in some shape or form, whether it stands alone or is part of something else, because it is currently only a snapshot in time. Hardware, software, tactics and strategy change rapidly. Chairman Vose said that Recommendation #4 relates to Recommendation #2. He has spoken with Mia Ray from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA). Some objected to putting the Task Force under the Illinois Terrorism Task Force (ITTF) umbrella but his goal as Chair moving forward is to sustain the Task Force. Jeff Aranowski is seeking a grant and working with Ms. Ray.

Recommendations #5 through #13: Mr. Henebry said that one of the recommendations out of the Physical Plant Subcommittee that he chaired was to develop a baseline so that there is some consistent and reasonable standard for school security. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Secret Service all share guidelines for school design. Mr. Henebry took some of these standards and added a level of specificity. The recommendations he has labeled as "required" would be the baseline and those labeled as "recommended" would be additions. Mr. Henebry said that 95% of attackers come through the front door and a lot of schools have blind entrances with very little visibility. He understands that schools cannot be flipped in the next five years but thinks there should be expectations for when the changes should be made. Mr. Henebry said he would write the recommendations into the School Code. Mr. Schwarm asked Mr. Henebry if he consulted with architects around the state because they may have competing views. Mr. Henebry said that in the presentations he has given across the country, as many as 85 architects in a room agreed with his recommendations. The architects designing the replacement school for Sandy Hook liked them, too.

Mr. Schnitzler expressed concern about the blind installation requirement and asked why Mr. Henebry recommended two Knox boxes instead of one. He also asked why 2040 is set as a deadline if there will be new technologies by then. Mr. Wilder said that closing blinds can be built into daily practice so no room stands out. Mr. Schnitzler noted that this conflicts with the Health/ Life Safety Code, which states that people should be able to view into every room. Mr. Tomlinson explained that the School Code requires design based on 2006 and 2009 International Building Codes (IBC) and asked if IBC is a better place for these specific design criteria. He suggested that the Task Force recommend the CPTED minimum standard as an option for districts to consider. He noted that Knox boxes are not required across the state and very few communities have them.

Mr. Henebry said that historically the Building Code has not taken on security issues so it would probably have to be a supplementary code like the Health/ Life Safety Code. He said that police officers cannot currently use Knox boxes because only the fire marshal has a key. Mr. Wilder said that putting the access systems for Knox boxes into police cars is impractical. Mr. O'Connor said that in an event, police officers will use breaching hardware. He is concerned about downstate mandates and thinks that these recommendations should be recommended as best practices. Representative Sente said that she likes comments such as "provide clear sight lines," "allow natural surveillance of approaching visitors," and "identifiable main entrance," as they seem to provide an architect and a school district with enough direction without going too far. In terms of landscaping or shrubbery, she would prefer that the Task Force write that there has to be clearance underneath trees rather than saying how tall a tree has to be. She has concerns with glazing because bulletproof glazing is four to five times more expensive than a standard glazing. Representative Sente and Mr. Schwarm would prefer that these recommendations be referred back to committee. Mr. Henebry explained that the dates were proposed benchmarks to give the Task Force a place to start. In terms of glazing, he does not see \$10,000 as a big expenditure if a district is building a \$15 million building. Mr. Aranowski explained that CPTED and FEMA 428 could be added as recommended reference publications for schools, an edit to Recommendation #13. Even if the Task Force does not vote to have the General Assembly adopt legislation that covers Recommendations #5-13, the report can say that constituents may want to take a look at these documents. Mr. Henebry clarified that any new code introduced in the course of designing a building is not applicable to that design.

Motion for the Task Force to recommend that school districts adopt best practices for school security design such as FEMA 428 or CPTED principles as a reference: Moved by Dave Tomlinson and seconded by Ben Schwarm. Voice vote. **Motion carried.** Recommendations #5-12 will go back to committee.

Recommendations #14 through 22: Mr. O'Connor said that Recommendation #14 does not incur any cost other than that one of the drills that are currently required in the Drill Act is a random drill. It would ensure that drills are practical exercises and that they serve as a training tool. Of his five recommendations, Mr. O'Connor clarified that #14 is his only recommendation for a requirement and the others should be best practices. As it is currently written in the recommendations document, Recommendation #15 discusses an expansion of threat teams and threat assessment training. Mr. O'Connor thinks this should be a best practice, not mandated. Recommendation #16 is a requirement for local districts to have secure glass entryways. Recommendation #17 is a requirement to train local districts in "Run, Hide, Fight," a free program that is endorsed by Illinois Chiefs and Illinois Sheriffs and provided by DHS. Mr. O'Connor said that active engagement and ALICE are also fine as best practices. Recommendation #18 is a recommendation for pushing "See Something, Say Something" into the culture of schools. Mr. Schnitzler said that the "require" language in Recommendations #5, 16 and 17 should be changed to "recommend." Mr. O'Connor agreed. When he proposed these recommendations, they were legislative changes that he thought would help, but when he looked at the Task Force's charge, he corrected himself and said they should be recommended and not required. Mr. O'Connor said that the superintendents he has spoken with recognize that an unscheduled drill would put their staff on their toes. Mr. Schwarm said that the Task Force would need to do wordsmithing before Recommendation #14 gets to the point of actual legislation. Someone has to schedule a drill so it would not be "unscheduled." Mr. Schwarm also asked what "random" means. Mr. O'Connor explained that the superintendents he has spoken with would schedule a drill such that it is not dropped in the middle of a testing

week. They want to catch staff in the hallways, between classes, in gym, and at lunch to see how things work. Mr. Henebry said he would like to roll Recommendation #16 about glazing into his glass recommendation. He added he would never want to have a school entrance with wire glass because it conveys that a school does not trust its students. In referring this recommendation back to committee, he will try to come up with a ballistic standard. Chairman Vose confirmed that Recommendations #5, 16 and 20 will be consolidated. Regarding Recommendation #17, Representative Sente said that she has superintendents telling her that they believe their local chiefs absolutely do not support "Run, Hide, Fight" and they will not enforce or encourage it. Mr. O'Connor said he thinks school districts just need something besides Shelter-In-Place. ALICE is a fairly expensive program, active engagement is accepted and Illinois Campus Chiefs have adopted "Run, Hide, Fight." Mr. Aranowski suggested that to make it less polarizing, the Task Force could say: "It is recommended that districts, in consultation with law enforcement and first responders, adopt some type of action plans for students which may include, without limitation, ALICE and/ or 'Run, Hide, Fight.'"

Task Force members confirmed which recommendations will be consolidated, voted on or sent back to committee:

- Recommendation #14 is a recommendation for statutory change that the Task Force will be voting on.
- Recommendation #15 is a best practice that the Task Force is recommending but not a legislative change.
- Recommendation #17 is a best practice recommendation with added language. Recommendations #17 and 19 will be combined.
- Recommendation #18 is a best practice recommendation.
- Recommendation #20 will be consolidated with Recommendations #5 and 16 and go back to committee.
- Recommendation #21 will be consolidated with Recommendation #18 (best practice recommendation). Part B of Recommendation #21 addresses the "Adopt a School" program in small communities where school districts cannot afford a school resource officer (SRO) in each school. As John Simonton said, Part B will be a recommended best practice for school districts to look into.
- Recommendation #22 will be combined with Recommendation #12 and go back to committee.

Recommendation #12: Mr. Schnitzler asked what on the list under Recommendation #12 was not included in the original plans that schools were required to send to the Illinois State Police (ISP). Mr. Henebry explained that there is probably no consistency in the plans. If ISP has floorplans from 100 different architects in the state, they will have 100 different floorplans. First responders will not have much time to read the floorplans in the squad car. Mr. Henebry said that standardized floorplans will not be a challenge for architects to provide. He recommends color-coding, identifying certain important things without identifying too many things and requiring room numbers to be legible. Representative Sente said that the architects should keep in mind type size for identifying rooms and/ or use a color-coded legend so that when a plan is on an 8 ½" x 11" cop car screen it can be easily understood. Mr. Schwarm and Mr. O'Connor said that there are services working locally that update information from school districts continuously and provide this information to first responders, and the plans may not meet all of these parameters. It may be counterproductive to require this when school districts have already made steps. Mr. Aranowski noted that Recommendation #12 directs schools to submit plans to ISBE for inclusion in a statewide database. He does not know if ISBE has that capability. Chairman Vose said that plans are currently submitted to ISP and asked that "submitted to ISBE" be changed. Mr. Tomlinson said that if the Task Force wants these plans to be used, they have to go to local law enforcement, not to ISP. Local police officers in small communities do not have access to information in the Illinois Wireless Information

Network (IWIN). IWIN is \$1,000 a user. If this is required, it is not going to be used. It is a great idea for ISP but ISP may not be in a lot of communities. Chairman Vose confirmed that Recommendation #12 will go back to committee.

Recommendations #1, 2, 3, 4 and 14: Mr. Schwarm identified Recommendations #1, 2, 3, 4 and 14 as the remaining recommendations for the Task Force to address. Mr. Schnitzler noted that if Task Force members vote on Recommendation #1, they cannot address Recommendation #14.

Motion for the Task Force to recommend that one of the currently required drills is required to be a random, unscheduled drill: Moved by Pat O'Connor and second by Dave Tomlinson. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, No; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Not Present; Demmer, Not Present; Frisch, Not Present; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O'Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Yes; Schwarm, Present; Sente, Yes; Simonton, Yes; Tomlinson, Yes; Vose, No; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Not Present. **The motion passed with 9 yes votes, 2 no votes and 1 present vote.**

Mr. Henebry asked if the Task Force needs a full year. Mr. Schwarm said that it is premature to extend the Task Force past July 1 as it is currently constituted right now. He would prefer to look at this again in the spring. Mr. Aranowski and Dr. Bernat said that now is the time to vote on this because this is the report that is going to the General Assembly and the report in July is going to ISBE. Representative Sente recommended making a reference in the report that should the Task Force find that it wants to extend past July 1, the Task Force would want it to include the same members for continuity. Mr. Aranowski said he will vote present because he would like to ensure that IEMA and other organizations can weigh in on anything that goes past July 1.

Motion for the Task Force to recommend that the Illinois School Security and Standards Task Force be extended for an additional year in its current form: Moved by Jeff Aranowski. Amendment approved by Robert Bernat. Seconded as amended by Steve Wilder. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, Present; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Yes; Demmer, Not Present; Frisch, Not Present; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O'Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Yes; Schwarm, No; Sente, Yes; Simonton, Yes; Tomlinson, Yes; Vose, Yes; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Not Present. **The motion passed with 11 yes votes, 1 no vote and 1 present vote.**

Dr. Bernat amended Recommendation #3 to include the architect and Regional Superintendent of Schools in the list of local task force members and to strike the sentence that says that no other mandates should be made. Mr. Henebry clarified that the architect would be the one for the school district. Mr. Schwarm explained that he opposes this because, as the Task Force discussed earlier, districts are already doing this. It is in state law and in policies so this would be another hoop for a school district to jump through. Mr. Schwarm and Mr. Tomlinson encouraged a no vote.

Motion for the Task Force to include Recommendation #3, as amended, in the report: Moved as amended by Robert Bernat and seconded by Steve Wilder. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, No; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Not Present; Demmer, Not Present; Frisch, Not Present; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Present; McCrory, Present; O'Connor, No; Schnitzler, No; Schwarm, No; Sente, No; Simonton, No; Tomlinson, No; Vose, No; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Not Present. **The motion did not pass (8 no votes, 2 yes votes and 2 present votes).**

Mr. Aranowski modified Recommendation #2. He inserted: "With the exception of the statutory recommendations contained herein," before "Between." He suggested that, if the Task Force votes yes on the statement, it is put in the Executive Summary as a guiding principal rather than in the list of recommendations. Mr. Schwarm clarified that the exceptions are making one safety drill random and extending the Task Force for one year. Mr. Henebry asked where the items referred to committee fit in and the Task Force confirmed that they are not negated.

Motion for the Task Force to include Recommendation #2, as amended, in the Executive Summary of the report as a principle: Moved as amended by Jeff Aranowski and seconded by Ben Schwarm. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, Yes; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Yes; Demmer, Not Present; Frisch, Yes; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O'Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Yes; Schwarm, Yes; Sente, Yes; Simonton, Yes; Tomlinson, Yes; Vose, Yes; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Not Present. **The motion passed with 14 yes votes.**

Mr. Aranowski said he would like to modify Recommendation #1 along the same lines. He amended it to say: "With the exception of the statutory recommendations contained herein, no additional statutory mandates shall be placed onto districts."

Motion for the Task Force to include Recommendation #1, as amended, in the report: Moved as amended by Jeff Aranowski and seconded by Ben Schwarm. Discussion: Mr. Henebry asked if this will shut discussions down around the items sent back to committee. Mr. Aranowski said that the way this is stated, the Task Force would have to come out with a recommendation to overturn it and a majority of the Task Force would have to vote in favor of the recommendation. Mr. Henebry said that he does not like shutting discussions down and recommended that this be taken off the table. Mr. Aranowski said that his intent was not to throw things back to committee to make them die but he thinks it is important to have the no statutory mandate clause. He asked that the motion is voted on or that a cross-motion is made.

Motion to eliminate Recommendation #1 because, language-wise, the Task Force has combined Recommendations #1 and 2: Moved by Dave Tomlinson and seconded by Representative Carol Sente.

Motion for the Task Force to include Recommendation #1, as amended, in the report, rescinded by Jeff Aranowski, provided the Task Force understands 1) that he is rescinding Recommendation #1 because it is duplicative of Recommendation #2; and 2) that the Task Force has an emphasis on not creating additional statutory mandates on school districts. Voice vote. **Task Force will not include Recommendation #1.**

Discussion and Approval of ISBE Staff Putting Together Report to the General Assembly and the Governor

Mr. Aranowski said that the purpose of this agenda item is to make sure the report to the Governor and General Assembly is reflective of the votes of the Task Force. Hannah Rosenthal sent members the skeleton of what the report could look like. The document would include acknowledgements, a table of contents, an executive summary, an introduction, a description of public acts, and the current statutory and regulatory landscape for school safety. Mr. Aranowski said the final document will not get to the General Assembly before January 1 if the Task Force does not approve it. He is asking for a vote on what is in the document already plus a summary of the recommendations the Task Force voted on today, primarily in their original language. ISBE

staff may make grammatical changes if necessary but will not change content or the purpose of the recommendations. Representative Sente asked if Task Force members will see the draft report before it is sent to the Governor and General Assembly. Mr. Aranowski said that ISBE staff will complete the draft, send it out to Task Force members and give them 24 to 48 hours to share any content concerns. Dr. Bernat agreed that there is no choice given the schedule.

Motion to approve the current contents of the report and a summary of the recommendations the Task Force voted on today, primarily in their original language, and to approve of ISBE staff putting together the report: Moved by Dave Tomlinson and seconded by Pat O'Connor. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Open Discussion and Next Steps

Mr. Tomlinson said that Champaign County has a youth assessment center. He followed up with Champaign County State's Attorney Julia Rietz and she would be happy to provide testimony on it. Mr. Schwarm said that he has had conversations with Bob Elliott at Western Illinois University who is leading the safety training program and he invited Mr. Elliott to speak. Chairman Vose asked Mr. Tomlinson and Mr. Schwarm to share contact information and brief synopses with Ms. Rosenthal. Chairman Vose thanked Task Force members for their time, patience and excellent input. He looks forward to getting the report to the Governor and General Assembly and to moving forward with the July report. The Task Force has not established the next meeting date. Task Force members can communicate next steps to Hannah.

Adjourn

Motion to adjourn: Moved by Jeff Aranowski and seconded by Robert Bernat. Voice vote. **Motion carried.** The meeting was adjourned at 3:54 p.m.

SCHOOL SECURITY AND STANDARDS TASK FORCE
Compiled Recommendations for Legislative Change
12/9/15

1. No additional statutory mandates shall be placed onto districts. (Aranowski)
2. Between now and its dissolution, in addition to its statutory obligations, the task force shall strictly devote its work to expanding the provision of technical assistance, resources and training to empower districts and communities to provide for the safety and security of the students and staff they serve. (Aranowski)
3. Each school district in the State of Illinois, as well as each private and parochial school or school system, should form their own local school security task force to review their current security measures and determine what improvements, if any, are needed and a timeline for instituting such improvements. Each such task force should at a minimum include administrators, teachers, facilities personnel, parents and police and fire department first responder representatives, and should examine the product of Illinois School Security and Standards Task Force as well as information from other sources, both federal and state, in making such determinations. No other mandates should be made. (Bernat)
4. The Illinois School Security and Standards Task Force should be extended for an additional year in its current form and thereafter a smaller group of individuals drawn from the current Task Force should be constituted into a subset of an existing, standing Illinois body, such as the Illinois Terrorism Task Force, in order that further modifications and improvements can be provided to the legislature, the Office of the Governor and the Illinois State Board of Education. As informed by the federal Department of Education, the efforts of a task force with a sunset provision provide merely a snapshot in time and its recommendations will prove outmoded shortly after they are made as events, training, tactics, hardware, software, psychiatric research, etc. change. (Bernat)
5. Required for all new design/Recommended for all existing facilities and renovations.
Adopt expanded principles of CPTED design:
Natural Surveillance:
Exterior - Provide clear site lines for observing physical movement on the School Campus/Site. The School entry/reception desk should be positioned to allow natural surveillance of all approaching visitors, students and staff. The views should not be camera dependent. The positioning of the building should provide an identifiable main entrance with parking and sidewalks positioned to lead you to the main entrance. There should be sufficient travel distance to allow the staff to monitor/recognize potential threatening behavior as they approach the entrance. The entry and reception should be all glass from a max 36" AFF to a minimum 7'4" AFF and a Glass Polycarbonate laminated Bullet Proof glazing should be installed to this height to protect the staff. Play and outdoor activity areas should be easily visually observed from the school. Avoid creating features that can be used to hide for an exterior attack like dense shrubbery and solid walls/features. Shrubs should be no more than 24" tall, and clearance underneath trees no less than 72" to ground. Biology grow plots and gardens should be positioned on the site in a manner that does not create hiding spots for attackers.
FEMA Recommendations:
 - o **FEMA – Open Space:** “The incorporation of open space into School site design presents a number of benefits. First and foremost is the ability to easily monitor an area and detect

intruders, vehicles, and weapons. Closely related to this benefit is the stand-off value of Open Space”

- o **FEMA – Parking:** “Surface lots can be designed and placed to keep vehicles away from the school buildings.”
- o **FEMA – Landscape Design:** “Landscape design features should be used to create the level of protection without turning the school into a fortress. Elements such as landforms, water features, and vegetation are among the building blocks of attractive and welcoming spaces.”

Interior - Provide simple building circulation patterns for clear site lines for observing student movements through the school. A minimum 12’ path width for primary corridor circulation should be required to allow movement with sufficient space for movement. Video cameras should be positioned and used to record and monitor the actions occurring in the building circulation and large gathering spaces. Transparency between the building circulation and classrooms should be provided to insure that classrooms/education spaces can be observed from the corridor and corridors from the education spaces. Covering the glazing should not be allowed. Storage Rooms should be provided with frosted glazing so that physical movement/activity can be detected in normally unoccupied areas. Blinds should be installed at exterior and interior glazing to block visibility during a lock down situation. (Henebry)

6. Required for all new design and renovations exceeding 20,000 sf or additions exceeding 7000sf/Required for all existing schools by September 1, 2040

Access Control:

Entry Access should be managed and controlled. The primary building entrance should be secured and require direct visual observance from the reception area. The glazing between the vestibule and school should be a Glass Polycarbonate laminated Bullet Proof glazing in 2 ¼” heavy duty aluminum door frames. The design should be standard friendly and inviting but secure. The receptionist should have an ability to have verbal communication with the visitor and ability to buzz them into the reception area for check in. The primary and secondary entries at the beginning and end of the school day should be physically monitored by staff as students enter and exit. All secondary entries should be locked down during the course of the day. Secondary entry points should be monitored by cameras.

All exterior doors should be equipped with a door position switch and a latch detection switch so if a door is breeched or propped open, or if a door latch gets taped or filled with a foreign substance, an alarm will occur. Additionally, all classroom doors should be locked at all times and held open, if necessary, on a magnetic hold open device. Doors could be automatically closed and locked, according to the threat level, at the push of a button. (Henebry)

7. Required for all new design and renovations or additions/Required for all existing schools by September 1, 2025

Exterior Doors and Classroom Doors

Exterior doors at the perimeter of the school should remain locked at all times requiring a key or access card for re-entry to the school. A door position and latch detection switch should be installed at every exterior door and alarm if the doors are held open for more than 10 minutes.

All Classroom and occupied education spaces should have doors that swing out into circulation. All door frames should be of metal construction.

Interior occupied spaces can be equipped with closures and hold open devices that can be disengaged when the lock down protocol is activated. All Classroom entries and access points to Classroom Commons/Villages/Pods should also be secured in a similar manner. Organizing buildings in a securable pod/village concept should be encouraged over organizing Classrooms along a singular corridor system to create a layering points of securing the education environments.

Classroom Locks – *Only Locksets that can be secured from the interior of the Classroom should be utilized.*

A traditional Dormitory Function: This may work well for changing out existing locksets and achieve the ability to lock from the interior of the Classroom.

or

Classroom Intruder (with deadbolt)

Or

Office Function Lock Function (Henebry)

8. Required for all new design/Recommended for all existing facilities and renovations.

Territorial Reinforcement:

The property edges should be discernable so it becomes obvious to someone approaching they are on school property as well as visually known to the school that a person is approaching. When a school district shares property with a Park District this may not be completely achievable so some subtle landscaping should be provided with signage noting that during school hrs a certain perimeter distance should be maintained and directing individuals who wish to visit the school to move around the property and approach the main entrance. (Henebry)

9. Recommended for all existing facilities and renovations.

Maintenance:

Schools that are not well maintained convey a sense of non-caring. This precipitates an attitude of acceptance for negative behavior. The building should convey a pleasant and caring environment for students. Industrial and deteriorating education environments are susceptible to negative behavior. The condition, colors and materials should convey a sense of caring for the young occupants as well as the staff.

Maintenance of the required security features are will be checked as a part of the annual ROE annual site visit and 10 yr Life Safety Surveys. Security vulnerability / threat assessments should be conducted, at minimum, every three years, preferably by a qualified professional security consultant.

(Henebry)

10. Required for all new design/existing facilities by September 1, 2025

Communications Infrastructure:

The communications systems should have redundancy to reduce the possibility of being disconnected by a sophisticated attacker.

Communications devices and systems (hardware and software) should be acquired and regularly evaluated within each school building to ensure teachers and school administrators can easily communicate with police and first responders during an incident. There should be interoperability between a school's system. (Henebry)

11. Required by September 1, 2016

Knox Boxes:

Two Knox boxes should be provided at the Main entrance and a secondary entry point/exit. One should be the traditional Knox Box for the Fire Department and the second Knox Box should be specific for police use. (Henebry)

12. Required for all schools by September 1, 2020

Security Reference Plans:

A School Security Reference Plan should be prepared and submitted to the ISBE for inclusion in the School Floor Plans Folder administered by the Illinois State Police STIC (Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center). The plans shall follow the attached checklist and include the additional information listed below:

Required Plans:

- o Site Plan
- o Floor Plan

Plan Information Guide:

- o Room Numbering – Room Numbers should be legible on the Computer Screen in Squad Cars
- o Doors should be clearly delineated.
- o Main Entrance identified
- o Exits identified
- o Knox Boxes identified
- o FACP identified
- o Primary Communications Server identified
- o Camera Locations identified and addressed
- o Secured area points of access (Example: Locked Pod entries)
- o Superintendent’s Office
- o Hazardous/Flammable Material Storage

Plan Color Guide:

- o Circulation - Beige
- o Occupied Education Spaces – Green
- o Unoccupied Spaces – Gray
- o Gathering and Public Spaces (Gym/Cafeteria/Toilets/Locker Rooms) – Blue
- o Administration – Orange
- o Critical Infrastructure (Fire Main/Electrical Dist., etc.) and Hazardous Storage (Gasoline/Paint Thinners, etc.) – Red (Henebry)

13. Recommended for New and Existing Schools

FEMA 428

FEMA 428 is a recommended reference publication for school security design. School Districts, Consultants and the Districts Architect of Record should review the document and determine what requirements the School District prefers to implement as policy. (Henebry)

14. Amend the School Safety Drill act to require one unscheduled random drill each year, to provide better evaluation of real time staff training. (105 ILCS 128/) School Safety Drill Act. (O’Connor)

15. Require K-12 to create and train a district wide Threat team including a local Law Enforcement representative. The emergency exception to FERPA allows K-12 districts; like Higher Ed, to disclose student information to Law Enforcement for health and safety emergencies.
Generally, schools must have written permission from the parent or eligible student in order to release any information from a student's education record. However, FERPA allows schools to disclose those records, without consent, to the following parties or under the following conditions (34 CFR § 99.31):
Appropriate officials in cases of health and safety emergencies; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html> (O'Connor)
16. Require local schools districts to have all glass entryways to their locations protected by.. Laminated, ballistic, wired glass or at their option "Ballistic film-based composite". The composite film is the cheapest of the options and can be installed by school maintenance staff relatively cheaply without replacing any glass. (O'Connor)
17. Require training of local district administrators in the concepts of Run, Hide Fight. This is a free program endorsed by the Illinois Chiefs and Illinois Campus Chiefs and will allow district to have options within their emergency planning and offered by the Department of Justice as an alternative to simply sheltering in place.
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active_shooter_pocket_card_508.pdf
<https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents/run-hide-fight-video>
(O'Connor)
18. Recommendation only: I believe we should encourage schools to engage all staff and student with self-responsibility and have an active and ongoing discussion program set up within each school district that encourages students and staff to come forward. The DHS- See something, Say something program is currently active in this state and across the country in many schools, colleges and universities. It should be discussed at the Superintendents level as part of their training and discussions. Again this is a DHS free program. <http://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something> (O'Connor)
19. Training as a Preventative Measure
- A. Incorporate the concepts of the A.L.I.C.E. method and / or Run, Hide, Fight
 - a. Easily understood and applicable to faculty / students
 - b. Helps empower students and staff to make life-saving choices and to take control of the situation until LEA arrives
 - c. Builds the "delay" mechanism – providing LEA additional time to respond / react
 - B. Regular scheduled training with First Responders
 - a. Recommend one "table-top" exercise and one drill with faculty per school year
 - b. Recommend one full-scale exercise every 3 years
 - c. Faculty should continue with in-house exercises as currently planned (Simonton)
20. Glass Installation/ Recommendations
- A. Delay mechanism
 - a. Recent testing conducted indicates that a laminate-based glass provided more of a delay mechanism than tempered glass.
 - b. A film-based composite consisting of laminate would also be recommended. This type of film or laminate does not shatter and completely fall into the frame, rather, the rounds travel through the glass without shattering. This provides an additional delay mechanism for those intruders that have the mindset of breaching the glass for entry into the school. COST: additional 10-15%

- c. The film-based composite also has a darker exterior, thus not allowing the intruder to see in as well as normal glass.
- B. Testing
 - a. The aforementioned ballistic testing was done at a local range, using the tempered and laminate glass compositions mentioned. Testing was filmed and recorded for validity. .40 caliber and .223 caliber rounds were shot through each of the test projects and the laminate was found to be superior in delay over tempered. (Simonton)

21. Intelligence

- A. Dr. Bernat's concept of See Something / Say Something, should be a model for the faculty. This is a "trust-building" concept that will, if used properly, eventually lead to the finding of disturbed students / faculty that may be planning for some time of incident – before the incident actually happens.
- B. Regular meetings with LEA and staff will also bridge the communication issue that has been discussed. Having an SRO in each school is nice, but unfortunately, some areas of the state cannot afford this luxury. What we have started to do in Lee County is use the "Adopt a School" program whereby a Deputy that lives close to, or regularly patrols an area where a school is located, stops in periodically, meets with staff and walks through the school. Because some of the smaller towns do not have 24 hour police protection, the Sheriff's Department is normally the first to respond. This concept allows the Deputies to become more familiar with the school floorplan, faculty and students. As this begins to progress, the students will (hopefully) become more at ease with the Deputy, easing the apprehension of providing information that may lead to proactive intervention. This concept also provides for a staggered schedule of when the Deputy may or may not be in the school, which inhibits strategic planning for the would-be intruder. (Simonton)

22. Pre-planned Safe Zones

- A. At a minimum, two safe zones for students and faculty to evacuate to, should be identified in the school crisis plan. Staff identifying these zones, in conjunction with First Responders, need to ensure that these zones are available during school hours and have the ability to house a large group. Faculty should also be assigned to these particular zones for accountability and supervision. Aerial photography should be updated annually, or when new construction / changes are made to the school facility and safe zones. (Simonton)

School Security and Standards Task Force

Meeting Agenda

February 19, 2016

1:00 p.m.

James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601



Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62777

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- I. Call to Order and Welcome
 - II. Roll Call
 - III. Approval of Minutes from December 15, 2015 Task Force Meeting and Minutes from January 19, 2016 and January 26, 2016 Physical Plant Subcommittee Meetings
 - IV. Review Revised Physical Plant Recommendations
 - V. Kip Heinle, President of Illinois School Resource Officers Association
 - VI. Julia Rietz, Champaign County State's Attorney
 - VII. Public Comment
 - VIII. Open Discussion and Next Steps
 - IX. Adjourn

Task Force members wishing to participate via phone may use the following:

Telephone Number: 1-888-494-4032
Access Code: 3 6 3 3 7 5 2 7 0 9

**School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Summary**

Springfield - Illinois State Board of Education
Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois

Chicago - Illinois State Board of Education
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois

Friday, February 19, 2016
1:00 p.m.

Chairman Vose called the meeting to order at 1:02 p.m.

Members Present

Jeff Aranowski
Robert Bernat
Laura Frisch
David Henebry
Ben Schwarm
David Tomlinson
Jeff Vose (Chairman)

Members on the Phone

Neil Anderson, Sen.
Tom Demmer, Rep.
Patrick O'Connor (Vice-Chair)
Carol Sente, Rep.

Members Absent

Tom Cullerton, Sen.
Patrick Hartshorn
Catherine McCrory
Roger Schnitzler
John Simonton
Steven Wilder
Tad Williams

Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) Staff

Hannah Rosenthal

Members of the Public

Ted Birren, Township High School District 214
Nick Giannini, Chief of Staff for Senator Tom Cullerton
Kip Heinle, President of Illinois School Resource Officers Association
Janelle McClendon
Barrett Monie, Legislative Aide for Representative Carol Sente
Julia Rietz, Champaign County State's Attorney
Sheila Sims, Legislative Aide for Senator Neil Anderson

Approval of Minutes from December 15, 2015 Task Force Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by Ben Schwarm and seconded by David Tomlinson. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Approval of Minutes from January 19, 2016 Physical Plant Subcommittee Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by Pat O'Connor and seconded by Neil Anderson. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Approval of Minutes from January 26, 2016 Physical Plant Subcommittee Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by Pat O'Connor and seconded by Ben Schwarm. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

Review Revised Physical Plant Recommendations

Physical Plant Subcommittee Chair David Henebry said that Subcommittee members were ready to put forward their revised Physical Plant Recommendations. The members of the public who attended the Subcommittee meetings agreed that these would be baseline requirements for new construction and any major renovations. Mr. Henebry noted that the Subcommittee's conversation continually returned to the current fiscal situation. The Subcommittee decided not to include any dates in the recommendations. Some members of the public thought the proposed dates may be too far out and may give the impression that the recommendations are not that important.

Chairman Vose asked if the Task Force would be reviewing or voting on the recommendations at the meeting and if members were prepared to vote. Jeff Aranowski noted that the agenda said that members would "review" the recommendations. He said that "review" could be changed to "vote" with a motion. He emphasized that the vote will impact program areas at the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), not just the Task Force's report and the information posted on ISBE's website. He said that he would like to vet the recommendations with ISBE's Health/Life Safety team before he votes, to make sure he is not skipping any steps from ISBE's perspective. Ben Schwarm said he was also not prepared to vote for any new requirements for school districts at this time. Dave Tomlinson clarified that the Task Force submitted initial recommendations to the General Assembly and the final report to the State Board of Education is not due until July 1. Mr. Tomlinson and Chairman Vose recommended that members review the recommendations at this meeting and ask questions, take time to vet and make edits to the recommendations after the meeting, and then vote at the next meeting. Jeff Aranowski clarified that the fact that he was not prepared to vote did not mean that he thinks the recommendations are not important. Pat O'Connor and Senator Tom Cullerton said they were fine with discussing the recommendations at this meeting and being prepared to vote at the next meeting.

Mr. Henebry said that the definition of renovation came up in previous conversations so he added a definition to the document as a reference: "Any major improvement to the education environment including athletic facilities and other non-educational space. This would exclude singular improvements such as flooring replacement, window replacement, abatement and/or energy efficient improvements. Though combining other physical improvements with any of the above within a single year would be deemed a renovation." Mr. Henebry said that the Subcommittee did not want to include lighting retrofits or window, roof or carpet replacement because they could trigger dollar amounts that could be construed as renovations. Mr. Henebry said that the Subcommittee's definition is more comprehensive than the sprinkler language. Mr. Tomlinson added that that language is based on the International Building Code (IBC). He noted that the Americans with Disabilities Act regulation has a threshold. Mr. Tomlinson said he wanted to make sure that the definition the Task Force uses is consistent with

existing definitions. Mr. Schwarm said that he thought other definitions included a percentage of square footage compared to a building's original footprint. Mr. Henebry confirmed that the Subcommittee's definition builds off of the language of the sprinkler requirement and that the Subcommittee did not intend to create a whole new formula. The Subcommittee is no longer recommending that renovations be required to be completed by a certain time. Mr. Henebry said that districts that do not have money to act on anything in the next four to five years are not expected to make changes.

Mr. Henebry said that the recommendation around access control stayed basically the same, keeping the intent that classrooms can be secured from the interior. Mr. Henebry said that each school district has a different level of need for security so the recommendations outline several options. He wanted to add a recommendation that the traditional classroom lockset be considered banned because it requires the teacher to exit the classroom to lock the door. Mr. Schwarm said it would be helpful to have an estimated cost for each item recommended. He recalled from one of the Task Force's public hearings that locks have a significant cost. Districts want to follow best practices but they are limited because of costs. Mr. Henebry said that there will not be much of a change to the cost of new construction. School districts have used cheaper options but locks do not cost more than \$150 per door. Mr. Tomlinson asked about the unlocking mechanism for the internal locks. Mr. Henebry said that the most costly item is bulletproof glass at the main entrance of a building.

Mr. Henebry said that the Physical Plant Subcommittee discussed having security surveys completed every three years but superintendents wanted to roll it into the 10-year Health/ Life Safety survey process. They wanted to keep the surveys separate, though, because Health/ Life Safety reports are subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Mr. Henebry explained that the recommendations incorporate feedback from educators but they still have language that needs to be vetted and polished. Regarding communications infrastructure, the Subcommittee did not want to lock school districts into proprietary software or systems. Subcommittee members wanted to come up with language that pushed the industry to competitive bidding so that there are no astronomical expenses that prevent school districts from obtaining the technology. Regarding Knox boxes, Mr. Henebry noted that some school districts would like to have the two Knox boxes but others provide local law enforcement with fobs. Some districts bridge three or four municipalities so they have to work with three or four law enforcement agencies. Districts' needs will vary. The Task Force should provide school districts with the flexibility to pick their own means for meeting the requirement.

Regarding the security reference plans, Mr. Henebry said that both of the law enforcement officers the Subcommittee spoke with really liked the idea of a color-coded plan so they do not have to read the plan to know where everything is. He issued samples of the color-coded plan. Mr. Henebry said that Texas created a list of what schools have to have on their security plans. Once the state adopts it, all architects will follow it. If there is consistency, law enforcement officers always know that x color is where x is and they can instantly understand a plan when they open it. Mr. Schwarm said that a lot of school districts are already using services and they have shared their building plans with local responders. He asked if all of the districts would have to change their schemes. It would be a huge problem if the services are currently working well for districts. Mr. O'Connor said that he likes the concept and thinks it will work where plans are not already in place, but he agrees with Mr. Schwarm that school districts that have already employed consultants and are working well with local police departments may be angry. Mr. Henebry said that he would change this to a recommended best practice. Nick Giannini from Senator Cullerton's office said that he can see the benefit of universal color-coded plans in DuPage where they have regional response teams and where school districts are in multiple law enforcement zones. Mr. Henebry said that he would like the universal color-coding scheme to be a recommended requirement but if it is a recommended best practice school districts can still refer to it. If there is a published standard, consultants that are doing this for school districts are more likely to adopt and follow it.

Mr. Henebry said that no one the Subcommittee spoke with was interested in making the Federal Emergency Management Agency 428 Primer (FEMA 428) a requirement. There would be no way to make sure people were

actually reading it. Regarding blue pull stations, Mr. Henebry said that there are new apps on phones that do the same thing as blue boxes. The Subcommittee is going to add that to the language and keep it as a recommendation. Mr. Tomlinson noted that Knox boxes are very expensive: each Knox box costs more than \$1,000 to install and the smallest Knox boxes cost \$250 each. He knows that this can be bonded in his county but bonding is not looked at favorably. Robert Bernat reminded Task Force members that School District 112 put Knox boxes in all elementary and middle schools. The blue boxes are wireless and can be moved, which saves installation costs. He will find out precisely what was paid and will send the information to Hannah Rosenthal. Mr. Henebry estimated that they cost \$1200 per device.

Mr. Henebry noted the time the Subcommittee spent discussing funding. Members talked about raising the levy and looking at how it was adjusted for inflation. Another idea was to look at tax caps for school districts. School districts should be allowed to go beyond the tax cap for Health/Life Safety. The Subcommittee also discussed security grants and maintenance grants. The grants try to touch as many schools as possible but \$50,000 by today's standards does not do anything meaningful. Mr. Henebry said that Subcommittee members want to start a dialogue about pushing that up to \$250,000 and giving schools access to the grant every third year as opposed to every year. Mr. Schwarm said that he agrees with the conversation about funding. Task Force members should talk about funding before talking about requirements. Mr. Aranowski said that school safety grants out of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) are not for facility upgrades. He likes Mr. Henebry's idea around the \$50,000 maintenance grant. Mr. Aranowski noted that ISBE is prepping for an FY17 budget without a FY16 budget, but he anticipates the \$50,000 maintenance grant will continue. He does not know if restricting access to every three years and expanding to \$200-250,000 will require a statutory or regulatory change or if it is just a policy at ISBE to spread the money out as much as possible. Regarding fiscal issues, Mr. Tomlinson said that recommendations should not be related to the current state of funding in Illinois. Either the Task Force should recommend that something is required or if it is not deemed important enough to fund, the Task Force should make it a recommended best practice. Mr. Tomlinson added that he is uncomfortable with the word "requirement." There is a long existing process to design the building code, and ISBE and others have adopted this building code as the standard for schools in Illinois. Mr. Tomlinson thinks that the Task Force should go through that process as opposed to making specific design requirements.

Regarding communications and infrastructure, Mr. Tomlinson and Mr. O'Connor said they cannot see first responders giving schools access to their communications systems. The term "interoperability" means something very specific. Mr. Henebry clarified that the intent was not that a school would ever have access to the communications systems of first responders. The recommendation would give law enforcement full access to communication systems within a school through some sort of technology or interface. Mr. Schwarm said that there is technology out there that goes far beyond this and local responders love it.

Mr. Henebry said that building code traditionally does not deal with security. The baseline requirements could become a supplement to FEMA 428. The sprinkler requirement was added because someone felt that it was a requirement that went beyond the School Code and the traditional building code. The Subcommittee's intent was to write this into school code like the sprinkler requirement. It would be implemented as any other building code; if it was not adopted at the time a building was designed, the building would not have to follow it.

Chairman Vose said he appreciates the Physical Plant Subcommittee getting everything together. For the next meeting, he would like to see dollar amounts attached to the recommendations. The Task Force can go line by line if members want to vote on particular items. Mr. Aranowski clarified that the Task Force's report due July 1 to the State Board of Education will include the model security plans and policies. If the Task Force votes on the recommendations at the next meeting, he is not sure what document the recommendations will be included in. They could be included in the final report or be a supplement to the report that is also sent to the General Assembly. Chairman Vose and Mr. Schwarm agreed to vet these recommendations with their organizations and Mr. Aranowski agreed to vet them with his Health/Life Safety colleagues at ISBE. Task Force members need to

submit any feedback to Ms. Rosenthal by March 15. The Subcommittee will meet again and use the feedback to make edits.

Kip Heinle, President of Illinois School Resource Officers Association

Kip Heinle said that this is his 20th year with the Madison County Sheriff's Department. He is the school resource officer for Triad Community Unit School District #2 in Troy, Illinois. His main job is safety and security but school resources officers are also counselors and mentors. This is his last year as president of the Illinois School Resource Officers Association. His primary role is to give advice to school districts and police departments who do not have SROs and to put together a training conference every year. This year's conference will be held in Normal, Illinois from June 22-24. There will be a presenter from the Illinois Attorney General's Office and Tom Dunlap from the Ferguson-Florissant School District is going to talk about how his district dealt with civil unrest. The conference will address risk assessment, social media, cyberbullying and sexting. Any administrator or police officer can attend.

Regarding blind installation and external and internal glazing to block visibility during a lockdown situation, Mr. Heinle said he wants to be able to see if kids are inside a classroom and if they are injured. In terms of classroom locks, he recommends that teachers slide magnets in the door frame. Teachers struggle to get their keys into a lock in an emergency situation. As far as communications inside a school building, Mr. Heinle said that his radio does not work because there is too much concrete and steel. In an emergency, a fire alarm would make it difficult for him to hear his radio anyway. His department can remotely access the cameras in the interior of his school by laptop.

Mr. Heinle said that his school has swipe cards, which are cheaper than Knox boxes (\$5 each). His school does not use shelter-in-place anymore. The trend in the National School Resource Officers Association is to move away from shelter-in-place. He is part of an Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate (ALICE) school district. The principal will identify where the shooter is on the intercom but the district leaves it up to the teachers to decide what they want to do in an emergency situation. Most buildings in southern Illinois do not have school resource officers (SROs). Mr. Heinle said he believes the safest thing inside a school is an SRO but the cost is tremendous. His district thoroughly prepares all students (Pre-K to 12) for emergency situations. They hold tornado, fire and active shooter drills three or four times a year. The local and county police walk through the schools. Mr. Heinle said that he likes the color-coding system but he is not sure how useful it will be because it takes a long time for a SWAT team to assemble.

Chairman Vose said he went to a meeting of the Missouri and Illinois school board associations, law enforcement, private schools and public schools. St. Louis police emphasized establishing relationships with students. Mr. Heinle agreed that building trust is important. Dr. Bernat asked Mr. Heinle if he uses any particular criteria to identify kids who might present a threat. Mr. Heinle said that he does not know all of the students in his school by name but he talks to many students daily. If he sees students that are not acting themselves or if he sees a group of students, he will talk to them. He does not look for any particular demeanor or actions; he looks for changes in mood. Mr. Heinle noted that kids are creatures of habit so he identifies what seems abnormal. Mr. Heinle also said that his department constantly monitors social media.

Chairman Vose asked Mr. Heinle to send him information about the conference. Chairman Vose will send the information to school superintendents, Mr. Schwarm will send it to superintendents and principals, and Ms. Rosenthal will send it to Task Force members. Mr. Heinle said that Mia Ray Langheim of the Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center (STIC) has all of the articles he has written.

Julia Rietz, Champaign County State's Attorney

Mr. Tomlinson introduced Julia Rietz as a strong advocate for youth in Champaign County. Ms. Rietz was elected Champaign County State's Attorney in 2004. Mr. Tomlinson asked Ms. Rietz to speak with the Task Force about the Youth Assessment Center, created by Champaign Community Unit School District #4 and all of Champaign County. Ms. Rietz thanked the Task Force for the opportunity to speak about the Youth Assessment Center, especially because the Governor now has plans to close the Department of Juvenile Justice's Kewanee facility in July. The closure is supposed to save \$16 million for the state and there is discussion about how to use the funds to prevent kids from entering the juvenile justice system. Ms. Rietz said that the issues surrounding youth in the court system are important because if the youth get on the right track, they will hopefully not end up in the adult court system where the consequences are more severe and long-lasting.

Ms. Rietz noted that the community, court system and government bodies in Champaign County have funding sources. One funding source is the quarter cent sales tax, which was approved to fund facilities. The County had a youth detention center that needed to be replaced and Champaign County Board members decided that if they were going to build a detention center they wanted to set aside \$200,000 a year for delinquency prevention programs. The County Board turned the money over to the Mental Health Board. The money has been used in two ways: Parenting with Love and Limits and an alternative to the juvenile detention center. Parenting with Love and Limits is an evidence-based parent and youth counseling program. It follows a curriculum, has very specific outcomes and involves communities and schools. The program's website is www.gopll.com. The Youth Assessment Center started in 2012 and catches kids that are just getting involved with law enforcement, having issues in school or creating problems in their homes. The typical assessment process is so long that it can take months before youth receive the interventions they need. The community concluded that a Youth Assessment Center would serve as a different place to take youth to have them assessed and referred to programs, and would ensure that interventions are put into place immediately.

The Youth Assessment Center is run and staffed by the Champaign County Regional Planning Commission, a county organization that is responsible for providing social services – head start, elder care, assistance for heat and power bills, etc. The Youth Assessment Center receives funding from a variety of sources in addition to the quarter cent sales tax. The Mental Health Board in Champaign County receives grant money and the Regional Planning Commission is fully grant funded. Each of the cities contributes \$10,000 and the Youth Assessment Center receives some money from the school districts. Champaign Community Unit School District #4 gave the Youth Assessment Center a building to use rent-free and provides building maintenance funds. The building is accessible for parents and is a comfortable place for kids in crisis and their families to meet with counselors. Youth Assessment Center staff members are county employees and receive county benefits. They are all counselors and they also run the peer court program. There are no private partners but that is an opportunity that the Regional Planning Commission could explore. If Unit #4 sells the building, the Youth Assessment Center will need to find another space.

The building does not have the funding to stay open 24/7, but it is open until 10 p.m. and on weekends. Law enforcement can bring kids directly to the Youth Assessment Center instead of to the detention center. The kids meet with counselors and have a Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument (YASI) screening for risk assessment. The counselors refer them to a variety of local programs – peer court, Parenting with Love and Limits, the boys and girls club, a substance abuse treatment facility, and mental health treatment options. The counselors and law enforcement monitor the kids on a station adjustment. If they complete the formal station adjustment, their police reports never come the State's Attorney's office and the youth are kept out of the criminal justice system. In 2014, the Youth Assessment Center analyzed risk assessment scores and saw great improvement in the number of kids assessed that came in with high risk and left with low risk, as well as improvement in kids not having further contact with law enforcement.

The Youth Assessment Center is a great collaboration between organizations but has required mindset changes. It has been challenging to encourage law enforcement to view the Youth Assessment Center as an alternative to the detention center. It came down to the Champaign Police Chief saying that officers will bring kids to the Youth Assessment Center, and the detention center saying that officers cannot bring kids to their facility. Changes in the law, especially detention centers not being able to hold kids under 13 and law enforcement not being able to send misdemeanors to the Department of Juvenile Justice, require the criminal justice system to have these alternatives at the beginning. Schools have also had to change their mindsets. Previously, kids who were misbehaving in school would be kicked out and could then be arrested for criminal trespassing if they hung around the school. Through Senate Bill 100, schools have a new requirement of least restrictive discipline policies. Ms. Rietz added that the Youth Assessment Center requires a mindset change for those in social services, too, as they go into communities and are much more hands on with families than they have been in the past.

Mr. Henebry agreed that youth that are sentenced to a juvenile justice facility are more likely to be incarcerated as adults. Ms. Rietz said that there are studies that show that for adults, a longer period of incarceration is not effective because they become used to it. The Youth Assessment Center has about 500 referrals per year but they are trying to increase the number of kids brought directly to the building. It is available to all county law enforcement officers and schools. The Center also receives self-referrals and parent referrals. The County does not want the Youth Assessment Center to be only a law enforcement-based program; the County wants to give kids and families access to all of the Youth Assessment Center's programs.

Ms. Rietz explained that YASI is an evidence-based screening tool that service providers use to screen a child for risk. Based on a child's responses to a list of questions, the counselor determines if the child is at risk to reoffend, or at risk for violence, substance abuse, or mental health issues. There are many screening tools out there that social service providers use to help them determine what issues need to be addressed.

Ms. Rietz said that there are youth assessment centers across the country, but she is not aware of any others in Illinois. Chicago has a diversion-type program within the police department. Champaign County looked at a youth assessment center in Minneapolis when creating the County's program. Chairman Vose said that Sangamon County has monthly superintendents meetings dealing with mental health problems. Sangamon County is trying to create a program with the hospital and alternative schools. Mr. Henebry said that Peoria Public Schools District 150 also has a route for intervention. Chairman Vose said that he attended a charter school meeting around the \$42 million charter school grant that Illinois received. The group talked about options for students transitioning out of the Department of Juvenile Justice's facilities.

Ms. Rietz highlighted that youth assessment centers provide an alternative for kids who may be in midst of trauma or who are creating problems within a school. They offer an opportunity for immediate intervention and prevention through community-based programs. Mr. Tomlinson added that this addresses the mental health leg of the Task Force's triad. The Task Force talks about facility interventions and law enforcement interventions but the mental health interventions are being cut quickly. Youth assessment centers can potentially prevent violence. Mr. Tomlinson said that schools in Champaign County have seen a reduction in the number of expulsions and long-term suspensions. As much as a school does not want a child interrupting the learning process, if the child is not in school, there is no learning process going on. A 10-day suspension is ineffective. This is another tool that changes school culture and is a good best practice model to include in the Task Force's recommendation to the State Board of Education.

Chairman Vose asked Ms. Rietz to share her presentation with Ms. Rosenthal to disseminate to the Task Force. Ms. Rietz said that she would be happy to give tours of the Youth Assessment Center to Task Force members.

Public Comment

Janelle McClendon said that this is her first time listening to the Task Force and she has been very impressed. She asked how to share the information at school board meetings. Mr. Schwarm said that the Task Force will have an official report out in July. The deliberations and recommended best practices will be posted on ISBE's website. Mr. Schwarm encouraged Ms. McClendon to engage school board members and suggest things that she thinks should be talked about at school board meetings. It is specific in law how school boards can conduct a meeting and they can only consider things that are posted on agenda, but the law and the Open Meetings Act do require every school board to have time for public comment at every meeting. Mr. Tomlinson recommended that Ms. McClendon have a conversation with the board president or superintendent a week or so before the school board meeting. Ms. McClendon said that she feels ignored by her school board and that the entire public comment section at her school board's last meeting was shut down. Mr. Aranowski said that ISBE can provide technical assistance if she is having issues with her school district.

Ted Birren, the Director of Operations with Township High School District 214 in Arlington Heights, thanked the Task Force, especially Representative Sente, for inviting him to be part of the February 8 Physical Plant Subcommittee meeting. He stated from District 214's perspective that the District fully supports the recommendations of the Physical Plant Subcommittee. Mr. Birren added that Dr. Bernat's "See, Hear and Speak Up" policy document is a great piece of information that the district also supports. Mr. Henebry thanked Mr. Birren for the time he took to attend the Subcommittee meeting and the excellent information he shared.

Open Discussion and Next Steps

Mr. O'Connor, the Task Force's Vice-Chairperson, took over for Chairman Vose. Mr. O'Connor directed Ms. Rosenthal to schedule the next meeting.

Dr. Bernat said that he provided the "See, Hear and Speak Up" policy memo to two psychiatrists on the clinical faculty at Harvard Medical School and one psychologist. He will also be sharing it at Northwestern. He has an initial read by a psychiatrist who thought that it was excellent scholarship and the makings of something practical that could help spot situations. At the next meeting, he will have details to report to the Task Force.

Mr. O'Connor said that at the request of Senator Anderson, he spoke with the Grandview Group about their proposals. He indicated that the Task Force cannot endorse a vendor. He will forward their information to Ms. Rosenthal to send out to the Task Force.

Adjourn

Motion to adjourn: Moved by David Tomlinson and seconded by David Henebry. Voice vote. **Motion carried.** The meeting was adjourned at 3:05 p.m.

School Security and Standards Task Force

Meeting Agenda

April 15, 2016
1:00 p.m.

James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601



Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62777

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- I. Call to Order and Welcome
 - II. Roll Call
 - III. Approval of Minutes from February 19, 2016 Task Force Meeting and Minutes from February 8, 2016 Physical Plant Subcommittee Meeting
 - IV. Discussion of and Possible Vote on Physical Plant Subcommittee Recommendations
 - V. Discussion of and Possible Vote on “See, Hear and Speak Up” Program and Policy
 - VI. Discussion of and Possible Vote on Adoption of Federal Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Plans and Existing ISBE School Emergency & Crisis Response Plan Guide
 - VII. Public Comment
 - VIII. Open Discussion and Next Steps
 - IX. Adjourn

Task Force members wishing to participate via phone may use the following:

Telephone Number: 1-888-494-4032
Access Code: 3 6 3 3 7 5 2 7 0 9

**School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Summary**

Springfield - Illinois State Board of Education
Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois

Chicago - Illinois State Board of Education
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois

Friday, April 15, 2016
1:00 p.m.

Chairman Vose called the meeting to order at 1:04 p.m.

Members Present

Jeff Aranowski
Robert Bernat
David Henebry
Jeff Vose (Chairman)
Tad Williams

Members on the Phone

Tom Demmer, Rep.
Catherine McCrory
Patrick O'Connor (Vice-Chair)
Ben Schwarm
Carol Sente, Rep.

Members Absent

Neil Anderson, Sen.
Tom Cullerton, Sen.
Laura Frisch
Patrick Hartshorn
Roger Schnitzler
John Simonton
David Tomlinson
Steven Wilder

Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) Staff

Hannah Rosenthal

Members of the Public

Nick Giannini, Chief of Staff for Senator Tom Cullerton
Jacob Seukunian, Legislative Assistant for Senator Neil Anderson

Approval of Minutes from February 19, 2016 Task Force Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by David Henebry and seconded by Representative Carol Sente. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**

The Physical Plant Subcommittee will need to vote on the February 8, 2016 Physical Plant Subcommittee Meeting minutes at the next Subcommittee meeting and then the full Task Force can vote at next Task Force meeting.

Discussion of and Possible Vote on Physical Plant Subcommittee Recommendations

Physical Plant Subcommittee Chair David Henebry said that Subcommittee members met and reviewed all the commentary that they received. Representative Sente said that she and Representative Demmer want to speak with the rest of the Task Force about what recommendations need to go in the final report versus what is handled by rules or legislation. Representative Sente suggested backing up on the renovation/ addition issue that continues to stump Task Force members regarding the timeline or size of a project and if security changes would be required. She suggested that the recommendations include language similar to: “as school districts are considering capital projects with their boards and architects, they should review the best practices identified in this report, and as their projects and budgets seem feasible, we would like school districts to incorporate security best practices.” This way, the Task Force is not defining a renovation or addition size. Task Force members are encouraging decision-makers and their consultants to review their report, and depending on the scope of the project and their budgets, see what is reasonable.

Representative Sente recalled earlier conversations about the Task Force continuing on as a unit but not meeting all the time. Representative Sente suggested an annual meeting for the Task Force to review new security protocol. Members would have a mechanism to come back together but it would not be unduly burdensome. If the financial situation or security protocol changed, Task Force members could make updates. Representative Demmer and Representative Sente spoke about how individuals planning new schools should make every effort to incorporate the best practices immediately because the cost is lower. In terms of legislation, however, if consultants say they can address the goal in a slightly different way, the Representatives questioned if the Task Force wants to be that prescriptive. Representative Sente said that the heaviest emphasis in the Task Force’s final report should definitely be that new schools take security issues seriously and incorporate the best practices.

Regarding the color-coding of floor plans, Representative Sente spoke with Pat O’Connor, Representative Demmer, several superintendents and first responders and concluded that it is highly beneficial to have a uniform color code. One color does not have to mean something specific to a school district or to a first responder, but they should seem reasonable and uniform. Representative Sente suggested that schools keep a legend on their maps until people become familiar with the color code. Mr. Henebry’s selection – with six areas identified with different colors (main entrance and administrative area in orange, hallways and corridors in yellow, classrooms in green, public spaces in blue, unoccupied spaces in gray, and electrical room in red) – makes logical sense. Representative Sente thought that the Task Force should allow school district three months from the date of the report to talk to consultants, ask architects to update the colors on the floor plans, and talk to first responders. Mr. Henebry added that if someone wanted to differ from one of the requirements for new construction, they could send a letter to ISBE for review. He can add language explaining this review process. Mr. Henebry will change the language to “recommended” for all the items listed under additions and renovations. Mr. Henebry said that the Subcommittee talked about leaving square footage in the recommendations as a benchmark so that if a school district is only adding two classrooms, the district does not have to wait for a full review of the requirements. Representative Sente would prefer that the square footage be taken out for renovations and additions so that there is not a threshold. She is okay with saying that after the school board and consultants review the feasibility of incorporating the items into the capital project they would submit their thoughts in a letter to ISBE.

Mr. Aranowski asked if this is going to be part of the final report or a series of recommendations to the General Assembly, maybe through Representative Sente or another legislator. Task Force members could vote on the document with the edits that were discussed or the Physical Plant Subcommittee could edit the document and Task Force members could vote on the entire updated document at the next meeting. Representative Sente and Representative Demmer agreed that they would be the chief sponsors on any piece of legislation coming out of the Task Force. Representative Sente said that it would be good to identify soon what would be in legislation; unless there is something pressing, these could all be recommendations included in the final report. Mr. Aranowski confirmed that Task Force members made two recommendations to the General Assembly for statutory change in their report to the Governor’s Office and the General Assembly in December 2015: 1) that the Task Force lives on past June 30; and 2) that one of the required safety drills is unannounced. Mr. O’Connor said that he is concerned

with laying out too much for legislation but he thinks it is a good idea to promulgate best practices that can be used by districts across the state. His biggest concern is being unduly burdensome. He said that if he were a superintendent doing a major renovation and he knew there were best practices for security out there, he would look at them. Representative Sente recalled that at a previous Subcommittee meeting, the only additional potential piece she heard to add to the legislation was telling school districts to distribute the report to their boards and administrative staff. She does not feel strongly one way or another so she does not see a need to add anything more to the legislative section. Representative Demmer added that if he and Representative Sente were to put some of these things in legislation, there would be a lot more scrutiny and the Task Force would have to air on the side of being gentle. The Task Force does have the ability through the final report to put out recommendations and guidance without worrying about exceptions. He would prefer going the report direction and understanding that as schools and board members are undergoing these projects, this is a great resource for them. Ben Schwarm said he could not support adding new unfunded mandates for school districts right now.

Regarding color-coding, Mr. Schwarm is concerned about standardizing colors statewide. A lot of school districts are already purchasing programs through vendors and have digital blueprints that are color-coded. They are working very well and the responders love them but they may not be the exact colors that the Physical Plant Subcommittee would want to put out there as a recommendation. Task Force members need to be careful because they do not want school districts or first responders to have to undo everything they have done in the last couple of years. Representative Sente said that she does not feel strongly about the uniformity of colors but wants to emphasize that changing the colors is easy; on a software program nowadays it does not take very long. Unless there is a central location and first responders are coming from outside of the area, if the local school districts and the local first responders understand the color-coding and like the colors they have chosen, she does not care about the specific coloration. Mr. O'Connor said that the Task Force does not want to reinvent the wheel if there are programs out there that are already working for communities, but realistically, it would be nice to have a standard. School districts are already using different colors that are working with their first responders, but if the Task Force wants a state uniform color, that could be proposed. Mr. O'Connor said that if he was sending people to respond outside of his area, they would be working at the direction of the locals so first responders could probably get by without a uniform color. Representative Sente said that schools can change the colors using their existing software and she is not suggesting that districts use a different software program or hire a consultant.

Chairman Vose reiterated that on the Physical Plant Recommendations document version 1.5 Final Draft, 1.1 through 1.6 were recommended as requirements and 1.7 through 1.9 were recommendations. Everything listed as "required" would shift to "recommended" and the Task Force would vote on the recommendations as a whole. Chairman Vose said that his only concern is that the changes are not in writing. Mr. Aranowski said he did not find any of the recommendations to be objectionable. He thinks it is all great practice. Chairman Vose said that if there are no objections, he would prefer to vote now instead of voting on the updated document at the next meeting. There were no objections to 1.1 or 1.2. Regarding 1.3, Mr. Henebry explained identifiable boundaries. He said that this could be a fence or a hedge or something that defines the edge of the property that is distinguishable. This is in the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CEPTD) recommendations that the Task Force already adopted. In a rural area on a 40 acre site, sometimes a post on each corner and the way the grass is mowed can distinguish where the edge is. Mr. Henebry said he does not want to get too prescriptive on this. There are a lot of different ways that schools can distinguish the edge of the property. He did not want to require a fence around all school properties. Mr. Schwarm said he was thinking about larger properties, those with irregular boundaries, and those that are in residential areas. Schools have to go by local zoning ordinances so they could not put up fences anyway. He said he realizes that this is just a recommendation but he thinks it could cause trouble down the road for someone. There were no objections to 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 or 1.8.

Regarding 1.9, Representative Sente said the Task Force should be sure to add other options, not just the blue pull stations. For example, there is the cellphone app. Mr. Henebry said that the sentence needs to be restructured or the language changed such that it is clear that there are other technologies out there that achieve what the blue boxes (used in District 112) achieve. The idea is to be able to generate an alert from various places within the building. Chairman Vose suggested writing "provide pull stations or alternative alarms" and removing the "blue"

piece. He said the Task Force needs to come up with a generic way of writing it without advocating for one specific company. Robert Bernat said it is not the name of the company. He thought it made sense to put the word “blue” in there because it differentiates these from fire pull stations. When people think blue they think police. Mr. Aranowski said that the Task Force could put in the final report a footnote that says “Nothing in this document is intended to endorse a company. Some terms are being used loosely.” It would be good to have a disclaimer for the whole document. Mr. O’Connor suggested inserting “panic station,” “pull station” or “emergency communication station.” That will be generic enough and anyone working in the system will understand it. Dr. Bernat asked about using the word “police.” The pull stations are not for fire or generic first responders. He suggested “law enforcement pull station.”

Motion for the Task Force to adopt the Physical Plant Subcommittee’s recommendations, labeled 1.5 Final Draft, by amending 1.9 to remove the word “blue” and to insert “law enforcement” so that 1.9 reads “law enforcement pull station,” and for these recommendations to be incorporated as suggestions and best practices to school districts in the Task Force’s final report to the State Board of Education, along with a footnote that states that nothing in the report is meant to endorse a specific product or a specific company: Moved by Jeff Aranowski and seconded by Representative Carol Sente. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, Yes; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Not Present; Demmer, Yes; Frisch, Not Present; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O’Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Not Present; Schwarm, Yes; Sente, Yes; Simonton, Not Present; Tomlinson, Not Present; Vose, Yes; Wilder, Not Present; Williams, Yes. **The motion passed with 10 yes votes.**

Chairman Vose thanked everyone for their contributions to the discussion. Mr. Aranowski thanked the Subcommittee for the recommendations. Part of the task of the Task Force, whether it is in the first report, second report or just in terms of analysis, is to give consideration to securing physical structures. The work that was done with the Physical Plant Recommendations specifically met a targeted need within the obligations in the statute.

Discussion of and Possible Vote on “See, Hear and Speak Up” Program and Policy

Mr. Aranowski said he would like more time to take a look at the “See, Hear and Speak Up” document. He asked if anyone would have any objections to tabling it until the next meeting. Representative Sente said that she understands that some districts or agencies do not like the “See Something, Say Something” system. She asked if the Task Force wants to be more general and encourage schools to have discussions with their students and their teachers, whether in an assembly setting or one-on-one. Schools should tell students and teachers that when they observe an individual behavior that is out of place, it is good culture in the school to do x, y and z. She asked if the Task Force is looking to specifically adopt “See, Hear and Speak Up.” Mr. Aranowski said that school districts or schools may not know how to engage in this conversation or where to start without resources on what might work for them. From his perspective, it is important that they have something. Maybe not “See, Hear and Speak Up” but something intentional that reaches staff, students and visitors to the extent possible (parents, community members) and that addresses what to do in emergencies. His initial take on “See, Hear and Speak Up” is that it is great to promote to school districts but it may not work for a particular district or a particular school within a district, and they may have something else. Dr. Bernat said that there is not anything else; this is cutting edge and he does not know of any district that has a different method. The federal government’s “See Something, Say Something” identifies suspicious activity as an unusual item or situation, someone asking curious questions, or someone paying unusual attention to a facility, which leaves schools nowhere. “See, Hear and Speak Up” is designed to put meat on the bones. Nobody is going to remember everything, but if they remember something of this, it will help them. It is broken down into the 4 Ms: means, motive, method and mentality, which will get someone thinking as to whether what they saw is unusual, out of the ordinary or merits further look. Representative Sente asked how this falls in line with the Task Force’s general concept of not highlighting one specific organization, company or vendor. Dr. Bernat clarified that this is not an organization. This came from the Task Force’s Prevention Subcommittee after research, including research from Dr. Peter Langman who spoke with the Task Force. It is not copyrighted; Dr. Bernat just used ™ as a placeholder temporarily. Mr. Aranowski said that he is not an attorney but he can ask one of ISBE’s attorneys if the Task Force can create a document that could be copyrighted. He thinks that since it was developed through a public body, it is a public document. Representative

Sente said that she did not know that a subcommittee that drafted this. Mr. O'Connor said that he thinks that Representative Sente's concern is that the Task Force is narrowing down to one methodology. He does not have a concern as far as recommending this as a methodology that can be explored. Mr. Aranowski said that the Task Force should take an extra couple of weeks to look at "See, Hear and Speak Up" and then put it on the agenda for a formal vote at the next meeting. At that time, Dr. Bernat can do a refresher of what it is, what it is not and specific content. Representative Sente agreed with Mr. O'Connor and said she would like the Task Force recommendations to suggest something more general, such as "We encourage schools to have these conversations with their teachers, their students, etc. There are various resources out there. See appendix for one such resource. If you have one that works for you that would be satisfactory as well."

Chairman Vose said that a lot of the discussion on this specific program goes along with the Training Subcommittee's focus on asking school districts to adopt procedures for students and staff to follow in the event of breached security or an intruder. He asked Mr. Aranowski to update Task Force members on the federal grant and what Illinois will be able to do with those federal dollars or the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) grant that the ISBE is working on. The Task Force may have opportunities to push these out through a potential website, academies or professional development for educators. Mr. Henebry said that there are differences between "See Something, Say Something" and "See, Hear and Speak Up." To him, this is a policy issue so it should be adopted at the school board level throughout the state. He thinks school boards should be aware of what the differences are and the Task Force should define those differences in the final report, so the people who are consuming the report can sit down and discuss it as a policy and determine to what extent they want to go beyond "See Something, Say Something" or adopt this as their policy. Mr. Aranowski agreed but added that "See Something, Say Something" is very general. "See, Hear and Speak Up" is not necessarily a departure from that, it implements it and fills in the blanks. Chairman Vose confirmed that the Task Force will push agenda item #5 to the next meeting.

Discussion of and Possible Vote on Adoption of Federal Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Plans and Existing ISBE School Emergency & Crisis Response Plan Guide

Chairman Vose reviewed the Task Force's charge. First, the Task Force was charged with gathering information concerning security in schools as it presently exists. Chairman Vose thinks Task Force members accomplished this through the presentations at their meetings. Second, the Task Force was charged with receiving reports, testimony from individuals, school districts, principals, teachers, security experts, architects, engineers, law enforcement community. Chairman Vose thinks these were accomplished within Task Force meetings and at the public forums. Third, the Task Force was charged with creating minimum standards for securing schools. Chairman Vose believes the minimum standards are there. A lot of these items have been covered as Task Force members reviewed other states and Illinois' Safety Drill Act. It was about ten years ago that the sheriffs, Chief of Police, state police, fire marshal, fire chiefs, Regional Offices of Education (ROEs), school boards and the State Board of Education came together to create the Safety Drill Act. Chairman Vose said that the Task Force has made some excellent recommendations. The Physical Plant Subcommittee worked through the fourth charge, giving consideration to physical structure and security recommendations. Mr. Schwarm asked if Task Force members were going to vote to accept the Training Subcommittee's revised recommendations because he did not see the Training Subcommittee's final report on the agenda. He said that when the Task Force gets to the Training Subcommittee report and to item #6, that will cover the model security plan policy. Mr. Aranowski said that he does not think there was any reason why it was left off the agenda and it can be added as an action item for the next meeting.

Chairman Vose confirmed that Task Force members have accomplished most of their tasks with the ISBE School Emergency & Crisis Response Plan Guide, the Federal Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Plans, the Illinois Association of School Board's Policy Reference Education Subscription Service (PRESS) items, and the suggested possible funding recommendations. Mr. Aranowski said that the IEMA grant for training will be available in the summer. There are going to be regionally-based trainings for school districts, ROEs and first responders. He has had some discussion with ISBE's federal partners. A lot of what the Task Force is doing ISBE can push out to

training. The training will be Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved and specific to Illinois.

Regarding the Task Force's charge to create a model security plan policy, Mr. Aranowski highlighted the last word, "policy." Federal guidance already exists for individual school emergency operations plans, and in looking at the Task Force's charge, the federal guidance is great. It does not say what a school's plan should look like; rather, it provides a shell of what a plan should look like and poses a series of questions. It gets at the core of what emergency operations plans should be by putting more emphasis on planning and less on the final product. It encourages schools to not just put their name on a template. Mr. Aranowski noted that the federal guidance was developed by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and FEMA, and has been vetted extensively. The guidance has a chart where schools can prioritize hazards specific to their regions, and includes pieces on Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) implications, student privacy rights, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) guidelines, psychological first aid, active shooter situations and how school climate can contribute to crises. Mr. Aranowski said that his thought is that Task Force members adopt the federal guidance as their model security plan policy whereby districts would go through the document in their planning. The Task Force can incorporate any recommendations from the Training Subcommittee into the final report. In the coming months, the federal government will also be releasing district emergency operations plan guidance. Dr. Bernat reminded Task Force members that David Esquith from ED discussed the guidance with them. There are sister documents for higher education and religious institutions. Dr. Bernat thinks that it is useful for ISBE to join with these other entities because of the uniformity. Mr. Aranowski said he wanted to be explicitly clear that the law requires the Task Force to create a model security plan policy. The Task Force would be adapting a policy, not creating one. Mr. Aranowski thinks it would be ludicrous to reinvent the wheel when so much work has been done by ISBE's federal partners in the area already. Mr. O'Connor said that if Task Force members take the federal guidelines and draft them towards their policy, Task Force members would be doing the state a great service because the school security grants in higher education and K-12 are getting tighter on their requirements. If Illinois is going to compete for federal dollars in the future, the grants are closer to the federal requirements. Mr. Aranowski agreed that if the federal government is moving in this direction, using the federal guidelines would only have the effect of setting Illinois schools up to be successful in applying for grants. Mr. Schwarm added that this fits exactly into the Training Subcommittee's final report and what is current practice in school districts. The Training Subcommittee's second recommendation is that "School districts adopt a policy that requires an Emergency Operations Plan; a designated District Safety Coordinator; a safety team for each school building; objectives substantially similar to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s Guide to Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, and; a school safety drill plan (including at least one drill to be unscheduled and random)."

Motion for the Task Force to vote on adopting this as its model security plan policy to go to the State Board of Education and to also consider additions and modifications pursuant to the Training Subcommittee: Moved by Ben Schwarm and seconded by Robert Bernat. Discussion: Tad Williams suggested that the Task Force wait to vote until the next meeting and give everyone a chance to look at the Training Subcommittee recommendations again. It is not technically on the agenda. Mr. Aranowski said that the Task Force can vote on this next month but he wants to make sure that ISBE staff have time to work on the final report. He thinks the Task Force should be fine as long as a draft is done by the second week in June.

Motion amended to support item #6 on the agenda: Moved as amended by Ben Schwarm and seconded by Jeff Aranowski. Voice vote. **Motion carried.** Task Force members will discuss and vote on the Training Subcommittee's final report at the next meeting.

Mr. Aranowski asked if he could make a simplistic statement about compliance and not about quality. He does not intend for this to swing members' potential votes but if the Task Force does not have a plan policy by the next meeting in May, the Task Force will fall behind in drafting the final report. Mr. Aranowski asked Task Force members to let him know as soon as possible if they will not be supporting the adoption of the federal guidance.

Open Discussion and Next Steps

Mr. Aranowski asked Ms. Rosenthal to resend the Federal Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Plans, ISBE's existing School Emergency & Crisis Response Plan Guide, the Training Subcommittee's final report and the "See, Hear and Speak Up" document in the same email. Chairman Vose said that Task Force members need to be prepared to vote so that they can get the report in. Dr. Bernat said that the next meeting should be the hard deadline. Chairman Vose confirmed that the Task Force would table agenda items #5 and #6 for the next meeting. Representative Sente requested that the attachments sent via email have dates on them. Mr. Aranowski said that Ms. Rosenthal will look at legislative calendars and will reach out to legislative staff to make sure the legislators are available for the vote. He said he appreciates their support and efforts and does not want to move forward without them. The Task Force needs to hold the vote sooner rather than later in the event that they need to have meetings in May and June to finalize everything. Representative Sente said that they will be down in Springfield every day in May. A Friday afternoon will probably work best. Mr. Henebry said he may be moving to India so he may not be able to participate.

Adjourn

Motion to adjourn: Moved by Jeff Aranowski and seconded by Representative Carol Sente. Voice vote. **Motion carried.** The meeting was adjourned at 2:29 p.m.

School Security and Standards Task Force

Meeting Agenda

June 8, 2016
10:00 a.m.

James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph Street
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601



Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois 62777

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- I. Call to Order and Welcome
 - II. Roll Call
 - III. Approval of Minutes from April 15, 2016 Task Force Meeting
 - IV. Vote on Training Subcommittee's Recommendations
 - V. Vote on "See, Hear and Speak Up" Program and Policy
 - VI. Vote on Adoption of Federal Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Plans and Existing ISBE School Emergency & Crisis Response Plan Guide
 - VII. Discussion and Approval of ISBE Staff Putting Together Final Report to the State Board of Education
 - VIII. Public Comment
 - IX. Open Discussion and Next Steps
 - X. Adjourn

Task Force members wishing to participate via phone may use the following:

Telephone Number: 1-888-494-4032
Access Code: 3 6 3 3 7 5 2 7 0 9

**Note: as this was the final meeting of the Task Force, these minutes were not formally approved.
However, the draft minutes are being included for transparency purposes.**

**School Security and Standards Task Force
Meeting Summary**

Springfield - Illinois State Board of Education
Alzina Building
100 North First Street
Videoconference Room, 3rd Floor
Springfield, Illinois

Chicago - Illinois State Board of Education
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph
Videoconference Room, 14th Floor
Chicago, Illinois

Wednesday, June 8, 2016
10:00 a.m.

Chairman Vose called the meeting to order at 10:08 a.m.

Members Present

Jeff Aranowski
Robert Bernat
David Henebry
Jeff Vose (Chairman)

Members on the Phone

Tom Cullerton, Sen.
Laura Frisch
Catherine McCrory
Patrick O'Connor (Vice-Chair)
Ben Schwarm
John Simonton
Steven Wilder
Tad Williams

Members Absent

Neil Anderson, Sen.
Tom Demmer, Rep.
Patrick Hartshorn
Roger Schnitzler
Carol Sente, Rep.
David Tomlinson

Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) Staff

Hannah Rosenthal

Members of the Public

Sheila Sims, Legislative Aide for Senator Neil Anderson

Approval of Minutes from April 15, 2016 Task Force Meeting

Motion for approval of the minutes: Moved by Patrick O'Connor and seconded by David Henebry. Voice vote.

Motion carried.

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Vote on Training Subcommittee's Recommendations

Jeff Aranowski noted that Task Force members were set to vote on the Training Subcommittee recommendations at the last Task Force meeting but they did not have a quorum. He thinks that the recommendations are highly appropriate and approachable in the sense that they provide needed direction to school districts without taking a cookie cutter approach.

Motion for the School Security and Standards Task Force to adopt the recommendations of the Training Subcommittee on the document dated April 11, 2016: Moved by Jeff Aranowski and seconded by Patrick O'Connor. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, Yes; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Yes; Demmer, Not Present; Frisch, Yes; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O'Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Not Present; Schwarm, Yes; Sente, Not Present; Simonton, Not Present; Tomlinson, Not Present; Vose, Yes; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Yes. **The motion passed with 11 yes votes.**

Vote on "See, Hear and Speak Up" Program and Policy

Mr. Aranowski reminded Task Force members that the "See, Hear and Speak Up" framework was drafted by the Prevention Subcommittee several months ago with review from researchers and academics in the field. It is in alignment with the latest research in behavioral threat assessment. The basis of the framework came out of "See Something, Say Something," copyrighted by the federal government. There are no implementation resources for districts, teachers or students in terms of what to do when they see something. Using federal funds, Illinois has been training some school districts and college campuses on how to identify threats and warning signs, and at the same time teaching them to be patient and careful so as not to have any small instance or statement misconstrued as a possible threat. Mr. Aranowski clarified that the recommendation here would not be to require school districts to adopt this framework; it would be that ISBE make this available to school districts. It would not be an additional mandate to school districts. David Henebry said that of all the committees he has worked on, this document from the Prevention Subcommittee is one of the best prepared and research-based documents he has seen compiled.

Motion for the Task Force to recommend to the State Board of Education that districts consider incorporating "See, Hear and Speak Up" into their security planning; and for the Task Force to recommend that, should sufficient funding be available, the State Board of Education engage with other governmental and nongovernmental entities to provide technical assistance and training in developing this framework: Moved by David Henebry and seconded by Jeff Aranowski. Discussion: Mr. Aranowski said that this could be a recommendation to ISBE that if ISBE has the staff and resources to provide ongoing training, whether it be through ISBE or through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) or some other governmental or nongovernmental agency, it would help clearly define roles in this framework and also allow it to be updated as needed. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, Yes; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Yes; Demmer, Not Present; Frisch, Yes; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O'Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Not Present; Schwarm, Yes; Sente, Not Present; Simonton, Not Present; Tomlinson, Not Present; Vose, Yes; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Yes. **The motion passed with 11 yes votes.**

Vote on Adoption of Federal Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Plans and Existing ISBE School Emergency & Crisis Response Plan Guide

Mr. Aranowski said that he has been going back to the original obligations of the Task Force to make sure members are meeting them. One obligation was to create a model security plan policy; Mr. Aranowski emphasized the word "policy." The federal government (U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal

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Bureau of Investigation, and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) in 2013 released a Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Plans. Mr. Aranowski floated the idea of voting on the document, asking why the Task Force should recreate a model policy if there is one that has already been researched through the federal government. The guidance does not tell schools exactly what to say in their plans; it tells them what kind of questions to ask (e.g. what are the threats in my area? What might be more likely to happen? Who are the individuals I should be reaching out to in my community to be part of this process? What about FERPA and implications for student records?) As a whole, this is keying districts into not just developing a plan but asking questions that will then yield something that is specific to an individual school. In addition, FEMA in November 2013 developed a Sample School Emergency Operations Plan that was in complete alignment with the guide. Mr. Aranowski said that his thought process is to use these documents to meet the Task Force's mandate to create a model security plan policy. The irony is that both documents are already on ISBE's website. Mr. Aranowski said that ISBE could send out the documents with more intentional communication.

Mr. Aranowski read his proposed motion that the Task Force adopts the 2013 Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operation Plans and the Sample School Emergency Operations Plan created by FEMA in November 2013. Mr. Henebry said that he would like districts to include their architect of record as they are developing their plans. Too often school districts propose a solution that conflicts with Health/Life Safety. They need the architect present through the process to make sure that they do not violate something that is going to show up on a 10 year survey. Mr. Aranowski said that he has no objection to adding "consulting with the architect of record" if Mr. Henebry thinks it is important. If districts are using the guidance the way it is intended, the architect, as a member of the school community, would be part of the planning process.

*Motion for the Task Force to 1)in fulfillment of its obligation to create a model security plan policy and in an effort not to duplicate work and recreate research-based policies that have already been developed, recommend that districts adopt the 2013 Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operation Plans and the Sample School Emergency Operations Plan created by FEMA in November 2013; 2) recommend that local adoption of such policies includes participation by the district's architect of record; and 3) include these recommendations in the final report submitted to the State Board of Education with an additional recommendation that ISBE formally communicate this with the field: Moved as amended by David Henebry and seconded as amended by Robert Bernat. Discussion: Mr. Schwarm noted that he supports this. The Illinois Association of School Boards (IASB) has a comprehensive Policy Reference Education Subscription Service (PRESS) policy on school safety plans. Mr. Aranowski said that this would be in alignment with what is already happening in many districts. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, Yes; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Yes; Demmer, Not Present; Frisch, Yes; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O'Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Not Present; Schwarm, Yes; Sente, Not Present; Simonton, Not Present; Tomlinson, Not Present; Vose, Yes; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Yes. **The motion passed with 11 yes votes.***

Discussion and Approval of ISBE Staff Putting Together Final Report to the State Board of Education

Chairman Vose asked Task Force members if they need another meeting to review the final report to the State Board of Education before it is submitted. Mr. Aranowski reminded Task Force members that they did this in December for the report that went out to the General Assembly. At the Task Force meeting in early December, there was a motion that allowed ISBE staff to craft the report. It went back to Task Force members for comments but they never met back together for final approval. Mr. Aranowski emphasized that the idea is not for ISBE to monopolize this report. Task Force members will see drafts and have the opportunity to comment. This is just a way to not have to meet again. If it is the group's desire to meet, Task Force members will need to do so as soon as possible because it is going to take a couple weeks to draft the

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report and the Task Force needs to get it in the week before June 30. ISBE staff will not change anything; the report will consist of what is adopted by the group. If Task Force members have any suggestions for content, those can be made all the way up until the report is submitted, as long as the Task Force has voted to allow that process to move forward. Chairman Vose noted that it has been difficult to get quorums because of the time of the year. His recommendation as Chair is that Task Force members go ahead and make a motion to approve of ISBE staff putting the report together and pushing it out to Task Force members to make comments and suggestions. Mr. O'Connor agreed that timeliness is important. Dr. Bernat asked if ISBE staff need volunteers to help put together the report and volunteered to help in whatever capacity if he is needed. Chairman Vose asked those interested in assisting with the report to reach out to him, Mr. Aranowski or Hannah Rosenthal.

Motion for the approval of ISBE staff to put together the Final Report: Moved by Robert Bernat and seconded by Patrick O'Connor. Roll call vote: Anderson, Not Present; Aranowski, Yes; Bernat, Yes; Cullerton, Not Present; Demmer, Not Present; Frisch, Not Present; Hartshorn, Not Present; Henebry, Yes; McCrory, Yes; O'Connor, Yes; Schnitzler, Not Present; Schwarm, Yes; Sente, Not Present; Simonton, Yes; Tomlinson, Not Present; Vose, Yes; Wilder, Yes; Williams, Yes. **The motion passed with 10 yes votes.**

Open Discussion and Next Steps

Dr. Bernat reminded Task Force members of their past discussion about trying to find some way for them to continue on with their mission. Chairman Vose recalled that Task Force members voted to continue meeting as a Task Force once a year. Mr. Aranowski said that there are two ways to approach this: 1) get a legislative extension, which any of the legislators on the Task Force could do; or 2) continue as a group in an ad hoc way. Task Force members would not necessarily be reporting in an official capacity without legislation enabling them but they would still be able to push information out and make recommendations to other agencies. Mr. Aranowski's opinion is that they should ask the Task Force members who are legislators if they would be willing to float something in the fall in veto session to extend the work of the Task Force. If that does not happen, Task Force members can still meet; they will have just lost their official capacity to make formal recommendations.

Chairman Vose asked about any further developments with the grant with IEMA. Mr. Aranowski said that it is moving forward. It looks like August is when the money will be flowing for training purposes. When he has more information, Mr. Aranowski will make sure everyone on the Task Force is included on those next steps. If the Task Force gets an extension, he will make sure the Task Force is working in concert with the grant. Chairman Vose noted that there will be related discussions at the Joint Annual Conference (Triple I) of IASB, the Illinois Association of School Administrators (IASA) and the Illinois Association of School Business Officials (IASBO) in November. Chairman Vose said that veto session is same time as the conference so if Task Force members did have a meeting, a time in November would be good. Dr. Bernat asked Chairman Vose to consider asking Representative Sente or any of the other legislators on the Task Force to try to bring this forward so that Task Force members can still continue with state imprimatur. Mr. Henebry said that it was Representative Sente's idea that Task Force members revisit once a year.

Mr. Aranowski thanked all Task Force members for their work and dedication. Travel has not been reimbursed and some members have traveled a considerable way, especially for the public hearings across the state. Mr. Aranowski said he has been on many task forces and commissions that have very little to do with impacting kids, but Task Force members had great discussions and their work means something. He is proud of how members conducted themselves and the products they have released, both the one in December and the one they will release later this month. He thanked Ms. Rosenthal for her support and for keeping the Task Force on track. Chairman Vose also said he appreciates everyone's time. He thanked Ms.

**Note: as this was the final meeting of the Task Force, these minutes were not formally approved.
However, the draft minutes are being included for transparency purposes.**

Rosenthal for keeping him on task as Chair. She will follow up with the report and getting the Task Force back together in fall.

Adjourn

Motion to adjourn: Moved by David Henebry and seconded by Robert Bernat. Voice vote. **Motion carried.**
The meeting was adjourned at 10:37 a.m.

Appendix E: Public Hearing Dates and Notice

For Immediate Release

Nov. 4, 2015

School Security and Standards Task Force holding public hearings across state

Public feedback will help guide the task force's recommendations for minimum school security standards

SPRINGFIELD – The School Security and Standards Task Force is asking community members to share their input on school safety issues during a series of public hearings to help guide its recommendations to the General Assembly, the governor, and the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE).

Public Act 98-695 created the task force within ISBE to research school security in the state and to draft minimum standards for schools to use to provide a safer learning environment for the children of Illinois. Per law, the task force must “receive reports and testimony from individuals, school district superintendents, principals, teachers, security experts, architects, engineers, and the law enforcement community” as part of its work.

Public Act 99-65 extended the task force’s deadline to Jan. 1, 2016, to submit recommendations for changes to the current law to the General Assembly and the governor. The task force must submit recommendations for model security plan policies to ISBE on or before July 1, 2016.

For more information about the task force, visit www.isbe.net/SSSTF/default.htm.

The public hearings will take place at the following times and locations:

Nov. 10, 6 p.m., Lisle – Universal Technical Institute, 2611 Corporate West Drive

Nov. 12, 6 p.m., Springfield – Illinois Association of School Boards Office, 2921 Baker Drive

Dec. 2, 6 p.m., Carterville – John A. Logan College, Building H, Room 127

Those who are unable to attend the hearings may send their thoughts and recommendations to schoolsafety@isbe.net.

**Appendix F: Executive Summary and Recommendations from
January 2016 Report**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FROM JANUARY 1, 2016 REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Public Act 98-0695, as amended by Public Act 99-0065, seeks to strengthen the safety and security of Illinois schools by charging the School Security and Standards Task Force (the “Task Force”) with developing legislative recommendations and drafting model plans and policies for use by schools. At the outset of the Task Force’s deliberations, discussion took place with respect to the utility of recommending additional legislative requirements or to provide best practices and resources to districts.

On December 15, 2015, the Task Force voted unanimously to adopt the following guiding principle in conducting its present and future work:

With the exception of the statutory recommendations contained herein, (see Legislative Recommendations in Section IV) between now and its dissolution, in addition to its statutory obligations, the Task Force shall strictly devote its work to expanding the provision of technical assistance, resources, and training to empower districts and communities to provide for the safety and security of the students and staff they serve.

The Task Force members wanted to be cognizant of unfunded mandates, varying resource levels of school districts throughout the state, and local control. Our goal was to identify best practices that would not be overly prescriptive in method so that school districts could incorporate existing programs/efforts that meet student safety goals and they could proceed with the Task Force's recommendations as their budgets allow. In such a way, the bulk of the Task Force’s work, deliberation, and recommendations will be through outreach to the field and its report due to the Illinois State Board of Education on or before July 1, 2016.

Ultimately, the Task Force votes to recommend the following legislative measures to the Illinois General Assembly and the Governor:

- 1. The Illinois School Security and Standards Task Force should be extended for an additional year in its current form.**
- 2. In order to provide better evaluation of real time staff training, the School Safety Drill Act should be amended to require one of the existing annual drills to be unscheduled and random.**

That said, the Task Force also recommends a series of best practices that schools and school districts may choose, at their option, to incorporate as they see fit (see Section IV). This listing of best practices does not constitute legislative recommendations of the Task Force. Rather, the list is being provided in this document as a way to help educate and inform legislators of the issues facing school districts and potential actions that districts may choose to adopt to address such issues.

As noted in Section II of this document, the Task Force must, on or before July 1, 2016, submit a report to the State Board of Education on specific recommendations for model security plan policies for schools to access and use as a guideline. The best practices identified in this document may form part of the report submitted to the State Board of Education.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE FROM JANUARY 1, 2016
REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

For purposes of this report, the recommendations of the Task Force have been divided into A) Legislative Recommendations for the consideration of the General Assembly and Governor; and B) Best Practice Recommendations for the consideration of schools and school districts.

A. Legislative Recommendations

The Task Force recommends the following legislative measures to the General Assembly and Governor:

- 1. The Illinois School Security and Standards Task Force should be extended for an additional year in its current form.**

Rationale: Under current law [P.A. 99-0065, 105 ILCS 5/2-3.160 (e)], the Task Force is abolished on July 2, 2015. However, school safety issues are often fluid and subject to change with the emergence of new technologies, local/state/world developments, and variances in available resources. Extending the life and work of the Task Force will allow for a more complete review of new and changing issues and provide districts with updated information, resources, and technical assistance.

- 2. In order to provide better evaluation of real time staff training, the School Safety Drill Act should be amended to require one of the existing annual drills to be unscheduled and random.**

Rationale: Pursuant to the School Safety Drill Act [105 ILCS 128], each school must conduct a minimum of six annual drills: three (3) fire evacuation drills, one (1) bus evacuation drill, one (1) law enforcement drill, and one (1) severe weather and shelter-in-place drill (see Section III for specific requirements). In order for administrators, first responders, and emergency managers to effectively gauge the readiness of both staff and students, it would be of benefit to ensure that at least one of the required annual drills, at the district's option, is unscheduled and not made privy to staff in advance.

B. Potential Best Practice Recommendations for Schools and School Districts to Consider

The Task Force will continue to study and vet various practices and programs for possible recommendations to schools and school districts that they can consider at their discretion, including the following. A full list of recommendations and best practices will be contained in the final Task Force report to the State Board of Education.

1. Creation and Training of a Districtwide (or, for Nonpublic Schools, a Schoolwide) Threat Team, Including a Local Law Enforcement Representative. The emergency exceptions to Federal Educational Rights Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Illinois School Student Records

Act (ISSRA) allow K-12 districts, like higher education, to disclose student information to law enforcement for health and safety emergencies. Generally, schools must have written permission from the parent or eligible student in order to release any information from a student's education record. However, FERPA and ISSRA allow schools to disclose those records, without consent, to appropriate officials in cases of health and safety emergencies [see 34 CFR § 99.31, 105 ILCS 10/6 (a) (7), and 23 Ill Admin. Code 375.60].

2. Adoption of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 428 and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) as Reference Publications for School Security Designs. School districts, consultants, and district architects of record should review the document and determine what requirements the school or school district prefers to implement.
3. Adoption of Action Procedures. In consultation with local law enforcement, schools and school districts may consider adopting procedures for students and staff to follow in the event of an intruder and/or breach of facility security. Such procedures may include “Run, Hide, Fight”; Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate (“A.L.I.C.E.”); or any other procedure/program deemed appropriate for the needs of students and staff as determined by the school or school district in consultation with local law enforcement. It is recommended that any such procedure/program:
 - A. Be easily understood and applicable to both faculty and students;
 - B. Help empower faculty and students to make life-saving choices and to take control of a situation until local law enforcement arrives; and
 - C. Builds a “delay” mechanism that provides local law enforcement additional time to respond and react.
4. Notification/Communication Program. Schools and school districts may consider engaging all staff and students in self-responsibility and have an active and ongoing discussion program set up that encourages students and staff to “come forward” should they be privy to an actual or perceived threat. This is a “trust-building” concept that will, if used properly, eventually lead to the finding of disturbed students/faculty that may be planning some type of incident – before the incident actually happens. The Department of Homeland Security’s “See Something, Say Something™” program is currently active in this state and across the country in many schools, colleges, and universities. It may be discussed at the superintendent level as part of training, coordination, and discussion.
5. Training as a Preventative Measure. Regular and consistent scheduled training with first responders is encouraged, including but not limited to one (1) table-top exercise per school year and one (1) full-scale exercise every three (3) years. The full-scale exercise should address the district’s or nonpublic school’s full emergency operations plan. Faculty should continue with in-house exercises as currently planned.

6. Intelligence and Connection to Law Enforcement. It is recommended that schools and school districts hold regular meetings with law enforcement agencies, faculty, and staff to bridge communication issues. Having a school resource officer (SRO) is beneficial, but unfortunately, some areas of the state cannot afford this measure. Schools and school districts may consider “Adopt a School” programs whereby a deputy who lives close to, or regularly patrols, an area where a school is located, stops in periodically, meets with staff, and walks through the school. Because some smaller towns do not have 24-hour police protection, the Sheriff’s Department can be the first agency to respond to an incident. This concept allows the deputies to become more familiar with the school floor plan, faculty, and students. As this begins to progress, students may become more at ease with the deputy, easing the apprehension of providing information that may lead to proactive intervention. This concept also provides for a staggered schedule of when the deputy may or may not be in the school, which inhibits strategic planning for a would-be intruder.

As part of its future work, the Task Force will study the various components of safety and security of actual school buildings, facilities, and grounds. Several deliberations took place with respect to facility construction and design and those deliberations will be more fully vetted and discussed in the coming months.

Appendix G: Physical Plant Recommendations

School Security and Standards Task Force

Final Recommendations

Physical Plant Sub-Committee

Representative Carol Sente
Robert Bernat
Pat Hartshorn
Steve Wilder
David Henebry - Chair

Existing Schools – After several discussions there was broad support and understanding that existing schools are in need of physical improvements to provide the same standard of safety as new and renovated schools. Due to the current fiscal issues facing the state we are of the opinion that setting a sunset date for compliance would be a non-ending debate. Concern for setting a sunset date far in the future could be interpreted as undermining the importance of the overall requirement. Therefore our recommendation would be for a School Security Task Force to review the subject of physical improvements to existing schools with recommendations revisited in the future with the hope that the fiscal situation in Illinois will be corrected or manageable.

Recommendations:

1.0 – Expected for all new design/Recommended for all existing facilities and renovations.

Adopt expanded principles of CPTED design: (FEMA 2.3)

Natural Surveillance:

Exterior - Provide clear site lines for observing physical movement on the School Campus/Site. The School entry/reception desk should be positioned to allow natural surveillance of all approaching visitors, students and staff. The views should not be camera dependent. The positioning of the building should provide an identifiable main entrance with parking and sidewalks positioned to lead you to the main entrance. There should be sufficient travel distance to allow the staff to monitor/recognize potential threatening behavior as they approach the entrance. The entry and reception should be all glass from a max 36” AFF to a minimum 7’4” AFF and a Glass Polycarbonate laminated Bullet Proof glazing should be installed to this height to protect the staff. Play and outdoor activity areas should be easily visually observed from the school. Avoid creating features that can be used to hide for an exterior attack like dense shrubbery and solid walls/features. Shrubs should be no more than 24” tall, and clearance underneath trees no less than 72” to ground. Biology grow plots and gardens should be positioned on the site in a manner that does not create hiding spots for attackers.

FEMA Recommendations:

FEMA – Open Space: “The incorporation of open space into School site design presents a number of benefits. First and foremost is the ability to easily monitor an area and detect intruders, vehicles, and weapons. Closely related to this benefit is the stand-off value of Open Space”

FEMA – Parking: “Surface lots can be designed and placed to keep vehicles away from the school buildings.”

FEMA – Landscape Design: “Landscape design features should be used to create the level of protection without turning the school into a fortress. Elements such as landforms, water features, and vegetation are among the building blocks of attractive and welcoming spaces.”

Interior - Provide simple building circulation patterns for clear site lines for observing student movements through the school. A minimum 12’ path width for primary corridor circulation should be required to allow movement with sufficient space for movement. Video cameras should be positioned and used to record and monitor the actions occurring in the building circulation and large gathering spaces. Transparency between the building circulation and classrooms should be provided to insure that classrooms/education spaces can be observed from the corridor and corridors from the education spaces. Covering the glazing should not be allowed. Storage Rooms should be provided with frosted glazing so that physical movement/activity can be detected in normally unoccupied areas.

1.1– Expected for all new design and renovations* exceeding 20,000 sf or additions exceeding 7000sf/Recommended for all existing schools (FEMA 3.6.1.1 & 3.6.1.2 & 4.5.2.2)

Access Control:

Entry Access should be managed and controlled. The primary building entrance should be secured and require direct visual observance from the reception area. The glazing between the vestibule and school should be a Glass Polycarbonate laminated Bullet Resistant glazing in 2 ¼” heavy duty aluminum door frames. The design should be standard friendly and inviting but secure. The receptionist should have an ability to have verbal communication with the visitor and ability to buzz them into the reception area for check in. The primary and secondary entries at the beginning and end of the school day should be physically monitored by staff as students enter and exit. All secondary entries should be locked down during the course of the day. Secondary entry points should additionally be monitored by cameras.

1.2– Expected for all new design and renovations or additions/Recommended for all existing schools

Exterior Doors (FEMA 3.6.1.1 & 3.6.1.2) and Classroom Doors (4.5.2.3)

Exterior doors at the perimeter of the school should remain locked at all times requiring a key or access card for re-entry to the school. A door position and latch detection switch can be installed at every exterior door and alarm if the doors are held open for more than 10 minutes.

All Classroom and occupied education spaces should have doors that swing out into circulation. All door frames should be of metal construction.

Interior occupied spaces can be equipped with closures and hold open devices that can be disengaged when the lock down protocol is activated. All Classroom entries and access points to Classroom Commons/Villages/Pods should also be secured in a similar manner. Organizing buildings in a securable pod/village concept should be encouraged over organizing Classrooms along a singular corridor system. Securing the education environments through layering of natural security points to limit penetration of the public within the school. This layering provides safety zones where open collaborative environments can function safely. If the Classroom wing or village is secured at all times the Classrooms can be left open for collaborative learning with a requirement for protocols in an event of a lockdown.

Classroom Locks – Only Locksets that can be secured from the interior of the Classroom without requiring the teacher to open the door should be utilized. The Traditional Classroom Function Lockset should be considered banned.

A traditional Dormitory Function: This may work well for changing out existing locksets and achieve the ability to lock from the interior of the Classroom.

or

Classroom Intruder Function

Or

Office Function - Lock Function

Or

Store Room Function

1.3 - Expected for all new design/Recommended for all existing facilities and renovations.

Territorial Reinforcement:

The property edges should be discernable so it becomes obvious to someone approaching they are on school property as well as visually known to the school that a person is approaching. When a school district shares property with a Park District this may not be completely achievable so some subtle landscaping should be provided with signage noting that during school hrs a certain perimeter distance should be maintained and directing individuals who wish to visit the school to move around the property and approach the main entrance.

1.5 - Expected for all new design and renovations* exceeding 20,000 sf or additions exceeding 7000sf/Recommended for all existing schools

Communications Infrastructure:

Communications devices and systems (hardware and software) should be acquired and regularly evaluated within each school building to ensure teachers and school administrators can easily communicate with police and first responders during an incident. First responders should be given full access to a school's communications system. Communications systems should not be proprietary. Communications systems should be openly compatible with first responders communication equipment without special patches or provisions.

“Non-proprietary system based on publicly known standard set of interfaces that allow anyone to use and communicate with any system that adheres to the same standards. Open system standards have four basic requirements (1) they must be defined fully, so that vendors can work within the same framework, (2) be stable over a reasonable length of time, so that the vendors have fixed targets to aim at, (3) they must be fully published, so that their interfaces are publicly available, and (4) they are not under the control any one firm or vendor.”

1.6 – Expected for all schools

Knox Boxes/Law Enforcement access:

Two Knox boxes should be provided at the Main entrance and a secondary entry point/exit. One should be the traditional Knox Box for the Fire Department and the second Knox Box should be specific for police use. Providing local law enforcement with keys or electronic access cards/fobs is an acceptable alternative.

1.7 – Recommended

Security Reference Plans:

A School Security Reference Plan should be prepared and submitted to the ISBE for inclusion in the School Floor Plans Folder administered by the Illinois State Police STIC (Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center) and/or local law enforcement. The plans shall follow the attached checklist and include the additional information listed below:

Required Plans:

- Site Plan
- Floor Plan

Plan Information Guide:

- Room Numbering – Room Numbers should be legible on the Computer Screen in Squad Cars
- Doors should be clearly delineated.

- Main Entrance identified
- Exits identified
- Knox Boxes identified
- FACP identified
- Primary Communications Server identified
- Camera Locations identified and addressed (Recommended)
- Secured area points of access (Example: Locked Pod entries)
- Superintendent's/Principal's Office
- Hazardous/Flammable Material Storage

Plan Color Guide:

- Circulation - Beige
- Occupied Education Spaces – Green
- Unoccupied Spaces – Gray
- Gathering and Public Spaces (Gym/Cafeteria/Toilets/Locker Rooms) – Blue
- Administration – Orange
- Critical Infrastructure (Fire Main/Electrical Dist., etc.) and Hazardous Storage (Gasoline/Paint Thinners, etc.) – Red

1.8 – Recommended reference for New and Existing Schools

FEMA 428

FEMA 428 is a recommended reference publication for school security design. School Districts, Consultants and the District's Architect of Record should review the document and determine what requirements the School District prefers to implement as policy.

1.9 – Recommended for New and Existing Schools

Law Enforcement Pull Stations or other authority alerting devices– Non Fire incident alarm

Example District 112 - Locations were driven by line of site and common path / intersections. Longer hallways had one in the middle of the span. These were spaced at about 120' on center. Discussions also included the acceptability of options including cell phone apps and similar technology.

Appendix H: Training Subcommittee Recommendations

The Training Sub-Committee of the School Security and Standards Task Force met on Tuesday, November 3, 2015 and was in communication again in March/April 2016. Each member had the opportunity to express his opinions and recommendations on the topic of addressing the training needs regarding school security.

Generally, it was the consensus of the Sub-Committee that given the diversity in the state regarding school district populations, scope and resources of the emergency responders, financial resources of the school district, geography, and community needs – mandates or requirements that treat all school districts the same would not be prudent. The objective should be to offer to all school districts assistance in making their school buildings and grounds as safe as possible by establishing training opportunities, continuing education to school district personnel and local first responders, and sharing best practices for school security.

To those ends, the Sub-Committee recommends the following best practices:

- School districts continually review and enforce the implementation of the current School Safety Drill Act
- School districts adopt a policy that requires an Emergency Operations Plan; a designated District Safety Coordinator; a safety team for each school building; objectives substantially similar to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s Guide to Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, and; a school safety drill plan (including at least one drill to be unscheduled and random)
- School districts implement periodic security vulnerability assessments
- School districts adopt procedures for students and staff to follow in the event of an intruder or breach of security in conjunction with appropriate local emergency responders
- School districts provide regular and consistent training with first responders including yearly table-top exercises and tri-annual full-scale exercises as appropriate (this does not necessarily include re-enactments)
- School districts subscribe to regularly published school security updates and best practices

The Sub-Committee also recommends exploration of these long-term goals:

- Establishing a website clearing house for school safety coordinators to visit containing best practices, model plans, safety updates
- Establishing a credentialing system for school safety coordinators/school districts who wish to participate
- Establishing/expanding academy classes for school administrators regarding school safety and allowing Continuing Professional Development Units (CPDU) for such education

Appendix I: See, Hear and Speak Up



MEMORANDUM

To: Illinois School Security and Standards Task Force
From: Prevention Subcommittee
Re: See, Hear and Speak Up Program and Policy
Date: May 16, 2016

Pursuant to the determination of the Illinois School Security and Standards Task Force (the “Task Force”), the Prevention Subcommittee has drafted the initial components of a policy and program designed to assist school authorities, law enforcement and the general public to be better able to interdict a potential attack on a school. Currently, it appears Illinois and perhaps many other states as well are woefully unprepared in this area which spans the bounds of mental health, constitutional rights, school law, privacy and public acceptance. It is a remarkably difficult and complex area about which experts in their various fields may disagree and for which the Prevention Subcommittee has yet to uncover guidance in peer-reviewed journals or similar publications.¹ Nevertheless, a failure to generate the first draft of a See, Hear and Speak Up program and policy would be a failure and abdication of Task Force duties. The following is the first cut at such a program for which a policy would be developed and should be reviewed for comment and constructive criticism by experts in education, constitutional law, law enforcement and mental health.

We start with the premise that most potential attackers, excluding those who might attack a school for political purposes, provide warning signs in the form of certain behaviors.²

¹ Although there exists no accurate or useful profile of individuals who have engaged in targeted school violence because the demographic, personality, school history and social characteristics of attackers vary substantially, nevertheless knowing that a particular individual exemplifies characteristics and/or behaviors which suggest preparations for an attack is more productive. *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*, the United States Secret Service and the United States Department of Education, Washington, DC, May 2002, p. 33.

² The greatest problem with deriving conclusions across the multiple individuals who attack school students is that the sample size is small. According to research undertaken by Andrew Solomon for his seminal article in the New Yorker magazine in conjunction with a series of interviews with Peter Lanza, Adam Lanza’s father, nearly half of all mass murderers commit suicide during their crime and many others are killed by police, leaving few left to study. Solomon, Andrew, *The Reckoning*, The New Yorker, March 17, 2014, p. 44. “Indeed Paul Appelbaum, the forensic psychiatrist at Columbia, views such cases as ‘suicides with murder as an epiphenomenon, rather than murders that happen to end in suicide.’ The opposite view is equally possible: Henry J. Friedman, a psychiatry professor at Harvard, has said that for these killers murderousness is ‘a primary rather than a reactive state,’ and their ‘desire to end life early surrounded by an aura of apocalyptic destruction’ does not signal the ‘true depressive despair’ typical of suicides. But, for

If teachers, school administrators, social workers, siblings, friends, parents, other relatives and the general public were made aware of such behaviors, warning signs could then be employed to cause a careful review of individuals of interest by those with expertise and may lead to an interdiction of a potential school attack. Warning signs do not relate to an individual's clothing, the video games they might play or their music preferences. Although there may exist a coincidence among such things and many perpetrators, the number of false positives would promptly overwhelm any system constructed to vet information provided to authorities. Witness that Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the perpetrators of the 1999 Columbine High School massacre, who reportedly tended to wear black, considered themselves to be Goths and played violent videogames.³ Of course many others do the same yet present no risk to school children. Furthermore, despite the successful interdiction of an impending school attack in 2014 in Waseca, Minnesota based upon information to authorities by Ms. Chelsie Shellhas that a teenager, John David LaDue, was acting weirdly leading to the subsequent discovery of firearms, ammunition and bombs in a storage locker and LaDue's arrest, behavior simply deemed "weird" is a wholly insufficient criteria upon which to base an interdiction program.⁴

There are however it seems specific attack-related behaviors which tend to provide indicators of impending attacks which appear in many, but not all, instances. For example, a key aspect which occurs commonly is leakage to others of attack planning or intent often in the form of recruiting others to join⁵, warning friends to stay away from a

Adam (Lanza) killing others and suicide were both crucial. The link seems clear: the more Adam hated himself, the more he hated everyone else." Id.

³ See also, Cullen, Dave, *Columbine*. New York, New York, Hachette Book Group (1999).

⁴ According to authorities in Waseca, Minnesota, John David LaDue, 17, was going to kill his family, start a diversionary fire, set off bombs at an area elementary school, kill the resource officer there and then shoot students at Waseca Junior and Senior High School. Police were tipped off to the matter two days earlier by Chelsie Shellhas who called them about someone acting suspiciously at a storage facility. "He shut the door, and I thought it looked funny," she told CNN affiliate WCCO. "Because, normally, we see people come here, and it doesn't take them 10 minutes to open a storage shed, so that's why I called it in." When officers arrived, among other things they saw what looked like bomb-making materials in a locker: a pressure cooker, pyrotechnic chemicals, steel ball bearings and gunpowder. Earlier at area elementary schools police had discovered bomb making materials.

⁵ Mitchell Scott Johnson (age 13) and Andrew Douglas Golden (age 11) were middle school students on March 24, 1998 when they committed a massacre at Westside Middle School in unincorporated Craighead County, near Jonesboro, Arkansas. Golden convinced Johnson to be his partner in the attack. The two boys shot and killed a total of five people: four students and a teacher. Ten other people, nine students and one teacher, were injured. See, Langman, Peter, *School Shooters*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland (2015), P. 185. A contrary result occurred when an attack on Plymouth Whitemarsh High School in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania was foiled and the plotter, Dillon Cossey (age 14) arrested after a fellow teenager, Lewis Bennett III, informed the local police that Cossey, who was home-schooled, had twice attempted to enlist Bennett in his assault plan. Bennett had not taken Cossey seriously until he learned of a rifle which Cossey's mother had illegally purchased for him. Cossey's weapons included a 9mm rifle (which he named his rifle "Reb" to honor Eric Harris, one of the Columbine killers), two other firearms, 13 BB guns, eight knives, five swords, two 16-ounce bottles of gunpowder and seven grenades, four of which were live. He also had in his possession handcuffs, bomb-making manuals, and a ski mask.

school on a given day⁶, bragging about an upcoming attack or otherwise indicating violent intentions. Unfortunately, warning signs are frequently missed, misinterpreted or simply not taken seriously by those who are in the best position to inform school or law enforcement authorities.⁷ Consequently, it is essential to develop the following See, Hear and Speak Up Program to alert and sensitize people on an age appropriate basis who are in such a position in order that they are able to recognize warning signs and then feel comfortable reporting their observations secure in the knowledge that neither they nor the person from whom the warning sign or signs emanated would suffer consequences should their conclusions prove inaccurate. A system with an acceptable degree of rigor and integrity must also be one which is understandable to those who are expected to be able to use it and engender sufficient confidence that anyone who expresses concerns to a trusted teacher, school administrator social worker, school resource officer or other law enforcement official will be undertaking not only the socially acceptable but also the

A poem that Cossey had written about a school shooting was also found. Montgomery County District Attorney Bruce Castor said of Bennett, "I think he saved lives."

⁶ The Heath High School shooting occurred at Heath High School in West Paducah, Kentucky on December 1, 1997. Fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal, who opened fire that day on a group of praying students killing three and injuring five more, had several days' prior warned friends to stay away from school on December 1. Carneal had wrapped a shotgun and a rifle in a blanket and took them to school, passing them off as an art project. He also carried a loaded Ruger MK II .22-caliber pistol in his backpack. According to reports, Carneal had been bullied by other students and suffered from severe paranoia. His paranoia was manifested in habits such as covering up vents and windows while in bathrooms because he believed he was being watched. Following the shooting, which Carneal survived, he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. He has been hospitalized several times since the start of his incarceration due to psychosis, and takes medication for this condition.

⁷ The murders which took place at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012 were a watershed event for many reasons not the least of which is now that mental health professionals are even more vigilant for any indicators of future violence and likely to err in favor of a conclusion that a patient presents a danger to themselves and/or others. The repercussions of being wrong are very chastening to such healthcare providers. Still making such diagnosis remains extraordinarily difficult. A social worker at Adam Lanza's high school informed a reporter from CNN that he knew Adam Lanza, that he never had any evidence of Lanza being bullied, and he certainly never saw in Lanza the risk of possible violence. In his interviews which were excerpted in the New Yorkers article entitled *The Reckoning*, Peter Lanza said, "If he had been a totally normal adolescent and he was well adjusted and then all of a sudden went into isolation, alarms would go off. But let's keep in mind that you expect Adam to be weird. Solomon, Andrew, *The Reckoning*, The New Yorker, March 17, 2014, p. 40. Peter Lanza characterized Adam in his pre-teenage years as "Just a normal little weird kid." Id. at 38. Thus "weird" behavior from Adam was the expected normal. "Still, Peter and Nancy (Lanza, Adam's mother and Peter's then wife) sought professional support repeatedly, and none of the doctors they saw detected troubling violence in Adam's disposition. According to the state's attorney report, 'Those mental health professionals who saw him did not see anything that would have predicted his future behavior ...'" Id. But at some point certain warning signs became manifest. For example, by 2009 Adam Lanza seemed to have developed an obsession with killing. "He started editing Wikipedia entries on various well-known mass murders and seems to have been eerily well informed." Id. at 41. Even in Adam Lanza, which certain officials of the United States Department of Education to this day consider a ghost, the warning signs were there. Despite his extreme reclusive behavior, had those who were near enough to him such as his parents been attuned to the thinking proposed herein and been willing to act, a tragedy may have been averted. It is impossible to know if Lanza could have been interdicted before his rampage, but it is equally impossible to know that he could not have been stopped by connecting the dots.

socially expected action.⁸ They should be made to understand that the operation of such program safeguards not only themselves, but also their friends and loved ones. This is crucial as family members, particularly parents, should be informed that school attackers frequently do not survive such assaults and often perish by their own hand.⁹

It must be recognized that in dealing with the thought processes of human beings it is not possible to predict with certainty which individuals who display some of the warning signs present an imminent or even latent threat to schools and school children. However, it must simultaneously be recognized that certain patterns of behavior and actions do exist across multiple school attackers and consequently a See, Hear and Speak Up program can and should be used as one tool to help interdict attacks. Although the behaviors of past attackers do not serve to predict new impending violence, they are signals which serve to raise the threat level and urge schools and law enforcement authorities to move promptly in investigating the possible threat as well as cause the defensive posture of schools to be elevated pending resolution of such investigation. The greater the number of warning signs, the higher the risk of attack.

The See, Hear and Speak Up program should be explained to both children and adults alike on an age appropriate basis, within and without a given school and school district.

⁸ The See, Hear and Speak Up program must be vetted by legal professionals for compliance with state and federal privacy laws including, but not limited to, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

⁹ Prominent examples include Adam Lanza who murdered 20 first graders and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut in 2012, Karl Pierson who murdered one student at Arapahoe High School in Centennial, Colorado in 2013, and Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold who murdered 13 people and wounded more than 20 others at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999, before turning their guns on themselves and committing suicide. Parents must be taught that to provide “cover” for their minor or adult children merely enhances the risk of death not only to others but also for their own child. Prime examples of parental obfuscation include the case of Kipland Kinkel, who killed his parents on May 20, 1999 and proceeded the next day to kill two and wound 25 at Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon. In an attempt to cover up essential information, his parents had lied to the police about his access to firearms and to psychologists about a significant history of mental illness within the family. Another prime example of parental irresponsibility is the case of Adam Lanza. It appears that Mrs. Lanza had grown inured to her son Adam’s increasingly aberrant behavior. According to her former spouse, Adam’s father Peter, Nancy Lanza was trapped by her son’s psychiatric condition into living a moment-to-moment existence while striving merely to provide him a ‘good day’. According to Robert King, MD of the Yale University Medical Center Child Study Center where both Peter and Nancy Lanza took Adam for evaluation at age 14, “Adam imposes many strictures, which are increasingly onerous for mother. He disapproves if mother leans on anything in the house because it is ‘improper’ ... He is also intolerant if mother brushes by his chair and objected to her new high heel boots, because they were ‘too loud’ If mother walks in front of him in the kitchen, he would insist she redo it.” Solomon, Andrew, *The Reckoning*, The New Yorker, March 17, 2014, p. 39. All the while she kept guns in easy access of Adam even taking him to the range for target practice and planning on giving him a check for Christmas in order that he could purchase a side arm. Peter Lanza was confident that his former wife was not afraid of their son and believes that Nancy’s pride prevented her from asking for help. Peter Lanza stated, “She wanted everyone to think everything was O.K.” Solomon, Andrew, *The Reckoning*, p. 43. Parents may think they are protecting their children, but in truth are doing the exact opposite. Clearly parents who fail to heed the warning signs and fail report such indicators to authorities, fail their children as well. Such children who attack a school never return to their prior life as they are imprisoned or often, nearly 50% of the time according to Andrew Solomon, take their lives by their own hand.

The proper functioning of such a program will allow necessary police functions to engage, including extensive searches of social media. It will permit the defensive system to function proactively to ward off a potential attack rather than simply function reactively once an attack has commenced. It is the only way communities can take the offensive against school attacks and thereby initiate steps to avoid the loss of life. With such a program teamed with security modifications to school architecture, incorporation of computer hardware and software which enhance security measures, training for school personnel in the operation of new security and safety measures and drills with law enforcement for the unthinkable, schools will have a defense in depth and lives will be saved.

Consequently, the following See, Hear and Speak Up Program is based upon an easily recalled system of the “4 Ms” – Means, Motive, Method and Mentality. The program is admittedly predicated on anecdotal evidence culled from school attacks and relies significantly upon the work of Peter Langman, PhD and the efforts of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Department of Homeland Security and the United States Department of Education as well as other sources.¹⁰ It is not expected that those being informed of the 4 Ms would recall the details of each example under any given heading, but it may be sufficient that they remember the 4 Ms themselves such that if confronted with a situation, they will treat information which comes their way with the appropriate level of significance and react accordingly.

Means:

- Stockpiling firearms¹¹
- Stockpiling magazines¹²
- Stockpiling ammunition¹³

¹⁰ See, Critical Incident Response Group, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, *The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective*, FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency and The State of Illinois, *Student Behavioral Threat Assessment*, September 2014; The United States Secret Service and The United States Department of Education, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situation and to Creating a Safe School Environment*, Washington, DC, May 2002; The United States Secret Service and The United States Department of Education, *Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*, Washington, DC, May 2002; The United States Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and The Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans*, Washington, DC, June 2013; Van Dreal, John, Editor, *Assessing Student Threats*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD (2011).

¹¹ Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold stand out among attackers for their accumulation of weapons, planning and practice. These youths, ages 18 and 17, respectively, succeeded in assembling a very significant arsenal including an Intratec TEC-DC9, a Hi-Point 995 Carbine, a Savage 67H pump-action shotgun, a Stevens 311D double barreled sawed-off shotgun, 99 explosives and four knives.

¹² Id.

¹³ Id.

- Converting or attempting to convert semi-automatic weapons to fully automatic weapons and/or shortening the barrel length of long guns¹⁴
- Development and/or testing of explosive devices¹⁵
- Ordering and/or purchasing weapons from the same distributor(s) of locale(s) as prior school attackers¹⁶
- Attempting to cause friends or acquaintances to obtain firearms, explosives, ammunition or their components¹⁷

Motive:

- Anger/rage at society in general for some perceived transgression(s)¹⁸
- Anger/rage at a group within a school or school environs for significant (e.g. bullying) or perceived slight(s)¹⁹
- Anger/rage at specific individuals within a school or school environs for significant (e.g. bullying) or perceived slight(s)²⁰

¹⁴ “Friends knew that he (Eric Harris) bought guns illegally, sawed off the barrels, and practiced with guns. While examining the impact of a bullet in a piece of wood, Harris commented about imagining what the bullet would do to someone’s brain.” Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 2. Federal law requires long guns to be no less than 16” in barrel length, a requirement designed to inhibit concealment.

¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ On September 23, 2008, at the Seinäjoki University of Applied Sciences in Western Finland, a 22-year-old student Matti Juhani Saari, shot and fatally injured ten people with a Walther P22 semi-automatic pistol, before shooting himself in the head. He imitated a prior school shooter, Pekka-Eric Auvinen who killed nine and wounded 13 also in Finland in 2007, by copy Auvinen’s clothing and ordering his firearm from the same shop.

¹⁷ “Harris also tried to get friends at school to buy him guns. He told peers he needed multiple propane tanks by April 20; when asked why, he said it was Hitler’s birthday. The peer apparently did not ask about the connection between Hitler and the propane tanks.” Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 5.

¹⁸ Although Adam Lanza destroyed the hard drive of his computer rendering an FBI investigation into his motivation to be stymied, it is reasonable to speculate that such motivation was at least in part his way of striking back at society for what more shocking act than to harm the most vulnerable and cherished members of that society.

¹⁹ Harris of Columbine appeared to have a grudge against athletes in his high school. He was heard to yell so loudly that it was picked up on a 911 recording, “Get up!” Staff and students hiding in the library exterior rooms later said they also heard the gunmen say, “All jocks stand up! We’ll get the guys in white hats!” (Wearing a white baseball cap at Columbine was a tradition among sports team members.) Apparently no one stood up, so Harris said, “Fine, I’ll start shooting anyway!” Kip Kinkel wrote a school essay on Romeo and Juliet from the perspective of Tybalt. It states in part, “But you know me, I loathe all of them (fellow students) ... Blood will flow until they are all dead ... This was the first moment in my life where I had taken the life of another. I loved it, it dispelled all the anger and animosity I was feeling. Langman, *School Shootings*, p.3; Liberman, J., *School Shootings*, Citadel, New York, NY (2008)

Methods:

- Diagraming or the obtaining of diagrams of a school²¹
- Development or the memorializing/writing down of attack plans²²
- Review of online or hard paper copy literature regarding methods of explosive/bomb construction²³
- Review of online or hard paper copy literature regarding methods of building assaults with weapons
- Posting, electronically or otherwise, of the results of explosive experiments or weapons practice²⁴
- Attempts at convincing one or more others to participate in an attack²⁵

Mentality:

- Overheard comments condoning or otherwise speaking favorably about school attack(s) or other murderous rampages²⁶

²⁰ On December 14, 2013, almost one year to the day after the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary, Karl H. Pierson, 18, armed with a shotgun, a bandolier stocked with ammunition, a machete, and three Molotov cocktails opened fire inside Arapahoe High School, in Centennial, Colorado where he was a senior. Claire Davis, 17, who apparently did not know Pierson, was mortally wounded at point-blank range, and Pierson then killed himself in the school library. Pierson had entered his school looking for the debate team's coach apparently seeking revenge against the faculty member because of some "confrontation or disagreement," according to the local Sheriff.

²¹ Reportedly, Klebold made a computer simulation of his high school being blown up. Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 4. See also, <https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/what-suspicious-activity>.

²² <https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/what-suspicious-activity>.

²³ Kip Kinkel gave an oral report as part of a school assignment and chose the topic of bomb making. Apparently he had obtained instructions as to how to construct a bomb on the internet and built several bombs at home which he left for authorities after his rampage at his school.

²⁴ Finnish school shooter Pekka-Eric Auvinen forecast his intentions by posting online sequences of him shooting a gun as well as clips in praise of Harris and Klebold, Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber. Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, pp. 5-6. Gill posted 51 photos of himself posing with guns in a threatening position while including a message: "Vengeance is coming." Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 5.

²⁵ Andrew Golden managed to convince Mitchell Johnson to participate in an attack on the Westside Middle School in Arkansas in 1998 during which five people died and 10 were wounded. In the Parker Middle School dance shooting on April 24, 1998 in Edinboro, Pennsylvania, Andrew Jerome Wurst, 14, killed one and wounded two during an 8th grade dinner dance. He had tried to recruit a friend but was rebuffed. Unfortunately the friend failed to alert any adults about the planned attack.

²⁶ Peers of Kip Kinkel overheard him speak about wanting to become the next Unabomber.

- Noticed fascination with prior school shootings and/or anniversaries thereof²⁷
- Online or otherwise posting of photographic material or ominous comments in text format indicating approval of prior school attacks or homicidal/suicidal intent²⁸
- Expressed admiration for prior school attackers²⁹
- Copying habits, clothing, mannerisms, language or other forms of imitation of prior school attackers³⁰
- Travel to and/or collection of photographs of prior school attack locations³¹
- Collecting articles and/or other writings regarding prior school attacks³²

²⁷ “A less direct threat occurs when a student condones or comments favorably on a school shooting, perhaps referring to it as ‘cool’ or stating that ‘someone ought to do that here.’ For example, Andrew Wurst made such comments about the Jonesboro shooting by Golden and Johnson. A month later, Wurst carried out his own attack. Kip Kinkel was also fascinated by the Jonesboro shooting and said that somebody should do something like that at his school. Two months after Jonesboro, Kip went on his rampage. Similarly, numerous shooters have been fascinated by previous attacks such as those at Columbine or Virginia Tech. Fascination with school shootings, especially if accompanied by comments like ‘somebody should do that at this school,’ should be taken as warning signs of a possible attack.” Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 2.

²⁸ Eric Harris posted online a log of his bomb making experiments and wrote of his desire to murder people, even naming a particular student he wished to kill. Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 6. “Similarly, Pekka-Eric Auvinen wrote what he called ‘Natural Selector’s Manifesto’ which is full of echos, quotes, and references to Eric Harris. Harris wrote about natural selection as a way to eliminate unfit people from the earth, and Auvinen wrote a long rant on the same theme. Harris wrote, ‘HATE! I’m so full of it and I love it (Eric Harris Journal, p.8). Auvinen wrote, Hate, I’m so full of it and I love it (Pekka-Eric Auvinen Online, p.4). Id. at 2. Obviously, the similarities are not serendipitous but bespeak of admiration, almost worship, posted online by Auvinen that he had for Harris and for Harris’ murderous acts.

²⁹ Multiple school attackers and potential attackers, such as Wurst, Gill, Kinkel, Auvinen, Saari, Cossey and Castillo, have expressed admiration for their predecessors.

³⁰ Multiple future attackers have imitated prior attackers. For example, Kimveer Gill, 25, who shot 20 people at Dawson College in Montreal, Quebec in 2006, greatly admired Harris and Klebold of Columbine, expressing on line liking of their nicknames, Reb and V, respectively. He also imitated Harris’ well known writing of “Ich bin Gott” (I am God written in German), a phrase that Harris wrote in the school planner and the yearbooks of several of his peers. Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 2. Alvaro Castillo purchased a black trench coat similar to that worn by Eric Harris. See, note 32, below. School attack plotter Dillon Cossey named his rifle “Reb” in honor of Eric Harris. See, note 5, above.

³¹ Alvaro Rafael Castillo, an 18 year old former student at Orange High School in Hillsborough, North Carolina was obsessed with the massacre at Columbine. He convinced his mother to take him from his home in North Carolina to Jefferson County, Colorado in June 2006 to visit the site of the Columbine killings. While there he purchased a black trench coat similar to the one worn by Eric Harris during the rampage. On August 30, 2006, Castillo blew past the security shack at the entrance to the student parking lot, stepped out of his van, set off 3 smoke bombs, and then proceeded to open fire towards the school. In 2007 Pekka-Eric Auvinen who killed nine and wounded 13 had a number of online accounts, including a Youtube account he used to upload videos about school shootings and violent incidents, including the Columbine High School massacre.

³² Adam Lanza developed an expertise with respect to prior mass murderers, even taking to providing edits to Wikipedia pages about such individuals. See, note 7, above.

- Collecting and/or studying the writings of prior school attackers³³
- School assignments reflecting suicidal/homicidal themes particularly if they relate to teenagers or young adults murdering students and/or teachers³⁴
- School assignments reflecting a fascination with the assumed intent of prior school attackers or attackers of other venues
- School assignments reflecting a violent storyline which include scenarios or characters resembling actual prior school attacks and/or actual prior school attackers³⁵
- School assignments or other writings reflecting sadistic acts³⁶
- School assignments reflecting significantly disorganized thinking/cognitive disorganization which may serve as a precursor of psychosis and a symptom of schizophrenia in the context of other warning signs³⁷

³³ Pekka-Eric Auvinen wrote what he called ‘Natural Selector’s Manifesto’ which contains multiple quotes, and references to the writings of Eric Harris. See, note 29, above.

³⁴ Luke Woodham, perpetrator of the Pearl High School shooting that took place on October 1, 1997 at Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi was a 16-year-old who killed two students and injured seven others at his high school. Before the shooting at Pearl High School began, Woodham stabbed and bludgeoned his mother to death in his home. For a certain writing assignment which was to create an essay describing what each student would do if they were the teacher for the day, Woodham wrote, “I would go crazy and kill all the other teachers. Then I would slowly and very painfully torture all the principals to death.” Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 3. See also, note 37, below. Of course, the authors of such writings may be able to hide their true intentions or may have a genuine academic interest in the topic without presenting any true risk. But the writings or other assignments which engender expressions on the topic of school related violence or mass murder may not be innocent but foreshadow an evil intent. Any expressions along these lines in school assignments, whether in written form, film or any other medium, should be taken seriously as warning sign and investigated by professionals.

³⁵ “In February, 1999, [Dylan] Klebold wrote a short story about a man who kills students. The story was so disturbing that his teacher refused to grade it. She talked with Klebold about it, met with Klebold’s parents, and talked to a guidance counselor. Klebold said it was just a piece of fiction, and no further action was taken. Approximately six to ten weeks later, the attack at Columbine occurred.” Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 4. Consequently, both fiction and non-fiction writings can foreshadow future events but must be carefully analyzed by professionals. “Many students write stories that include violent content, however, so it is important not to overreact to student writings. What makes the stories by Klebold and Carneal different from ordinary stories about war or criminals? First, both stories are about young people killing students. In today’s climate, any story in which students are murdered by other students should raise concern. Also, in both stories there is an identification of the author with the killer. In Klebold’s story, the killer is described as wearing a black trench coat, being 6’4”, and left-handed. Klebold was approximately 6’4”, wore a black trench coat, and was left-handed. In [Michael] Carneal’s story (see, note 37), the killer is named Michael, just like Carneal himself. In addition, the names of students being killed in the story were the names of actual students in his school. Thus, both stories contain evidence that the writers identified with the killers who murdered students, and Carneal actually named real students as victims, giving the story a threatening sense of imminent danger.” Id. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight we are able to see what signals such writings provide as their authors try to work out their drives on paper, which may in essence be a cry for help.

³⁶ Eric Harris of Columbine wrote of his plan to dominate others in a god-like manner while committing acts of torture. His writing bespeak of violent mental illness and focus upon tearing out portions of his victims’ anatomy with his hands and teeth. Langman, *School Shooters*, p. 20.

- School behavior reflecting social isolation and/or antisocial attitudes in the context of other warning signs
- Personal journal or diary entries reflecting profound anger, depression, suicidal/homicidal mentation and/or profound obsession with weapons or violence³⁸
- Expressed admiration for historical mass murderers, such as Hitler or Stalin, or religious evil entities, such as Satan³⁹
- Expressed admiration for political criminal organizations, such as the SS, or for organized crime, such as the Mafia, which engage in murder and atrocities⁴⁰
- Suicidal ideation and/or homicidal ideation⁴¹

In the teaching of the tenets of a See, Hear and Speak Up program it is not expected that school children or adults will retain the details of each of the 4 Ms. Nevertheless, given that there appears to be in process a cultural shift toward an enhanced sensitivity of warning signs. A See, Hear and Speak Up program should be designed on an age appropriate basis to further enhance such sensitivity while providing clear, socially acceptable and constitutional means to report such concerns. Such reports must be as a

³⁷ Michael Carneal, age 14, killed three and wounded five in an attack on Heath High School in West Paducah, Kentucky on December 1, 1997. Carneal suffered from psychosis at an early age, becoming a paranoid schizophrenic by the time of puberty. His family was apparently loving and supportive, although there existed a history of mental illness on the father's side of the family with some members having been institutionalized. According to experts, such as Peter Langman, PhD, Carneal's schizophrenia cannot alone account for Carneal's rampage. He did have very significant envy of others who he perceived as being more popular, higher achieving students whom he targeted in the attack, as well as one girl who had rejected him for a date. He was also envious of his sister who was articulate, attractive, popular and graduated as valedictorian of her class, whereas he was a socially awkward individual. Although of short stature at 5'2", which was a source of distress for Carneal, researchers and fellow students were consistent in relaying that Carneal was generally the one who picked on and bullied other students, and his reports of significant bullying was likely as a result of his own hypersensitivity to non-excessive teasing by fellow teenagers.

³⁸ Eric Harris kept such a journal filled with hate filled rantings. *See*, note 29, above.

³⁹ "Harris' friend knew that he was fascinated by Hitler and even gave the Nazi salute in public." Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ The Canadian attacker, Kimveer Gill, wrote online about his great admiration for Nazis.

⁴¹ The East Carter High School shooting occurred on January 18, 1993 in Grayson, Kentucky. The incident occurred when 17 year old Gary Scott Pennington walked into an English classroom and fatally shot his teacher Deanna McDavid and head custodian Marvin Hicks, and held classmates hostage for fifteen minutes before surrendering to police. He had taken a .38-caliber revolver that was owned by his father, and brought the weapon to school by concealing it in a duffel bag-type backpack. "Pennington had given warning signs of being both suicidal and homicidal. He wrote an essay stating, 'The worst day of my life was the day I was born.' He also wrote a short poem: 'Lying in bed/Wish I was dead./Thought of suicide/Might be homicide.' In another assignment he wondered where he would be in a year. 'Home and college can be ruled out. Why? Because they don't pat you on the back and send you home for what I am planning.' Pennington was planning a rampage and he provided multiple warning signs of what was coming." Langman, *School Shooters: The Warning Signs*, p. 3.

matter of policy promptly forwarded to the requisite authorities to trigger an immediate investigation by law enforcement and heightened school or school district wide threat level with attendant procedures. Furthermore, in teaching such tenets it should be emphasized that collective security depends upon everyone in the community. A failure to follow the program by anyone in the community is a weak link which can permit an otherwise avoidable tragedy. Finally, a See, Hear and Speak Up program, although an inherently flawed construct as it deals with humans and human frailties, is the best we have to help interdict a school attack. Such program will undoubtedly be improved over time. For now, however, we must use what tools we have at our disposal while we continually strive to improve upon them. Although imperfect, we can and should by clear, articulated school policies convert what we have observed by 20/20 hindsight into foresight in order to employ the best tools available to save lives.

**Appendix J: 2013 Federal Guide for Developing High-Quality
School Emergency Operation Plans**

GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY SCHOOL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS



FEMA



GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY SCHOOL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS

U.S. Department of Education
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency

2013

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June 2013

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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

Each school day, our nation’s schools are entrusted to provide a safe and healthy learning environment for approximately 55 million elementary and secondary school students¹ in public and nonpublic schools. Families and communities expect schools to keep their children and youths safe from threats (human-caused emergencies such as crime and violence) and hazards (natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and accidents). In collaboration with their local government and community partners, schools can take steps to plan for these potential emergencies through the creation of a school Emergency Operations Plan (school EOP).

Lessons learned from school emergencies highlight the importance of preparing school officials and first responders to implement emergency operations plans. By having plans in place to keep students and staff safe, schools play a key role in taking preventative and protective measures to stop an emergency from occurring or reduce the impact of an incident. Although schools are not traditional response organizations, when a school-based emergency occurs, school personnel respond immediately. They provide first aid, notify response partners, and provide instructions before first responders arrive. They also work with their community partners, i.e., governmental organizations that have a responsibility in the school emergency operations plan to provide a cohesive, coordinated response. Community partners include first responders (law enforcement officers, fire officials, and emergency medical services personnel) as well as public and mental health entities.

We recommend that planning teams responsible for developing and revising school EOPs use this document to guide their efforts. It is recommended that districts and individual schools compare existing plans and processes against the content and processes outlined in this guide. To gain the most from it, users should read through the entire document prior to initiating their planning efforts and then refer back to it throughout the planning process.

The guide is organized in four sections:

1. The principles of school emergency management planning.
2. A process for developing, implementing, and continually refining a school EOP with community partners (e.g., first responders and emergency management personnel) at the school building level.
3. A discussion of the form, function, and content of school EOPs.
4. “A Closer Look,” which considers key topics that support school emergency planning, including addressing an *active shooter*, school climate, psychological first aid, and information-sharing.

As the team that developed this guide began its work to respond to the president’s call for model emergency management plans for schools, it became clear that there is a need to help ensure that

¹ U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Education Statistics 2011*. Washington, DC: Author, 2012. Available at <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/index.asp>.

our schools' emergency planning efforts are aligned with the emergency planning practices at the national, state, and local levels. Recent developments have put a new emphasis on the process for developing EOPs.

National preparedness efforts, including planning, are now informed by *Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8*, which was signed by the president in March 2011 and describes the nation's approach to preparedness. This directive represents an evolution in our collective understanding of national preparedness, based on the lessons learned from terrorist attacks, hurricanes, school incidents, and other experiences.

PPD-8 defines preparedness around five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.

- ❖ **Prevention**,² for the purposes of this guide, means the capabilities necessary to avoid, deter, or stop an imminent crime or threatened or actual mass casualty incident. Prevention is the action schools take to prevent a threatened or actual incident from occurring.
- ❖ **Protection** means the capabilities to secure schools against acts of violence and manmade or natural disasters. Protection focuses on ongoing actions that protect students, teachers, staff, visitors, networks, and property from a threat or hazard.
- ❖ **Mitigation** means the capabilities necessary to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property damage by lessening the impact of an event or emergency. In this document, "mitigation" also means reducing the likelihood that threats and hazards will happen.
- ❖ **Response** means the capabilities necessary to stabilize an emergency once it has already happened or is certain to happen in an unpreventable way; establish a safe and secure environment; save lives and property; and facilitate the transition to recovery.
- ❖ **Recovery** means the capabilities necessary to assist schools affected by an event or emergency in restoring the learning environment.

Emergency management officials and emergency responders engaging with schools are familiar with this terminology. These mission areas generally align with the three timeframes associated with an incident: before, during, and after.

The majority of Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation activities generally occur before an incident, although these three mission areas do have ongoing activities that can occur throughout an incident. Response activities occur during an incident, and Recovery activities can begin during an incident and occur after an incident. To help avoid confusion over terms and allow for ease of reference, this guide uses "before," "during," and "after."

² In the broader *PPD-8* construct, the term "prevention" refers to those capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. The term "prevention" also refers to preventing imminent threats.

As schools plan for and execute response and recovery activities through the emergency operations plan, they should use the concepts and principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). One component of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), which provides a standardized approach for *incident management*, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. By using ICS during an incident, schools will be able to more effectively work with the responders in their communities. For more information on ICS and NIMS, please see the Resources section.

While some of the vocabulary, processes, and approaches discussed in this guide may be new to the education community, they are critical. The vocabulary, processes, and approaches are critical to the creation of emergency management practices and plans that are integrated with the efforts of first responders and other key stakeholders, and that incorporate everything possible to keep children safe. If a school system has an existing plan, revising and adapting that plan using the principles and process described in this guide will help ensure alignment with the terminology and approaches used across the nation.

The Departments issuing this guidance are providing examples of good practices and matters to consider for planning and implementation purposes. The guidance does not create any requirements beyond those included in applicable law and regulations, or create any additional rights for any person, entity, or organization. The information presented in this document generally constitutes informal guidance and provides examples that may be helpful. The inclusion of certain references does not imply any endorsement of any documents, products, or approaches. There may be other resources that may be equally helpful.

This guide replaces “*Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities*” (January 2007), which is rescinded.

All websites listed in this guide were last accessed on May 30, 2013.

PLANNING PRINCIPLES

The following principles are key to developing a comprehensive school emergency operations plan (school EOP) that addresses a range of threats and hazards:

Planning must be supported by leadership. At the district and school levels, senior-level officials can help the planning process by demonstrating strong support for the planning team.

Planning uses assessment to customize plans to the building level. Effective planning is built around comprehensive, ongoing assessment of the school community. Information gathered through assessment is used to customize plans to the building level, taking into consideration the school's unique circumstances and resources.

Planning considers all threats and hazards. The planning process must take into account a wide range of possible threats and hazards that may impact the school. Comprehensive school emergency management planning considers all threats and hazards throughout the planning process, addressing safety needs before, during, and after an incident.

Planning provides for the access and functional needs of the whole school community. The “whole school community” includes children, individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, those from religiously, racially, and ethnically diverse backgrounds, and people with limited English proficiency.

Planning considers all settings and all times. School EOPs must account for incidents that may occur during and outside the school day as well as on and off campus (e.g., sporting events, field trips).

Creating and revising a model emergency operations plan is done by following a collaborative process. This guide provides a process, plan format, and content guidance that are flexible enough for use by all school emergency planning teams. If a planning team also uses templates, it must first evaluate their usefulness to ensure the tools do not undermine the collaborative initiative and collectively shared plan. There are some jurisdictions that provide templates to schools, and these will reflect state and local mandates, as applicable.

THE PLANNING PROCESS

There are many ways to develop a school EOP. The planning process discussed in this section is flexible and can be adapted to accommodate a school’s unique characteristics and situation.

Effective school emergency management planning and development of a school EOP are not done in isolation. It is critical that schools work with their district staff and community partners—local emergency management staff, first responders, and public and mental health officials—during the planning process, as an effective school EOP is supported at the district level and integrated with district, community, regional, and state plans. This collaboration makes more resources available and helps to ensure the seamless integration of all responders.

Schools can use the process outlined below to develop a plan, do a comprehensive review of their entire plan, or conduct periodic and incremental reviews of the plan’s components. While this guide is designed for schools, districts may use this planning process as well.

Figure 1 depicts the six steps in the planning process.³ At each step, schools should consider the impact of their decisions on ongoing activities such as training and exercises as well as on equipment and resources.

Figure 1: Steps in the Planning Process



Step 1: Form a Collaborative Planning Team

Lessons learned from experience indicate that operational planning is best performed by a team. Case studies reinforce this concept by pointing out that the common thread found in successful operations is that participating organizations have understood and accepted their roles. Close

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2.0*. Washington, DC: Author, November 2010. Available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.

collaboration between schools and community partners ensures the coordination of efforts and the integration of emergency management plans.

Identify Core Planning Team: The core planning team should include representatives from a wide range of school personnel, including, but not limited to, administrators, educators, school psychologists, nurses, facilities managers, transportation managers, food personnel, and family services representatives. It should also include student and parent representatives, and individuals and organizations that serve and represent the interests of students, staff, and parents with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs, as well as racial minorities and religious organizations, so that specific concerns are included in the early stages of planning. In addition, the core planning team should include community partners such as first responders, local emergency management staff, and others who have roles and responsibilities in school emergency management before, during, and after an incident. This includes local law enforcement officers, emergency medical services (EMS) personnel, school resource officers, fire officials, public and mental health practitioners, and local emergency managers. Their expertise will inform the development, implementation, and refinement of the school EOP.

The planning team should be small enough to permit close collaboration with first responders and other community partners, yet large enough to be representative of the school, its families, and its community. It should also be large enough as to not place an undue burden on any single person.

Connecting the Planning Team to District, Local or Regional, State, Tribal, and Federal Emergency Planning

Schools undertake emergency operations planning within the context of district, local or regional, state, tribal, and federal agency emergency planning. School districts serve as the liaison between the school and these broader agencies. In order to promote coordination between these entities, the planning team is strongly encouraged to include a district representative. The local school district's emergency planning policies, procedures, and training activities will inform and enhance the school's planning to a significant degree.

In addition, from the onset, the planning team should be aware of any local or state requirements that may apply to the school EOP.

Form a Common Framework: A shared approach facilitates mutual understanding, coordination, and execution of the emergency management strategies as well as works from a common command structure. All team members need to take time to learn each other's vocabulary, command structure, and culture in order to facilitate effective planning.

Define and Assign Roles and Responsibilities: Each person involved in the development and refinement of the plan should know her or his roles and responsibilities in the planning process.

Determine a Regular Schedule of Meetings: School emergency management planning is an ongoing effort that is reinforced through regularly scheduled planning meetings. Establishing a

flexible but regular schedule of meeting times will facilitate greater collaboration, coordination, and communication among team members and will help solidify crucial relationships.

Step 1 Outcome

After completing Step 1, the school has formed a planning team with representatives from all necessary stakeholders. The planning team has taken initial steps to form a common framework, define and assign roles and responsibilities in the planning process, and set a schedule of planning meetings.



Step 2: Understand the Situation

In Step 2, the planning team identifies possible threats and hazards, and assesses the risk and vulnerabilities posed by those threats and hazards.

Effective school planning depends on a consistent analysis and comparison of the threats and hazards a particular school faces. This is typically performed through a threat and hazard identification and risk assessment process that collects information about threats and hazards, and assigns values to risk for the purposes of deciding which threats or hazards the plan should prioritize and subsequently address.

Identify Threats and Hazards

The planning team first needs to understand the threats and hazards faced by the school and the surrounding community.

The planning team can draw upon a wealth of existing information to identify the range of threats and hazards that may be faced by the school. First, the planning team members should share their own knowledge of threats and hazards the school and surrounding community have faced in the past or may face in the future. The planning team should then reach out to local, state, and federal agencies for data about historical threats and hazards faced by the surrounding community. Local and county agencies that have a knowledge of threats and hazards include, but are not limited to, emergency management offices, fire and police departments, as well as local organizations and community groups (e.g., local chapter of the American Red Cross, Community Emergency Response Team), utilities, and other businesses that can provide helpful information.

Assess the Risk Posed by the Identified Threats and Hazards

Once an initial set of threats and hazards have been identified through the process described in the previous section, the planning team should select suitable assessment tools to evaluate the risk posed by the identified threats and hazards.⁴ Evaluating risk entails understanding the probability that the specific threat or hazard will occur; the effects it will likely have, including

⁴ For more information on the threat and hazard identification and risk assessment process, please see FEMA's *Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide (CPG 201)* at <http://www.fema.gov/plan>.

the severity of the impact; the time the school will have to warn students and staff about the threat or hazard; and how long it may last. The local and county emergency management staff should be able to provide information on some of the risks posed by threats and hazards common to the school and surrounding community. This enables the planning team to focus its assessment efforts on threats and hazards unique to the school community, as well as on the particular vulnerabilities of the building and its occupants.

“Vulnerabilities” refers to the characteristics of the school (e.g., structure, equipment, information technology (IT) or electrical systems, grounds, surrounding area) that could make it more susceptible to the identified threats and hazards. Assessing risk and vulnerability enables the planning team to focus its efforts on prioritized threats and hazards.

There are numerous assessments that the planning team may use, including site assessments, culture and climate assessments, school behavioral threat assessments, and capacity assessments. These assessments will help the planning team not only assess risk but also identify resources and issues that the plan may need to address. Through the assessment process, the planning team may also identify additional threats and hazards.

The most successful assessments are conducted by a broad array of individuals, including support staff and first responders. Students and parents, including students and parents with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs, should be included to the maximum extent appropriate. The assessment also has to be strategic: If the school is in an isolated region of a county and the response times for law enforcement officers or fire officials and EMS practitioners are lengthy, that may alter the calculus of the assessment. If response time is lengthy, other security measures may need to be enacted to compensate for lengthy response times.

Assessments will be used not only to develop the initial plan but also to inform updates and revisions to the plan on an ongoing basis. The following table provides more information about some of the most essential assessments the planning team should undertake.⁵

⁵ For more information on assessments and schools, see the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance (TA) Center’s *A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments* at http://rems.ed.gov/display.aspx?page=publications_General.

Table 1: Assessment

Type of Assessment	Description	Purpose and Results
Site Assessment	<p>A site assessment examines the safety, accessibility, and emergency preparedness of the school’s buildings and grounds. This assessment includes, but is not limited to, a review of building access and egress control measures, visibility around the exterior of the building, structural integrity of the building, compliance with applicable architectural standards for individuals with disabilities and others with functional and access needs, and emergency vehicle access.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased understanding of the potential impact of threats and hazards on the school buildings and grounds. • Increased understanding of risk and vulnerabilities of the school buildings and grounds when developing the plan. • Knowledge of which facilities are physically accessible to students, staff, parents, volunteer workers, and emergency response personnel with disabilities and can be used in compliance with the law.
Culture and Climate Assessment	<p>In schools with positive climates, students are more likely to feel connected to adults and their peers. This fosters a nurturing environment where students are more likely to succeed, feel safe, and report threats. A school culture and climate assessment evaluates student and staff connectedness to the school and problem behaviors. For example, this assessment may reveal a high number of bullying incidents, indicating a need to implement an anti-bullying program. If a student survey is used to assess culture and climate, student privacy must be protected. A range of school personnel can assist in the assessment of culture and school climate, including school counselors and mental health staff.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge of students’ and staff’s perceptions of their safety. • Knowledge of problem behaviors that need to be addressed to improve school climate.

Type of Assessment	Description	Purpose and Results
School Threat Assessment	A school threat assessment analyzes communication and behaviors to determine whether or not a student, staff, or other person may pose a threat. These assessments must be based on fact, must comply with applicable privacy, civil rights, and other applicable laws, and are often conducted by multidisciplinary threat assessment teams. While a planning team may include the creation of a threat assessment team in its plan, the assessment team is a separate entity from the planning team and meets on its own regular schedule.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Students, staff, or other persons that may pose a threat are identified before a threat develops into an incident and are referred for services, if appropriate.
Capacity Assessment	The planning team needs to know what resources will be at their disposal. A capacity assessment examines the capabilities of students and staff as well as the services and material resources of community partners. This assessment is used to identify people in the building with applicable skills (e.g., first aid certification, search and rescue training, counseling and mental health expertise, ability to assist individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs). Equipment and supplies should also be inventoried. The inventory should include an evaluation of equipment and supplies uniquely for individuals with disabilities, such as evacuation chairs, the availability of sign language interpreters and technology used for effective communication, accessible transportation, and consumable medical supplies and durable medical equipment that may be necessary during a shelter-in-place or evacuation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An increased understanding of the resources available. • Information about staff capabilities will help planners assign roles and responsibilities in the plan.

After conducting these assessments, the planning team should consolidate all of the information it has obtained into a format that is usable for comparing the risks posed by the identified threats and hazards. This information will then be used to assess and compare the threats and hazards and their likely consequences. This is referred to as a “risk and vulnerability assessment.” One effective method for organizing information is to create a table with a range of information about each possible threat and hazard, including any new threats or hazards identified through the assessment process. The table should include:

- ❖ Probability or frequency of occurrence (i.e., how often a threat or hazard may occur);
- ❖ Magnitude (i.e., the extent of expected damage);
- ❖ Time available to warn staff, students, and visitors;
- ❖ Duration (i.e., for how long the hazard or threat will be occurring); and
- ❖ Follow-on and cascading effects of threat or hazard.

While some of the information collected will directly feed into this table, other information, for example details on school climate challenges, will have to be organized differently. The most important outcome is that information is clearly presented so that it can be easily used to inform the plan’s development.

Prioritize Threats and Hazards

Next, the planning team should use the information it has organized to compare and prioritize risks posed by threats and hazards. This will allow the team to decide which threats or hazards it will directly address in the plan. The team must consider multiple factors when developing an indicator of risk to the institution. One option is a mathematical approach, which assigns index numbers (e.g., a 1-to-4, 1-to-5, or 1-to-10 scale) for different categories of information used in the ranking scheme. Using this approach, the planning team will categorize threats and hazards as posing a relatively high, medium, or low risk. The following table, “Table 2: Sample Risk Assessment Worksheet” (separate from Table 1, above) provides a sample risk assessment worksheet for comparing and prioritizing threats and hazards.

Table 2: Sample Risk Assessment Worksheet

Hazard	Probability	Magnitude	Warning	Duration	Risk Priority
Fire	4. Highly likely 3. Likely 2. Possible 1. Unlikely	4. Catastrophic 3. Critical 2. Limited 1. Negligible	4. Minimal 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 12–24 hrs. 1. 24+ hrs.	4. 12+ hrs. 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 3–6 hrs. 1. < 3 Hours	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> Low
Hazmat spill outside the school	4. Highly likely 3. Likely 2. Possible 1. Unlikely	4. Catastrophic 3. Critical 2. Limited 1. Negligible	4. Minimal 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 12–4 hrs. 1. 24+ hrs.	4. 12+ hrs. 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 3–6 hrs. 1. < 3 hrs.	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> Low

Step 2 Outcome

After completing Step 2, the planning team has a prioritized (high, medium, or low risk) list of threats and hazards based on the results of the risk assessment.



Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives

In Step 3, the planning team decides which of the threats and hazards identified in Step 2 will be addressed in the school EOP. The planning team may decide to address only those threats and hazards that rank “high” in risk priority, or they may decide to also address some of the threats and hazards that rank “medium.” This is a critical decision point in the planning process that is left up to the planning team. It is recommended that the team address more than just the “high” risk priority threats and hazards.

Once the planning team has decided which threats and hazards will be addressed in the school EOP, it develops *goals* and *objectives* for each.

Develop Goals and Objectives

Goals are broad, general statements that indicate the desired outcome in response to the threat or hazard identified by planners in the previous step. They are what personnel and other resources are supposed to achieve. They also help identify when major activities are complete and what defines a successful outcome.

The planning team should develop at least *three goals* for addressing each threat or hazard (though the planning team may want to identify more). Those three goals should indicate the

desired outcome for (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the threat or hazard. For a fire, for instance, three possible goals include

- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 1 (before): Prevent a fire from occurring on school grounds.
- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 2 (during): Protect all persons from injury and property from damage by the fire.
- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 3 (after): Provide necessary medical attention to those in need.

Objectives are specific, measurable actions that are necessary to achieve the goals. Often, planners will need to identify multiple objectives in support of a single goal.

Using the goal in Example 1 of preventing a fire on or near school grounds, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 1.1: Provide fire prevention training to all students and staff who use combustible materials or equipment.
- ❖ Objective 1.2: Store combustible materials in fireproof containers or rooms.

Using the goal in Example 2 of protecting all persons from injury by the fire, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 2.1: Evacuate all persons from the building immediately.
- ❖ Objective 2.2: Account for all persons.

Using the goal in Example 3 of providing necessary medical attention to those in need, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 3.1: Immediately notify fire department officials and EMS personnel of any fire on schools grounds via 911.
- ❖ Objective 3.2: Immediately begin to provide first aid.

After the team has finished compiling the objectives for the prioritized threats and hazards, it will find that certain critical “*functions*” or activities apply to more than one threat or hazard. Examples of these cross-cutting functions include evacuating, providing medical care, and accounting for all students, staff, and guests.

After identifying these functions, the planning team should develop three goals for each function. As with the goals already identified for threats and hazards, the three goals should indicate the desired outcome for (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the function has been executed. These commonly occurring functions will be contained in a “*Functional Annex*” within the school EOP. More details on these functions are included in the Plan Content section of this guide, including issues to consider as you develop goals and objectives for these functions.

For an evacuation function, three possible goals are

- ❖ Function Goal Example 1 (before): Ensure all students and staff know their evacuation route.
- ❖ Function Goal Example 2 (during): Evacuate the school immediately.
- ❖ Function Goal Example 3 (after): Confirm that all individuals have left the building.

Once the goals for a function are identified, possible supporting objectives are identified. For the evacuation goals above, objectives could include

- ❖ Objective 1.1 (before): Assess, identify, and communicate the location of rally points to be used during an evacuation.
- ❖ Objective 2.1 (during): Evacuate all students, staff, and guests from the school using assigned routes.
- ❖ Objective 3.1 (after): Safely sweep the building.

Step 3 Outcome

After completing Step 3, the planning team has at least three goals (i.e., before, during, and after) for each threat or hazard and function, as well as objectives for each goal.



Step 4: Plan Development (Identifying Courses of Action)

In Step 4, the planning team develops courses of action for accomplishing each of the objectives identified in Step 3 (for threats, hazards, and functions). Courses of action address the what, who, when, where, why, and how for each threat, hazard, and function. The planning team should examine each course of action to determine whether it is feasible and whether the stakeholders necessary to implement it find it acceptable. For additional issues to consider as you develop courses of action for functions, please see the Plan Content section.

Identify Courses of Action

Courses of action include criteria for determining how and when each response will be implemented under a variety of circumstances. Subsequently, the planning team develops response protocols and procedures to support these efforts.

Possible courses of action are typically developed using the following steps:

1. **Depict the scenario.** Create a potential scenario based on the threats and hazards identified and prioritized in Step 2.

-
2. **Determine the amount of time available to respond.** This will vary based on the type of threat or hazard and the particular scenario. For example, in the case of a hurricane, the school might have days or hours to respond before the storm makes landfall, while the school may have to respond in minutes to an *active shooter*.
 3. **Identify decision points.** Decision points indicate the place in time, as threats or hazards unfold, when leaders anticipate making decisions about a course of action. Walking through each scenario in detail will help identify the relevant decision points for each one, such as whether or not to evacuate, shelter in place, or lockdown.
 4. **Develop courses of action.** Planners develop courses of action to achieve their goals and objectives by answering the following questions:
 - What is the action?
 - Who is responsible for the action?
 - When does the action take place?
 - How long does the action take and how much time is actually available?
 - What has to happen before?
 - What happens after?
 - What resources are needed to perform the action?
 - How will this action affect specific populations, such as individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs who may require medication, wayfinding, evacuation assistance, or personal assistance services, or who may experience severe anxiety during traumatic events?

PLANS MUST COMPLY WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Plans must comply with the *Americans with Disabilities Act*, among other prohibitions on disability discrimination, across the spectrum of emergency management services, programs, and activities, including preparation, testing, notification and alerts, evacuation, transportation, sheltering, emergency medical care and services, transitioning back, recovery, and repairing and rebuilding. Plans should include students, staff, and parents with disabilities. Among other things, school emergency plans must address the provision of appropriate auxiliary aids and services to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities (e.g., interpreters, captioning, and accessible information technology); ensure individuals with disabilities are not separated from service animals and assistive devices, and can receive disability-related assistance throughout emergencies (e.g., assistance with activities of daily living, administration of medications); and comply with the law's architectural and other requirements. (Information and technical assistance about the *Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)* is available at <http://www.ada.gov>.)

PLANS MUST ADDRESS LANGUAGE ACCESS

Effective communication with individuals with limited English proficiency (LEP), including students and parents, is an essential component of emergency planning and response. Plans must comply with applicable legal requirements on language access, including *Title VI* of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964* (available at <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/titlevi.php>) and the *Title VI* regulation of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964* (available at <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/fedagencies.php>).

Select Courses of Action

After developing courses of action, planners compare the costs and benefits of each proposed course of action against the goals and objectives. Based on this comparison, planners select the preferred course or courses of action to move forward in the planning process. Plans often include multiple courses of action for a given scenario to reflect the different ways it could unfold.

After selecting courses of action, the planning team identifies resources necessary to accomplish each course of action without regard to resource availability. Once the planning team identifies all of the requirements, it begins matching available resources to requirements. This step provides planners an opportunity to identify resource gaps or shortfalls that must be taken into account.

Step 4 Outcome

After completing Step 4, the planning team will have identified goals, objectives, and courses of action for before, during, and after threats and hazards, as well as functions.

Goals, objectives, and courses of action for threats and hazards will go into the “Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes” section of the school EOP.

Goals, objectives, and courses of action for functions will be contained in the “Functional Annexes” section of the school EOP.



Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval

In Step 5, the planning team develops a draft of the school EOP using the courses of action developed in Step 4. In addition, the team reviews the plan, obtains official approval, and shares the plan with community partners such as first responders, local emergency management officials, staff, and stakeholders.

Format the Plan

An effective school EOP is presented in a way that makes it easy for users to find the information they need and that is compatible with local and state plans. This may include using

plain language and providing pictures and/or visual cues for key action steps. This guide presents a traditional format that can be tailored to meet individual school needs. This format has three major sections: the Basic Plan, Functional Annexes, and Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes.

The *Basic Plan* section of the school EOP provides an overview of the school's approach to emergency operations. Although the Basic Plan section guides the development of the more operationally oriented annexes, its primary audiences consist of the school, local emergency officials, and the community (as appropriate). The elements listed in this section should meet the needs of these audiences while providing a solid foundation for the development of supporting annexes.

The *Functional Annexes* section details the goals, objectives, and courses of action of functions (e.g., evacuation, communications, recovery) that apply across multiple threats or hazards. Functional annexes set forth how the school manages a function before, during, and after an emergency.

The *Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes* section specifies the goals, objectives, and courses of action that a school will follow to address a particular type of threat or hazard (e.g., hurricane, *active shooter*). Threat- and hazard-specific annexes, like functional annexes, set forth how the school manages a function before, during, and after an emergency.

The following functional format can be used for the Functional Annexes as well as for the Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes sections. Using the format below and the work the planning team did in Step 4, each function, threat, and hazard will have at least three goals, with one or more objectives for each goal and a course of action for each of the objectives.

- ❖ Title (the function, threat, or hazard)
- ❖ Goal(s)
- ❖ Objective(s)
- ❖ Courses of Action (Describe the courses of action you developed in Step 4 in the sequence in which they will occur.)

Figure 2 below outlines the different components of each of these three sections. This guide details the contents of these three sections under Plan Content.⁶

⁶ The term *annex* is used throughout this guide to refer to functional, hazard- or threat-specific, or other supplements to the basic plan. Some plans may use the term *appendix* in the same fashion (e.g., hazard-specific appendix).

Figure 2: Traditional EOP Format

School EOP Format

Basic Plan

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Introductory Material | 2.4. Planning Assumptions |
| 1.1. Promulgation Document and Signatures | 3. Concept of Operations |
| 1.2. Approval and Implementation | 4. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities |
| 1.3. Record and Changes | 5. Direction, Control, and Coordination |
| 1.4. Record of Distribution | 6. Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination |
| 1.5. Table of Contents | 7. Training and Exercises |
| 2. Purpose, Scope, Situation Overview, and Assumptions | 8. Administration, Finance, and Logistics |
| 2.1. Purpose | 9. Plan Development and Maintenance |
| 2.2. Scope | 10. Authorities and References |
| 2.3. Situation Overview | |

Functional Annexes

NOTE: This is not a complete list, but it is recommended that all EOPs include at least the following functional annexes:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Communications | 6. Reunification |
| 2. Evacuation | 7. Continuity of Operations (COOP) |
| 3. Shelter-in-Place | 8. Security |
| 4. Lockdown | 9. Recovery |
| 5. Accounting for All Persons | 10. Health and Medical |

Threat- or Hazard-Specific Annexes

NOTE: This is not a complete list. Each school's annexes will vary based on its hazard analysis.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Hurricane or Severe Storm | 5. Mass Casualty Incident |
| 2. Earthquake | 6. <i>Active Shooter</i> |
| 3. Tornado | 7. Pandemic or Disease Outbreak |
| 4. Hazardous Materials Incident | |

Write the Plan

As the planning team works through the draft, the members add necessary tables, charts, and other supporting graphics. The planning team circulates a draft to obtain the comments of stakeholders that have responsibilities for implementing the plan. Successful plans are written according to the following simple rules.

1. Summarize important information with checklists and visual aids, such as maps and flowcharts.
2. Write clearly, using plain language, avoiding jargon, minimizing the use of abbreviations, and using short sentences and the active voice. Qualifiers and vague wording only add to confusion.
3. Use a logical, consistent structure that makes it easy for readers to grasp the rationale for the sequence of the information and to scan for the information they need.

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4. Provide enough detail to convey an easily understood plan that is actionable. For example, classroom teachers may have a one-page document that covers what they will need to know and do during an emergency, or create flip-charts, posters, or signs giving simple directions. Organize the contents in a way that helps users quickly identify solutions and options. Plans should provide guidance for carrying out common courses of action, through the functional and threat- and hazard-specific annexes, while also staying out of the weeds.
 5. Develop accessible tools and documents. Use appropriate auxiliary aids and services necessary for effective communication, such as accessible websites, digital text that can be converted to audio or Braille, text equivalents for images, and captioning of any audio and audio description of any video content.

Review the Plan

Planners should check the written plan for compliance with applicable laws and for its usefulness in practice. Commonly used criteria can help determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the plan. The following measures can help determine if a plan is of high quality:

- ❖ A plan is *adequate* if the plan identifies and addresses critical courses of action effectively; the plan can accomplish the assigned function; and the plan's assumptions are valid and reasonable.
- ❖ A plan is *feasible* if the school can accomplish the assigned function and critical tasks by using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan.
- ❖ A plan is *acceptable* if it meets the requirements driven by a threat or hazard, meets cost and time limitations, and is consistent with the law.
- ❖ A plan is *complete* if it
 - Incorporates all courses of action to be accomplished for all selected threats and hazards and identified functions;
 - Integrates the needs of the whole school community;
 - Provides a complete picture of what should happen, when, and at whose direction;
 - Estimates time for achieving objectives, with safety remaining as the utmost priority;
 - Identifies success criteria and a desired end state; and
 - Conforms with the planning principles outlined in this guide.
- ❖ The plan must *comply* with applicable state and local requirements because these provide a baseline that facilitates both planning and execution.

Additionally, when reviewing the plan, the planning team does not have to provide all of the resources needed to execute a course of action or meet a requirement established during the

planning effort. However, the plan should explain where or how the district and school will obtain the resources to support those requirements.

Approve and Share the Plan

After finalizing the plan, the planning team should present it to the appropriate leadership and obtain official approval of the plan. The team should then share the plan with its community partners who have a responsibility in the plan (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) and additional stakeholders that have a role in the plan, including relevant district, local, regional, and/or state agencies with which the plan will be coordinated. The plan should also be shared with other organizations that may use the school building(s).

Schools should be careful to protect the plan from those who are not authorized to have it and should consider how they will secure documents shared electronically. Law enforcement agencies and first responders have a secured, Web-accessible site available to house copies of plans, building schematics, phone contact sheets, and other important details that round out planning. Schools must comply with state and local open records laws in storing and protecting the plan.

The team should maintain a record of the people and organizations that receive a copy of the plan.

Step 5 Outcome

After completing Step 5, the planning team will have a final school EOP.



Step 6: Plan Implementation and Maintenance

Train Stakeholders on the Plan and Their Roles

Everyone involved in the plan needs to know her or his roles and responsibilities before, during, and after an emergency. Key training components include:

Hold a meeting. At least once a year, hold a meeting to educate all parties on the plan. Go through the plan to familiarize these stakeholders with it.

Visit evacuation sites. Show involved parties not only where evacuation sites are located but also where specific areas, such as reunification areas, media areas, and triage areas will be located.

Give involved parties appropriate and relevant literature on the plan, policies, and procedures. It may also be helpful to provide all parties with quick reference guides that remind them of key courses of action.

Post key information throughout the building. It is important that students and staff are familiar with and have easy access to information such as evacuation routes and shelter-in-place procedures and locations. Ensure that information concerning evacuation routes and shelter-in-

place procedures and locations is effectively communicated to students, staff, and parents with disabilities as well as others with access and functional needs, such as by distributing the materials by e-mail in an accessible format.

Familiarize students and staff with the plan and community partners. Bringing community partners (e.g., law enforcement officers, fire officials, and EMS personnel) that have a role into the school to talk about the plan will make students and staff feel more comfortable working with these partners.

Train staff on the skills necessary to fulfill their roles. Staff will be assigned specific roles in the plan and positions supporting the Incident Command System (ICS) that will require special skills, such as first aid, threat assessment, and provision of personal assistance services for students with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs. Also, substitute teachers must be trained on the plan and their roles in the plan.

Exercise the Plan

The more a plan is practiced and stakeholders are trained on the plan, the more effectively they will be able to act before, during, and after an emergency to lessen the impact on life and property. Exercises provide opportunities to practice with community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management personnel), as well as to identify gaps and weaknesses in the plan. The exercises below require increasing amounts of planning, time, and resources. Ideally, schools will create an exercise program, building from a tabletop exercise up to a more advanced exercise, like a functional exercise:

- ❖ **Tabletop exercises:** Tabletop exercises are small-group discussions that walk through a scenario and the courses of action a school will need to take before, during, and after an emergency to lessen the impact on the school community. This activity helps assess the plan and resources, and facilitates an understanding of emergency management and planning concepts.
- ❖ **Drills:** During drills, school personnel and community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) use the actual school grounds and buildings to practice responding to a scenario.
- ❖ **Functional exercises:** Functional exercises are similar to drills but involve multiple partners; some may be conducted district-wide. Participants react to realistic simulated events (e.g., a bomb threat, or an intruder with a gun in a classroom), and implement the plan and procedures using the ICS.
- ❖ **Full-scale exercises:** These exercises are the most time-consuming activity in the exercise continuum and are multiagency, multijurisdictional efforts in which all resources are deployed. This type of exercise tests collaboration among the agencies and participants, public information systems, communications systems, and equipment. An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is established by either law enforcement or fire services, and the ICS is activated.

Before making a decision about how many and which types of exercises to implement, a school should consider the costs and benefits of each, as well as any state or local requirements. For

example, while a tabletop exercise may be less costly and less time-consuming to run, a full-scale exercise provides a more realistic context for the simulated response to an emergency situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to improve the plans. If students are involved, the school should also consider the age of the student population when selecting the appropriate exercise. Schools should also consider whether to include parents and should take into account the cultural diversity of their populations when designing exercises and training.

It is up to the planning team to decide how often exercises should be conducted. While frequent exercise is important, it is imperative that exercises are of high quality.

To effectively execute an exercise

- ❖ Include community partners such as first responders (law enforcement officers, EMS practitioners, and fire department personnel) and local emergency management staff;
- ❖ Communicate information in advance to avoid confusion and concern;
- ❖ Exercise under different and non-ideal conditions (e.g., times of day, weather conditions, points in the academic calendar, absence of key personnel, and various school events);
- ❖ Be consistent with common emergency management terminology;
- ❖ Debrief and develop an after-action report that evaluates results, identifies gaps or shortfalls, and documents lessons learned; and
- ❖ Discuss how the school EOP and procedures will be modified, if needed, and specify who has the responsibility for modifying the plan.

For additional information on conducting exercises, please see the *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Guide* at https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP10.aspx.

Review, Revise, and Maintain the Plan

This step closes the loop in the planning process. It focuses on adding the information gained from exercising the plan to the research collected in Step 2, starting the planning cycle over again. Remember, planning is a continuous process even after the plan is published. Plans should evolve as the school and planning team learn lessons, obtain new information and insights, and update priorities.

Reviews should be a recurring activity. Planning teams should establish a process for reviewing and revising the plan. Many schools review their plans on an annual basis. In no case should any part of a plan go for more than two years without being reviewed and revised.

Some schools have found it useful to review and revise portions instead of reviewing the entire plan at once. Schools may consider reviewing a portion each month or at natural breaks in the academic calendar. Certain events will also provide new information that will be used to inform the plan. Schools should consider reviewing and updating their plans or sections of their plans after

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- ❖ Actual emergencies;
 - ❖ Changes have been made in policy, personnel, organizational structures, processes, facilities, or equipment;
 - ❖ Formal updates of planning guidance or standards have been finalized;
 - ❖ Formal exercises have taken place;
 - ❖ Changes in the school and surrounding community have occurred;
 - ❖ Threats or hazards change or new ones emerge; or
 - ❖ Ongoing assessments generate new information.

The planning team should ensure that all community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) have the most current version of the school EOP.

PLAN CONTENT

Step 5 of the planning process in this guide introduced a format with three sections for schools to follow in developing a school EOP. This section provides greater detail about what each of the three sections should include and some key considerations in developing the content.

The Basic Plan

The Basic Plan section of the school EOP provides an overview of the school’s approach to operations before, during, and after an emergency. This section addresses the overarching activities the school undertakes regardless of the function, threat, or hazard. The content in this section provides a solid foundation for the school’s operations. The information in this section should not duplicate information contained in other parts of the plan. Almost all of the information contained in the basic plan should be able to come from the planning team. If the planning team finds that it has to go outside its members for a significant amount of information, it may be an indication that the planning team membership needs to be expanded.

Introductory Material

Introductory material can enhance accountability with community partners, including first responders, local emergency managers, and public and mental health officials, and make a school EOP easier to use. Typical introductory material includes:

- ❖ **Cover Page.** The cover page includes the title of the plan, a date, and the school(s) covered by the plan.
- ❖ **Promulgation Documentor Signature Page.** This document or page contains a signed statement formally recognizing and adopting the school EOP. It gives both the authority and the responsibility to school officials to perform their tasks before, during, or after an incident, and therefore should be signed by the school administrator or another authorizing official.

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- ❖ **Approval and Implementation Page.** The approval and implementation page introduces the plan, outlines its applicability, and indicates that it supersedes all previous plans. It includes a delegation of authority for specific modifications that can be made to the plan and by whom they can be made without the school administrator's signature. It also includes a date and should be signed by the authorized school administrator.
 - ❖ **Record of Changes.** Each update or change to the plan should be tracked. The record of changes, usually in table format, contains, at a minimum, a change number, the date of the change, the name of the person who made the change, and a summary of the change.
 - ❖ **Record of Distribution.** The record of distribution, usually in table format, indicates the title and the name of the person receiving the plan, the agency to which the recipient belongs (either the school office or, if from outside the school, the name of the appropriate government agency or private-sector entity), the date of delivery, and the number of copies delivered. Other relevant information could be considered. The record of distribution can be used to prove that individuals and organizations with specified roles have acknowledged their receipt, review, and/or acceptance of the plan. Copies of the plan can be made available to the public and media without sensitive information, in accordance with public records laws.
 - ❖ **Table of Contents.** The table of contents is a logically ordered, clearly identified layout of the major sections and subsections of the plan that will make finding information within the plan easier.

Purpose and Situation Overview

The Purpose and Situation Overview section includes the following components:

- ❖ **Purpose.** The purpose sets the foundation for the rest of the school EOP. The basic plan's purpose is a general statement of what the school EOP is meant to do. The statement should be supported by a brief synopsis of the basic plan and annexes.
- ❖ **Situation Overview.** The situation section explains why a school EOP is necessary. The situation section covers a general discussion of
 - The threats and hazards that pose a risk to the school and would result in a need to use this plan; and
 - Dependencies on parties outside the school for critical resources.

Concept of Operations

The Concept of Operations section explains in broad terms the school administrator's intent with regard to an operation.

This section is designed to give an overall picture of how the school will protect the students, staff, and visitors, and should

- ❖ Identify those with authority to activate the plan (e.g., school administrators, department heads);
- ❖ Describe the process by which the school coordinates with all appropriate agencies, boards, or divisions within the jurisdiction;
- ❖ Describe how plans take into account the architectural, programmatic, and communication rights of individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs;
- ❖ Identify other response and support agency plans that directly support the implementation of this plan (e.g., city or county EOP, school EOPs from schools co-located on the campus);
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken before an emergency is to prevent, protect from, and mitigate the impact on life or property;
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken during an emergency is to respond to the emergency and minimize its impact on life or property; and
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken after an emergency is to recover from its impact on life or property.

Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

This section provides an overview of the broad roles and responsibilities of school staff, families, guardians, and community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency managers, public and mental health personnel), and of organizational functions *during* all emergencies. It

- ❖ Describes the broad roles and responsibilities of individuals that apply *during*⁷ all emergencies.
 - Individuals that the planning team may wish to include in this section of the plan are principals and other school administrative leaders, teachers, support personnel (e.g., instructional aides, counselors, social workers, psychologists, nurses, maintenance staff, school resource officers [SROs], cafeteria workers, bus drivers), and parents and guardians.
 - The planning team may also wish to include community-based organizations represented in the EOP.

⁷ If the planning team considers the information critical to the successful implementation of the plan, it may identify roles and responsibilities of one or more of these individuals before and after an emergency in addition to during an emergency.

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- The following is an example of the type of information that would be included in the plan to describe the broad roles and responsibilities of teachers during all emergencies.
 - Teachers will be responsible for the supervision of students and shall remain with students until directed otherwise. Teachers' responsibilities include:
 - ✓ directing students to inside or outside assembly areas according to instructions provided by the Incident Commander or designee;
 - ✓ accounting for students when class relocates to an outside or inside assembly area or evacuates to another location;
 - ✓ reporting missing students to the Incident Commander or designee;
 - ✓ obtaining first-aid services for injured students; and if trained and certified in first aid, rendering first aid, if necessary.
 - ❖ Describes informal and formal agreements in place for the quick activation and sharing of resources during an emergency (e.g., evacuation locations to a nearby business' parking lot). Agreements may be between the school and response groups (e.g., fire department, police department), neighboring schools, organizations, and businesses.

Direction, Control, and Coordination

This section describes the framework for all direction, control, and coordination activities. It should explain

- ❖ The ICS structure as used by the school;
- ❖ The relationship between the school EOP and the district, or the broader community's emergency management system; and
- ❖ Who has control of the equipment, resources, and supplies needed to support the school EOP.

Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination

This section addresses the role of information in the successful implementation of the activities that occur before, during, and after an emergency.

- ❖ Identify the type of information that will be helpful in the successful implementation of the activities that occur before, during, and after an emergency, such as
 - Before and during: weather reports, law enforcement alerts, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration radio alerts, crime reports.
 - After: mental health agencies' websites and hotlines, and emergency management and relief agencies websites and hotlines assisting in all aspects of recovery.

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- ❖ For each of the identified types of information, provide answers to the following questions:
 - What is the source of the information?
 - Who analyzes and uses the information?
 - How is the information collected and shared?
 - What is the format for providing the information to those who will use it?
 - When should the information be collected and shared?

Training and Exercises

This section describes the critical training and exercise activities the school will use in support of the plan. This includes the core training objectives and frequency to ensure that staff, students, faculty, parents, and community representatives understand roles, responsibilities, and expectations. This section also establishes the expected frequency of exercises to be conducted by the school. Content may be influenced based on similar requirements at the district and/or local jurisdiction level(s). Exercises may range from basic fire and shelter-in-place drills to full-scale communitywide drills that realistically portray a crisis and show the role the school plays in school district and municipal planning.

Administration, Finance, and Logistics

This section covers general support requirements and the availability of services and support for all types of emergencies, as well as general policies for managing resources. It should identify and reference policies and procedures that exist outside the plan. This section should

- ❖ Identify administrative controls (e.g., budget and acquisition policies and procedures) and requirements that will be used to provide resource and expenditure accountability;
- ❖ Briefly describe how the school will maintain accurate logs of key activities;
- ❖ Briefly describe how vital records (e.g., student records) will be preserved (details may be contained in a Continuity of Operations [COOP] functional annex); and
- ❖ Identify general policies for keeping financial records, tracking resource needs, tracking the source and use of resources, acquiring ownership of resources, and compensating the owners of private property used by the school.

Plan Development and Maintenance

This section discusses the overall approach to planning and the assignment of plan development and maintenance responsibilities. This section

- ❖ Describes the planning process, participants in that process, and how development and revision of different sections of the school EOP (basic plan and annexes) are coordinated before an emergency;

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- ❖ Assigns responsibility for the overall planning and coordination to a specific position or person; and
 - ❖ Provides for a regular cycle of training, evaluating, reviewing, and updating of the school EOP.

Authorities and References

This section provides the legal basis for emergency operations and activities, and includes

- ❖ Lists of laws, statutes, ordinances, executive orders, regulations, and formal agreements relevant to emergencies; and
- ❖ Provisions for the succession of decision-making authority and operational control to ensure that critical emergency functions can be performed in the absence of the school administrator.

Functional Annexes Content

Functional annexes focus on critical operational functions and the courses of action developed to carry them out. This section of the guide describes functional annexes that schools should address in developing a comprehensive, high-quality school EOP. As the planning team assesses the school's needs, it may need to prepare additional or different annexes. Also included in this section are issues the planning team should consider as it develops goals, objectives, and courses of action for these functions. While these are some of the most important issues, they are not meant to constitute an exhaustive list.

While these functions should be described separately, it is important to remember that many functions will occur consecutively. For example, a shelter-in-place during an emergency may be implemented but, if the building is damaged, the school may then initiate an evacuation.

Often, multiple functions will also be performed concurrently. For example, during an evacuation, once students are safely out of the building, the accounting for students, staff, and guests function will begin. The evacuation function, however, will still be in effect as staff or first responders work to locate and evacuate any persons not accounted for.

While functions build upon one another and overlap, it is not necessary to repeat a course of action in one functional annex if it appears in a second functional annex. For example, though an evacuation may lead to reunification, it is not necessary to list a course of action for reunification within the Evacuation Annex.

Evacuation Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action that schools will execute to evacuate school buildings and grounds.

The planning team should consider the following when developing their goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to safely move students and visitors to designated assembly areas from classrooms, outside areas, cafeterias, and other school locations.

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- ❖ How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.
 - ❖ How to evacuate students who are not with a teacher or staff member.
 - ❖ How to evacuate individuals with disabilities (along with service animals and assistive devices, e.g., wheelchairs) and others with access and functional needs, including language, transportation, and medical needs.

Lockdown Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action schools will execute to secure school buildings and grounds during incidents that pose an immediate threat of violence in or around the school. The primary objective of a lockdown is to quickly ensure all school staff, students, and visitors are secured in the rooms away from immediate danger.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to lock all exterior doors, and when it may or may not be safe to do so.
- ❖ How particular classroom and building characteristics (i.e., windows, doors) impact possible lockdown courses of action.
- ❖ What to do when a threat materializes inside the school.
- ❖ When to use the different variations of a lockdown (e.g., when outside activities are curtailed, doors are locked, and visitors are closely monitored, but all other school activities continue as normal).

Shelter-in-Place Annex

A Shelter-in-Place annex focuses on courses of action when students and staff are required to remain indoors, perhaps for an extended period of time, because it is safer inside the building or a room than outside. Depending on the threat or hazard, students and staff may be required to move to rooms that can be sealed (such as in the event of a chemical or biological hazard) or without windows, or to a weather shelter (such as in the event of a tornado).

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ What supplies will be needed to seal the room and to provide for the needs of students and staff (e.g., water).
- ❖ How a shelter-in-place can affect individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, such as students who require the regular administration of medication, durable medical equipment, and personal assistant services.
- ❖ How to move students when the primary route is unusable.
- ❖ How to locate and move students who are not with a teacher or staff member.

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- ❖ Consider the need for and integration of “safe rooms” for protection against extreme wind hazards (such as a tornado or hurricane) in order to provide immediate life-safety protection when evacuation is not an option.

Accounting for All Persons Annex

This annex focuses on developing courses of action for accounting for the whereabouts and well-being of students, staff, and visitors, and identifying those who may be missing.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How staff will determine who is in attendance at the assembly area.
- ❖ What to do when a student, staff member, or guest cannot be located.
- ❖ How staff will report to the assembly supervisor.
- ❖ How and when students will be dismissed or released.

Communications and Warning Annex

The Communications and Warning annex includes communication and coordination during emergencies and disasters (both internal communication and communication with external stakeholders), as well as the communication of emergency protocols before an emergency and communication after an emergency.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How the school’s communications system integrates into the local disaster and response law enforcement communication networks (e.g., fire department and law enforcement staff).
- ❖ How to ensure relevant staff members can operate communications equipment.
- ❖ How the school will communicate with students, families, and the broader community before, during, and after an emergency.
- ❖ How to account for technology barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How to effectively address language access barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How the school will handle the media (e.g., district or school Public Information Officer [PIO]).
- ❖ How impacts on students will be communicated to the community, including the impact on activities related to the school but not necessarily at the school or during regular school hours (i.e., church use of school property and athletic events).

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- ❖ How the school will ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs (e.g., coordinating with first responders and local emergency managers to provide sign language interpreters for use during press conferences, publishing only accessible documents, ensuring information on websites is accessible).

Family Reunification Annex

The Family Reunification annex details how students will be reunited with their families or guardians.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to inform families and guardians about the reunification process in advance, and how to clearly describe their roles and responsibilities in reunification.
- ❖ How to verify that an adult is authorized to take custody of a student.
- ❖ How to facilitate communication between the parent check-in and the student assembly and reunion areas.
- ❖ How to ensure students do not leave on their own.
- ❖ How to protect the privacy of students and parents from the media.
- ❖ How to reduce confusion during the reunification process.
- ❖ How frequently families will be updated.
- ❖ How to account for technology barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How to effectively address language access barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.

Telling Family Members That Their Loved One Is Missing, Injured, or Killed

When reunification is not possible because a child is missing, injured, or killed, how and when this information is provided to families is critical. Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom loved ones will be informed if their loved one is missing or has been injured or killed. Law enforcement typically takes the lead on death notifications, but all parties must understand their roles and responsibilities. This will ensure that parents and loved ones receive accurate and timely information in a compassionate manner.

While law enforcement and medical examiner procedures must be followed, families should receive accurate information as soon as possible. Having trained personnel on hand or immediately available to talk to loved ones about death and injury can ensure the notification is provided to family members with clarity and compassion. Counselors should be on hand to immediately assist family members.

The school EOP should include pre-identified points of contact (e.g., counselors, police officers) to work with and support family members. These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while children are still missing but also before any victims have been positively identified. After an incident, it is critical to confirm that each family is getting the support it needs, including over the long-term.

The school EOP should consider printed and age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help in regard to a variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency. Often, a family that has lost a child may have other children or another child in the school. It is critical that these families and loved ones are supported as they both grieve their loss and support their surviving child(ren).

The school EOP also should explicitly address how impacted families and children will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping the media separate from families and students while the emergency is ongoing, and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.

Continuity of Operations (COOP) Annex

This annex describes how a school and district will help ensure that essential functions continue during an emergency and its immediate aftermath. Essential functions include business services (payroll and purchasing), communication (internal and external), computer and systems support, facilities maintenance, safety and security, and continuity of teaching and learning.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How the COOP annex will be designed so that it can be activated at any time and sustained for up to 30 days.

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- ❖ How the COOP annex will set priorities for re-establishing essential functions, such as restoration of school operations, and maintaining the safety and well-being of students and the learning environment.
 - ❖ How the COOP annex will ensure students receive applicable related services in the event of a prolonged closure.

Recovery Annex

This annex describes how schools will recover from an emergency. The four most fundamental kinds of recovery are academic recovery, physical recovery, fiscal recovery, and psychological and emotional recovery.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ Academic recovery
 - When the school should be closed and reopened, and who has the authority to do so.
 - What temporary space(s) the school may use if school buildings cannot be immediately reopened.
 - How to provide alternate educational programming in the event that students cannot physically reconvene.
- ❖ Physical recovery
 - How to document school assets, including physically accessible facilities, in case of damage.
 - Which personnel have expert knowledge of the schools' assets, and how and where they will access records to verify current assets after disaster strikes.
 - How the school will work with utility and insurance companies before an emergency to support a quicker recovery.
- ❖ Fiscal recovery
 - How district leadership will be included (e.g., superintendent, chief business officer, personnel director, and risk manager).
 - How staff will receive timely and factual information regarding returning to work.
 - What sources the school may access for emergency relief funding.
- ❖ Psychological and emotional recovery
 - Who will serve as the team leader.

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- Where counseling and psychological first aid will be provided.
 - How teachers will create a calm and supportive environment for the students, share basic information about the incident, provide psychological first aid (if trained), and identify students and staff who may need immediate crisis counseling.
 - Who will provide trained counselors.
 - How to address the immediate, short-, and long-term counseling needs of students, staff, and families.
 - How to handle commemorations, memorial activities, or permanent markers and/or memorial structures (if any will be allowed). This includes concerns such as when a commemoration site will be closed, what will be done with notes and tributes, and how students will be informed in advance.
 - How memorial activities will strike a balance among honoring the loss, resuming school and class routines and schedules, and maintaining hope for the future.
 - How the Public Health, Medical and Mental Health annex will inform the actions and plans of the Recovery annex.

Public Health, Medical, and Mental Health Annex

This annex describes the courses of action that the school will implement to address emergency medical (e.g., first aid), public health, and mental health counseling issues. Schools should coordinate these efforts with the appropriate emergency medical services, public health, mental health, law enforcement, fire department, and emergency management representatives. Mental health needs after an emergency will be addressed in the Recovery annex.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ What the role of staff members is in providing first aid during an emergency.
- ❖ Where emergency medical supplies (e.g., first aid kits, AEDs) will be located and who is responsible for purchasing and maintaining those materials.
- ❖ Which staff have relevant training or experience, such as in first aid or CPR.
- ❖ How the school will secure a sufficient number of counselors in the event of an emergency.
- ❖ How the school will promptly share and report information about outbreaks or epidemics or other unusual medical situations to the local health department.
- ❖ How the school will support the needs of students identified by the threat assessment team.

Security Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action that schools will implement on a routine, ongoing basis to secure the school from criminal threats originating from both inside and outside the school. This includes efforts done in conjunction with law enforcement personnel.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How agreements with law enforcement agencies address the daily role of law enforcement officers in and around school.
- ❖ How to make sure the building is physically secure (including implementation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design [CPTED]).

CPTED Principles

Natural surveillance – arranging physical features to maximize visibility

Natural access control – guiding people with signage, well-marked entrances and exits, and landscaping while limiting access to certain areas by using real or symbolic barriers

Territoriality reinforcement – clearly delineating space, expressing pride and ownership, and creating a welcoming environment

Management and maintenance – ensuring building services function properly and safely, and the exterior is properly maintained and organized with landscaping and plantings maintained and trimmed

The American Clearinghouse on Educational Facilities, available at <http://www.acefacilities.org>, provides additional information describing how CPTED can be applied in the school environment.

- ❖ How to get students to and from school safely (including traffic control and pedestrian safety).
- ❖ How to keep prohibited items out of school.
- ❖ How to respond to threats identified by the behavioral threat assessment team.
- ❖ How information will be shared with law enforcement officers or other responders (keeping in mind any requirements or limitations of applicable privacy laws, including the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 [FERPA]*, the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [HIPAA]*, and civil rights and other laws. More information on *FERPA* and *HIPAA* can be found in “A Closer Look, Information Sharing”.)

Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes

The Threat- and Hazard-specific annexes describe the courses of action unique to particular threats and hazards. Courses of action already outlined in a Functional annex need not be

repeated in a Hazard-Specific annex. Schools will develop these based on the prioritized list of hazards determined in the assessment process. As planning teams develop courses of action for threats and hazards, they should consider the federal, state, and local regulations or mandates that often apply to specific hazards.

If there is a Functional annex that applies to one of the threat or hazard annexes, the latter will include it by reference. For example, if a “during” course of action for a fire hazard involves evacuation, and there is an evacuation annex, the Fire annex would indicate “see Evacuation annex” in the “during” course of action section rather than repeat the evacuation courses of action in the Fire annex.

Table 3: Threat and Hazard Types and Examples

Threat and Hazard Type	Examples
Natural Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Earthquakes • Tornadoes • Lightning • Severe wind • Hurricanes • Floods • Wildfires • Extreme temperatures • Landslides or mudslides • Tsunamis • Volcanic eruptions • Winter precipitation
Technological Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explosions or accidental release of toxins from industrial plants • Accidental release of hazardous materials from within the school, such as gas leaks or laboratory spills • Hazardous materials releases from major highways or railroads • Radiological releases from nuclear power stations • Dam failure • Power failure • Water failure
Biological Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infectious diseases, such as pandemic influenza, extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, <i>Staphylococcus aureus</i>, and meningitis • Contaminated food outbreaks, including <i>Salmonella</i>, botulism, and <i>E. coli</i> • Toxic materials present in school laboratories
Adversarial, Incidental, and Human-caused Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire • <i>Active shooters</i> • Criminal threats or actions • Gang violence • Bomb threats • Domestic violence and abuse • Cyber attacks • Suicide

A CLOSER LOOK

This section of the guide provides users with information on four key topics to enhance the implementation of their Emergency Operations Plans (EOP). These topics are described in the following chapters:

- ❖ “Information Sharing” provides an overview of the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act*, the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act*, and the implications that these federal statutes may have for information-sharing in the emergency planning process.
- ❖ “Psychological First Aid for Schools” (PFA-S) describes this type of aid and how schools can use it to help students, staff, and families during and immediately after a traumatic incident.
- ❖ “School Climate and Emergencies” describes how a positive school climate provides students with ready access to emotional and behavioral supports that can affect the capacity of students and staff to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies.
- ❖ “*Active Shooter Situations*” describes unique challenges involved in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a school-based shooting.

1. Information Sharing

This section of “A Closer Look” provides an overview of the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)* and the implications that this and other federal statutes have for information-sharing in the emergency planning process. This section also provides a brief overview of the more limited circumstances when the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)* may apply to impact information-sharing in the school setting.

While it is critical that schools comply with these laws, there is often confusion about their applicability, which results in schools sharing less than allowed with law enforcement officers or the appropriate authorities even when there is appropriate cause for sharing information. If schools understand when and how these laws apply, they can both ensure public safety and protect student privacy.

While this section of the guide focuses on *FERPA*, and to a lesser extent *HIPAA*, there may be federal and state civil rights and other laws that place restrictions on when and with whom schools may share information. At the federal level, for instance, public elementary and secondary schools are subject to federal civil rights laws, including laws that prohibit discrimination based on disability (the *Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]*), and *Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973*); race, color, and national origin (*Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*); sex (*Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*); and religion (*Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*). For example, *Section 504 and Title II of the ADA*⁸ prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability, and generally would prohibit unnecessary disclosures of disability status or information related to that disability, to third parties.⁹ Disclosures may be necessary when the student presents a significant, articulable threat to others.¹⁰

Schools are strongly urged to take the time to review these laws, as well as others that apply in their jurisdictions, when working with their community partners to ensure that all parties have a strong understanding of applicable laws when deciding whether to disclose information. In particular, it is critical to train school employees, including contractors, on applicable laws to ensure that schools, school officials, or employees do not release information inappropriately or make decisions about students or release of records based upon myths, fears, or stereotypes related to race, color, national origin, sex, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity.¹¹

⁸ *Title II of the ADA* prohibits discrimination based on disability by public entities, including public schools.

⁹ See 34 CFR § 104.4; 28 CFR § 35.130; “Dear Colleague Letter” and “Frequently Asked Questions on Report Cards and Transcripts for Students with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools,” October 2008. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20081017.pdf>.

¹⁰ See 28 CFR 35.139.

¹¹ For more information about applicable civil rights statutes, please visit www.justice.gov/crt, www.ed.gov/ocr or www.ada.gov. Information about appropriate training and management for school resource officers and law enforcement officials in schools may be found at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)

In this section:

- What Is *FERPA*?
- What Are “Education Records?”
- Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records?
- Balancing Safety and Privacy
 - The Health and Safety Emergency Exception to the Consent Requirement
 - The Law Enforcement Unit Record Exception to the Definition of Education Records
 - Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings
 - Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations
- Incorporating *FERPA* Into Your Emergency Planning Process
 - What Information Is *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?
 - What Information Is Not *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?
- Frequently Asked Questions Pertaining to *FERPA*
- *FERPA* Guidance and Resources

What Is *FERPA*?

FERPA is a federal law that protects the privacy of student *education records*. The law applies to all educational agencies and institutions that receive funds under any U.S. Department of Education program (termed “schools” below). *FERPA* gives parents certain rights with respect to their children’s education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or she reaches the age of 18 or attends a school beyond the high school level. Students to whom the rights have transferred are “eligible students.” The Family Policy Compliance Office at the U.S. Department of Education administers *FERPA*.

FERPA protects the rights of parents or eligible students to

- ❖ Inspect and review education records;
- ❖ Seek to amend education records; and
- ❖ Consent to the disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) from education records, except as specified by law.

For a thorough review of *FERPA*, in addition to what is provided in this document, please see the implementing regulations for *FERPA*, found in Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 99, and the resources and guidance documents listed at the end of this section.

What Are “Education Records?”

Different types of records and information may be protected by *FERPA* if determined to be “education records.” Education records are protected by *FERPA* and are broadly defined as records that are directly related to a student and maintained by an educational agency or institution, or by a party acting for the agency or institution.

The non-exhaustive chart below shows several examples of what types of records generally *are* and *are not* considered to be education records.

Education Records	Not Education Records
Transcripts	Records that are kept in the sole possession of the maker and used only as personal memory aids
Disciplinary records	Law enforcement unit records
Standardized test results	Grades on peer-graded papers before they are collected and recorded by a teacher
Health (including mental health) and family history records	Records created or received by a school after an individual is no longer in attendance and that are not directly related to the individual’s attendance at the school
Records on services provided to students under the <i>Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)</i>	Employee records that relate exclusively to an individual in that individual’s capacity as an employee
Records on services and accommodations provided to students under <i>Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973</i> and <i>Title II of the ADA</i> ¹²	Information obtained through a school official’s personal knowledge or observation and not from the student’s education records

See the discussion under “Balancing Safety and Privacy” below for more detail on law enforcement units under *FERPA*, what constitutes a law enforcement unit record, and how these records may be used.

Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records?

“School officials with a legitimate educational interest” may access *FERPA*-protected education records. Schools determine the criteria for who is considered a school official with a legitimate

¹² Schools should also consider carefully whether information they are requiring for student enrollment in services, including special education services, will tend to identify a student as a person with a disability and determine to what extent laws other than *FERPA* should be considered before release of that information without consent. In addition, release of details about some disabilities or accommodations that permit the student to be identified could constitute discrimination on the basis of disability pursuant to the *ADA* or the *Rehabilitation Act* or other civil rights statutes.

educational interest under *FERPA* regulations, and it generally includes teachers, counselors, school administrators, and other school staff.

The term “school official with a legitimate educational interest” may also include contractors, consultants, volunteers, and other parties if those individuals

- ❖ Perform an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees;
- ❖ Are under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and
- ❖ Are subject to the requirements of 34 CFR § 99.33(a), which specifies that individuals who receive information from education records may use the information only for the purposes for which the disclosure was made and which generally prohibits the redisclosure of PII from education records to any other party without the prior consent of the parent or eligible student. There are, however, exceptions to this prohibition.

In addition, schools must annually notify parents and eligible students of their rights under *FERPA*, and must include in this notification the criteria for who constitutes a school official and what constitutes a legitimate educational interest. The U.S. Department of Education provides model notification statements on its website at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/FERPA/lea-officials.html>.¹³

This means that if a school wishes to consider non-employee members of its threat assessment team (TAT), its contracted counseling, nursing, service, or security staff, its school resource officers (SROs), and other non-employees as “school officials” who may have access to education records, the school must ensure that these individuals meet the criteria in the bullets above and the criteria in the school’s annual notification of *FERPA* rights. Schools are encouraged to train all school officials who may have access to education records, including contractors, on *FERPA* as well as other applicable laws.

Balancing Safety and Privacy

School officials must balance safety interests and student privacy interests. *FERPA* contains exceptions to the general consent requirement, including the “health or safety emergency exception,” and exceptions to the definition of education records, including “law enforcement unit records,” which provide school officials with tools to support this goal.

The Health or Safety Emergency Exception to the Consent Requirement

FERPA generally requires written consent before disclosing PII from a student’s education records to individuals other than his or her parents. However, the *FERPA* regulations permit school officials to disclose PII from education records without consent to appropriate parties only when there is an actual, impending, or imminent emergency, such as an articulable and

¹³ See 34 CFR § 99.7(a)(3)(iii) for further information. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/reg/ferpa/index.html>.

significant threat. Information may be disclosed only to protect the health or safety of students or other individuals. In applying the health and safety exception, note that:

- ❖ Schools have discretion to determine what constitutes a health or safety emergency.
- ❖ “Appropriate parties” typically include law enforcement officials, first responders, public health officials, trained medical personnel, and parents. This *FERPA* exception is temporally limited to the period of the emergency and does not allow for a blanket release of PII. It does not allow disclosures to address emergencies that *might* occur, such as would be the case in emergency preparedness activities.
- ❖ The information that may be disclosed is limited to only PII from an education record that is needed based on the type of emergency.
- ❖ Disclosures based on this exception must be documented in the student’s education records to memorialize the
 - Emergency that formed the basis for the disclosure; and
 - Parties with whom the school shared the PII.

The U.S. Department of Education would not find a school in violation of *FERPA* for disclosing *FERPA*-protected information under the health or safety exception as long as the school had a rational basis, based on the information available at the time, for making its determination that there was an articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of the student or other individuals.

For more information on the health or safety exception, see: “Addressing Emergencies on Campus,” June 2011, available at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/emergency-guidance.pdf> and 34 CFR §§ 99.31(a)(10) and 99.36.

The Law Enforcement Unit Record Exemption to the Definition of Education Records

FERPA defines a “law enforcement unit” as any individual, office, department, division, or other component of an educational agency or institution, such as a unit of commissioned police officers or non-commissioned security guards, that is officially authorized or designated by that agency or institution to

- (i) Enforce any local, state, or federal law, or refer to appropriate authorities a matter for enforcement of any local, state, or federal law against any individual or organization other than the agency or institution itself; or
- (ii) Maintain the physical security and safety of the agency or institution.

Significantly, to be considered a “law enforcement unit” under this definition, an individual or component must be officially authorized or designated to carry out the functions listed above by the school. Schools may designate a traditional law enforcement entity (such as school security staff, school resource officers [SROs], school safety officers, school police, or other school

security personnel) as a law enforcement unit, or opt to designate another non-law enforcement school official to serve as their law enforcement unit, such as a vice principal or another school official.

FERPA does not prevent schools from disclosing information from records maintained by law enforcement that were created for law enforcement purposes by the law enforcement unit to anyone, subject to state law, including outside law enforcement authorities, without the consent of the parent or eligible student during an emergency or otherwise.

Law enforcement unit records, which are not subject to the *FERPA* consent requirements, are defined as records that are

- ❖ Created by a law enforcement unit;
- ❖ Created for a law enforcement purpose; and
- ❖ Maintained by the law enforcement unit.

Law enforcement unit records *do not* include

- ❖ Records created by a law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose that are maintained by a component of the school other than the law enforcement unit, such as a principal or guidance counselor;
- ❖ Health records or PII collected about or related to the disability of a student, including information about providing an accommodation; and
- ❖ Records created and maintained by a law enforcement unit exclusively for a non-law enforcement purpose, such as a school disciplinary action or proceeding.

In designating a law enforcement unit and using law enforcement unit records, note that

- ❖ To be given access to PII from a student's education records, law enforcement unit officials who are employed by the school must meet the criteria set forth in the school's *FERPA* notification for school officials with a legitimate educational interest. While law enforcement unit officials are not required to be school officials under *FERPA*, many schools have found that it is useful for them to be school officials so that they may access education records that may be necessary to ensure school safety. For instance, if a student has been suspended for a period of time (a fact that would be recorded in the student's education records), the law enforcement unit could need to know this in case the student attempts to enter the building when not permitted to do so.
- ❖ A school's law enforcement unit officials must protect the privacy of education records they receive and may disclose them only in compliance with *FERPA*. For that reason, we recommend that law enforcement unit records be maintained separately from education records.

For more information on law enforcement unit records and *FERPA*, refer to the following sources:

- ❖ “Addressing Emergencies on Campus,” June 2011
<http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/emergency-guidance.pdf>
- ❖ The discussion in the preamble to the final rule in the Federal Register published Dec. 9, 2008, starting on page 74836
<http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/finrule/2008-4/120908a.pdf>
- ❖ Family Policy Compliance Office website
<http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/index.html>
- ❖ The regulatory definition of “Law Enforcement Unit” under *FERPA* in 34 CFR § 99.8(a) available at <http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=ae535d41f8bb03bedfef79634883360f&n=34y1.1.1.1.33&r=PART&ty=HTML#34:1.1.1.1.33.1.132.8>

Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings

School administrators and their partner organizations must understand *FERPA* and its implications because misinterpretations of the law and subsequent delays in information-sharing can hinder first responders’ efforts to provide necessary assistance in a health or safety emergency.

Sharing Personal Observation or Knowledge

Misinterpreting *FERPA* can lead school administrators to miss opportunities to share crucial information that could prevent an emergency situation. For instance, some schools incorrectly believe that information obtained from a school official’s personal observations or knowledge is protected by *FERPA*. In fact, personal observation or knowledge is generally not considered to be part of the student’s education records (see “What Are ‘Education Records’” above) and therefore may be disclosed. For example, if a teacher overhears a student making threatening remarks to other students, the teacher is not prohibited from sharing that information with appropriate authorities, including the parents of the students who were threatened.

However, if a school official learns of information about a student through his or her official role in creating or maintaining an education record, then that information would be covered by *FERPA*. For instance, if a principal suspends a student, the principal would not be permitted to non-consensually disclose that information (unless the disclosure met one of the exceptions in *FERPA* to consent) because he or she gained personal knowledge of that information in making that disciplinary determination.

Releasing Directory Information

In some circumstances, schools may be able to disclose “directory information” to prevent an emergency situation. Directory information means information contained in a student’s education record that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed. Some examples of directory information include a student’s name, address, telephone number, or e-mail address. Schools must follow certain requirements in publicly designating “directory information,” and they may not disclose directory information from a student’s

education record if the parent or eligible student has opted out of allowing that disclosure. For example, assuming that the parents' cell phone numbers have been properly designated as "directory information," what if the parents have not opted out of the disclosure of such "directory information," and a flood displaced families from their homes and these children are brought to a shelter? The school may disclose those parents' cell phone numbers to an emergency management agency that is trying to locate the parents.

Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations

FERPA has implications in a variety of different situations, and new questions arise as schools become more creative and innovative in developing their campus safety plans. In many cases, however, it is helpful to review the *FERPA* basics to help you clearly think through each scenario. The following are some scenarios that may arise.

❖ Infectious Disease

Under the health or safety emergency exception, school officials may, without consent, disclose PII from education records to appropriate parties in connection with an emergency. In the case of an influenza outbreak, for instance, if school officials determine that an emergency exists, they may share immunization records with parties such as state and local public health officials whose knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of students or others in the school community. Under this exception, schools may share information only during the limited period of time connected with the emergency. A blanket release of information is not allowed. You must instead determine what information to disclose on a case-by-case basis depending on the particular threat.

❖ Threat Assessment Teams

Some educational agencies and institutions may need assistance in determining whether a health or safety emergency exists for purposes of complying with *FERPA*. Federal agencies encourage schools to implement a threat assessment program, including the establishment of a multidisciplinary threat assessment team that utilizes the expertise of representatives from mental health service providers, persons familiar with emergency procedures, and law enforcement agencies in the community.

The threat assessment team must comply with applicable civil rights and other federal and state laws. Under a properly implemented threat assessment program, schools can respond to student behavior that raises safety concerns that are not based on assumptions, stereotypes, or myths about people with disabilities (including mental health-related disabilities) or people of a particular race, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or sex.

If a threat assessment team member meets the definition of a school official (as a party to whom the school has outsourced administrative functions or services) with a legitimate educational interest under *FERPA*, (see "Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records" above), then he or she would be able to access students' education records in which he or she has legitimate educational interests. A threat assessment team member who is appropriately designated as a school official, however, may not disclose PII from

education records to anyone without consent or unless one of the exceptions to consent under *FERPA*, such as the health or safety emergency exception, applies.

❖ **Security Videos**

Schools are increasingly using security cameras as a tool to monitor and improve student safety. Images of students captured on security videotapes that are created and maintained by the school's law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose are not considered education records under *FERPA*. Accordingly, these videotapes may be shared with parents of students whose images are on the video and with outside law enforcement authorities, as appropriate.

Incorporating *FERPA* Into Your Emergency Planning Process

Below are critical questions and concepts that schools should discuss with their community partners while in the process of developing or revising an emergency management plan. While building partnerships is critical, in gathering information to support these partnerships, schools must also take steps to consider student privacy and civil rights and other laws as well as their mission of safety. Be sure to refer to the sections elsewhere in this guidance to review any concepts with which you are unfamiliar.

What Information Is *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?

Education records are protected by *FERPA*, and schools may generally only PII from those records only with written consent from a parent or eligible student, unless a *FERPA* exception to consent applies. (See “What Are ‘Education Records’” above.) The following are examples of such exceptions.

Example: At the start of flu season, your local public health agency requests the names of those students showing influenza-like symptoms, as well as their parents’ contact information. You know that you may not disclose PII from a student’s education records without consent if there is not a health or safety emergency or another exception to consent under *FERPA* that applies. So, to facilitate this sharing of information, you opt to develop a consent form that identifies students’ names and parent contact information as specific PII from student education records. And you would like to share the form with the local public health agency, as well as the purpose of the disclosure. The form gives parents and eligible students the option to allow or to not allow this sharing of information. After collecting the signed and dated consent forms, for the students for whom you received consent you begin to share with the local health agency the names of students who are showing influenza-like symptoms and their parents’ contact information. Your purpose of this sharing of PII is to help so the health agency is able to conduct real-time surveillance to prevent the spread of the illness. (See “What Is *FERPA*” above.)

Example: Your school’s threat assessment team includes representatives from your community partners, and you have properly designated them as “school officials with a legitimate educational interest.” (See “Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Records” above.) The local law enforcement representative on your team does not share with his police chief or other law enforcement official the PII that he obtains from a student’s

education records in his capacity as a threat assessment team member while working to identify possible threats because he knows that this is not permitted. Several months after the threat assessment team initially convened to review a collection of behaviors and communications concerning a particular student and determined that there was not sufficient information demonstrating that the student posed a threat, the team learns that the student has now communicated his intent to harm the school principal. At this juncture, the law enforcement representative (and other members of the threat assessment team) shares pertinent PII from education records with appropriate parties so they can take steps, such as consulting with a police agency, to protect the health or safety of the principal (in this case). (See also the discussion of threat assessment teams under “Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations” above.)

Example: At the beginning of the school year, your school notified parents and eligible students that you had designated students’ names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses as “directory information,” explaining to them that you would disclose this information upon request to anyone contacting the school. In your notice, you explained how and by when they could opt out. When a reporter contacts your institution requesting the directory information about a student who is under 18, you check to see whether the student’s parents opted out of the disclosure of directory information. Because the student’s parents did not opt out of the school’s directory information policy, you provide that directory information to the reporter. (See “Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings” above.)

Example: A student has a severe allergic reaction to peanuts during lunch. The school nurse administers epinephrine and then calls an ambulance in accordance with applicable federal and state laws. When the emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrive, the nurse discloses PII from the student’s education record to the EMTs without obtaining parental consent under the health or safety emergency exception. (See “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.)

What Information Is Not *FERPA*-Protected and When May the School Share It?

Records that are created and maintained by a school’s law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose are not protected by *FERPA*, and there are no *FERPA* restrictions on the sharing of information in law enforcement unit records. (See “What Are ‘Education Records’” and “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.)

Example: Your school contracts with the law enforcement agency in your county to bring in an SRO and you properly designate the officer as a “school official with a legitimate educational interest.” (See “Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Records?” above.) You also properly designate the SRO as your school’s law enforcement unit. (See “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.) The SRO knows that she may not redisclose to her home agency PII that she obtains from a student’s education records while serving in her SRO capacity, unless there is a health or safety emergency or another *FERPA* exception to consent that would apply. However, she shares her law enforcement unit records about a student who was arrested for smoking marijuana on campus with other law enforcement officials because she knows that law enforcement unit records are not protected by *FERPA*.

Are Processes and Protocols, Including Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), in Place for Information Sharing and Record Keeping That Comply With *FERPA*?

It is important for schools to consider entering into MOUs with law enforcement and their other community partners to formalize roles, responsibilities, and protocols. MOUs can be tailored to the needs of the individual schools in the jurisdiction. Any policies regarding information sharing between the school and the law enforcement agency, however, must comply with applicable federal, state, and local laws, including *FERPA*. While information-sharing MOUs should be developed regarding what information can be shared between departments and what information is protected, no provision in an MOU can override a school's obligations under *FERPA*.

Frequently Asked Questions Pertaining to *FERPA*

Q: To what entities does *FERPA* apply?

A: *FERPA* applies to educational agencies and institutions that receive funds under any program administered by the U.S. Department of Education. This includes virtually all public schools and school districts, and most private and public postsecondary institutions, including medical and other professional schools.

Private and religious schools at the elementary and secondary school levels generally do not receive funds from the U.S. Department of Education and, therefore, are not subject to *FERPA*.

Q: Does an interagency agreement with partners such as the state or local health department enable a school to non-consensually disclose education records?

A: No. Interagency agreements do not supersede the consent requirements under *FERPA*. Although an interagency agreement would be a helpful tool for planning purposes, schools must comply with *FERPA*'s requirements regarding the disclosure of PII from students' education records.

Q: Under the health or safety emergency exception, may a school non-consensually disclose PII from a student's education records to the media?

A: No, you generally may not disclose *FERPA*-protected information to the media. While the media play a role in alerting the community of a health epidemic or a violent incident outbreak, they generally do not have a role in protecting the health or safety of individual students or others at the school.

Q: When would the health or safety exception apply?

A: Under *FERPA*, an emergency means a situation in which there is an articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of students or other individuals. This determination must be made by the school.

Q: Do I need to tell parents and eligible students or otherwise document when I have disclosed PII from their education records without consent under a health or safety emergency?

A: Within a reasonable period of time after a disclosure is made under the health or safety exception, a school must record in the student’s education records the articulable and significant threat that formed the basis for the disclosure, and the parties to whom the information was disclosed. Parents and eligible students have a right to inspect and review the record of disclosure, but do not need to be proactively informed that records have been disclosed.

Q: Can members of our threat assessment team have access to student education records?

A: School officials with legitimate educational interests may have access to a student’s education records. Members of a threat assessment team who are not school employees may be designated as such if they are under the direct control of the school with respect to the maintenance and use of PII from education records; are subject to the requirements of 34 CFR § 99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of PII from education records; and otherwise meet the school’s criteria for being school officials with legitimate educational interests.

Members of a threat assessment team who are considered school officials with a legitimate educational interest generally cannot non-consensually redisclose PII from a student’s education records to which he or she was privy as part of the team. However, if a threat assessment team determines that a health or safety emergency exists, members may non-consensually redisclose PII from a student’s education records on behalf of the school to appropriate officials under the health or safety emergency exception.

For example, a representative from the city police who serves on a school’s threat assessment team generally could not redisclose, without consent, PII from a student’s education records to the city police during the initial discussions about a particular student. However, once the threat assessment team determines that a health or safety emergency exists, as defined under *FERPA*, the representative may redisclose, without consent, PII from a student’s education records on behalf of the school to appropriate officials. (See the discussion under “Additional Situations with *FERPA* Considerations” above.)

Q: How does *FERPA* interact with the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)*?

A: The U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services jointly developed guidance on the application of *FERPA* and *HIPAA*. This guidance explains that records that are protected by *FERPA* are exempt from the *HIPAA* Privacy Rule. Accordingly, school officials must follow the requirements of *FERPA* with regard to the disclosure of records protected by *FERPA*. Please see the guidance at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf> for more information, as well as the *HIPAA* guidance in this “A Closer Look” section.

Q: Who should I contact for more information related to *FERPA*?

A: The U.S. Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance Office is available to respond to any questions about *FERPA*. For quick responses to routine questions, please e-mail the Department of Education at FERPA@ed.gov. For more in-depth technical assistance or a more formal response, you may call the Family Policy Compliance Office at 202-260-3887 or write to them at

Family Policy Compliance Office
U.S. Department of Education
400 Maryland Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20202-8520

Q: What are some of the other federal and state laws relating to emergency management planning that are relevant to access to and sharing of information about students?

A: As noted in the introduction to this “A Closer Look” section, schools may also be subject to federal and state civil rights laws that protect the disclosure of information about students. Schools and their community partners should review guidance from the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice on any applicable civil rights or other statutes governing privacy and information sharing and discuss their implications for emergency management and related planning processes. At a minimum, in determining what constitutes an “emergency,” schools and their partners must base their decisions on actual risks and not on assumptions, stereotypes, fears, or myths about people with disabilities (including mental health-related disabilities) or people of a particular race, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or sex.^{14, 15}

***FERPA* Guidance and Resources**

The Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) at the U.S. Department of Education administers *FERPA*. FPCO has developed, and continues to develop, extensive guidance pertaining to the implementation of *FERPA* and emergency situations. For more detailed information or additional guidance, please see the documents below and the FPCO website at www.ed.gov/fpc.

¹⁴ See Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 35.139.

¹⁵ In enacting the *Americans with Disabilities Act*, Congress relied on *School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline*, 480 U.S. 273, (1987) to “acknowledge[] that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” As explained in the preamble to the Justice Department's 1991 *ADA* regulation, codification of the *Arline* standard was deemed essential if the *ADA* is to achieve its goal of protecting disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to legitimate concerns, such as the need to avoid exposing others to significant health and safety risks. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, sec. 36.208. This rationale applies with equal force to making determinations based on stereotypes about other characteristics protected by *Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)

In this section:

- What Is *HIPAA*?
- How Does *HIPAA* Apply in Schools?
- *HIPAA* Guidance and Resources

What Is *HIPAA*?

The *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)* and its implementing regulations, commonly known as the *HIPAA* Privacy Rule and the *HIPAA* Security Rule, protect the privacy and security of individually identifiable health information, called protected health information or PHI, held by health plans, health care clearinghouses, and most health care providers, collectively known as covered entities, and their business associates (entities that have access to individuals' health information to perform work on behalf of a covered entity).

The Privacy Rule, or *Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information*, establishes national standards to protect the privacy of individuals' identifiable health information. In doing so, the Privacy Rule sets forth the circumstances under which covered entities and their business associates may use or disclose an individual's health information, requires safeguards to protect the information, and gives individuals rights, including rights to examine and obtain a copy of their health records and to request corrections.

A major goal of the Privacy Rule is to ensure that individuals' health information is properly protected while allowing the flow of health information needed to provide and promote high quality health care and to protect the public's health and well-being. Given that the health care marketplace is diverse, the Privacy Rule is designed to be flexible and comprehensive to cover the variety of uses and disclosures that need to be addressed.

The *Security Rule*, or *Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information*, establishes a national set of security standards for protecting health information that is held or transferred in electronic form. The Security Rule sets out the technical, administrative, and physical safeguards that covered entities and business associates must put in place to secure individuals' electronic health information. The Security Rule is designed to be flexible and scalable, and technology neutral, so a covered entity or business associate can implement policies, procedures, and technologies that are appropriate for the entity's particular size, organizational structure, and risks to consumers' electronic health information.

The HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has responsibility for administering and enforcing the Privacy and Security Rules.

How Does *HIPAA* Apply in Schools?

Generally, *HIPAA* does not apply to student health information maintained by a school. While schools and school districts may maintain student health records, these records are in most cases not protected by *HIPAA*. Rather, student health information maintained at a school would be considered education records protected by the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)*.

HIPAA may apply however to patient records at a university hospital, which may include records on students and non-students, or to the health records of non-students at a university health clinic.

During the emergency planning process, if you believe health information to which access may be needed is covered by *HIPAA*, you should consult the guidance and resources below for further information about how *HIPAA* applies.

***HIPAA* Guidance and Resources**

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has developed, and continues to develop, extensive guidance pertaining to the implementation of *HIPAA* Privacy Rule and emergency situations. The OCR website has guidance about the intersection between *HIPAA* and *FERPA* and the release of PHI for common emergency preparedness issues and public health purposes, such as terrorism preparedness and outbreak investigations. For more detailed information or additional guidance, please see the HHS OCR website at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/index.html> and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/U.S. Department of Education *HIPAA/FERPA* guide at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveridentities/hipaaferpajointguide.pdf>

2. Psychological First Aid for Schools (PFA-S)

Psychological First Aid for Schools (PFA-S) is an evidence-informed intervention model to assist students, staff, and families in the immediate aftermath of an emergency and can be used by any trained staff member or community partner. Trauma-related distress can have a long-term impact. PFA-S uses brief interventions to produce positive results that last. PFA-S is designed to reduce the initial distress caused by emergencies, allows for the expression of difficult feelings and assists students in developing coping strategies and constructive actions to deal with fear and anxiety. A growing body of research shows that there are brief, effective interventions that have a long-lasting positive influence on trauma-related distress.

PFA-S is intended for students, school personnel, and families who have been exposed to a disaster or other emergency. Whether an emergency occurs on school grounds or in the community at large, schools serve as a central location for professionals to assist children, families, school personnel, and school partners.

PFA-S is most effective immediately following or even during an incident. In some circumstances, assuming the safety of students and staff has been ensured, PFA-S can be initiated while an incident is still occurring, such as in shelter-in-place or lockdown situations.

Students and staff may experience a broad range of reactions (e.g., physical, cognitive, psychological, behavioral, spiritual) to an emergency. Some of these reactions can cause distress

that interferes with adaptive coping. Support from informed, compassionate, and caring professionals can help students and staff members recover from these reactions. PFA-S has the potential to decrease the likelihood of mental health problems or long-term difficulties by identifying individuals who may need additional services and linking them to such services as needed.¹⁶

PFA-S assists students, staff, and families by

- ❖ Establishing a positive connection in a non-intrusive, compassionate manner;
- ❖ Enhancing immediate and ongoing safety and providing physical and emotional comfort;
- ❖ Calming and orienting those who are emotionally overwhelmed or distraught;
- ❖ Helping to identify their immediate needs and concerns and offering practical assistance and information to help address these needs and concerns;
- ❖ Empowering individuals to take an active role in their recovery by acknowledging their coping efforts and strengths, and supporting adaptive coping; and,
- ❖ When appropriate, linking those in need to other relevant school or community resources such as school counseling services, peer support programs, afterschool activities, tutoring, primary care physicians, local recovery systems, mental health services, employee assistance programs, public-sector services, and other relief organizations.

Training School Staff

Because PFA-S is not psychotherapy, an extended “treatment,” or a stand-alone mental health intervention, any trained staff member, regardless of whether he or she has had formal mental health training, can deliver aspects of PFA-S and can contribute to the school recovery by functioning within the PFA framework. Schools can find training resources, including the PFA-S Field Operations Guide, at <http://www.nctsn.org/content/psychological-first-aid-schoolspfa>. Similarly, trained members of community emergency response agencies and mental health professionals may provide PFA-S. During and after an emergency, teachers and other staff are a critical link in promoting resilience, in recognizing the signs of traumatic stress, and in helping students and their families regain a sense of normalcy.

3. School Climate and Emergencies

“School climate” describes a range of campus conditions, including safety, relationships and engagement, and the environment, that may influence student learning and well-being. Positive school climates that promote student learning and well-being often feature

- ❖ Safe environments free of violence, bullying, harassment, and substance use;

¹⁶ Melissa Brymer, Matt Taylor, Pia Escudero, Anne Jacobs, Mindy Kronenberg, Robert Macy, Lou Ann Mock, Linda Payne, Robert Pynoos, and Juliet Vogel, *Psychological First Aid For Schools: Field Operations Guide, 2nd Edition*. Los Angeles: National Child Traumatic Stress Network, 2012.

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- ❖ Appropriate facilities and physical surroundings;
 - ❖ Supportive academic settings;
 - ❖ Clear and fair disciplinary policies;
 - ❖ Respectful, trusting, and caring relationships throughout the school community; and
 - ❖ Available social, emotional, and behavioral supports.

Positive school climates are inclusive of and responsive to students of all backgrounds, regardless of race, color, national origin, language, disability, religion, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

Research shows that creating positive school climates can help districts, schools, and teachers meet key goals, including: boosting student achievement and closing achievement gaps; increasing high school graduation rates; decreasing teacher turnover and increasing teacher satisfaction; and turning around low-performing schools. Positive school climates also enhance safety in the school and community by increasing communication between students, families, and faculty. At the same time, schools reduce various forms of harm to students that can stem from negative school climates, including violence, bullying, and even suicide.

A positive school climate that provides students with ready access to emotional and behavioral supports can affect the capacity of students and staff to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies.

Prevention

A positive school climate can help to prevent emergencies because it can reduce the incidence of behaviors that can contribute to crisis (e.g., violence, bullying, harassment, substance abuse). Further, schools with positive school climates engage students in developing strong relationships with staff and peers, increasing the likelihood that students will quickly report potential threats to trusted adults within the school.

Response

Schools with positive school climates teach students the social and emotional competencies that enable them to develop persistence, tolerance of frustration, and ability to manage their emotions during an emergency. The teachers, counselors, school resources officers, and other staff who create positive school climates train regularly on child and adolescent development, and on how to respond appropriately to a variety of student behaviors so they are able to de-escalate aggressive behavior before it becomes a threat to school safety.

Recovery

A positive school climate can help in the recovery from an emergency because it represents a commitment, even prior to an emergency, to providing emotional and mental health services and supports to all members of the community. Schools with such a climate create an environment that recognizes the importance of social and emotional health, and so support the recovery of all members of the school community and promote an understanding that individual needs will vary in a post-emergency situation.

The following steps when implemented as part of a single, comprehensive, and integrated strategy for improving student health and safety will help schools promote a positive school climate.

Conduct a Comprehensive Needs Assessment

School communities are complex systems that include multiple stakeholders and interconnecting environmental factors that influence student health and safety. As such, comprehensive needs assessments of school climate including school engagement, school safety, and the school environment as elements to be evaluated can provide schools with the data support needed to pursue comprehensive approaches to improving school climate. A comprehensive picture of school health and safety can be created by utilizing needs assessments that include student perceptions and, where appropriate, parent and staff perceptions, to help schools identify key issues in need of attention. By monitoring indicators such as the frequency and severity of student risk behaviors, and perceptions of their safety, schools may identify threats to school safety and then use this information to implement the appropriate intervention or program to improve school safety. These data can be most effective when they are used regularly for decision-making and are disaggregated by different groups to determine how they experience the school environment. If a student survey is used to assess culture and climate, student privacy must be protected, including in accordance with the *Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment*, 20 U.S.C. 1232, if applicable.

A number of these surveys are in the compendium of school climate measures on the National Center on Safe Supportive Learning Environments' website at <http://safesupportiveschools.ed.gov/index.php?id=133>.

The center also houses archived webinars that provide information on how to use these surveys and the data that they collect. Visit at <http://safesupportiveschools.ed.gov/index.php?id=65>.

Use Multi-Tiered Interventions and Supports

School climate can be enhanced by a data-driven, multi-tiered framework that provides a continuum of behavioral supports and interventions to improve student behavior and achievement. A three-tiered framework would comprise the following:

1. Schoolwide or universal interventions and supports focus both on developing expected behaviors and social-emotional competence, and on preventing problem behavior.
2. A second tier of interventions targets groups of students who are at elevated levels of risk or exhibiting problem behavior (such as bullying). These groups of students can be identified more easily, and their needs or behavior can be addressed more effectively when a schoolwide foundation is in place.
3. A third tier of interventions targets individual students, including traumatized youths, who are at even more elevated levels of academic and social-emotional behavioral need and risk.

While interventions for students who are at elevated levels of risk address their needs and problem behaviors, they should also build the skills that support thriving in life and resiliency in crisis. Using an evidence-based, multi-tiered behavioral framework has been found to improve

school climate by reducing problem behaviors like bullying, drug abuse, and poor attendance, while making students feel safer and improving academic performance. Implementation of a schoolwide framework provides a structure for schools in which to customize and organize the varied practices and programs they need to provide to their students based on data on student needs and local resources. Further, such a framework may help schools to better identify students struggling with trauma post-event, and select appropriate interventions to help them to recover. For more information about a multi-tiered behavioral framework, visit the Technical Assistance Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports available at <http://www.pbis.org>.

Promote Social and Emotional Competencies

Social and emotional learning is important to enable individuals to learn to understand and manage their emotions and relationships, and to make good decisions. Social-emotional learning can help individuals stop and think before they react, control their response to stress, develop supportive and caring relationships, persist through challenge, seek help, and pay attention to theirs and others' needs and feelings. These and other social and emotional competencies can help individuals prepare for and respond to emergencies. Students are more likely to develop such competencies when they have good relationships with adults, and when the adults model these competencies.

For more information about teaching social and emotional competencies, visit <http://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov>. For additional information on how social and emotional learning may be integrated into a multi-tiered framework, visit <http://www.pbis.org>.

4. Active Shooter Situations

Police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services technicians (first responders) who come to a school because of a 911 call involving gunfire face a daunting task. Though the objective remains the same – protect students and staff – the threat of an “*active shooter*” incident is different than responding to a natural disaster or many other emergencies.

Emergency calls can involve actual or future threats of physical violence. This violence might be directed not only in or at the school building, students, staff, and campus but also at nearby buildings on or off school grounds.

“*Active shooter situations*” are defined¹⁷ as those where an individual is “actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.”¹⁸ Unfortunately, schools face *active shooter situations* as well.

The better first responders and school personnel are able to discern these threats and react swiftly, the more lives can be saved. This is particularly true in an *active shooter situation* at a school where law enforcement responds to a 911 call of shots fired. Many young and innocent lives are at risk in such a concentrated space. This is why it is critical that schools work with first

¹⁷ Other gun-related incidents that may occur in a school environment are not defined as *active shooter* incidents because they do not meet this definition. Instead, they may involve a single shot fired, accidental discharge of a weapon, or incidents that are not ongoing.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Active Shooter, How to Respond*. Washington, DC: Author, October 2008. Available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf.

responders, emergency management staff, and all community partners to identify, prepare, prevent, and effectively respond to an *active shooter situation* in a coordinated fashion.

Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Because of this, individuals must be prepared to deal with an *active shooter situation* before law enforcement officers arrive on the scene.

Preparing for an *Active Shooter Situation*

Planning

As with any threat or hazard that is included in a school's EOP, the planning team will establish goals, objectives, and courses of action for an annex. These plans will be impacted by the assessments conducted at the outset of the planning process and updated as ongoing assessments occur. As courses of action are developed, the planning team should consider a number of issues, including, but not limited to

- ❖ How to evacuate or lock down students, staff, and visitors, including those who are not with staff or in a classroom (e.g., in the hall, bathroom, break room). Personnel involved in such planning should pay attention to disability-related accessibility concerns when advising on shelter sites and evacuation routes.
- ❖ How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.
- ❖ How to select effective shelter-in-place locations (optimal locations have thick walls, solid doors with locks, minimal interior windows, first-aid emergency kits, communication devices and duress alarms).
- ❖ How the school community will be notified that there is an *active shooter* on school grounds. This could be done through the use of familiar terms, sounds, lights, and electronic communications such as text messages. Include in the courses of action how to communicate with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as visual signals or alarms to advise deaf students, staff, and parents about what is occurring. School wide "reverse 911-style" text messages sent to predetermined group distribution lists can be very helpful in this regard. Posting this protocol near locations where an all-school announcement can be broadcast (e.g., by the microphone used for the public announcement system) may save lives by preventing students and staff from stepping into harm's way.
- ❖ How students and staff will know when the building is safe.

The planning team may want to include functions in the *Active Shooter* annex that are also addressed in other functional annexes. For example, evacuation will be different during an *active shooter situation* than it would be for a fire.

Additional considerations are included in the "Responding to an *Active Shooter*" and "After an *Active Shooter Incident*" sections below.

Sharing Information With First Responders

The planning process is not complete until the school EOP is shared with first responders. The planning process must include preparing and making available to first responders an up-to-date and well-documented site assessment as well as any other information that would assist them. These materials should include building schematics and photos of both the inside and the outside, and include information about door and window locations, and locks and access controls. Emergency responders should also have advance information on where students, staff, and others with disabilities as well as those with access and functional needs are likely to be sheltering or escaping, generally in physically accessible locations, along accessible routes, or in specific classrooms. Building strong partnerships with law enforcement officers, fire officials, and EMS technician includes ensuring they also know the location of available public address systems, two-way communications systems, security cameras, and alarm controls. Equally important is information on access to utility controls, medical supplies, and fire extinguishers.

Providing the detailed information listed above to first responders allows them to rapidly move through a school during an emergency, to ensure areas are safe, and to tend people in need. It is critically important to share this information with law enforcement and other first responders before an emergency occurs. Law enforcement agencies have secure websites where this information is stored for many schools, businesses, public venues, and other locations. All of these can be provided to first responders and viewed in drills, exercises, and walk-throughs.

Technology and tools with the same information (e.g., a portable USB drive that is compatible with computers used by first responders) should be maintained at the front of the school, in a lock box, or other secured location from which school officials can immediately provide it to responding officials or first responders can directly access it. The location of these materials at the school should be known by and accessible to a number of individuals to ensure ready access in an emergency. Every building should have more than one individual charged with meeting first responders to provide them with the school site assessment, the school EOP and any other details about school safety and the facility.¹⁹ All parties should know who these key contacts are.

Exercises

Most schools practice evacuation drills for fires and protective measures for tornadoes, but far fewer schools practice for *active shooter situations*. To be prepared for an *active shooter* incident, schools should train their staff, students, and families, as appropriate, in what to expect and how to react. If students are involved, to select the appropriate exercise the school should consider the ages of the students. In a study of 84 *active shooter* events that occurred between 2000 and 2010, 34 percent involved schools.²⁰

Good planning includes conducting drills which must include first responders and school resource officers (where applicable). Exercises with these valuable partners are one of the most effective and efficient ways to ensure that everyone knows not only his or her roles, but also the

¹⁹ See also, <http://www.ready.gov>.

²⁰ J. Pete Blair with M. Hunter Martaindale, *United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: Training and Equipment Implications*. San Marcos, Texas: Texas State University, 2013. Available at <http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Blair-UnitedStatesActiveShooterEventsfrom2000to2010Report-Final.pdf>.

roles of others at the scene. These exercises should include walks through school buildings to allow law enforcement to provide input on shelter sites as well as familiarize first responders with the location.

Each person carries a threefold responsibility.

- First: Learn the signs of a potentially volatile situation and ways to prevent an incident.
- Second: Learn the best steps for survival when faced with an *active shooter situation*.
- Third: Be prepared to work with law enforcement during the response.

Preventing an *Active Shooter Situation*

Warning Signs

No profile exists for an *active shooter*; however, research indicates there may be signs or indicators. Schools should learn the signs of a potentially volatile situation that may develop into an *active shooter situation* and proactively seek ways to prevent an incident with internal resources, or additional external assistance.

In 2002, the Safe School Initiative (SSI) was completed by the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret Service, examining 41 K–12 student attackers involving 37 incidents in the United States from 1973 through May 2000.²¹ These research results, though focused on targeted school violence and not on *active shooter situations*, remain highly useful as a guide for law enforcement officials, educators, and mental health practitioners.

The study identified 10 key findings for the development of strategies to address targeted school violence:

- ❖ There is no accurate or useful profile of students who have engaged in targeted school violence.
- ❖ Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden, impulsive acts.
- ❖ Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or the plan to attack.
- ❖ Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

²¹ Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, William Pollack, Randy Borum, William Modzeleski, and Marisa Reddy, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/threatassessmentguide.pdf>.

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- ❖ Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.
 - ❖ Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant loss or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
 - ❖ Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
 - ❖ Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
 - ❖ In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
 - ❖ Despite prompt law enforcement officer responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.²²

By highlighting common pre-attack behaviors displayed by past offenders, federal researchers have sought to enhance the detection and prevention of tragic attacks of violence, including active shooting incidents. Several agencies within the federal government continue to explore incidents of targeted violence in the effort to identify these potential “warning signs.” In 2002, the FBI published a monograph on workplace violence, including problematic behaviors of concern that may telegraph violent ideations and plans.²³ In 2007, the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education, and the FBI collaborated to produce the report *Campus Attacks, Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Learning*, which examined lethal or attempted lethal attacks at U.S. universities and colleges from 1900 to 2008. The report was published in 2010, and featured several key observations related to pre-attack behaviors, including the following:

- ❖ In only 13 percent of the cases did subjects make verbal and/or written threats to cause harm to the target. These threats were both veiled and direct, and were conveyed to the target or to a third party about the target.
- ❖ In 19 percent of the cases, stalking or harassing behavior was reported prior to the attack. These behaviors occurred within the context of a current or former romantic relationship, or in academic and other non-romantic settings. They took on various forms, including written communications (conventional and electronic), telephonic contact, and harassment of the target and/or the target’s friends and/or family. Subjects also followed, visited, or damaged property belonging to target(s) or their families prior to the attack.
- ❖ In only 10 percent of the cases did the subject engage in physically aggressive acts toward the targets. These behaviors took the form of physical assaults, menacing actions with weapons, or repeated physical violence to intimate partners.

²² Bryan Vossekuil, Robert Fein, Marisa Reddy, Randy Borum, and William Modzeleski, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf>.

²³ U.S. Department of Justice FBI Academy, *Workplace Violence: Issues in Response*. Quantico, Va.: Author, 2002. Available at <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence>.

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- ❖ Concerning behaviors were observed by friends, family, associates, professors, or law enforcement officers in 31 percent of the cases. These behaviors included, but were not limited to paranoid ideas, delusional statements, changes in personality or performance, disciplinary problems on campus, depressed mood, suicidal ideation, non-specific threats of violence, increased isolation, “odd” or “bizarre” behavior, and interest in or acquisition of weapons.

Specialized units in the federal government (such as the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit) continue to support behaviorally based operational assessments of persons of concern in a variety of settings (e.g., schools, workplaces, places of worship) who appear to be on a trajectory toward a violent act. A review of current research, threat assessment literature, and active shooting incidents, combined with the extensive case experience of the Behavioral Analysis Unit, suggest that there are observable pre-attack behaviors which, if recognized, could lead to the disruption of a planned attack.²⁴ While checklists of various warning signs are often of limited use in isolation, there are some behavioral indicators that should prompt further exploration and attention from law enforcement officers and/or school safety stakeholders. These behaviors often include

- ❖ Development of a personal grievance;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent acquisitions of multiple weapons;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent escalation in target practice and weapons training;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent interest in explosives;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and intense interest or fascination with previous shootings or mass attacks; and
- ❖ Experience of a significant real or perceived personal loss in the weeks and/or months leading up to the attack, such as a death, breakup, divorce or loss of a job.
- ❖ Few offenders had previous arrests for violent crimes.

²⁴ See Frederick Calhoun and Stephen Weston, *Contemporary Threat Management: A Practical Guide for Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Individuals of Violent Intent* (San Diego, CA: Specialized Training Services, 2003); Gene Deisinger, Marisa Randazzo, Daniel O’Neill, and Jenna Savage, *The Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment and Management Teams* (Stoneham, MA: Applied Risk Management, 2008); Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, and Gwen Holden, *Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1995); John Monahan, Henry Steadman, Eric Silver, Paul Appelbaum, Pamela Robbins, Edward Mulvey, Loren Roth, Thomas Grisso, and Steven Banks, *Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001); Bryan Vossekuil, Robert Fein, Marisa Reddy, Randy Borum, and William Modzeleski, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004).

Threat Assessment Teams

As described in the previous section, research shows that perpetrators of targeted acts of violence engage in both covert and overt behaviors preceding their attacks. They consider, plan, prepare, share, and, in some cases, move on to action.²⁵ One of the most useful tools a school can develop to identify, evaluate, and address these troubling signs is of a multidisciplinary school threat assessment team (TAT). A TAT with diverse representation often will operate more efficiently and effectively. TAT members should include school principals, counselors, employees, medical and mental health professionals, law enforcement personnel and school resource officers, where applicable.

The TAT serves as a central convening body, so that warning signs observed by multiple people are not considered isolated incidents that slip through the cracks, when they actually may represent escalating behavior that is a serious concern. School districts should keep in mind, however, the importance of relying on factual information (including observed behavior) and avoid unfair labeling or stereotyping of students, to remain in compliance with civil rights and other applicable federal and state laws.

For the purposes of consistency and efficiency, a school TAT should be developed and implemented in coordination with school district policy and practice. In addition, staff already working to identify student needs can be a critical source of information about troubling student behavior for a TAT.

The TAT reviews troubling or threatening behavior of current or former students, parents, school employees or other persons brought to its attention. The TAT contemplates a holistic assessment and management strategy that considers the many aspects of the person's life—academic, residential, work, and social. More than focusing on warning signs or threats alone, the TAT assessment involves a unique overall analysis of changing and relevant behaviors. The TAT takes into consideration, as appropriate, information about classroom behaviors, various kinds of communications, not-yet substantiated information, any threats made, security concerns, parenting issues, or relationship problems that might involve a troubled individual. The TAT may also identify any potential victims with whom the individual may interact. Once the TAT identifies an individual that may pose a threat, the team will identify a course of action for addressing the situation. The appropriate course of action—whether law enforcement intervention, counseling, or other actions—will depend on the specifics of the situation.

Although not as common as in the K–12 environment, TATs are increasingly common in university settings, pushed to the forefront of concern following the 2007 shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Va., where 32 individuals were killed. In some cases, state funding mandates that colleges and universities create threat assessment teams.²⁶

²⁵ See <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/february-2010/threat-assessment-teams>.

²⁶ See *Recommended Practices for Virginia Colleges Threat Assessments at* http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu/resources/tat_info/VArecommended_practices.pdf.

Even in a K–12 setting, where a designated TAT may not have been established, area law enforcement officials can help assess reported threats or troubling behavior, and reach out to available federal resources. The FBI’s behavioral experts in its National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes (NCAVC) at Quantico, Va., are available on a 24/7 basis to join in any threat assessment analysis and develop threat mitigation strategies for persons of concern. The law enforcement member of the school TAT should contact the local FBI office for this behavioral analysis assistance.

Each FBI field office has a NCAVC representative available to work with school TATs and coordinate access to the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), home to the NCAVC. They focus not on how to respond tactically to an *active shooter situation* but rather on how to prevent one. Early intervention can prevent a situation from escalating by identifying, assessing, and managing the threat. The TAT should consult with its district and develop a process to seek these additional resources.

Generally, *active shooter situations* are not motivated by other criminal-related concerns, such as monetary gain or gang affiliation. Often, situations may be prevented by identifying, assessing, and managing potential threats. Recognizing these pre-attack warning signs and indicators might help disrupt a potentially tragic event.

Responding to an Active Shooter Situation

School EOPs should include courses of action that will describe how students and staff can most effectively respond to an *active shooter situation* to minimize the loss of life, and teach and train on these practices, as deemed appropriate by the school.

Law enforcement officers may not be present when a shooting begins. The first law enforcement officers on the scene may arrive after the shooting has ended. Making sure staff know how to respond and instruct their students can help prevent and reduce the loss of life.

No single response fits all *active shooter situations*; however, making sure each individual knows his or her options for response and can react decisively will save valuable time. Depicting scenarios and considering response options in advance will assist individuals and groups in quickly selecting their best course of action.

Understandably, this is a sensitive topic. There is no single answer for what to do, but a survival mindset can increase the odds of surviving. As appropriate for your community, it may be valuable to schedule a time for an open conversation regarding this topic. Though some parents or personnel may find the conversation uncomfortable, they may also find it reassuring to know that, as a whole, their school is thinking about how best to deal with this situation.

During an *active shooter situation*, the natural human reaction, even if you are highly trained, is to be startled, feel fear and anxiety, and even experience initial disbelief and denial. You can expect to hear noise from alarms, gunfire and explosions, and people shouting and screaming. Training provides the means to regain your composure, recall at least some of what you have learned, and commit to action. There are three basic options: run, hide, or fight. You can run away from the shooter, seek a secure place where you can hide and/or deny the shooter access, or incapacitate the shooter to survive and protect others from harm.

As the situation develops, it is possible that students and staff will need to use more than one option. During an *active shooter situation*, staff will rarely have all of the information they need to make a fully informed decision about which option is best. While they should follow the plan and any instructions given during an incident, often they will have to rely on their own judgment to decide which option will best protect lives.²⁷

Respond Immediately

It is not uncommon for people confronted with a threat to first deny the possible danger rather than respond. An investigation by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005) into the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on 9/11 found that people close to the floors impacted waited longer to start evacuating than those on unaffected floors.²⁸ Similarly, during the Virginia Tech shooting, individuals on campus responded to the shooting with varying degrees of urgency.²⁹ These studies highlight this delayed response or denial. For example, some people report hearing firecrackers when in fact they heard gunfire.

Train staff to overcome denial and to respond immediately, including fulfilling their responsibilities for individuals in their charge. For example, train staff to recognize the sounds of danger, act, and forcefully communicate the danger and necessary action (e.g., “Gun! Get out!”) to those in their charge. In addition, those closest to the public address or other communications system, or otherwise able to alert others, should communicate the danger and necessary action. Repetition in training and preparedness shortens the time it takes to orient, observe, and act.

Upon recognizing the danger, as soon as it is safe to do so, staff or others must alert responders by contacting 911 with as clear and accurate information as possible.

Run

If it is safe to do so for yourself and those in your care, the first course of action that should be taken is to run out of the building and far away until you are in a safe location.

²⁷ As part of its preparedness mission, *Ready Houston* produces “Run, Hide, Fight” videos, handouts, and trainings to promote preparedness among residents of the Houston region. These materials are not specific to a school setting but may still be helpful. These videos are not recommended for viewing by minors. All of these items are available free of charge, and many are available at <http://www.readyhouston.tx.gov/videos.html>.

²⁸ Occupants of both towers delayed initiating their evacuation after World Trade Center 1 was hit. In World Trade Center 1, the median time to initiate evacuation was 3 minutes for occupants from the ground floor to floor 76, and 5 minutes for occupants near the impact region (floors 77 to 91). See National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005. *Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications*. Available at <http://www.mingerfoundation.org/downloads/mobility/nist%20world%20trade%20center.pdf>.

²⁹ *Report of the Virginia Tech Review Team*, available at <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempContent/techPanelReport-docs/FullReport.pdf> and <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempContent/techPanelReport-docs/12%20CHAPTER%20VIII%20MASS%20MURDER%20AT%20NORRIS%20HALL.pdf>.

Students and staff should be trained to

- ❖ Leave personal belongings behind;
- ❖ Visualize possible escape routes, including physically accessible routes for students and staff with disabilities as well as persons with access and functional needs;
- ❖ Avoid escalators and elevators;
- ❖ Take others with them, but not to stay behind because others will not go;
- ❖ Call 911 when safe to do so; and
- ❖ Let a responsible adult know where they are.

Hide

If running is not a safe option, hide in as safe a place as possible.

Students and staff should be trained to hide in a location where the walls might be thicker and have fewer windows. In addition:

- ❖ Lock the doors;
- ❖ Barricade the doors with heavy furniture;
- ❖ Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows;
- ❖ Turn off lights;
- ❖ Silence all electronic devices;
- ❖ Remain silent;
- ❖ Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of the view from the hallway (allowing for an ambush of the shooter and for possible escape if the shooter enters the room);
- ❖ Use strategies to silently communicate with first responders if possible, for example, in rooms with exterior windows make signs to silently signal law enforcement officers and emergency responders to indicate the status of the room's occupants; and
- ❖ Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law enforcement officers.

Fight

If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, as a last resort when confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers, and chairs. In a study of 41 *active shooter* events that ended before law enforcement officers arrived, the potential

victims stopped the attacker themselves in 16 instances. In 13 of those cases they physically subdued the attacker.³⁰

While talking to staff about confronting a shooter may be daunting and upsetting for some, they should know that they may be able to successfully take action to save lives. To be clear, confronting an *active shooter* should never be a requirement in any school employee's job description; how each staff member chooses to respond if directly confronted by an *active shooter* is up to him or her. Further, the possibility of an *active shooter* situation is not justification for the presence of firearms on campus in the hands of any personnel other than law enforcement officers.

Interacting With First Responders

Staff should be trained to understand and expect that a law enforcement officer's first priority must be to locate and stop the person(s) believed to be the shooter(s); all other actions are secondary. One comprehensive study determined that more than half of mass-shooting incidents—57 percent—still were under way when the first officer arrived; in 75 percent of those instances that solo officer had to confront the perpetrator to end the threat. In those cases, the officer was shot one-third of the time.³¹

Students and staff should be trained to cooperate and not to interfere with first responders. When law enforcement officer(s) arrives, students and staff must display empty hands with open palms. Law enforcement may instruct everyone to place their hands on their heads, or they may search individuals.

After an Active Shooter Incident³²

Once the scene is secured, first responders will work with school officials and victims on a variety of matters. This will include transporting the injured, interviewing witnesses, and initiating the investigation.

The school EOP should identify trained personnel who will provide assistance to victims and their families. This should include establishing an incident response team (including local first responders and other community partners) that is trained to appropriately assess and triage an *active shooter situation* (as well as other emergencies), and provide emergency intervention services and victim assistance beginning immediately after the incident and throughout the recovery efforts. This team will integrate with state and federal resources when an emergency occurs.

Within an ongoing and/or evolving emergency, where the *immediate reunification* of loved ones is not possible, providing family members with timely, accurate, and relevant information is paramount. Having family members wait for long periods of time for information about their

³⁰ J. Pete Blair with M. Hunter Martaindale, *United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: Training and Equipment Implications*. San Marcos, Texas: Texas State University, 2013. Available at <http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Blair-UnitedStatesActiveShooterEventsfrom2000to2010Report-Final.pdf>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Also see the "Functional Annexes Content" and "Recovery Annex" sections of this guide.

loved ones not only adds to their stress and frustration but can also escalate the emotions of the entire group. When families are reunited, it is critical that there be child release processes in place to ensure that no child is released to an unauthorized person, even if that person is well-meaning.

Essential steps to help establish trust and provide family members with a sense of control are

- ❖ Identifying a safe location separate from distractions and/or media and the general public, but close enough to allow family members to feel connected in proximity to their children and their loved ones;
- ❖ Scheduling periodic updates even if no additional information is available;
- ❖ Being prepared to speak with family members about what to expect when reunified with their child and their loved ones; and
- ❖ Ensuring effective communication with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as sign language interpreters for deaf family members.

When reunification is not possible because a child is missing, injured, or killed, how and when this information is provided to families is critical. Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom loved ones will be informed if their child or loved one is missing or has been injured or killed. Law enforcement typically takes the lead on death notifications, but all parties must understand their roles and responsibilities. This will ensure that parents and loved ones receive accurate and timely information in a compassionate way.

While law enforcement and medical examiner procedures must be followed, families should receive accurate information as soon as possible. Having trained personnel on hand or immediately available to talk to loved ones about death and injury can ensure the notification is provided to family members with clarity and compassion. Counselors should be on hand to immediately assist family members.

The school EOP should include pre-identified points of contact (e.g., counselors, police officers) to work with and support family members. These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while children are still missing but before any victims have been positively identified. After an incident, it is critical to confirm that each family is getting the support it needs, including over the long-term.

The school EOP should consider printed and age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help with regard to a variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency. Often, a family that has lost a child may have another child or other children in the school. It is critical that these families and loved ones be supported as they both grieve their loss and support their surviving child(ren).

The school EOP also should explicitly address how impacted families and children will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping the media separate from families and students while the emergency is ongoing and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.



Appendix K: Sample School Emergency Operations Plan



Sample School Emergency Operations Plan

November 2013

For Training Purposes Only with
E/L361 and G364: Multihazard Emergency Planning for Schools



FEMA

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Signature Page

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This document presents excerpts from a sample school emergency operations plan (EOP). Common procedures, such as evacuation and family reunification, may differ at the local, tribal, and State level; those that are presented are samples; procedures should be developed specifically for each school or district. It is recommended that planners coordinate with local and tribal law enforcement, fire, and emergency managers when developing these procedures. Appendixes are mentioned in the sample EOP for example purposes only; no appendixes are included in the sample plan.

This sample plan is for training purposes only and is based on a fictional school and county. It is important to tailor all emergency operations plans to the specific threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities of your jurisdiction, school district, and school.

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SIGNATORY PAGE

This school emergency operations plan has been completed and approved through a collaboration of efforts in the community, including:

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Superintendent of Schools

Jennifer Paprocki
School Principal

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Plan

The purpose of the Springfield School Emergency Operations Plan (School EOP) is to identify and respond to incidents by outlining the responsibilities and duties of Springfield School and its employees, students, and families. Developing, maintaining, training, and exercising the plan empowers everyone involved in an incident to act quickly and knowledgeably. In addition, the plan educates staff, faculty, students, and other key stakeholders on their roles and responsibilities before, during, and after an incident. This plan provides parents/guardians and other members of the community with assurances that Springfield School has established guidelines and procedures to respond to threats and hazards in an effective way.

The developed guidelines and procedures for dealing with existing and potential student and school incidents are defined in the plan below. The basic plan and the functional and threat/hazard-specific annexes outline an organized, systematic method to address threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities before, during, and after an incident. Faculty and staff have been trained to assess the seriousness of incidents and respond according to these established procedures and guidelines. Springfield School regularly schedules in-service training for faculty and staff and provides training for students and parents/guardians throughout the school year.

Lastly, developing, maintaining, and exercising the School EOP increases Springfield School's legal protection. Schools without established incident management procedures have been found liable for their absence. While no set of policies rules out the potential for legal problems, establishing procedures and guidelines on the best professional practices provides a margin of protection against liability.

B. Scope of the Plan

The Springfield School Emergency Operations Plan outlines the expectations of staff/faculty; roles and responsibilities; direction and control systems; internal and external communications plans; training and sustainability plans; authority and references as defined by local, tribal, State, and Federal government mandates; common and specialized procedures; and specific threat/hazard vulnerabilities and responses/recovery.

1. Definitions

Hazard: Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome.

Incident: An occurrence, caused by either human action or natural phenomena, that may bring about harm and may require action. Incidents can include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, fires, floods, hazardous materials accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response. The principal/building administrator shall have the authority to determine when an incident has occurred and to implement the procedures within this Emergency Operations Plan.

Threat: A natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property.

Vulnerability: Characteristic of the school that could make it more susceptible to the identified threats and hazards.

2. School Board Policy Statement

The Springfield School Emergency Operations Plan operates within the framework of the Columbia County School Board policy.

C. Situation Overview

1. School Population

Springfield School's current enrollment is approximately 730 middle-school students located in one, two-story building on campus. These students are supported by a committed staff and faculty consisting of:

- 58 Teachers and specialists
- 5 Administrators
- 7 Office/support staff
- 9 Instructional Assistants
- 5 Cafeteria staff
- 8 Maintenance and custodial staff

A master schedule of where classes, grade levels, and staff are located during the day is provided to each classroom and is available in the main office. The master schedule is also located in the appendix as a reference. [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.]

Springfield School is committed to the safe evacuation and transport of students and staff with access and functional needs, which includes students/staff with:

- Limited English proficiency,
- Blindness or visual disabilities,
- Cognitive or emotional disabilities,
- Deafness or hearing loss,
- Mobility/physical disabilities (permanent and temporary), and
- Medically fragile health (including asthma and severe allergies).

The school's current enrollment of students with access and functional needs is approximately 35; however, this number will fluctuate. Students and/or staff may require additional assistance if they are temporarily on crutches, wearing casts, etc.

Classrooms containing students and staff that require additional assistance during an incident will be noted by an asterisk next to the room number during the applicable class period(s) on the master schedule. The list of students and staff names along with their schedules can be found in the appendix. Staff members that have been trained and are assigned to provide assistance during drills, exercises, and incidents are listed in the appendix. [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.]

2. Building Information

Springfield School is located on a 40-acre lot and includes three buildings, one baseball field, one football/soccer field, two tennis courts, and one staff parking lot. All classes take place in the J.M. Schulz Building, the main building on campus.

A map of the buildings annotated with evacuation routes, shelter locations, fire alarm pull stations, fire hydrants, fire extinguishers, first aid kits, hazardous materials storage, and utility shutoffs is included in the appendix. All staff members are required to know these locations as well as how to operate the utility shutoffs. [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.]

3. Threat/Hazard Assessments Summary

Springfield School is exposed to many threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities. All of these have the potential for disrupting the school community, causing casualties, and damaging or destroying public or private property.

In May 2013, the school planning team completed a thorough site assessment to identify any circumstances in the school or near the campus that may present unique problems or potential risk to people or property. The interior and exterior portions of all school buildings and school grounds have been assessed for potential threats/hazards that may impact the site, the staff, and the students. Identified threats/hazards have been assessed by risk and likelihood and ranked accordingly.

The school planning team also conducted a culture and climate assessment to determine student and staff perceptions of safety and to identify problem behaviors needing to be addressed.

The table on the following page briefly discusses Springfield School's high-priority threats/hazards of flood, severe storm, fire, hazardous material, active shooter, pandemic, terrorism, and bullying.

Table 1. High-Priority Hazards

Flood	<p>Flooding is a natural feature of the climate, topography, and hydrology of Springfield and its surrounding areas. Flooding predominates throughout the winter and early spring due to melting snow, breakaway ice, and rainy weather.</p> <p>The Green River, north of Springfield, floods every 2 to 5 years. Long periods of rainfall and mild temperatures are normally the cause. Springfield School is located in a flood plain, making it vulnerable to flood damage. During the past 10 years, Springfield School grounds have been severely flooded twice. In 2008, the entire athletic field was destroyed by the Green River overflowing and had to be replaced.</p> <p>Flooding could threaten the safety of students and staff whenever storm water or other sources of water threaten to inundate school grounds or buildings. Flooding may occur if a water pipe breaks or prolonged rainfall causes urban streams to rise. Flooding may also occur as a result of damage to water distribution systems such as failure of a dam or levee.</p>
Severe Storm	<p>Springfield and its surrounding areas are vulnerable to severe local storms. The effects are generally transportation problems and loss of utilities, but can vary with the intensity of the storm, the level of preparation by Springfield School, and the equipment and staff available to perform tasks to lessen the effects of severe local storms.</p> <p>During the 2012-13 school year winter storms, high snowfall, and cold temperatures resulted in significant snow accumulations. The accumulations aggravated by rain, drifting snow, and ice in roof drains caused excessive weight and the collapse of a shed located near the soccer field. The collapse resulted in over \$3,000 in damage to sports equipment.</p>
Fire	<p>Fire hazards are the most prevalent types of threat/hazard.</p> <p>A 2003 fire at Mitchell School in Columbia County reiterated the importance of fire preparedness and prevention efforts. That fire, started in a science laboratory, caused \$20,000 in damages.</p>
Hazardous Materials	<p>Hazardous materials are used for a variety of purposes and are regularly transported through many areas in and around Springfield. Currently, ammonia, chlorine, and propane are all used and stored on school grounds.</p>
Active Shooter	<p>While an active shooter incident has never occurred in a Columbia County school, Springfield School, like any school, is vulnerable.</p>

Pandemic	<p>An influenza pandemic is a global outbreak of disease that occurs when a new flu virus appears that can spread easily from person to person. Because people have not been exposed to this new virus before, they have little or no immunity to the virus; therefore, serious illness or death is more likely to result than during seasonal flu.</p> <p>The effects of a pandemic can be lessened if preparations are made ahead of time. Springfield School is vulnerable to pandemic and must understand the school's impact on the overall illness rates within the community.</p>
Terrorism	<p>Springfield School, like other public institutions, is vulnerable to terrorist activity.</p>
Bullying	<p>During the 2012-13 school year, Springfield School had five cases of bullying. In addition, the climate and culture survey identified that both faculty and students considered bullying to be an area of concern for the school.</p>

4. Resources

Springfield School's leadership and planning team realize the importance of having agreements in advance in order to access critical resources in the case of an incident.

Springfield School has the following agreements in place, with:

- Springfield High School and Johnson Middle School to borrow or lend counselors.
- Springfield Waste Removal Company to provide debris removal services.
- Springfield Recreation Center as a reunification site.
- Community Mart to supply first aid kit and sanitation supplies.
- American Red Cross to supply cots and bedding.
- Happyway Grocery Store to supply food and water supplies.
- Safety and Secure Company to provide security services.
- Columbia County Mental Health Department to provide counseling services.
- Office of State Personnel to provide payroll services.

All pre-negotiated agreements and contracts are included in the appendix section. [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.]

D. Planning Assumptions and Limitations

1. Planning Assumptions

Stating the planning assumptions allows Springfield School to deviate from the plan if certain assumptions prove not to be true during operations. The School EOP assumes:

- The school community will continue to be exposed and subject to threats/hazards and vulnerabilities described in the Threat/Hazard Assessments Summary, as well as lesser threats/hazards that may develop in the future.
- A major disaster could occur at any time, and at any place. In many cases, dissemination of warning to the public and implementation of increased readiness measures may be possible; however, some emergency situations occur with little or no warning.
- A single site incident (e.g., fire, gas main breakage) could occur at any time without warning and the employees of the school affected cannot, and should not, wait for

direction from local response agencies. Action is required immediately to save lives and protect school property.

- Following a major or catastrophic incident, the school may have to rely on its own resources to be self-sustaining for up to 72 hours.
- There may be a number of injuries of varying degrees of seriousness to faculty, staff, and/or students. Rapid and appropriate response will reduce the number and severity of injuries.
- Outside assistance from local fire, law enforcement, and emergency managers will be available in most serious incidents. Because it takes time to request and dispatch external assistance, it is essential for the school to be prepared to carry out the initial incident response until responders arrive at the incident scene.
- Actions taken before an incident, such as creating a positive school environment and conducting fire inspections, will stop or reduce incident-related losses.
- Maintaining the School EOP and providing frequent opportunities for training and exercising the plan for stakeholders (staff, students, parents/guardians, first responders, etc.) can improve the school's readiness to respond to incidents.
- A spirit of volunteerism among school employees, students, and families will result in their providing assistance and support to incident management efforts.

2. Limitations

It is the policy of Springfield School that no guarantee is implied by this plan of a perfect incident management system. Because personnel and resources may be overwhelmed, Springfield School can only endeavor to make every reasonable effort to manage the situation, with the resources and information available at the time.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This plan is based upon the concept that the incident management functions that must be performed by the school generally parallel some of their routine day-to-day functions. To the extent possible, the same personnel and material resources used for day-to-day activities will be employed during incidents. Because personnel and equipment resources are limited, some routine functions that do not contribute directly to the incident may be suspended. The personnel, equipment, and supplies that would typically be required for those routine functions will be redirected to accomplish assigned incident management tasks.

A. National Incident Management System (NIMS)

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a set of principles that provides a systematic, proactive approach guiding government agencies at all levels, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly before, during, and after an incident, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to protect and mitigate the impact on life or property. This system ensures that those involved in incident response/recovery understand what their roles are and have the tools they need to be effective.

Springfield School recognizes that staff and students will be first responders during an incident. Adopting NIMS enables staff and students to respond more effectively to an incident and enhances cooperation, coordination, and communication among school officials, responders, and emergency managers.

Springfield School and the Columbia County schools work with local government agencies to remain NIMS compliant. NIMS compliance for schools and school districts includes completing the following:

- Adopt the use of the Incident Command System (ICS). All staff and students who assume roles described in this plan will receive ICS-100 training. ICS-100: Introduction to Incident Command System is a Web-based course available free from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute.
- Complete NIMS awareness course IS-700 NIMS: An Introduction. IS-700 is a Web-based course available free from the Emergency Management Institute. All persons assuming roles described in the basic plan or annexes will take the IS-700 course.
- Participate in local government's NIMS preparedness program and incorporate the school plan into the community EOP.
- Train and exercise the plan. All staff and students are expected to participate in training and exercising the plan's procedures and threat/hazard-specific incident plans. The school is charged with ensuring that the training and equipment necessary for an appropriate response/recovery operation are in place.

B. Implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS)

In a major emergency or disaster, Springfield School may be damaged or need to be evacuated, people may be injured, and/or other incident management activities may need to be initiated. These activities must be organized and coordinated to ensure efficient incident management.

The Incident Command System (ICS) will be used to manage all incidents and major planned events. [Note: The ICS approach can be used before, during, and after an incident.]

The Incident Commander at Springfield School will be delegated the authority to direct all incident activities within the school's jurisdiction. The Incident Commander will establish an incident command post (ICP) and provide an assessment of the situation to the principal or other officials, identify incident management resources required, and direct the on-scene incident management activities from the ICP. If no Incident Commander is present at the onset of the incident, the most qualified individual will assume command until relieved by a qualified Incident Commander.

C. Initial Response

School personnel are usually first on the scene of an incident in a school setting. Staff and faculty are expected to take charge and manage the incident until it is resolved or command is transferred to someone more qualified and/or to an emergency responder agency with legal authority to assume responsibility. Staff will seek guidance and direction from school district and local officials and seek technical assistance from State and Federal agencies and industry where appropriate.

The principal or his/her designee is responsible for activating the School EOP, including common and specialized procedures as well as threat/hazard-specific procedures. The principal or designee will assign an Incident Commander based who is most qualified for that type of incident.

III. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

This section establishes the operational organization that will be relied on to manage the incident and includes:

- A list of the kinds of tasks to be performed by position and organization.
- An overview of who does what.

The principal and assistant principals are not able to manage all the aspects associated with an incident without assistance. The school relies on other key school personnel to perform tasks that will ensure the safety of students and staff during a crisis or critical incident. The Incident Command System (ICS) uses a team approach to manage incidents. It is difficult to form a team while a crisis or critical incident is unfolding. Roles should be pre-assigned based on training and qualifications. Each staff member and volunteer must be familiar with his or her role and responsibilities before an incident occurs.

School staff may be required to remain at school to assist in an incident. In the event that this School EOP is activated, staff will be assigned to serve within the Incident Command System based on their expertise and training and the needs of the incident.

A. Principal/Building Administrator

The principal may serve as the Incident Commander or delegate that authority to a qualified individual. At all times, the principal still retains the ultimate responsibility for the overall safety of students and staff. However, delegating the authority to manage the incident allows the principal to focus on policy-level activities and interfacing with the school district, other agencies, and parents/guardians. The principal shall coordinate between the superintendent's office and the Incident Commander.

B. Incident Commander

The Incident Commander responsibilities include:

- Assume overall direction of all incident management procedures based on actions and procedures outlined in this EOP.
- Take steps deemed necessary to ensure the safety of students, staff, and other individuals.
- Determine whether to implement incident management protocols (e.g., Evacuation, Reverse Evacuation, Shelter in Place, Lockdown, etc.), as described more fully in the functional annexes in this document.
- Arrange for transfer of students, staff, and other individuals when safety is threatened by a disaster.
- Work with emergency services personnel. (Depending on the incident, community agencies such as law enforcement or the fire department may have jurisdiction for investigations, rescue procedures, etc.)
- Keep the principal and other officials informed of the situation.

C. Teachers

Teachers shall be responsible for the supervision of students and shall remain with students until directed otherwise.

Responsibilities include:

- Supervise students under their charge.
- Take steps to ensure the safety of students, staff, and other individuals in the implementation of incident management protocols.
- Direct students in their charge to inside or outside assembly areas, in accordance with signals, warning, written notification, or intercom orders according to established incident management procedures.
- Give appropriate action command during an incident.
- Take attendance when class relocates to an outside or inside assembly area or evacuates to another location.
- Report missing students to the Incident Commander or designee.
- Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor.
- Obtain first aid services for injured students from the school nurse or person trained in first aid. Arrange for first aid for those unable to be moved.
- Render first aid if necessary. School staff will be trained and certified in first aid and CPR.

D. Instructional Assistants

Responsibilities include assisting teachers as directed.

E. Counselors, Social Workers, and Psychologists

Counselors, social workers, and psychologists provide assistance with the overall direction of the incident management procedures at the site.

Responsibilities may include:

- Take steps to ensure the safety of students, staff, and other individuals in the implementation of incident management protocols.
- Direct students in their charge according to established incident management protocols.
- Render first aid and Psychological First Aid if necessary. Counselors will be trained in Psychological First Aid.
- Assist in the transfer of students, staff, and other individuals when their safety is threatened by a disaster.
- Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor.

F. School Nurses/Health Assistants

Responsibilities include:

- Administer first aid or emergency treatment as needed.
- Supervise administration of first aid by those trained to provide it.
- Organize first aid and medical supplies.

G. Custodians/Maintenance Personnel

Responsibilities include:

- Survey and report building damage to the Incident Commander or appropriate supervisor.
- Control main shutoff valves for gas, water, and electricity and ensure that no hazard results from broken or downed lines.
- Provide damage control as needed.
- Assist in the conservation, use, and disbursement of supplies and equipment.
- Keep Incident Commander or designee informed of condition of school.

H. School Secretary/Office Staff

Responsibilities include:

- Assist in the school site assessments.
- Answer phones and assist in receiving and providing consistent information to callers.
- Provide for the safety of essential school records and documents.
- Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor.
- Provide assistance to the principal and Policy/Coordination Group.
- Monitor radio emergency broadcasts.
- Assist with health incidents as needed, acting as messengers, etc.

I. Food Service/Cafeteria Workers

Responsibilities include:

- Use, prepare, and serve food and water on a rationed basis whenever the feeding of students and staff becomes necessary during an incident.
- Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor.

J. Bus Drivers

Responsibilities include:

- Supervise the care of students if disaster occurs while students are in the bus.
- Transfer students to new location when directed.
- Execute assignments as directed by the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor.
- Transport individuals in need of medical attention.

K. Other Staff (e.g., Itinerant Staff, Substitute Teachers)

Responsibilities include reporting to the Incident Commander or ICS supervisor if requested or activated.

L. Students

Responsibilities include:

- Cooperate during emergency drills and exercises, and during an incident.
- Learn to be responsible for themselves and others in an incident.
- Understand the importance of not being a bystander by reporting situations of concern.

- Develop an awareness of the high priority threats and hazards and how to take measures to protect against and mitigate those threats and hazards.
- Take an active part in school incident response/recovery activities, as age appropriate.

M. Parents/Guardians

Responsibilities include:

- Encourage and support school safety, violence prevention, and incident preparedness programs within the school.
- Participate in volunteer service projects for promoting school incident preparedness.
- Provide the school with requested information concerning the incident, early and late dismissals, and other related release information.
- Practice incident management preparedness in the home to reinforce school training and ensure family safety.
- Understand their roles during a school emergency.


IV. DIRECTION, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION

A. School Incident Command System (ICS)

To provide for the effective direction, control, and coordination of an incident, either single site or multi-incidents, the School EOP will be activated including the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS).

The Incident Commander is delegated the authority to direct tactical on-scene operations until a coordinated incident management framework can be established with local authorities. The Policy Group is responsible for providing the Incident Commander with strategic guidance, information analysis, and needed resources.

Figure 1. Incident Management Team



The ICS is organized into the following functional areas:

1. Incident Command

Directs the incident management activities using strategic guidance provided by the Policy Group.

Responsibilities and duties may include:

- Establish and manage the Command Post, establish the incident organization, and determine strategies to implement protocols and adapt as needed.
- Monitor incident safety conditions and develop measures for ensuring the safety of building occupants (including students, staff, volunteers, and responders).
- Coordinate media relations and information dissemination with the principal.

- Develop working knowledge of local/regional agencies, serve as the primary on-scene contact for outside agencies assigned to an incident, and assist in accessing services when the need arises.
- Document all activities.

2. Operations Section

Directs all tactical operations of an incident including implementation of response/recovery activities according to established incident management procedures and protocols, care of students, first aid, Psychological First Aid, search and rescue, site security, damage assessment, evacuations, and the release of students to parents.

Responsibilities and duties may include:

- Analyze school staffing to develop a Family Reunification Plan, and implement an incident action plan.
- Monitor site utilities (i.e., electric, gas, water, heat/ventilation/air conditioning) and shut off only if danger exists or directed by Incident Commander, and assist in securing facility.
- Establish medical triage with staff trained in first aid and CPR, provide and oversee care given to injured persons, distribute supplies, and request additional supplies from the Logistics Section.
- Provide and access Psychological First Aid services for those in need, and access local/regional providers for ongoing crisis counseling for students, staff, and parents.
- Coordinate the rationed distribution of food and water, establish secondary toilet facilities in the event of water or plumbing failure, and request needed supplies from the Logistics Section.
- Document all activities.

As needed, the types of Strike Teams described in the following table may be established within the Operations Section.

Table 2. Operations Section Teams

Strike Team	Potential Responsibilities
Search & Rescue Team	<p>Search & Rescue Teams search the entire school facility, entering only after they have checked the outside for signs of structural damage and determined that it is safe to enter. Search & Rescue Teams are responsible for ensuring that all students and staff evacuate the building (or, if it is unsafe to move the persons, that their locations are documented so that professional responders can locate them easily and extricate them). Search and Rescue Teams are also responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identifying and marking unsafe areas. ▪ Conducting initial damage assessment. ▪ Obtaining injury and missing student reports from teachers.
First Aid Team	<p>First Aid Teams provide triage, treatment, and Psychological First Aid services. First Aid Teams are responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Setting up first aid area for students. ▪ Assessing and treating injuries. ▪ Completing master injury report. <p>Note: The Logistics Section provides care to responders (if needed). The Operations Section First Aid Team is dedicated to students or other disaster victims.</p>
Evacuation/ Shelter/Care Team	<p>Evacuation, shelter, and student care in an incident are among the most important tasks faced by schools. These tasks include student accounting, protection from weather, providing for sanitation needs, and providing for food and water. The Evacuation/Shelter/Care Team is responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Accounting for the whereabouts of all students, staff, and volunteers. ▪ Setting up a secure assembly area. ▪ Managing sheltering and sanitation operations. ▪ Managing student feeding and hydration. ▪ Coordinating with the Student Release Team. ▪ Coordinating with the Logistics Section to secure the needed space and supplies.
Facility & Security Response Team	<p>The Facility & Security Response Team is responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Locating all utilities and turning them off, if necessary. ▪ Securing and isolating fire/HazMat. ▪ Assessing and notifying officials of fire/HazMat. ▪ Conducting perimeter control.
Psychological and Emotional Recovery Team	<p>The Psychological and Emotional Recovery Team is responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessing need for onsite mental health support. ▪ Determining need for outside agency assistance. ▪ Providing onsite intervention/counseling. ▪ Monitoring well-being of school Incident Management Team, staff, and students, and reporting all findings to the Operations Section Chief.

Strike Team	Potential Responsibilities
Student Release Team	Reunification refers to getting students reunited with their parents or guardians in an efficient and orderly manner. Reunification can be an enormous challenge and takes a lot of planning. The Student Release Team is responsible for: <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Setting up secure reunion area.▪ Checking student emergency cards for authorized releases.▪ Completing release logs.▪ Coordinating with the Public Information Officer on external messages.

3. Planning Section

Collects, evaluates, and disseminates information needed to measure the size, scope, and seriousness of an incident and to plan appropriate incident management activities.

Responsibilities and duties may include:

- Assist Incident Commander in the collection and evaluation of information about an incident as it develops (including site map and area map of related events), assist with ongoing planning efforts, and maintain incident time log.
- Document all activities.

4. Logistics Section

Supports incident management operations by securing and providing needed personnel, equipment, facilities, resources, and services required for incident resolution; coordinating personnel; assembling and deploying volunteer teams; and facilitating communication among incident responders. This function may involve a major role in an extended incident.

Responsibilities and duties may include:

- Establish and oversee communications center and activities during an incident (two-way radio, battery-powered radio, written updates, etc.), and develop telephone tree for after-hours communication.
- Establish and maintain school and classroom preparedness kits, coordinate access to and distribution of supplies during an incident, and monitor inventory of supplies and equipment.
- Document all activities.

5. Finance/Administration Section

Oversees all financial activities including purchasing necessary materials, tracking incident costs, arranging contracts for services, timekeeping for emergency responders, submitting documentation for reimbursement, and recovering school records following an incident.

Responsibilities and duties may include:

- Assume responsibility for overall documentation and recordkeeping activities; when possible, photograph or videotape damage to property.
- Develop a system to monitor and track expenses and financial losses in accordance with district policy, and secure all records.

This section may not be established onsite at the incident. Rather, the school and school district management offices may assume responsibility for these functions.

B. Coordination With Policy/Coordination Group

In complex incidents, a Policy/Coordination Group will be convened at the school district operations center. The role of the Policy/Coordination Group is to:

- Support the on-scene Incident Commander.
- Provide policy and strategic guidance.
- Help ensure that adequate resources are available.
- Identify and resolve issues common to all organizations.
- Keep elected officials and other executives informed of the situation and decisions.
- Provide factual information, both internally and externally through the Joint Information Center.

The Springfield School Principal and Incident Commander will keep the Policy/Coordination Group informed.

C. School District Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)

The Columbia County School District maintains a district Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) to address threats/hazards and incidents. The Springfield School EOP has been developed to fit into the larger district EOP in the case of a large-scale incident. Staff members that maintain and exercise the plan are in frequent contact with Mr. Bob Semble, Manager, Columbia County School District Emergency Management Department.

D. Coordination With Responders

An important component of the Springfield School EOP (in conjunction with the Columbia County School District) is a set of interagency agreements with various county agencies to aid timely communication. Agreements with these agencies and services (including such county governmental agencies as mental health, law enforcement, and fire departments) help coordinate services between the agencies and Springfield School. The agreements specify the type of communication and services provided by one agency to another. The agreements also make school personnel available beyond the school setting in an incident or traumatic event taking place in the community.

If a school incident is within the authorities of the responder community, command will be transferred upon the arrival of qualified responders. A transfer of command briefing shall occur. The school Incident Commander may be integrated into the Incident Command structure or assume a role within a Unified Command structure.

E. Source and Use of Resources

Springfield School will use its own resources and equipment to respond to incidents until incident response personnel arrive. Parent volunteers and community members have been trained to assist if called upon and available after an incident occurs. The following organizations or agencies have agreed to be responsible for providing additional resources or assistance:

- First aid kit and sanitation supplies will be provided by: Community Mart, Mr. Jerald Evans.
- Cots and bedding supplies will be provided by: American Red Cross, Ms. Angie Ferguson.
- Food/water supplies will be provided by: Happyway Grocery Store, Ms. Janet Weber.
- Security will be provided by: Safety and Secure Company, Ms. Yvonne Hun.
- Counseling services will be provided by: Columbia County Mental Health Department.

All pre-negotiated agreements and contracts are included in the appendix section. [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.]

V. INFORMATION COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION

Springfield School will collect, analyze, and disseminate information before, during, and after an incident.

A. Types of Information

Before and during an incident, Springfield School will assign administrative staff to monitor the weather, local law enforcement alerts, and crime reports daily. This information will be analyzed and shared with the principal with any immediate actions required identified.

After an incident, Springfield School will assign staff to monitor Web sites and hotlines of mental health, emergency management, and relief agencies, as well as the school district information portal, to determine any information pertinent or critical to the school's recovery effort.

B. Information Documentation

The assigned staff member will document the information gathered using the form in the appendix section. [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.] Information to be documented includes:

- The source of the information.
- The staff member who collected and analyzed the information.
- The staff member to receive and use the information.
- The format for providing the information.
- The date and time the information was collected and shared.

VI. TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Springfield School understands the importance of training, drills, and exercises in maintaining and planning for an incident. To ensure that school personnel and community responders are aware of their duties and responsibilities under the school plan and the most current procedures, the following training, drill, and exercise actions will occur. The Exercise Planning Team will coordinate training and exercising efforts in accordance with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.

Training and exercises will be documented including date(s), type of training or exercise, and participant roster.

A. Training

All Springfield School staff, students, and parents/guardians will receive training during the school year to better prepare them for an incident.

1. Staff Training

Basic training and refresher training sessions will be conducted during the first in-service day of the school year for all school personnel in coordination with local fire, law enforcement, and emergency managers.

Mandatory staff training will include:

- Threat/hazard and incident awareness training for all staff.
- Orientation to the School EOP.
- First aid and CPR for all staff.
- Team training to address specific incident response or recovery activities, such as Family Reunification and Relocation.
- Two online FEMA courses: ICS 100 and IS-700. Both courses are available without charge at FEMA's Emergency Management Institute Web site.
- Psychological First Aid for Schools (PFA-S) based on the PFA-S Field Operations Guide for school counselors and other designated staff.

All Springfield School staff members are expected to develop personal and family emergency plans. Each family should anticipate that a staff member may be required to remain at school following a catastrophic event. Knowing that the family is prepared and can handle the situation will enable school staff to do their jobs more effectively. Staff will receive training in how to prepare a personal and family emergency plan.

2. Student Training

Eighth grade students will be offered the teen Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training as an elective. All students will receive age-appropriate training on the importance of preparedness and participating in exercises.

3. Parent/Guardian Training

Parents/guardians will be provided the opportunity to take video-based training courses on some of the school's response procedures via the Springfield School Web site.

B. Exercises

Drills will be conducted at least once per semester. Other types of exercises will occur at least once per school year. The details of training are outlined in the Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (see the appendix). [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.]

Approved parent/guardian volunteers and community members will also be incorporated into larger exercise plan.

VII. ADMINISTRATION, FINANCE, AND LOGISTICS

A. Agreements and Contracts

If school resources prove to be inadequate during an incident, Springfield School will request assistance from local emergency services, other agencies, and industry in accordance with existing mutual aid agreements and contracts (see Direction, Control, and Coordination, for specific details). Such assistance includes equipment, supplies, and/or personnel. All agreements are entered into by authorized school district and school officials and are in writing. Agreements and contracts identify the school and district officials authorized to request assistance pursuant to those documents.

All pre-negotiated agreements and contracts are included in the appendix. [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.]

B. Recordkeeping

1. Administrative Controls

Springfield School is responsible for establishing the administrative controls necessary to manage the expenditure of funds and to provide reasonable accountability and justification for expenditures made to support incident management operations. These administrative controls will be done in accordance with the established local fiscal policies and standard cost accounting procedures.

2. Activity Logs

The ICS Section Chiefs will maintain accurate logs recording key incident management activities, including:

- Activation or deactivation of incident facilities.
- Significant changes in the incident situation.
- Major commitments of resources or requests for additional resources from external sources.
- Issuance of protective action recommendations to the staff and students.
- Evacuations.
- Casualties.
- Containment or termination of the incident.

C. Incident Costs

1. Annual Incident Management Costs

The ICS Finance and Administration Section is responsible for maintaining records summarizing the use of personnel, equipment, and supplies to obtain an estimate of annual incident response costs that can be used in preparing future school budgets.

2. Incident Costs

The ICS Finance and Administration Section Chief will maintain detailed records of costs for incident management and operations to include:

- Personnel costs, especially overtime costs,
- Equipment operations costs,
- Costs for leased or rented equipment,
- Costs for contract services to support incident management operations, and
- Costs of specialized supplies expended for incident management operations.

These records may be used to recover costs from the responsible party or insurers or as a basis for requesting financial assistance for certain allowable response and recovery costs from the State and/or Federal government.

D. Preservation of Records

In order to continue normal school operations following an incident, vital records must be protected. These include legal documents and student files as well as property and tax records. The principal causes of damage to records are fire and water; therefore, essential records will be protected accordingly. Details are outlined in the Continuity of Operations (COOP) Procedures, a functional annex of this plan.

VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

The planning team is responsible for the overall maintenance and revision of the Springfield School EOP and for coordinating training and exercising of the School EOP. Team members are expected to work closely together to make recommendations for revising and enhancing the plan.

The Columbia County School District School Board and superintendent, and the Springfield School principal, are responsible for approving and promulgating this plan. Community fire, law enforcement, and emergency managers' approval and suggestions will also be requested.

A. Approval and Dissemination of the Plan

The School Board, together with the superintendent and principal, will approve and disseminate the plan and its annexes following these steps:

- Review and Validate the Plan
- Present the Plan (for Comment or Suggestion)
- Obtain Plan Approval (School Board, principal, and superintendent)
- Distribute the Plan

1. Record of Changes

Each update or change to the plan will be tracked. The record of changes will include: the change number, the date of the change, and the name of the person who made the change. The record of changes will be in table format and maintained by the planning team.

2. Record of Distribution

Copies of plans and annexes will be distributed to those tasked in this document. The record of distribution will be kept as proof that tasked individuals and organizations have acknowledged their receipt, review, and/or acceptance of the plan. The planning team will indicate the title and name of the person receiving the plan, the agency to which the receiver belongs, the date of delivery, and the number of copies delivered. Copies of the plan may be made available to the public and media without the sensitive information at the discretion of the School Board.

B. Plan Review and Updates

The basic plan and its annexes will be reviewed annually by the planning team, emergency management representative(s), law enforcement representative(s), and others deemed appropriate by school administration. The principal will establish a schedule for annual review of planning documents.

The School EOP will be updated based upon deficiencies identified during incident management activities and exercises and when changes in threats, hazards, resources and capabilities, or school structure occur.

IX. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

The following regulations are the State authorizations and mandates upon which this School EOP is based. These authorities and references provide a legal basis for incident management operations and activities.

- Columbia Code of Regulations, Title 3, Division 1, Chapter 2, Subchapter 3, Article 2, § 50 mandates that school boards adopt a policy for use by district schools in formulating individual civil defense and disaster preparedness plans.
- Columbia Code of Regulations, Title 12 specifies implementing and using the Standardized Emergency Management System, which mandates the use of the National Incident Management System and the use of the Incident Command System for managing all disaster/crisis situations.
- Columbia Education Code, Title 4, Division 2, Part 15, Chapter 2, Article 8.5 requires school boards to “establish an emergency procedure system in every private school building under its jurisdiction having an occupant capacity of 50 or more pupils or more than one classroom.”

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Functional Annexes

Note:

Functional annexes address critical operational functions for all threats and hazards, including:

- Common procedures, and
- Specialized procedures.

Each functional annex describes the policies, processes, roles, and responsibilities for that function.

All functional annexes should address:

- Situations under which the procedures should be used.
- Who has the authority to activate the procedures.
- Specific actions to be taken when the procedures are implemented.

Functional annexes do not repeat content but rather build on the information within the basic plan. This section presents four sample functional annexes.

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COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE

I. PURPOSE

Communication is a critical part of incident management. This section outlines Springfield School's communications procedures and supports its mission to provide clear, effective internal and external communication between the school, staff, students, parents/guardians, responders, and media.

II. SCOPE

The communications procedure outlines the steps to be taken to communicate information before, during, and after an incident.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

To implement the communications procedures all staff will be trained on the communications procedures in this annex.

IV. SPECIALIZED PROCEDURES

A. Before an Incident

Communicating with the larger school community begins before an incident occurs. In the event of an incident, parents/guardians, media, and first responders will require clear and concise messages from Springfield School about the incident, what is being done about it, and the safety of the children and staff.

Before an incident occurs, Springfield School will:

- Develop a relationship with parents/guardians so that they trust and know how to access alerts and incident information.
- Inform parents/guardians about the school's Emergency Operations Plan, its purpose, and its objectives. Information will be included in the school newsletter and a presentation delivered at Back-to-School Night.
- Identify parents/guardians who are willing to volunteer in case of an incident, include them in preparation efforts, and include them in training.
- Be prepared with translation services for non-English-speaking families and students with limited English proficiency.
- Maintain (by the principal's administrative assistant) a list of contacts for the major television and radio stations and Web sites.

B. During an Incident

1. Internal Communications

Faculty and staff will be notified when an incident occurs and kept informed as additional information becomes available and as plans for management of the situation evolve. The following practices will be utilized to disseminate information **internally** when appropriate:

- **Telephone Tree:** A telephone tree is a simple, widely used system for notifying staff of an incident when they are not at school. The tree originates with the principal, who contacts the members of the Incident Management Team. Team members then in turn will contact groups of staff (teachers, administrators, and support staff).

- **Morning Faculty Meeting:** As appropriate, updated information about an incident will be presented at the morning faculty meeting. Any new procedures for the day will also be reviewed at this time.
- **End-of-Day Faculty Meeting:** As appropriate, updated information and a review of the day's events will be presented at the end-of-day meeting. Staff will also have the opportunity to address any misinformation or rumors.

The Incident Commander will use the countywide Columbia County Emergency Radio Network to notify the principal of the school's status/needs. The principal will notify the district office and will designate staff member(s) to monitor all communications.

2. External Communications

Springfield School will communicate with parents during an incident by:

- Disseminating information via text messages, radio announcements, and emails to inform parents about exactly what is known to have happened.
- Implementing the plan to manage phone calls and parents who arrive at school.
- Describing how the school and school district are handling the situation.
- Providing information regarding possible reactions of their children and ways to talk with them.
- Providing a phone number, Web site address, or recorded hotline where families can receive updated incident information.
- Informing families and students when and where school will resume.

Springfield School will communicate with the media during an incident by:

- Designating a Public Information Officer.
- Establishing an off-campus briefing area for media representatives.
- Determining the need to establish or participate in a Joint Information Center.
- Coordinating messages with the principal and Policy Group.
- Requesting the media contacts broadcast Springfield School's external communications plans, including the information hotline for parents and guardians.

Springfield School employees are to refer all requests for information and questions to the designated spokesperson or Joint Information Center (if established). Templates for statements/press releases to the media, including standard procedures and protocols, have been developed and are included in the appendix. [Note: Appendixes are not included in this sample plan.]

The Incident Commander will maintain communication with first responders during an incident. Transfer of command will occur when community responders arrive on the scene to assume management of the incident under their jurisdiction.

3. Rumor Control

In addressing rumors, the most effective strategy is to provide facts as soon as possible. To combat rumors, Springfield School will:

- Provide appropriate information to internal groups including administrators, teachers, students, custodians, secretaries, instructional assistants, cafeteria workers, and bus drivers. These people are primary sources of information and are likely to be contacted in their neighborhoods, at grocery stores, etc.

- Hold a faculty/staff meeting before staff members are allowed to go home so that what is (and is not) known can be clearly communicated.
- Designate and brief personnel answering calls to help control misinformation.
- Conduct briefings for community representatives directly associated with the school.
- Enlist the help of the media to provide frequent updates to the public, particularly providing accurate information where rumors need to be dispelled.

C. After an Incident

After the safety and status of staff and students have been assured, and emergency conditions have abated following an incident, staff/faculty will assemble to support the restoration of the school's educational programs. Defining mission-critical operations and staffing will be a starting point for the recovery process. Collecting and disseminating information will facilitate the recovery process.

After an incident, Springfield School administrators will:

- Schedule and attend an open question-and-answer meeting for parents and guardians as soon as possible.
- Conduct public meetings as needed. These meetings are designed to provide the opportunity for people to ask questions and receive accurate information.

After an incident, the staff/faculty teams will:

- Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the physical and operational recovery needs.
- Assess physical security, data access, and all other critical services (e.g., plumbing, electrical).
- Examine critical information technology assets and personnel resources, and determine the impact on the school operations for each asset and resource that is unavailable or damaged.
- Document damaged facilities, lost equipment and resources, and special personnel expenses that will be required for insurance claims and requests for State and Federal assistance.
- Provide detailed facilities data to the school district office so that it can estimate temporary space reallocation needs and strategies.
- Arrange for ongoing status reports during the recovery activities to: a) estimate when the educational program can be fully operational; and b) identify special facility, equipment, and personnel issues or resources that will facilitate the resumption of classes.
- Educate school personnel, students, and parents on available crisis counseling services.
- Apprise the Columbia County Office of Education of recovery status.

After an incident, the school district will:

- Identify recordkeeping requirements and sources of financial aid for State and Federal disaster assistance.
- Establish absentee policies for teachers/students after an incident.
- Establish an agreement with mental health organizations to provide counseling to students and their families after an incident.
- Develop alternative teaching methods for students unable to return immediately to classes: correspondence classes, videoconferencing, telegroup tutoring, etc.

- Create a plan for conducting classes when facilities are damaged (e.g., alternative sites, half-day sessions, portable classrooms).
- Get stakeholder input on prevention and mitigation measures that can be incorporated into short-term and long-term recovery plans.

V. COMMUNICATION TOOLS

Some common internal and external communication tools that Springfield School may use include the following:

- **Standard telephone:** Springfield School has designated a school telephone number as a recorded “hotline” for parents to call for information during incidents. The goal is to keep other telephone lines free for communication with first responders and others.
- **Mobile communication technology:** Mobile devices may be the only tool working when electric service is out; they are useful to faculty/staff en route to or from a site.
- **Intercom systems:** The intercom system includes teacher-initiated communication with the office using a handset rather than a wall-mounted speaker.
- **Bullhorns and megaphones:** A battery-powered bullhorn is part of the school’s emergency to-go kit to address students and staff who are assembling outside the school. Procedures governing storage and use will help ensure readiness for use.
- **Two-way radio:** Two-way radios provide a reliable method of communication between rooms and buildings at a single site. All staff will be trained to understand how to operate the two-way radio.
- **Computers:** A wireless laptop computer may be used for communication both within the school and to other sites. Email may be a useful tool for updating information for staff, other schools in an affected area, and the district superintendent. An assigned staff member(s) will post information such as school evacuation, closure, or relocation on the home page of the school and district Web site.
- **Fax machines:** Possible uses include off-campus accidents where lists of students and staff members involved, their locations, and needed telephone numbers can be quickly and accurately communicated. Medical information, release forms, and authorizations include the designated fax number.
- **Alarm systems:** Bells or buzzers are in place and sound in different ways to signal different types of incidents – for example, fire, lockdown, or special alert (with instructions to follow). All staff/faculty, support staff, students, and volunteers will be trained on what the sounds mean and how to respond to them.
- **Whistles:** Whistles should be included in crisis kits in order to signal a need for immediate attention or assistance

EVACUATION OF SCHOOL BUILDING PROCEDURE

I. PURPOSE

In cases of an incident requiring the evacuation of the school building, the following procedure should be adhered to by students and staff.

II. SCOPE

The evacuation procedure outlines steps to be taken to protect students and staff from injury or death during an incident and ensure a safe evacuation of all occupants when necessary. Designated staff members, emergency management, and response personnel are required to participate in the development, implementation, and evaluation of the School EOP as it relates to this annex.

The plan outlines procedures for students/staff located:

- Indoors.
- Outdoors.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

To implement the evacuation procedure:

- All staff and students will undergo training and participate in incident management training and drills.
- Staff assigned to work with students with access and functional needs will undergo in-depth training.
- Emergency management and response personnel will review and provide input into the plan.

IV. SPECIALIZED PROCEDURES

The following procedures will be implemented by staff/faculty when directed by the principal or when deemed appropriate by the situation.

A. Indoor Procedure

When indoors, staff and students should:

- Listen for fire alarm or evacuation procedure announcement.
- Immediately leave the building in a calm, orderly fashion using the primary or alternate evacuation routes shown on the school map.
- Check the classroom and any adjoining restrooms to ensure everyone has exited (this should be a teacher or other staff member).
- Close the classroom door, but not lock it (teacher or other staff member).
- Bring class rosters, emergency kit, and crisis box (teacher or other staff member).
- Ensure students with access and functional needs are properly assisted in the evacuation.
- Gather at the pre-assigned assembly area away from the building.
- Implement the procedures in the accounting for all persons annex once at the assembly area.
- Keep students together and calm.
- Ensure no one reenters the building until notified by the appropriate school administrator.

- Remember that it may be necessary to take independent action during a real emergency.

Note: Under no circumstances should staff/students use the elevators to evacuate.

B. Outdoor Procedure

When outdoors, staff and students should:

- Listen for fire alarm or evacuation procedure announcement.
- Direct students to move away from the building immediately in a calm, orderly fashion to the pre-assigned assembly area.
- Ensure students with access and functional needs are properly assisted in the evacuation.
- Gather at the pre-assigned assembly area away from the building.
- Implement the procedures in the accounting for all persons annex once at the assembly area.
- Keep students together and calm.
- Ensure no one reenters the building until notified by the appropriate school administrator.
- Remember that they may need to take independent action during a real emergency.

FULL LOCKDOWN OF SCHOOL BUILDING PROCEDURE

I. PURPOSE

In cases of an incident requiring the full lockdown of the school building, the following procedure should be adhered to by students and staff.

II. SCOPE

The lockdown procedure outlines steps to be taken to protect students and staff from injury or death during an incident and ensure the safety of all occupants when necessary. Designated staff members, emergency management, and response personnel are required to participate in the development, implementation, and evaluation of the School EOP as it relates to this annex.

The plan outlines procedures for students/staff located:

- Indoors.
- Outdoors.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

To implement the full lockdown procedure:

- All staff and students will undergo training and participate in incident management drills.
- Staff assigned to work with students with access and functional needs will undergo indepth training and provide appropriate assistance during drills.
- Emergency management and response personnel will review and provide input into the plan.

IV. SPECIALIZED PROCEDURES

The following procedures will be implemented by staff/faculty when directed by the principal or when deemed appropriate by the situation.

A. Indoor Procedure

When indoors, staff and students should:

- Listen for the lockdown procedure announcement.
- Immediately lock windows and doors, simultaneously bringing students from the area immediately outside the classroom into the classroom.
- Leave blinds or curtains open, unless directed otherwise.
- Turn off lights.
- Crouch down away from windows and doors.
- Remain silent and ensure the room looks and sounds like it is unoccupied.
- Ensure students with access and functional needs are properly assisted in the lockdown.
- Not allow anyone to enter the room once it is locked.
- Remain calm.
- Not make phone calls.
- Continue the lockdown until notified by the appropriate authority.

B. Outdoor Procedure

When outdoors, staff and students should:

- Listen for the lockdown procedure announcement.
- Gather behind a natural barrier.
- Follow instructions for a reverse evacuation if given.
- Be prepared to move away from danger. Teachers should look for several escape routes.
- Ensure students with access and functional needs are properly assisted.
- Remain calm.
- Continue the lockdown until notified by the appropriate authority.

PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALING PROCEDURES

I. PURPOSE

These procedures have been developed to provide an emotional catharsis to students/staff impacted by trauma at school or in the community. Following a traumatic event or incident, the following recovery procedures should be implemented to assist students, staff, and their families in the healing process.

II. SCOPE

The following procedures outline steps to be taken by staff/students following a trauma, a serious injury or death, and/or a major incident impacting the community. Mental health professionals available in the school community such as nurses and social workers are required to participate in the development, implementation, and evaluation of the School EOP as it relates to this annex. Additional advice will be sought from outside psychologists and mental health experts.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

To implement the recovery psychological healing procedures:

- All staff will undergo training to learn how to recognize signs of trauma.
- Members of the Crisis Response Team will undergo indepth training to learn how to assist in managing trauma.
- Parents and guardians will be offered tips on how to recognize signs of trauma.
- Mental health experts will review and provide input into the plan.

IV. SPECIALIZED PROCEDURES

The following procedures will be implemented by staff/faculty when directed by the principal or when deemed appropriate by the situation.

Immediately Following a Serious Injury or Death and/or Major Incident

- Convene a staff meeting immediately to discuss how the situation is being handled and to discuss what resources are available to staff, students, and families (refer to the communication procedures in the basic plan).
- Set up crisis centers and designate private rooms for private counseling/defusing. Staff should include outside mental health professionals to assist with staff grief.
- Encourage teachers to facilitate class discussions about the incident and allow students to openly discuss feelings, fears, and concerns shortly after the incident. Any students who are excessively distraught should be referred to the crisis response team.
- Accept donations. In the first hours and days after a major incident, offers of help will probably be plentiful; however, offers will diminish considerably as time passes. Donations given and not used can always be returned.
- Designate a place for staff, students, and community members to leave well-wishes, messages, and items.

Hospital/Funeral Arrangements

- Provide staff with information regarding visitation and/or funeral arrangements (time, location, customs) when available. If the funeral is scheduled during a school day, all student and staff will be excused from school.

- Encourage staff and students to attend the funeral to provide support for the family and bring closure to the incident.
- Designate staff person(s) to visit the hospital and/or attend the funeral to represent the school.

Post-Incident Procedures

- Allow for changes in normal routines or schedules to address injury or death; however, recommend students and staff return to their normal routine as soon as possible after the funeral.
- Follow up with students and staff who receive counseling and refer them to outside mental health professionals as needed.
- Donate all remaining memorial items to charity.
- Discuss and approve memorials with the School Board's consent.

Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes

Note:

The **threat/hazard-specific annexes:**

- Provide unique procedures, roles, and responsibilities that apply to a specific threat or hazard.
- Include provisions and applications for warning the public and disseminating emergency public information.
- Do not repeat information presented in the basic plan or functional annexes.

Repeating information is not advisable for the following reasons:

- School staff and students should learn and exercise simple procedures that apply to all threats/hazards. The threat/hazard-specific annexes should present only threat/hazard-unique information.
- Repeating procedures increases the possibility that there will be inconsistencies in procedures that could lead to confusion during an incident.
- The plan becomes larger and more difficult for users to comprehend.

Threat/hazard-specific annexes do not repeat content but rather build on the information within the basic plan. This section presents four sample annexes.

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FLOOD (NEAR OR ON SCHOOL GROUNDS)

I. PURPOSE

Flooding is a natural feature of the climate, topography, and hydrology of Springfield and its surrounding areas. Some floods develop slowly during an extended period of rain or in a warming trend following a heavy snow. Flash floods can occur quickly, without any visible sign of rain. Catastrophic floods are associated with burst dams and levees, hurricanes, storm surges, tsunamis, and earthquakes. The purpose of this annex is to ensure that there are procedures in place to protect staff/students and school property in case of a flood.

II. SCOPE

The annex outlines additional responsibilities and duties as well as procedures for staff responding to a flood near or on school grounds.

III. CORE FUNCTIONS

The City of Springfield Office of Emergency Management, the National Weather Service, and other Federal cooperative agencies have an extensive river and weather monitoring system and provide flood watch and warning information to the school community via radio, television, Internet, and telephone. In the event of a flood, the Incident Commander, or principal, will activate the EOP and implement the Incident Command System.

The school siren acts as a warning system to notify staff/faculty and students in case of imminent or confirmed flooding, including that due to dam failure. If there is a loss of power, a compressed air horn or megaphone and two-way radios will serve as backup alerting/communication devices.

A. Operational Functions/Procedures That May Be Activated

Operational functions or procedures that may be activated in the event of a flood include the following:

- Communications
- Evacuation
- Reverse Evacuation
- Relocation
- Reunification
- Accounting for All Persons
- Continuity of Operations (COOP)
- Psychological Healing
- Health and Medical

B. Activating the EOP

The principal/building administrator will determine the need to activate the EOP and designate an Incident Commander.

1. Incident Commander Actions

- Issue stand-by instruction. In consultation with the principal/Policy Group determine if evacuation is required.

- Activate communications procedures.
- Notify local law enforcement of intent to evacuate, the location of the safe evacuation site, and the route to be taken to that site.
- Delegate a search team to ensure that all students have been evacuated.
- Determine if additional procedures should be activated.
- Issue directed transportation instruction if students will be evacuated to a safer location by means of buses and cars.
- Notify the principal/Policy Group of the status and action taken. The principal/Policy Group shall notify the superintendent of schools.
- Update the principal/Policy Group, Incident Management Team, and Section Chiefs of any significant changes.
- Do not allow staff and students to return to the building until proper authorities have determined that it is safe to do so.
- Communicate with bus drivers.
- Determine whether school will be closed or remain open.
- Document all actions taken.

2. Incident Management Team and Section Chiefs Actions

- Monitor radio and Internet for flood information and report any developments to the Incident Commander.
- Review procedures with staff as needed.
- Disseminate information about the incident and followup actions such as where the school has relocated and family reunification procedures.
- Implement the internal and external communications procedures.
- Notify relocation centers and determine an alternate relocation center, if needed, if primary and secondary centers would also be flooded.
- Implement additional procedures as instructed by the Incident Commander.
- Take appropriate action to safeguard school property.
- Document all actions taken.

3. Staff Actions

- Execute evacuation procedures when instructed by the Incident Management Team and/or Section Chiefs.
- Take the class roster and emergency kits. Take attendance before leaving the campus.
- Remain with students throughout the evacuation process.
- Upon arrival at the safe site, take attendance. Report any missing or injured students to the Incident Commander.
- Do not return to the school building until it has been inspected and determined safe by proper authorities.
- Document all actions taken.

4. Bus Driver Actions

- If evacuation is by bus, do not drive through flooded streets and/or roads. Do not attempt to cross bridges, overpasses, or tunnels that may be damaged by flooding.
- If the bus is caught in an unavoidable situation, seek higher ground immediately. If the bus stalls and water is rising, abandon the bus and seek higher ground.

- Use two-way radios to communicate with the Incident Commander, Incident Management Team, and Section Chiefs.
- Document all actions taken.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

I. PURPOSE

Hazardous materials are used for a variety of purposes and are regularly transported through many areas in and around Springfield. Currently, ammonia, chlorine, and propane are all used and stored on school grounds. The purpose of this annex is to ensure that there are procedures in place to protect staff/students and school property in case of a chemical spill.

II. SCOPE

The annex outlines additional responsibilities and duties as well as procedures for staff responding to a chemical spill.

III. CORE FUNCTIONS

Chemical accidents may originate inside or outside the building. Examples include: toxic leaks or spills caused by tank, truck, or railroad accident; water treatment/waste treatment plants; and industry or laboratory spills.

The Springfield School maintenance team inspects stored chemicals twice a month.

The school siren acts as a warning system to notify staff/faculty and students. Decontamination equipment and personal protective equipment are located in a storage unit next to the main office.

A. Operational Functions/Procedures That May Be Activated

Operational functions, or procedures, that may be activated in the event of an **external** chemical spill include:

- Communications
- Reverse Evacuation
- Shelter-in-Place
- Evacuation
- Accounting for All Persons
- Reunification
- Continuity of Operations (COOP)
- Psychological Healing
- Health and Medical

If there is an **internal** chemical spill, the following procedures may be activated:

- Communications
- Evacuation
- Relocation
- Reunification
- Accounting for All Persons
- Continuity of Operations (COOP)
- Psychological Healing
- Health and Medical

The Incident Commander and the Incident Management Team/Section Chiefs will determine if and when these procedures should be activated.

B. Activating the EOP for an External Chemical Spill

The principal will determine the need to activate the EOP and designate a temporary Incident Commander until a qualified HazMat Incident Commander arrives at the scene.

If the chemical spill is **external**, the following steps will be taken by the school community:

1. Incident Commander Actions

- Issue stand-by instruction if school is in session.
- Determine what procedures should be activated.
- Consider a reverse evacuation to bring all persons inside the building.
- Notify Maintenance/Building and Grounds Manager to shut off mechanical ventilating systems.
- Notify local law enforcement of intent to shelter in place.
- Notify the principal/Policy Group of the status and action taken. The principal/Policy Group shall notify the superintendent of schools.
- Activate communications plan.
- Issue directed transportation instruction if students will be evacuated to a safer location by means of buses and cars.
- Update the principal/Policy Group, Incident Management Team, and Section Chiefs of any significant changes.
- Do not allow staff and students to return to the building until proper authorities have determined that it is safe to do so.
- Give the “all clear” signal after the threat has passed.
- Determine whether school will be closed or remain open.
- Document all actions taken.

2. Incident Management Team and Section Chiefs Actions

- Review procedures with staff if needed.
- Implement the internal and external communications procedures.
- Monitor radio and Internet for additional information and report any developments to the Incident Commander.
- Disseminate information about the incident and followup actions such as where the school has relocated and parent-student reunification procedures.
- Notify relocation centers and determine an alternate relocation center if necessary.
- Implement additional procedures as instructed by the Incident Commander.
- Take appropriate action to safeguard school property.
- Document all actions taken.

3. Staff Actions

- Move students away from immediate vicinity of danger.
- Implement the reverse evacuation procedure if students are outside; observe wind direction by observing flags or leaves and move students appropriately.
- Execute shelter-in-place procedures when instructed by the Incident Management Team and/or Section Chiefs.

- Remain with students throughout the shelter-in-place process.
- Report any missing or injured students to the Incident Commander.
- Remain in sheltered area until the “all clear” signal has been issued.
- In the event of building damage, evacuate students to safer areas of the building or from the building. If evacuation does occur, do not re-enter the building until an “all clear” signal is issued.
- Document all actions taken.

C. Activating the EOP for an Internal Chemical Spill

The principal will determine the need to activate the EOP and designate a temporary Incident Commander until a qualified HazMat Incident Commander arrives at the scene.

If the chemical spill is **internal**, the following steps will be taken by the school community:

1. Person Discovering the Spill

- Alert others in immediate area to leave the area.
- Close windows and doors and restrict access to affected area.
- Notify principal/teacher/safety officer.
- Do not eat or drink anything or apply cosmetics.

2. Incident Commander Actions

- Issue stand-by instruction to all staff and students.
- Determine what procedures should be activated.
- Activate the evacuation procedures using primary or alternate routes, avoiding exposure to the chemical fumes.
- Consider an all-school evacuation.
- Notify Maintenance/Building and Grounds Manager to shut off mechanical ventilating systems.
- Notify the local fire department and the Department of Public Health. Provide the following information:
 - School name and address, including nearest cross street(s).
 - Location of the spill and/or materials released; name of substance, if known.
 - Characteristics of spill (color, smell, visible gases).
 - Injuries, if any.
- Notify local law enforcement of intent to evacuate.
- Notify the principal/Policy Group of the status and action taken. The principal/Policy Group shall notify the superintendent of schools.
- Activate communications plan.
- Issue directed transportation instruction if students will be evacuated to a safer location by means of buses and cars.
- Update the principal/Policy Group, Incident Management Team, and Section Chiefs of any significant changes.
- Do not allow staff and students to return to the building until proper authorities have determined that it is safe to do so.
- Give the “all clear” signal after the threat has passed.
- Determine whether school will be closed or remain open.
- Document all actions taken.

3. Incident Management Team and Section Chiefs Actions

- Move staff and students away from the immediate danger zone and keep staff and students from entering or congregating in danger zone.
- Review procedures with staff if needed.
- Implement the internal and external communications plan.
- Disseminate information about the incident and followup actions such as where the school has relocated and parent-student reunification procedures.
- Notify relocation centers and determine an alternate relocation center if necessary.
- Implement additional procedures as instructed by the Incident Commander.
- Take appropriate action to safeguard school property.
- Document all actions taken.

4. Staff Actions

- Move students away from immediate vicinity of danger.
- Report location and type (if known) of the hazardous material to Incident Commander.
- Execute evacuation and relocation procedures when instructed by the Incident Management Team and/or Section Chiefs unless there is a natural or propane gas leak or odor. If a natural or propane gas leak or odor is detected, evacuate immediately and notify the principal.
- If evacuation is implemented, direct all students to report to assigned evacuation area. Take class roster and emergency to-go kits. Check that all students have left the building. Students are not to be left unattended at any time during evacuation process.
- Upon arrival at evacuation site, take attendance. Notify Incident Commander or designee of any missing or injured students.
- Remain with students throughout the evacuation and relocation process.
- Report any missing or injured students to the Incident Commander.
- Remain in sheltered area until the “all clear” signal has been issued.
- Do not return to the building until emergency response personnel have determined it is safe.
- Render first aid as needed.

ACTIVE SHOOTER

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this annex is to ensure that there are procedures in place to protect staff/students and school property in the event of an active shooter on school grounds or in the school building.

II. SCOPE

The annex outlines additional responsibilities and duties as well as procedures for staff responding to an active shooter on school grounds or in the school building.

Active Shooter: An individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined space or other populated area, most often using firearms and following no pattern or method in the selection of victims.

III. CORE FUNCTIONS

Springfield School will train staff of the importance of responding immediately, including recognizing the sounds of danger, forcefully communicating the danger and necessary action to students, and calling 911 when it is safe to do so.

Springfield School will post signs at points of entry to the campus and buildings from streets and parking lots stating the following:

All visitors entering school grounds on school days between 7:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. must register at the Main Office. Failure to do so may constitute a misdemeanor.

– Columbia Penal Code Title 17, Chapter 21 § 227.1

To prevent unauthorized access to the school, Springfield School administrators will keep doors secure, require sign-in sheets for visitors, and use cameras and staff to monitor entryways.

In the event of an active shooter, Springfield School will contact law enforcement agencies for their assistance. Practiced procedures will be put into action to alert and protect students and faculty/staff.

Precautionary measures are outlined below to keep school personnel and students from undue exposure to danger. Efforts should be made to remain calm, to avoid provoking aggression, and to keep students safe.

A. Operational Functions/Procedures That May Be Activated

Operational functions or procedures that may be activated in the event of an active shooter on campus include the following:

- Evacuation
- Reverse Evacuation
- Lockdown
- Accounting for All Persons
- Reunification

- Communications
- Psychological Healing

B. Activating the EOP

The first individual(s) to hear or witness shots fired will activate the EOP immediately taking the necessary response actions to keep everyone safe and notifying the office and (when possible) calling 911.

The principal will ensure appropriate announcements are made and designate an Incident Commander to implement the procedures specified in this annex. The school Incident Commander will transfer command upon the arrival of a law enforcement Incident Commander who has authority to manage the incident.

1. Incident Commander Actions

- Determine what procedures should be activated depending on the location and nature of the shooter.
- Issue instructions, e.g., lockdown, reverse evacuation, or evacuation depending on the situation.
- Deactivate the fire alarm pull stations without disengaging the fire sensors and deactivate the school bells, until law enforcement arrives.
- Notify school buses to not enter the school grounds.
- Consult with local law enforcement and emergency management agencies and monitor the situation.
- Notify law enforcement and School Resource Officers to assist if necessary. Provide a description and location of the active shooter.
- Activate communications procedures.
- Designate an administrator or staff member to coordinate with public safety at their command post; provide a site map and keys to public safety personnel.
- Notify the principal/Policy Group of the status and action taken. The principal/Policy Group shall notify the superintendent of schools.
- Be available to deal with the media and bystanders and keep site clear of visitors.
- Implement reunification and accounting for all persons procedures.
- Activate the Psychological and Emotional Recovery Team to implement psychological healing procedures.
- Update the principal/Policy Group, Incident Management Team, and Section Chiefs of any significant changes.
- Do not allow staff and students to enter or leave the building until proper authorities have determined that it is safe to do so.
- Give the “all clear” signal after the threat has passed.
- Determine whether school will be closed or remain open.
- Document all actions taken.

2. Staff Actions

- Implement the appropriate response procedure to keep students safe, including taking cover for protection from bullets.
- Notify the Incident Commander or designee. Provide description and location of the active shooter.

- Use extreme caution.
- Continue the appropriate response action (lockdown or evacuation) until an all clear is issued.
- Implement reunification and accounting for all persons procedures, when safe to do so.
- When law enforcement arrives, ensure everyone puts items down, raises their hands and spreads their fingers, keep their hands visible at all times, avoids making quick movements toward officers, and avoids pointing, screaming, or yelling.

3. Law Enforcement Actions

- Locate and stop the person(s) believed to be the shooter(s). Rescue efforts are delayed until the shooter has been stopped.

PANDEMIC FLU

I. PURPOSE

A pandemic is a global disease outbreak. It is determined by how the disease spreads, not how many deaths it causes.

When a new influenza A virus emerges, a flu pandemic can occur. Because the virus is new, the human population has little to no immunity against it. The virus spreads quickly from person to person worldwide and schools are often where disease outbreaks start. The purpose of this annex is to ensure that there are procedures in place to protect staff/students and the community in case there is a pandemic flu outbreak.

During a flu pandemic, Springfield School's main goals will be to limit the number of illnesses and deaths, maintain school functions, minimize academic disruptions, and minimize economic losses.

II. SCOPE

The annex outlines additional responsibilities and duties as well as procedures for staff responding to flu from seasonal flu to mild/moderate pandemic flu to severe pandemic flu.

III. CORE FUNCTIONS

Springfield School, in conjunction with the Columbia County School District, has identified partners within the public health department to collaborate with on the development of these procedures and will continue to coordinate with these partners as needs change and to ensure consistent communication with the school community during an incident.

Springfield School trains staff and students on procedures to protect against illness including hand-washing and cough/sneezing etiquette. Springfield School also trains nurses and staff on flu-symptom recognition.

Springfield School encourages flu vaccination for those students and staff for whom it is recommended.

Springfield School has policies on having staff and students stay home or be sent home when ill and policies on when they may return after an illness.

A. Operational Functions/Procedures That May Be Activated

Operational functions, or procedures, that may be activated in the event of a pandemic include:

- Communications
- Health and Medical
- Academic Recovery
- Physical Recovery
- Continuity of Learning

B. Activating the EOP for a Pandemic

The principal will determine the need to activate the appropriate EOP procedures based on the severity of the pandemic.

1. Principal Actions

- Implement procedures for social distancing.
- Work with the community flu-planning team and school district to determine if the school will be closed and/or any additional measures to be taken.
- If school is closed, cancel all extracurricular activities and notify other schools impacted (e.g., opposing teams.)
- Announce dismissal if school will be closed during the school day.
- Communicate school closure using communication process.
- Implement daily symptom monitoring and reporting processes, and send home anyone who is positive for symptoms.
- Activate continuity of learning procedures with alternate learning strategies and changes to the school calendar.
- Identify chain of command with a minimum of two backups for key administrators.
- Make any necessary updates to procedures for sending ill individuals home.
- Determine any necessary changes to school cleaning.
- Implement processes for reporting the number of absent staff and students due to illness. (See the appendix for reporting forms.) [Note: The appendixes are not included in the sample plan.]
- Document all actions taken.
- Provide information to parents on the status of the pandemic flu within the school and closures.
- Develop a schedule to hold staff meetings.
- Participate in community flu-planning team meetings.
- When reopening the school implement physical recovery procedures.

2. Staff Actions

- Report any students with signs of illness.
- Communicate with students the importance of social distancing, staying home when sick, covering the nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing, and hand-washing.
- Track students' absences due to illness.
- Provide students with at-home assignments.
- Follow dismissal procedures.